

THE
PHENOMENOLOGY
of
SPIRIT

G. W. F. HEGEL

TRANSLATED BY
PETER FUSS AND JOHN DOBBINS

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*To our students at the University
of Missouri–St. Louis, who suffered
through many of our drafts and helped
us more than they could know.*

The eternal mystery of the universe is its comprehensibility.

—Albert Einstein

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TRANSLATORS' INTRODUCTION

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* examines the course of experience in progress from ephemeral matter-of-fact appearance, through mounting evidence of an underlying coherency, to a comprehensive result so critically thought through that the inner logical dynamic of the real is manifest. In the preface of his book Hegel says (in paragraph 12, using the word 'expression' in its older sense of pressing or compelling out into the open): "The power of spirit [*Geist*] is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to extend and expend itself in disclosing what it is." And in his lectures entitled *The History of Philosophy*¹ he writes that "Spirit is absolute genus," that is, wholly a principle of generation—which is why he doesn't treat *Geist* as a logical or ontological category, it being neither a metaphysical nor classificatory universal. Rather is it a term used not just to explain but to tease out the animating principle pervading all modes of activity. Spirit thus includes for instance the subject of a given predicate, that is, the thinking behind a judgment leading to a decision to act, or on the other hand the brute logic integral to some matter-of-fact phenomenon (a logic perceived and grasped only by a subject observing it).

'Spirit' is the word Hegel chooses to epitomize the intelligible dynamism at work in everything, and, as ultimately becomes clear, it is virtually synonymous with conceptual experience, both as met with in conceptualizing as such and in the objectively conceptual nature integral to—indeed constitutive of—the logical dynamic of all actual reality. Each of the two is in its own way a demonstration of the other, there being

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 2:44.

no move that spirit/mind can make in its conceptualizing, whether rational or unrealistic, that isn't an instance of the natural processes of organic functioning, and there being no phenomenon of nature, however chaotic (including the historical facts of human nature at its most irrational), that isn't logically comprehensible. (Consider Spinoza's concise yet sweeping proposition vii in book 2 of his *Ethics*: "The order and interconnectedness of ideas is the same as the order and interconnectedness of things."²)

Like Platonic dialogue, Hegelian phenomenology leads to an appreciation of the wholeness of thought coming to terms with the fullness of life. Students of Hegel (scholars included), weaned on treatises, tend to expect something other than what he gives them, and end up missing the artistry with which he gets inside phenomena. Critics keen on demolishing what they construe as dogmatic assertions in Hegel's work—whereas what he's actually offering are telltale self-disclosures from within the phenomena he's examining—would do well to ponder an idea he presented at the outset (preface paragraph 28), namely that refuting a fundamental proposition or principle doesn't just consist in exposing deficiency, but to be thoroughgoing should be derived or developed from the principle itself rather than from extraneous counterassertions. For then the refutation would actually be remedying the deficiency and developing the principle to adequacy. As he later noted: "True refutation has to engage the opponent's strength and situate itself within the ambit of his power."³

The ever-present protagonist of Hegel's *Phenomenology* is human consciousness, which by nature is recurrently inchoate and (as Melville would say) needing to subtilize itself—having thus to develop through successive self-embodiments to attain its full potential for self-clarity. But while broadly retracing some of the more memorable developments of Western culture, this book isn't a historical analysis or commentary, nor even an examination of intellectual history. The collapse of the commonsense world, the convoluted path that consciousness in servility takes toward emancipating itself, the successive implosions of scientific reductionism, the anything-but-smooth evolution of culture (from the ethical community of Antigone, through Enlightenment's conflict with Faith, and the still unresolved sociopolitical paradoxes left in the wake of the French Revolution, to the Kantian moral world-view)—these and such other historical moments as Hegel chooses to examine are best understood as paradigms: conspicuous examples of failure and success as our species, goaded by its own critical imagination, successively surmounts natural and self-imposed thresholds of oblivion.

Hegelian phenomenology is among other things the correction of a long-standing error: equating appearance with illusion. As was once said, the apparent has a parent,

2. Benedict Spinoza, *Spinoza Opera* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1972), 2:89.

3. Hegel, *Logik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 2:250.

and that parent is the real—or as Kant put it in another context, there cannot be an appearance without something that's actually appearing. For Hegel, appearances are essences-in-waiting, silently petitioning the mind to extract them: "the essence must appear," in other words cannot but appear (or as Shakespeare might have put it, "the essence will out"). In keeping with the inscription from Einstein cited above, we might summarize Hegel's venture by inverting the thrust of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle: As a given phenomenon is being conceptualized, its noumenal latency begins vanishing—the last trace of which is that phenomenon's manifest essence.

If there's a discipline other than philosophical attentiveness to appearances that's to be found recurrently in the *Phenomenology*, it is psychoanalysis, or perhaps better psyche-analysis. Our psyches balk at, as often as they embrace, reasonableness, and Hegel's focus is constantly on the trials and tribulations of consciousness as it emerges from its most simplistic and evolves toward its more nuanced forms. En route he engages consciousness's seemingly inexhaustible capacity for confusion and error, self-deception and self-deceived manipulation of others, forgetfulness both willful and "unconscious" (not infrequently neurotic or sociopathic), lordly grandiosity and arrogance alternating with ludicrous self-abasement and self-contempt—and for bogging down in a slue of wrong-headed and sick-hearted mental fixations, among them determinism, cynicism, narcissism, and even solipsism. While he'd sometimes have us believe that what he presents are mere "descriptions" of conscious modalities, the *Phenomenology* actually reads more like a series of cultural psychoanalytic sessions in which Hegel does his patients' "free associating" with them (and, when necessary, for them), diagnosing their malady, coaxing them into a display of characteristic symptoms (whether overt or veiled)—and then bracing for the next, as a rule even more eye-opening, appointment. Since he had already internalized Socratic dialectic, there's probably little that Hegel could have learned later from Freud.



As for our translation, our primary goal is to render Hegel's argument perspicuous—a "seeing through" in a triple sense: seeing through the eyes of disparate modes of self-consciousness, seeing through the potential deficiencies, delusions, and deceptions of each, and seeing through the whole argument to its ultimate conclusion. And yes indeed, Hegel does argue, as philosophers invariably do; moreover the sundry sub-protagonists we meet along the way (Perception, Self-Consciousness, Reason, etc.) each argue in their own way as well. One might even characterize the *Phenomenology* as a titanic sorites. But despite its convoluted prose and unusual terminology, the overall thrust and bent of Hegel's book could be considered as closer in spirit to a Bildungsroman than to a philosophical tract. It has greater kinship with Plato's *Republic*, Dante's *Divine Comedy* (which may well have been the poetic inspiration for its structure and overall movement), and Rousseau's *Emile* than with Aquinas's *Summa*,

Spinoza's *Ethics*, or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Thus one could characterize the Hegel of the *Phenomenology* as among other things a philosophical playwright. He presents a cast of characters (Understanding, Stoicism, Virtue, etc.) on a quasi-historical stage, their mind-sets and actions parts of a plot that betimes unfolds, unravels, reaches dénouement, then starts over with a new twist.

And to convey in English the dense-textured expressiveness of the characters in this philosophical drama, we've found it useful, even necessary, to take advantage of the pliability of the English language instead of adhering rigidly to the often heard but seldom heeded admonition to produce a strictly "literal" rendition. (Imagine translating Gestalt psychology as "shape psychology" even once, let alone over and over again.) Hegel tends to use terms—such as 'concept, form, substance, matter, essence,' and so on—in their full ambit of meanings and connotations, ranging from the earthy commonsensical to the speculatively philosophical. If we failed to make the adaptations befitting the dynamics of our own language, we'd be doing a disservice to one of the more decisive ways in which Hegel is genuinely empirical.

We should also note that the blizzard of italicized words and phrases in Hegel's original text isn't uncommon in texts from that era, but it's virtually taboo in ours. We found that careful sentence composition renders most of them unnecessary, and we've retained only those we found useful (even adding a few of our own) for clarity or appropriate emphasis. We've observed that often Hegel's italics serve merely to draw neutral attention to a given concept or word, and we've opted to set off such words in single quotation marks—for example, the concept 'justice.' At other times Hegel seems to be flagging a formulation as conceptually suspect, and is accordingly distancing himself from it, signaling that this is a given mentality's notion and not his; we flag these with double quotation marks—for example, the manner of "virtue" espoused by sociopathic reasoning. –A problem we attempt to solve via italics of our own concerns sentences in which the referents of multiple pronouns, while clear in German via their gender, are ambiguous in English (especially in cases in which it would be cumbersome to translate the pronouns by repeating the referent nouns). Usually this problem involves multiple use of the word 'it,' with the first use appearing in standard print and referring to a preceding noun, and with the second use appearing in *italics* and referring to another noun subsequent to the first.

Regarding text layout, we're responsible for more than half of the double-skips between paragraphs in our translation. These are designed to aid the reader in focusing on the various "subsorites" integral to Hegel's overall argument. Moreover we paragraph far more frequently than Hegel does; his way was modish then, fortunately not now. Every paragraph in our translation that begins with an en dash (–Like this) was in Hegel's text continuous rather than separate from the paragraph preceding it. We should note that we also occasionally use the en dash in midparagraph to flag significant shifts in Hegel's conceptual analysis, perspective, or subject matter.

As for Hegel's Swabian "abruptions" (his elisions and ellipses), his use of pronouns plausibly referring back to two or more nouns of the appropriate gender, and so on—these have scarcely served even his German readers well. To copy Hegel here would be to compound the disservice. Instead we've in such instances repeated the substantives to which the pronouns refer, at times interspersing clarificatory words or phrases in brackets (which can in any instance be ignored, if preferred, since the text reads right through without them). Our goal in this was to maintain clarity, avoid unfortunate ambiguities, and sustain our reading of what Hegel actually means.

Another tricky problem is Hegel's penchant for using the genitive virtually in apposition. Since Hegel personifies, as it were, such conceptual entities as Consciousness, Reason, Spirit, and so on, many ambiguities arise. For example, "der Begriff der Vernunft" on the face of it reads as 'the concept of reason.' But this is ambiguous, plausibly meaning Reason's concept (i.e., reason's way of conceiving or its conception in such and such context); yet on a very different and equally plausible reading it can mean the concept 'reason' (with the genitive functioning appositively). In each such case we've given what contextually we take to be the more convincing reading.

In comparing the most recent readily accessible and affordable German editions of the *Phenomenology* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952 and 1988) when they diverge, we've followed the one that seemed to us the more intelligible—as often as not the earlier of the two. For readers who wish to consult the German text, we've included markers—for example, [M42], meaning "Meiner edition 1988, page 42 begins here." The reader should note, however, that due to German word order being quite different from that of English, these indicators are only approximate. –All footnotes throughout the text are ours rather than Hegel's.

Like so many thinkers and writers, Hegel explored and exploited the resources of etymology, including not only the origins of German words but those of other languages. As translators we've tried to be alert to this tendency, and in our forthcoming commentary we'll be calling attention to some of Hegel's more illuminating formulations. –One example of this is found in his explication of the notion he terms '*die Sache selbst*' in chapter V; it could be translated as 'the thing itself,' but this would fly in the face of Hegel's having called attention to the pivotal difference between a '*Sache*' and a 'thing' (V, ¶289). The German word is derived from the Germanic root **sak-*, meaning 'pick up the scent, hunt or track,' and is related to the English words 'seek' and 'sake,' as in the phrase 'that for the sake of which I seek.' Hegel notes that integral to this concept is a self-conscious perceptual dynamic; and as we see, this persists through successive permutations—hence our translation of it as 'the abiding concern,' which is a bit free but conceptually accurate. '*Sache*' used by itself can mean variously a 'concern, enterprise, business, endeavor, case or cause' or simply refer to some 'matter or subject matter'; many of these were used in rendering Hegel's account tracing the checkered experiential course engendered by this concept. Consistent with Hegel's assertion

about its involving a dynamic akin to perception, 'concern' derives from the Latin *com-*, meaning 'with,' and *cernere*, one meaning of which is 'to perceive.' –Another example occurs in one of Hegel's more opaque passages where he refers to members of the pantheon of gods and heroes as *Gestalten*, which we translated as 'exemplary figures' (VII, ¶86), relying on the link in meaning between the German word and the Latin *exemplum*, both of which can mean 'pattern.' –A more remarkable example is Hegel's use of what appears to be an odd euphemism, namely *abstracter Wesen* (VI, ¶23), in a passage having to do with the funeral rites of deceased members of the ethos (to prevent defilement of their bodies by everything from beasts to bugs). On first blush the phrase could be taken to mean 'abstract entities,' although in context this would be close to incomprehensible, not to mention itself hopelessly abstract. However, *Wesen* has a wide range of meanings, two of which, namely 'living beings' and 'creatures,' do fit the context. The key to our understanding of Hegel's unusual phrasing is that the word 'abstract' is from the Latin participle *abstractum*, whose infinitive form means, in its most physical sense, 'to tear off' as well as 'to drag away': hence in place of 'creatures that tear off and drag away' we simply say 'feral creatures.'

Also notable is Hegel's occasional use of idioms difficult to find in modern dictionaries. In this regard we found helpful *Flügel's Complete Dictionary*.⁴ Consider, for instance, the first sentence of paragraph 177 in chapter VI: Hegel employs multiple verbs, three of which—*gewähren*, *sich geben*, and *gelten*—we take to be modified by the auxiliary verb *läßt*. Baillie translates these successively as 'lets . . . dispose themselves at will,' '[lets] subsist,' and 'lets . . . hold [and] . . . hold good.' Relying on some of the older idioms, we translate these as 'gives free rein to,' 'concedes,' and 'lets pass unquestioned [and] . . . as validated.'



Notes on some key terms used by Hegel:

Fürsichsein

Often enough the so-called literal translation of an expression turns out to be neither conceptually accurate nor genuinely even a translation—rather more of a misleading

4. The foreign-language dictionaries consulted in translating and discussing the present text include the following: *Flügel's Complete Dictionary of the German & English Languages* (London, 1878); *Wahrig Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Bertelsmann Lexikon Verlag, 1997); *The New Wildhagen German Dictionary* (Chicago: Follet Publishing Co., 1965); *Collins German Dictionary*, 7th ed. (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2007); *Lexicon of the Latin Language* (Boston, 1850); *The White Latin Dictionary* (Chicago: Follet Publishing Co., 1948); H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

transliteration. This is especially the case with Hegel's writings, given his penchant for word concatenations.

In a strictly literal translation the expressions *Fürsichsein* and *für sich* might be rendered 'for-itself-being' and 'for itself.' It seems more natural in English to invert the word order, giving us the expression 'being-for-itself'; but this changes the meaning, emphasizing the 'being' as opposed to the 'for itself.' Moreover the *-sein*, which in noun form does mean 'being,' is at least as likely in the present combination to be functioning as does the last syllable of the word *Bewußtsein*, which, though accurately translated as 'conscious being' in some passages, is more commonly and naturally rendered as 'consciousness.' Looking at *Fürsichsein* that way, we end up with 'for-itself-ness,' an odd and potentially misleading neologism. In an attempt to circumvent (or conceal) such problems a would-be translator might try rendering this term in pseudo-Latin, an effort which ends up with expressions like 'being per se' or even 'perseity.' –In his *Science of Logic* Hegel made note of a related and rather remarkable German expression, namely '*was für ein Ding*,' which reads literally 'what for a thing' but means something closer to 'what kind of thing.' Were one to bend over backward to preserve the literalistic feel of this expression while bridging the gap between it and its meaning, one might (say, as used in a question) try something like 'What is it for a thing to be that?' The problem with such efforts is that they remain cumbersome, often inappropriate in context, and more likely to hinder comprehension than convey what's meant. Thus in deciding how to render the sense of *Fürsichsein*, and similar terms, we need in each instance to get to the basic concepts without fettering ourselves with one or another mode of expression. Once we've explored the range of meanings that a given concept spans—in the present case examining, as it were, the *Fürsichsein* of *Fürsichsein* itself—we'll be in position to decide how best to articulate it.

To begin with we note that in Hegel's deployment of this and its related expressions the meaning of the *für* is complex in function, and rendering it simply as 'for' is in many contexts a bad idea. Suppose we were to ask: What is the being of a rock for itself? –or (as Aristophanes might ask) the shape of a cloud for itself? –or, for that matter, a calculator for itself? In the very way that these questions are formulated there lurks a quaint expectation that these conglomerations or configurations or substances somehow have an awareness of and regard for themselves. In English, talking about, say, the being of oxygen "for itself" does no justice to Hegel's spirit, and is actually rather spooky—unless of course these questions are meant to be ironic, suggesting that such things don't in fact exist "for" themselves at all but simply are. After all, what is the being of an inorganic glob of rock—or a heap of garbage—for itself?

On the other hand *für* is also used by Hegel to indicate that consciousness is taking note of an object—that something is there for it in the sense of being within the purview of or *present to* consciousness. And the same applies when the object in question is consciousness itself, in which case we're examining the being that consciousness

has for itself, its presence to itself, and not just its explicit, objective presence as such, but also what it is subjectively or, as we might say, "in its own eyes."

But in the case of the rock, cloud, and so on—or a sheerly relational objectivity such as force (physical causality)—no process of noetic self-apprehension is directly evident in the object per se, and it would be misleading to suggest by one's choice of words that there is. Still, an inanimate object does have a presence—does exhibit its nature, impacting upon other things (including consciousness) simply by being there and doing what it does. Hegel's use of *für* in reference to the being of unconscious objects comes closer to meaning what it does in the unusual expression noted above concerning what kind of thing such and such is. The question then concerns the specific nature of the thing as it actively unfolds and reveals itself. The identity of the thing is seen to be dynamic— isn't "just there" but doing something. In the lecture notes assembled in his *History of Philosophy* Hegel links *Fürsichsein* with the Aristotelian concept of *energeia*⁵ or *actus*: action as opposed to momentarily inactive potential. As any given reality moves from one phase or moment of itself to another, each moment integral to this dynamic bears a relation to the others.

This self-relatedness integral to unconscious phenomena extends to conscious ones as well. We aren't limited to talking about a conscious being or mode of consciousness only in terms of its presence to itself; we can also discuss its relation to itself. For instance, who is Latisha, and what is she like at age two—at age thirty—at age eighty? She's ever turning into someone else, yet is continuously self-related; as her life unfolds she actively displays the moments of her historical self, each of which bears a relation to her overall unfolding identity. She presents us with a progressively self-relating and self-related, objectively existent reality which, as a self-conscious being, is moreover an organic identity self-consciously present to itself.

And when we go on to examine such a presence specifically with an eye to its conscious capacity to act, namely its conceiving of things that don't yet exist and then actualizing them (as in, say, planning and building a house or a business), we see laid out consciousness's self-related presence-to-self in process of acting for its own sake, having a self-oriented agenda for good or ill—existing then indeed for itself.

Thus far we've unpacked the basic moments integral to the concept *Fürsichsein*: the self-relatedness of the real (i.e., of substance at large, including all modes of being, whether conscious or devoid of consciousness) and the presence-to-self exhibited in conscious entities exclusively, which in self-conscious action results in the still more ambiguity-laden phenomenon of self-orientedness. But this already complex concept has dimensions that we've yet to explore and that require our looking beyond it alone in order to grasp its role and import in the dynamic of conception overall.

5. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2:154.

Sein-für-Anderes

In literal translation this expression might be rendered 'being-for-other' or 'being-for-otherness' or 'being for another.' To the extent that a phenomenon can be considered in abstraction from everything else, it can indeed be looked upon as self-related; but a self-related whole viewed thus by itself turns out to be only incompletely self-related and only partially whole. By virtue of its presence anything real relates not only to itself but also to what's other than it; and this outward relating is integral to its identity—an indispensable feature that may not be readily evident when the phenomenon is considered strictly in how it relates to itself. In other words the effect an entity's presence has on what lies outside the sphere of its own immediate self-relatedness is with equal justification regarded as part and parcel of it—thus presenting us with an ambiguity inherent in the very concept of identity.

An entity's self-relatedness as a whole, then, turns out to be only a moment of a greater whole. If an atom of iron is present in a molecule, it does its part in making that molecule exist and act in a certain way. Likewise, if an intelligent being actively intervenes to restructure that molecule to its own purposes, the engineered results of the intervention are a demonstration that intelligence is no less an active player in the universe than is the molecule or the iron atom. In each of these cases the self-relatedness of the active entity is spilling out of the immediate relation that entity has to itself and intruding upon or permeating the self-relativity of what may initially have been regarded as beyond it.

Even as an active entity impinges upon and interpenetrates what by that very fact no longer lies beyond it, so also is it subject to such effects upon itself from without. It doesn't just relate to itself by relating to what's other than it; it relates to itself via the effect that outside entities (which are in turn relating to themselves as they relate to this entity other than them) have upon it. Each is then in various ways, consciously or obliviously, interrelating with otherness and, to the extent that each thus has its own identity placed "at the disposal" of otherness, has an identity that is relative—both in the sense of active interrelating and in the sense of having a specific identity in part determined from without.

Relativity is thus a feature of both *Fürsichsein* and *Sein-für-anderes*, the self-relatedness and relativity-to-otherness of everything conceivable. Each is bound to, or inevitably plays into, the other, dissolving the abstract identity of anything initially thought of as existing in isolation, even while preserving the concrete identity realized thus interactively. The process whereby an entity's identity is matter-of-factly realized may very well involve aspects of itself being superseded. That an acid's acidity disappears when the acid is combined with an alkali is essential to that acid's very reality. Similarly, when an intelligent being consciously interrelates with otherness—say, in a love relationship, in which that person goes so far as to adopt the living *modus operandi* of another—its presence-to-itself isn't so much compromised as confirmed.

While even in isolation an entity may be active, undergoing alterations fueled by its own inner resources and in this sense progressively relating to itself, these changes have implications one way or another on its potential for interaction with otherness. Once the latter potential is in any way engaged, the arena of that entity's own self-relatedness expands and complexifies. Accordingly it could be said that the entity is then actually more self-related than before, although the decisive factor to be noted is the qualitative changes that take place in the process. –Likewise, a conscious being sustains a relation to otherness even when its self-relatedness is maintained solipsistically, as observable in mentalities so obsessed with their own affairs that self-orientedness becomes their all-consuming *modus operandi*. The very process of actualizing and sustaining such a self-concept makes that way of thinking all the more conspicuous, its attendant agenda all the more intrusively incontinent, its would-be isolated self-relatedness all the more drawn into showdowns with the otherness from which it recoils. Thus for entities that are present to themselves, because their self-oriented activities have a bearing on other conscious beings, their individual self-orientedness becomes of interest to others in the very measure that it is asserted, with both sides then having a hand in how the overall relation plays out.

When a brute object receives the attention of a conscious being (which as a sentient being functions in this relation as something quite other than the object), the object constitutes a presence for or to that other, a presence that may or may not have a bearing on the self-orientedness of that other. In this manner of relation the consciousness poised in the role of 'other' may remain indifferent, but on the other hand may take an unquestionably intrusive interest in the object thus subject to its scrutiny. –Suppose a construction contractor places a large order with a lumber supplier, who in turn places an order with the timber company. By this very fact a number of trees are now at the disposal of a group of conscious beings who've made an assessment regarding at least one thing that trees are deemed useful "for." The reality that the trees have independently is now subject to and in effect relative to the conceptual activity of these entities outside them. –This relativization process is also seen among conscious beings vis-à-vis each other. We may very well find ourselves not merely present to some other but virtually subject to the self-orientedness of that other. Just as trees can be turned into objects of use, so also can conscious beings. What are we under the gaze of others? What are we for them? What are we, in their eyes, for? History is in part a catalogue of uses that the human imagination has found for other human beings, regardless of what these subjects took themselves to be inherently.

Ansichsein

Sorting out the myriad implications latent in the interweaving of conceptual self-relatedness and relativity to otherness is no mean task. Throughout all the permutations of these logical modalities as they interrelate, an underlying ontological dimension has discernible bearing upon the horizon of identity possible for any given

thing. This is its *Ansichsein* (literally its 'in-itself-ness' or its 'being-in-itself'), the being that is intrinsic to or inherent in any entity, substance, or relation, given the full range of its potential to be: the dynamic latent reality implicit in its very being, both in its self-relatedness and in its relation to what's other than it. Hegel's use of the related expression *an sich* in its own way illustrates how wide a range of potential meanings such an expression can have in the German language: while, strictly speaking, it can mean 'in itself, inherently, or intrinsically,' in some contexts it's more tentative, meaning 'virtually, in principle, potentially, latently, or implicitly,' and in still others it ranges from the rhetorical to the colloquial, meaning then 'strictly speaking, properly considered, by itself, on its own, in the abstract,' or even 'on the face of it.'

As with the *für* in the two preceding conceptual expressions, the '*an-*' of *Ansichsein* is philosophically plurisignative. On the one hand this term denotes what the entity is within the bounds of its own identity, what it is self-containedly in its own right. On the other hand the term denotes the full implicit range of that identity, its potential for becoming more than what it happens actually to be at any given time, having, as it inevitably does, a portion of its reality still locked up latently within it. Its relative simplicity is ever apt to be disrupted either by the potent disequilibrium inherent in all things in nature or by what its own sheer presence detonates in the outside world—either way implicating it with a form of otherness and requiring reassessment of the scope of its identity.

Hegel explicitly links *Ansichsein* with the Aristotelian *dynamis*⁶ or *potentia*: 'real potential for being.' Nature, physical reality, the realm of substance, is at any given time a self-relating totality which, by virtue of the teeming potential astir within it, is of necessity always in process of going beyond what it is now and turning into something else [*Anderswerden*]⁷—therein realizing not only an ongoing relation to itself but by this its own protean activity relating to itself as something other than what it in any one phase is. Everything that actually exists is in this sense (à la Democritus) a self-refracting dynamism, repeatedly curving or deviating from a constant course by virtue of its own nature as well as that of everything with which it interacts. One of the most remarkable aspects of the dynamic integral to natural substance is its evolutionary feat of rearing up, so to speak, and turning its gaze upon itself, thus showing itself to consist not only of inanimate matter but of conscious intelligence, as it has done in the case of ourselves and other living species. Mind, nous, intelligence is a form of substance. And the works of intelligence, even those existing "only in the head," as we say, are historically real events by the very fact that they are indeed actually being thought and one way or another influence how reality plays out.

Sorting out the full potential of natural substance generally and of conscious substance specifically is as big a task as our species will ever face. At every turn reality,

6. Ibid., 2:155.

despite its in-your-face concreteness, presents us with conceptual ambiguities and a gray-on-gray indeterminacy—opens up windows of opportunity, ways of reconceiving the real. Any substantive matter at hand, any human concern, enterprise, or undertaking involving conceptual effort, brings to light this amorphous plasticity inherent in the real, and in the course of its endless ramifications gives rise to the basic question as to “what it’s all about.” In proceeding to ask questions about the inherent being of a thing, intelligence is itself adopting a momentary standpoint of indeterminacy simply in order to appreciate that thing’s own intrinsic possibilities in relation to itself as well as in relation to other entities. But when philosophy gets around to doing what it does most characteristically, asking questions about the questions that have been asked, the search comes full circle. The depths of substance are seen to involve yet another dimension that has to be fathomed, the experience of which begins with a question that thrusts us ourselves inextricably into the “equation”: Who are we inherently?

An-und-fürsichsein

Consciousness, itself a form of natural substance, is specifically conscious being as opposed to sheer being generally. The emergence of consciousness from substance in general or nature at large is one more manifestation of nature being itself—of nature “naturing,” turning into something other than what it was before. Natural substance is always in motion, the activation of its abyssal potency ever under way. So too with conscious substance and the entities that instantiate it, although in self-conscious entities the way in which this dynamic unfolds reveals something distinctive about the kind of identity that intelligent beings have.

When an object is present to it, a conscious being finds itself already in a relation to that object while at the same time distinguishing itself from the object; it recognizes the otherness of that independently existing entity—of which it nonetheless has knowledge (as by this time encoded in the very biological substance of its brain). Self-conscious entities have also the capacity to relate in this way to themselves, reflectively distancing themselves from their own life and identity, adopting a critical, questioning, or ironic stance toward them. We can, as it were, take a step back into our own organic “cyber-space,” affording ourselves a different perspective on our “whole little life”—perhaps deciding that it isn’t meeting its full potential, seeing it to be unintelligently and frustratingly going nowhere, like a mouse running inside an exercise wheel. The very fact that one seriously adopts such a stance indicates that the self is motivated to get to the bottom of something vexing, that it is asking unsettling questions and venturing into the consideration of possible alternatives.

This capacity for internal self-distantiation is captured by Hegel in his use of the term *Entäußerung*, which in German ordinarily means that something is being ‘parted with,’ that a concept or way of thinking and living is being ‘renounced’ via a conscious act of ‘abnegation.’ But Hegel also has his eye on the etymological composition of this word, which, literally rendered, would be something like ‘en-outering,’ suggesting that

one is externalizing or objectifying something about oneself in the public arena, or that one is in process of getting outside of oneself, distancing oneself from oneself internally for the sake of a more truthful inner objectivity. Either way, the critical perspective thus afforded one's self-consciousness (whether prompted by others or in the course of one's own private awakening) in principle undermines the sheer cut-and-dried determinateness of any given role, station, or life-mode.

This distinctive capacity inherent in self-conscious intelligence, to cognitively negate and struggle clear of any mode of existence that would otherwise stifle it, is the core of what we call freedom, indeed of selfhood—the kind of reality met with when an intelligent being for good or ill demonstrates that it is to an extent self-determining, existing thus in and for itself. But even freedom—this self-conscious awareness that no brute determinacy or factor of fate decisively compromises the essence and integrity of the self-conscious identity we realize—inextricably involves us in the otherness everywhere met with in the realm of self-conscious existence. In accordance with the logic of its own externalizations (in both the above senses), the very being that consciousness has in and present to itself, its abiding in and relative to itself while functioning in and for itself, inevitably ensures that all attempts at a “self-containedly self-oriented existence” turn into the very opposite. In the totality of all its moments, intelligence is what Hegel calls *Geist*: spirit, a world of individually instantiated conscious substance that amidst its diversity—as seen in ourselves—is ever intercommunicating and interacting with itself, reconceiving and re-creating both its own identity and the natural realm it inhabits within the purview of its experientially emerging critical imagination.



THE
PHENOMENOLOGY
OF SPIRIT

PREFACE

1 Although it is customary for a writer to preface his work with an explanation of the objective he has set for himself, his motives for writing, and where he believes his work stands in relation to earlier or contemporary treatments of the same subject, in a philosophical work this seems not only superfluous but out of keeping and even at odds with the nature of such an enterprise. For whatever might be suitably said about philosophy in a preface, howsoever presented (as, say, an account of one's point of view and bent, of the overall content and results, or a farrago of truistic assertions and assurances), this can hardly be accepted as the way to set forth philosophical truth.

2 –Then again, since philosophy basically abides in the element of universality encompassing the particular, it, more than other sciences, gives the impression that when its purpose and results are presented the gist of its subject matter is so fully expressed that really there's no point to going into detail. By contrast, in our overall idea of, for example, anatomy (roughly, knowledge of the parts of the body considered in their inanimate presence) we've no doubt that we're not yet in possession of the matter itself, the content of this science, until we come to grips with the particulars as well. What's more, in the context of a mere aggregate of information such as this, which doesn't merit being called a science, when [M4] purpose and other such comprehensive matters are discussed they tend to be handled in the same matter-of-fact and nonconceptual way as is the content (nerves, muscles, etc.). How incongruous it would be for philosophy to make use of such an approach even as it shows this to be incapable of grasping truth.

3 So too, by settling upon what relation one believes a philosophical work has to other efforts with a similar object an extraneous interest is introduced, obscuring what really matters in the discernment of truth. Just as conventional opinion fixates on the oppositeness of true and false, so also does it tend to expect a given philosophical system to meet with either outright agreement or disagreement, and to see in accounts of such only the one or the other—seeing in the diversity of philosophical systems not the progressive unfolding of truth, but mere contradiction. –The bud vanishes as the blossom bursts forth, and one could say that the former is “refuted” by the latter; and once the fruit appears one could in like manner say that the blossom is a “false” presence of the plant, its truth having been supplanted by that of the fruit. These forms not only differ but, by their mutual incompatibility, actually displace one another. Yet their fluid nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity in which they not only don’t conflict but are each as necessary as the others; and only in their being equally necessary does the life of the whole consist. But a view counter to a given philosophical system tends not to think of itself in this way; nor does a mind holding such a view ordinarily know how to free it, or keep it free, from its one-sidedness and to discern, in what takes form amidst this seeming conflict and contrariety, mutually necessary moments.

4 Calling for and providing such elucidations [M5] may well seem to be doing something of substance. Where could the inner meaning of a philosophical work find fuller expression than in its purpose and results? And how could these be more precisely known than by their variance from all else the age brings forth in the same sphere? Yet when such an endeavor is deemed as more than the bare beginning of knowledge—indeed as actual knowing—then it would actually be better reckoned among strategies for skirting the real concern, toward which it appears earnestly to strive while actually sparing itself the trouble. For an undertaking hasn’t run its full course in its purpose but in being carried through; nor is the result the actual whole of it, but rather the result together with the process of its becoming. By itself a purpose is a lifeless generality, just as the bent of an undertaking is by itself an as yet unrealized impetus, and the bare result alone is but the corpse that the purpose and impetus have left behind. So too, what’s at variance with a given undertaking sooner delimits it, is there where it leaves off, is what it itself isn’t.

5 –Busying oneself with purpose or results, as well as with how these differ among themselves and are to be critically assessed, is thus lighter work than might appear. For instead of sticking with the matter at hand such activity keeps straying beyond it; instead of dwelling with and becoming absorbed in the matter itself, such eruditeness keeps reaching after something else, thus remaining wrapped up in itself rather than being given over to it. Passing judgment on something of substance and solidity is the easiest of things; to comprehend it is harder; but hardest, combining judgment with comprehension, is to effectively explicate it.

6 Thus at its outset one's cultivation and the endeavor to get beyond the immediacy of substance-bound life will ever require knowledge of general principles and perspectives—at first just working up to the basic idea of such an undertaking [M6] as well as the reasons pro or con—apprehending this concrete abundance in its specifics so as to be properly informed and responsibly critical. This beginning of cultivation prepares the way for the serious endeavor of mature life and leads one to experience what's then the abiding concern—an experience whose depths, once conceptually fathomed in earnest, afford such knowledge and critical perspective as secures its proper place in public discourse.

7 Only in a scientific system can truth exist in its true embodiment. To collaborate in bringing philosophy nearer to this, so that it might put aside the appellation “love of knowledge” and be actual knowing; that's the goal I've set for myself. That knowledge be scientific is internally necessitated by its very nature, a satisfactory account of which can be provided only by philosophical exposition itself. But its outer necessity, grasped in a public light apart from personal contingencies and individual motives, is the same as the inner, taking shape as time bodies forth this necessity's moments existentially. Thus only by showing that in the course of time philosophy does advance to science would the purpose of such efforts be truly vindicated, since then she'd be proving it necessary at the same time that she's seeing it through.

8 Asserting that truth's true embodiment is science—or equivalently that truth exists solely in the element of conceptualization—seems, I know, to run counter to a notion (not to mention its consequences) that nowadays is as prevalent as it is pretentious. While some clarification of our dissenting standpoint wouldn't then seem uncalled for, it can [M7] here scarcely amount to anything more than an assurance like the one with which it's at odds. Thus when truth is styled as existing solely in, or rather as, what's sometimes called “intuition,” sometimes “direct knowledge of the absolute,” “religion,” “being” (not being that abides within, but itself *is*, divine love's very center), this in effect calls for philosophical exposition to take a form altogether opposite that of conception. Such an “absolute” isn't supposed to be comprehended but felt and intuited; it's not the concept of it but the feeling and intuiting of it that are to do the talking and have the final say.

9 That such a demand even arises, taken in broader context and at self-conscious spirit's present standpoint, shows that spirit is here well beyond the substantial life it formerly led in the element of thought—beyond the immediacy of its own believing, beyond the reassuring and satisfying certainty that consciousness had in abiding at one with the divine being and the all-pervading presence (within as well as without) that such a being has. Not only has it gone beyond all this into the other extreme, an insubstantial reflecting of self into self, but beyond even that. Not only is the vitality essential to it lost; it's mindful of this and of how utterly limited its content is. Turning

from such chaff, acknowledging and deploring what a fix it's in, it now wants from philosophy not so much knowledge of what it has come to, as to recover through philosophy its former substantiveness and solidity of being. Philosophy is to meet this need not by laying open what lies closed up within substance and raising it to self-consciousness, not by bringing chaotic consciousness to reflective order and conceptual simplicity, but rather by conflating what thought has sorted out, suppressing conceptual discrimination, [M8] and producing the mere *feeling* of being essential—in short, by providing not insight but edification. The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, love, and the like are the bait needed to arouse the desire to bite. Not conception but ecstasy, not the coolly progressing necessity of the matter itself but yeasty enthusiasm—*that's* what is supposed to sustain and enhance the abundance of [spirit's] substance.

10 In response to this demand there's a strenuous, if not rash and petulant effort to pull men up out of their immersion in the sensuous, the commonplace, and the personal and to direct their gaze to the stars—as though they'd forgotten all about the divine and had reached the point of contenting themselves, like worms, with dirt and water. In times past they had a heaven provisioned with vast stores of ideas and imagery. The meaning of everything hung by the thread of light that linked it to that heaven. Their vision, rather than keeping within the present, went further, following this luminous thread up to the divine being—to, as one might say, a present that lies “beyond.” The eye of spirit had to be turned and held to the mundane forcibly; and it has taken a long time for the clarity once afforded only by the celestial to penetrate the tangled and turbid intricacies in which one's sense of the here-and-now had become mired, and to make attentiveness to the present as such, that is, what was called “experience,” interesting and worthwhile. Nowadays there seems to be need of just the opposite: one's sensibility is so rooted in the mundane that an equivalent force is needed to extricate it. Spirit appears so destitute that, like a wanderer in the desert thirsting for a simple drink of water, it seems to be yearning after the barest feeling of something divine to revitalize it. By what thus satisfies it we can gauge the magnitude of its loss.

11 Yet to be so easily satisfied when receiving, or so stingy when giving, scarcely befits science. Whoever [M9] seeks mere edification—whoever wants the multifacetedness of worldly existence and thought to be left shrouded in fog, and longs for the nebulous enjoyment of so amorphous a divinity—may look where he will; he'll readily find the means to rouse his enthusiasm and swell his sails. But philosophy needs be wary of wishing to edify.

12 Still less can this so easily satisfied mentality, dispensing as it does with science, make any claim that such murk and ferment is somehow superior to science. This

manner of prophetic utterance, intent upon dwelling right at the core and in the deep, views definiteness (the *horos*) with contempt, and deliberately avoids conception and the workings of necessity as being concerned with reflection rooted merely in finitude. But just as there's an airy breadth, so too is there a vacant depth; just as there's an attenuatedness in which substance gushes forth into endless multiplicity without having the power to hold it all together, so is there a contentless intensity which, sustaining itself as sheer force without scope, is nothing but superficiality. The power of spirit is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to extend and expend itself in disclosing what it is. And so, when a noncohesive, substance-bound mode of knowledge like the above claims to have submerged in the divine being what's idiosyncratic to the self and imagines that in so doing it is philosophizing in a true and holy manner, it keeps from itself the fact that, by thus scorning measure and specificity, it doesn't devote itself to God, but only betrays the arbitrariness of its content even as it ascribes to God what's merely its own caprice. When its advocates¹ abandon themselves thus to the teeming ferment of substance, they imagine that by engulfing their self-consciousness and forsaking their understanding they become God's very own, to whom he gives wisdom in sleep, which is why what they in fact conceive and bring forth in their slumber are indeed dreams.

13 Nonetheless it isn't hard to see that ours is a time of birth and transition to a new era. [M10] Here spirit has broken with the world it had hitherto imagined and inhabited, and is of a mind now to let all that recede into the past and set about transforming it. Indeed, spirit is never at rest but is always advancing. Yet just as the first breath an infant draws after its long, quiet gestation breaks the gradualness of a merely cumulative development, and—a qualitative leap—the child is born, so likewise the spirit taking shape ripens slowly and silently into its new configuration, dissolving piece by piece the structure of its previous world, whose tottering is evident only through isolated symptoms. The frivolousness and boredom that unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding of something unknown: these are the portents of something very different on the way. The gradual crumbling that scarcely altered the overall physiognomy is abruptly cut short by a dawn that illuminates the features of a new world.

14 Yet this new world is no more a perfected reality than is a newborn child, and it's important to keep that in mind. What first emerges is only this world's immediacy, its basic concept. And just as a building isn't finished with the laying of its foundation, the bare concept of such a totality is hardly the whole thing itself. When one expects to see a mighty oak with massive trunk and full spread of branches and foliage, it

1. The Romantics, among others.

hardly suffices to be shown an acorn instead. So too science, the intellectual world's crowning achievement, is by no means complete at its inception. The onset of a new spirit is the product of a widespread upheaval affecting manifold cultural forms, the prize at the end of a tortuous path requiring all manner of strenuous exertion. It is a totality that, having issued forth from successive and expansive development, has re-integrated itself internally—is the emergent simplex conceptual being of such a whole. But the actual reality of this simplex whole consists in each of the experiential permutations that have become moments thereof proceeding to develop anew within this emergent outlook, taking shape [M11] in what's now their new element.

15 While at first this new world appears as but a totality veiled in simplicity (in the generic principle underlying it), consciousness still has the wealth of the previous way of life fresh in memory. It misses in the newly emerging permutation the range and detail of substantive content, and misses even more the elaboration of form whereby distinctions are securely defined and interrelated. Without such elaboration science lacks widespread intelligibility, giving instead the impression of being the esoteric possession of a few solitary individuals: an esoteric possession in that it's as yet present only in conception, that is, in inward fashion, and of a few sporadic individuals in that such presence as it has is isolated due to the very starkness of the manner in which it first appears. Only what's fully specified is at once exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by all. In its intelligible form science is proffered to all and accessible to all; and consciousness's demand as it approaches science—that the rational knowledge science provides be attainable by means of the understanding—is entirely legitimate since understanding is thinking, the pure I that's common to all, and intelligibility consists in being already familiar as well as common to both science and unscientific consciousness, affording the latter direct access to science.

16 When it first starts out, science, having achieved neither completion in detail nor perfection in form, is vulnerable to censure on both counts. But to suppose that such censure strikes at the heart of science would be as unjust as it would be unacceptable for science to ignore the demand for elaboration. This incongruity [between incipient and developed science] is to all appearances the knottiest problem the scientific community is currently laboring over, and about which it's as yet unclear. While one contingent boasts of an abundance of material and its accessibility to the understanding, the other—dismissive of such accessibility, to say the least—trumpets instant [M12] rationality and divinity. Even if the former is reduced to silence (whether by the force of truth alone or by the blustering of the other) and feels out of its depth with regard to the basic principle of the matter, it's nonetheless hardly at ease regarding these demands, since they're justified and as yet unmet. Its silence is only half due to the "victory" of the latter, the rest being due to the tedium and indifference that tend to ensue when expectations are continually heightened by promises only to be left unfulfilled.

17 Those of the other persuasion² may at times find it easy to come up with an expansive content. By laying claim to a lot of already familiar and well-ordered material, focusing especially on the peculiar and exotic, they seem all the more to have command of the rest of what conventional knowledge has in its fashion worked up as well as what's still unordered—subjecting everything to an arbitrary idea that's then construed as present in all things and makes it seem as though they've achieved an exhaustive science. But as we look closer it becomes evident that this wide range of material isn't due to one and the same thing undergoing various transformations, but merely consists in one and the same idea being uniformly repeated as applied to varied materials, yielding a monotonous semblance of variety. If developing an idea consists in nothing but repeating the same formula, then even an idea that's true enough in its own right never really gets anywhere. When someone who's "well-informed" totes around a single static form, using this inert element to coat the outside of any material he encounters, this comes no closer to meeting the need for a spontaneously origina-tive, self-defining panoply of embodying forms than does addressing a given content with whatever pops into one's head. What we have here is a monochromatic formalism that manages to differentiate its material only when, and then indeed solely because, these differences have already been worked out and made familiar.

18 Accordingly such formalism attributes this monotonousness and abstract [M13] generality to "the absolute," and protests that any dissatisfaction with this betrays an incapacity to attain the standpoint to keep it in view. Time was when the mere possibility of there being an alternative to a given way of representing something was deemed sufficient to refute that representation; and this sheer possibility, this thought with its sweeping implications, carried the entire positive weight of actual knowledge. In our own time we so much as see all weight being ascribed to an all-comprehensive idea in a form having nothing to do with reality, with everything definite and distinct being analyzed away or rather tossed (without further development, let alone inherent justification) into the abyss—this being deemed the way to view things speculatively. To consider something from the perspective of this absolute all one need do is declare that although right now one is speaking of it as a distinct something, still in the absolute, the $A = A$, there's really nothing of the kind, since there all is one. To pit this single bit of wisdom, that in this absolute everything is the same, against knowledge that's at once sufficiently differentiated and exhaustive (or which at least seeks and demands such exhaustiveness), to palm off its absolute as the night in which, as it's said, all cows are black, betrays an utterly empty-headed intellectual naïveté. The formalism that philosophy of late denounces and despises only to have reappear in her midst will not,

2. Schelling, et al.

even when recognized and felt to be inadequate, vanish from science until the process of apprehending what's unqualifiedly real has become full-well clear about its own nature.

19 –Considering that it's easier to grasp the point of a project when the idea behind it is stated in advance, it would be well to provide a rough sketch of this here, taking care in the process to steer clear of certain habits of mind that hinder philosophical discernment.



20 In my view—which can be justified [M14] solely by the exposition of the system itself—everything hinges on truth being grasped and expressed not only as substance but coequally as subject. It should also be borne in mind that substantiality includes the universal, the immediacy integral to knowing, as much as it does the immediacy of matter-of-fact being, that which is *present to* knowing. –When the characterization of God as the One Substance³ shocked the age in which it was articulated, this response was based upon an instinctive sense that therein self-consciousness is simply submerged, not sustained. But the opposite view, which holds fast to thought as thought, universality as such,⁴ is in the embrace of something equally simplistic, an undifferentiated, unmoved form of substantiality. And when, thirdly, thought unites itself with the being of substance as such while construing immediacy or intuition as thought, the question remains as to whether this intellectual intuiting doesn't likewise fall back into inert simplicity and portray reality itself in an unreal way.

21 Living substance is a form of being that in actual truth is moreover *subject*—in other words is genuinely actual only insofar as it processively establishes itself, mediating its turning-into-something-else with [its continuing to be] itself. It is, as subject, a form of pure *simplex negativity*, and by that very fact is a diversification amidst simplicity: a dualization that sets this substance in tension with itself while in turn negating this diversity spun from the same cloth together with the tensiveness thereof. Only this self-reconstituting identity, this reflecting, in otherness, into self (certainly not an original or direct unity as such) is living substance's truth. This truth is self-developing, a cyclic process that presupposes its end as its purpose, has this as its starting point, and is actual only in seeing this through and attaining its end.

22 While the life of God and divine intellection may well be portrayed, then, in terms of love at play with itself, such an idea lapses into edification and even becomes

3. Spinoza, namely.

4. In this sentence: Descartes, Kant, and Fichte. In the sentence that follows: generically Schelling.

ridiculous if it lacks the gravity, the pains, patience, [M15] and toil that the negative involves. In principle such life is indeed one of untroubled self-identity and oneness, to which otherness and estrangement as well as the surmounting of estrangement are of no serious concern. But this 'in principle' is an abstract generality in which such life's own nature, that of being *present to itself*, and hence the self-activated stirrings of form, are altogether left out of account. If form is declared to be the same as essence, then for that very reason one is mistaken in supposing that knowledge can be satisfied with what anything is in principle, with the essence, and can get along without the form—that some axiom or intuition deemed to be decisive renders superfluous the actuation of that essence, that is, the evolution of the form. Precisely because the form is as indispensable to the essence as the essence is to itself, the divine being is to be apprehended and expressed not just as essence (i.e., as a directly present substance, the way divinity contemplates itself in *its* purity), but equally as form, indeed the whole spectrum of developed form. Only then is it comprehended and expressed as it actually is.

23 Truth is an integral whole—a whole whose essential nature is brought to completion only by undergoing development. Of the absolute it needs be said that in essence it's a result—that only in the end is it what it is in truth, its nature consisting precisely in its being actual, subject, in *coming to be* itself. Though to conceive of it as by nature a result may seem contradictory, this mere semblance of contradictoriness takes little reflection to dispel. The beginning, the principle—the absolute as directly expressed at first—is a mere generality. When I say "all animals," what's being expressed can scarcely pass for zoology. No better at expressing what they involve are the words for the divine, the absolute, eternal, and so on—and indeed all that such words give expression to is an intuition as it immediately is. Anything that goes beyond such a word, even the mere transition to a proposition, is a turning-into-something-else that has to be reintegrated, a process of mediation. Yet [M16] it's just this that meets with horrified rejection, as though in making anything more of mediation than that it neither is, nor in any sense consists in, something absolute, fully complete knowledge were being abandoned.

24 This abhorrence stems from ignorance of the nature of both mediation and fully complete knowledge itself. For mediation is nothing other than self-identity in motion within itself—is a reflecting into self—the moment in which the I is presenting itself to itself: a form of pure negativity or simplex becoming. The I, or for that matter all manner of becoming, anything mediative in this way, is actually, by virtue of its simplicity, both a processively emerging immediacy and something itself immediate. —Thus reason is misunderstood when this reflection is dissociated from truth and not grasped as a positive moment integral to the absolute [truth thus emerging]. It's this reflection-into-self that makes truth a result, while also sublating the tension between the resultant truth and the process by which it comes to be. For this becoming is itself simplex and hence no different from the form that such truth has, which in the result

is shown to be simplex. To become in this way is precisely to have *returned* to simplicity. –While “in itself” a human being, an embryo nonetheless isn’t one that’s present to itself; only in cultivated reason that has made of itself what it is in itself do we have a human being who’s present to himself. This alone is reason’s actual reality. Yet this resultant being is itself a simplex immediacy, consisting in a self-conscious freedom that’s internally poised and, rather than having brushed aside all opposition and left it at that, is reconciled with it.

25 What we’ve just said can also be expressed by saying that reason consists in purposive activity. The exaltation of what’s construed as nature over what’s misconceived as thought, and in particular the rejection of external purposiveness, has brought the form of purpose per se into disrepute. But in keeping with the way Aristotle characterizes nature—as purposive action—purpose is something immediate, at rest, unmoved even while self-moving; in a word, subject. Motivating its abstract force [M17] is a relating-unto-self or pure negativity. The result is the same as the beginning precisely because the beginning is telic—that is, any such reality is identical with its own conceptual nature precisely because purposive immediacy has self, a form of pure reality, integrally within it. The purpose being realized, the actuality made existent, is both process and fully unfolded becoming—is exactly the manner of unrest that a self is. Moreover the self is immediate and simple like the beginning because it is a result, something that has turned back into itself—which is precisely self: the identity and simplex entity here relating itself to itself.

26 The felt need to represent some absolute as subject has found voice in propositions such as ‘God is eternal,’ ‘God is the world’s moral compass,’ ‘God is love,’ and so on. While in propositions such as these truth is posed outright as subject, it isn’t set forth as the dynamic of something that of itself reflects into itself. In a proposition of this sort one begins with the word ‘God.’ This by itself is a meaningless sound, a sheer name. The predicate alone states what God is, providing body and meaning; only at the proposition’s conclusion does the blankness of the beginning turn into actual knowledge. So it’s not clear why one doesn’t simply give utterance to the meaning alone (the eternal, the moral world-order, etc.), or, as the ancients did, to pure concepts (being, the One, etc.) without adding senseless sounds.

27 –Yet it’s precisely by means of this word [‘God’] that one indicates that it’s not some manner of generic being, essence, or universal that’s set forth, but rather something reflected into itself—a subject—even though as yet only by way of anticipation. The subject is regarded as though it were a fixed point to which predicates are attached via a process putatively intrinsic to some knower of this subject, a dynamic that moreover isn’t part and parcel of that point itself. Yet only if the process is part and parcel of it can this predicated content be presented as subject. Set up in the above manner [M18] there can be no movement intrinsic to the subject: indeed presupposing the

subject to be a point precludes any alternative—any movement can only be external to it. Thus “anticipating” that this absolute is subject not only doesn’t embody that concept’s actual reality but even prevents its actualization, setting forth the subject as a static point whereas the reality of it consists in self-movement.

28 Among the several consequences that follow from what’s been said, it should be stressed that knowledge is real and capable of being articulated only as science, only as systemic, and further, that a so-called axiom or principle of philosophy, even when true, is nonetheless false precisely to the extent that it’s merely axiomatic or a principle. It’s then easy to refute. The refutation consists in exposing its deficiency; and indeed it is deficient because it’s only a generality or principle, only a beginning. If the refutation is thorough, it’s derived and developed from the principle itself, not from counter-assurances and extraneous inspirations. Such a refutation would actually serve to develop and thus remedy the deficiency of that principle—so long as the refutation didn’t in the process lose sight of what it’s doing, paying attention only to its negative activity without also taking note of the positive aspect of its progress and result. The true and positive exposition of any such beginning is thus at the same time no less the very reverse, relating negatively to it, namely to its one-sided form—against its being at first only immediate, existing in the manner of a purpose. Hence such an exposition can also be looked upon as refuting what constitutes the very foundation of a given system, or, better, as demonstrating that its foundation or principle is but its inception.

29 That truth is real only when systemic—that is, that substance is essentially subject—is made explicit in a manner of representation that expresses what’s absolute as *spirit*, the [M19] most sublime of concepts, and one pertinent to the modern age and its religion. The spiritual alone is the actual: it is essence, that is, something that exists in itself; it is of itself a relating, that is, something specific, involving otherness as well as self-related being; and in this very specificity, the existence it has outside itself, it abides ongoingly within itself, in other words exists both in, and as relating to, itself. Yet this existence in and relative to itself is at first evident only to us, that is, in principle, being [as yet only] spiritual *substance*. Such being must needs also become evident to itself; it must come to know what it is to be spiritual and to know itself as spirit—must become an object present to itself, albeit one that’s no less immediately mediated: a sublated object reflected into itself. To the extent that spirit’s content is in process of being generated by spirit itself, spirit is present to itself only as it’s present to us; but to the extent that it’s also present to itself within its own purview, this self-generation, this pure conceiving, moreover affords it an *objective* element in which it has matter-of-fact presence—in this way being present to itself as an object reflected into itself.

30 –Spirit that, thus unfolded, knows itself to be spirit, is what science is. Science is spirit’s actual reality, and is the realm it fashions for itself in its own element.



31 Pure self-comprehension in absolute otherness—this aether as such—is the ground and basis of science, the knowing that's intrinsic to the universal. Philosophy's inception presupposes, or rather requires, that consciousness find its place within this element. But it's only via the dynamic whereby it comes into being that this element is perfected and rendered transparent. It consists in spirit through and through, a manner of universal that exists in the way that simplex immediacy does, an immediacy which, in actually existing as a universal, is something fundamental—thinking—which exists only within spirit. Because this element, spirit's own immediacy, is altogether constitutive [M20] of spirit's substance, it is existence transfigured, a reflection that's itself simplex, an immediacy that's present to itself as an immediacy, a manner of being consisting in self-reflectivity.

32 –Science from her side requires of self-consciousness that it have made the ascent into this aether so as to live its life with and within her. The individual, in turn, is justified in demanding that science at least provide him with the ladder needed to reach this standpoint—show him that this standpoint lies in him. His claim to such is grounded in the complete autonomy he knows he possesses in each permutation of his knowledge, since throughout each of them—whatever its content, and whether recognized by science or not—the individual himself all the while embodies the decisive *form*: he has direct self-certainty, and hence constitutes a manner of being that is (should this expression be preferred) unconditioned.

33 –While the standpoint of consciousness that understands objectively existent things to be contrary to it and it contrary to them is foreign to science (which looks upon that in which consciousness feels right at home as being instead a forfeiture of spirit), the element in which science abides is for such consciousness a remote yonder in which it isn't really in possession of itself anymore. Each appears to the other as a perversion of truth. The very idea of entrusting itself to science without further ado is for natural consciousness rather like its trying, urged on by who knows what, to walk around on its head for a change. To be compelled to adopt and move about in this unusual posture strikes natural consciousness as an odd thing to inflict upon oneself, something quite needless and for which it's ill prepared. Whatever science might be in her own estimation, she appears wrongheaded in [M21] relation to unsophisticated self-consciousness, since the latter locates the principle of its reality in self-certainty. So long as such self-consciousness abides on its own outside her, science bears the form of something unreal. Thus science has to integrate this element, self-certainty, into herself, or rather show that, and how, this element belongs to her. Without such reality, science is a substantive content only in principle, a purpose as yet only inward—is spiritual substance, not spirit itself. Science has to express herself openly and become

present to herself, meaning nothing other than that she has to establish her oneness with self-consciousness.

34 The developmental process integral to science proper, that is, to knowing, is what this *phenomenology* of spirit, the first part of the system of science, sets forth. Knowledge as it is at first, as unmediated spirit, is deficient in spirit, consisting as it does in sense-consciousness. In order to become genuine knowledge, to bring into being this element consisting in science's own pure conceiving, spirit has to endure a long, arduous journey. As it sets forth its content and brings to light the various permutations of its knowledge along the way, this process of becoming proves to be quite different from an "initiation" of the unscientific mind into science, likewise from the "founding" of a science, and in any event from the kind of "inspiration" that, as though shot out of a pistol, starts straight off with "absolute knowledge," [M22] having made short shrift of other points of view simply by declaring that it takes no notice of them.

35 The task of leading the individual from his uncultivated standpoint to a more cultivated way of knowing needs be grasped in its broader context, with individuality at large, the world-spirit, being considered in the context of *its* cultivation. Concerning the interrelation of the two, as each of these moments is taking on concrete form and assuming a configuration distinctively its own, it begins showing up in individuality at large. By itself each such individuation is spiritually incomplete, is a concrete embodiment in whose entire existence a single defining modality predominates, the others being present only in faint outline. In a mode of spirit whose vantage point is more advanced than that of another, the less advanced concrete life-mode dwindles to an indistinct moment; what previously had been an abiding concern is now but a vestige, its lineaments shrouded in shadow. An individuation substantively comprising a more advanced spirit scans the one that's been surpassed much as someone pursuing an advanced science reviews the preparatory knowledge he'd long since mastered in order to have the gist of it present in mind, recalling it without having an abiding interest in it.

36 –Each individual retraces the formative stages of spirit at large, albeit as permutations which spirit itself has already left behind, like steps along a path by now trodden smooth. Regarding the knowledge thus acquired we see that what in earlier ages engaged the energies of intellectually mature men has been reduced to mere information, exercises, even child's games; and amidst this educational advance we also come to see the very history of the world's [M23] cultural evolution traced in silhouette. Such bygone existence has already been assimilated into the cultural spirit constitutive of a given individual's substance, as it were the inorganic part (in seeming thus to be something outside him) of his own nature. –From the perspective of the individual, then, formative education consists in his assimilating what's already there before him,

incorporating this his inorganic nature and taking possession of it for himself. But this is exactly how spirit at large, spirit as substance, provides itself with self-consciousness, developing and reflecting into itself.

37 Science demonstrates the full scope and necessity of this formative process, presenting what has already been reduced to a moment and possession of spirit as it processively bodies forth. The goal is spirit's insight into what 'to know' consists in. Impatient souls demand the impossible: attainment of the end without the means. Yet the full length of the journey has to be endured, each moment of it being necessary; moreover each has to be dwelt upon, since each is itself a complete individual embodiment and is definitively apprehended only insofar as its specific character as whole (its concrete totality), or the whole as uniquely embodied in this specific modality, is taken into account.

38 –Now since the substance undergirding the individual, the world-spirit itself, has had the perseverance to pass through these forms in the long expanse of time and to take on the titanic labor of world history, elaborating within each of them as much of the total content as each is capable of sustaining, and since indeed spirit couldn't have attained to consciousness of itself with any less effort, nothing short of this [M24] would enable the individual to comprehend his own substance. Yet due to all that has in fact been accomplished in the process, less is required of him after all—the content of this reality having already been brought down into the realm of open possibility, its sheer immediacy overcome. As something that's already being thought, this content is a property of individuality—is no longer a presence needing to be converted into something that in itself exists, but is something already in itself extant, needing simply to be turned into a form of presence-to-self. How that's accomplished merits closer attention.

39 Although in such a process the individual is spared the effort of superseding matter-of-fact existence, there still remains the task of presenting the above forms and making them familiar. Matter-of-fact existence, when integrated into [the self's own] substance, has via this initial negation merely been transposed directly into the self's element, and so still has the character of an uncomprehended immediacy—something as inertly indifferent as matter-of-fact existence itself; in effect it has merely turned into a *representation*. Thus is it also familiar, something with which the mind has finished and in which it no longer takes an active interest. Mental activity that becomes adept in processing whatever is matter-of-factly there, for its part merely processing particulars, is that of a mind that isn't comprehending. *Knowing*, by contrast, relates [M25] tensively to any representation that has reached such stasis, such familiarity. Knowing is the action of a comprehending self, and is thought's abiding interest.

40 The familiar, precisely because it *is* familiar, is ill understood. Indeed when one's comprehension of something consists merely in presupposing and accepting it in the

way in which it's familiarly known, one succumbs to the most common of deceptions of self and others. Such knowledge, for all its verbal meanderings, never really gets anywhere and has no inkling why this is so. Subject and object, God, nature, understanding, sensibility, and so on are taken for granted just as they're familiarly known, being thus established as fixed points of departure and return. This way of proceeding flits back and forth between these fixed points and, since they remain unmoved, merely skims over their surface. In like manner, apprehending and verifying here consist merely in seeing whether all agree that their impressions coincide with what's being claimed, whether or not that's how it appears and is familiar to them.

41 Traditionally, the analysis of a given representation has consisted in nothing short of sublating the form in which it had become familiar. To break a representation down into its original elements is to return to its moments, which at least don't have the form of an externally encountered representation but constitute a property directly of the self. Of course all that such analysis arrives at are "thoughts" that themselves consist of familiar, hard-and-fast determinations. But to be broken down thus, becoming then something unreal, is a pivotal moment, since only by deconstructing and turning into an unreality is such a concretion self-moving. Breaking things down thus is the capacity and function of the *understanding*, a power most wondrous and mighty—or rather one that is absolute. A cyclic process that's statically self-enclosed, keeping within its moments in the way that substance does, embodies but a direct relation and so is hardly anything wondrous. But that something accidental as such (bound to other accidents [M26] and real only in relation with them) should deviate from this its compass, attaining an existence of its own and freedom apart from them, that is an awesome power—the power to negate—the active energy of thinking, of the pure I.

42 –Death (to so characterize this manner of derealization) is of all things the most dreaded, and to come to grips with it requires the greatest effort. Beauty that would sustain itself at the price of effeteness hates the understanding for asking of it what it simply can't do.⁵ The life of spirit isn't one that shrinks from death and preserves itself from devastation, but rather one that endures death and in so doing sustains itself. It wins its truth only when it finds itself in virtual dismemberment. Power such as this doesn't exist in spirit that, positively disposed, turns a blind eye to the negative (saying, as we're wont, that it's nothing or is false, and then, having done with it, going on to something else), but solely in spirit that looks right into the face of the negative and abides with it. This capacity to abide with negation is a magical power that changes it into a form of being. This is the same as the knowing subject we referred to above, which, in affording specificity a presence within its element, sublates abstract immediacy (that which in any given instance is just what matter-of-factly is) and is thereby

5. The target here is Novalis, champion of a cult of beauty.

constitutive of something genuinely substantial: a manner of being or directness that, instead of having mediation external to it, itself is mediation.

43 That what's been set forth in representation becomes the property of pure self-consciousness, this overall advance in comprehensiveness, is but one aspect of cultivation, not its culmination. The mode of study in ancient times was at variance with that of the modern age in that the former involved a thoroughgoing cultivation of natural consciousness. Putting itself rigorously to the test in every part of its existence and philosophizing about everything it came across, ancient study forged itself into a mode of all-inclusiveness actively engaged at all points. But in modern times the individual finds the abstract form ready-made; and his endeavor to grasp it and make it his own consists more in his extracting its inner core without engaging it intermediately, producing a truncated comprehensiveness rather than one that emerges from the concreteness and complexity of *its* presence. Hence nowadays the task lies not so much in purifying the individual of his unsophisticated, sense-bound ways, [M27] not so much in making him into a substantive being who thinks and considers, but rather in the opposite, in sublating rigidly defined ideas so as to make all that's comprehended in them real and bring it to life.

44 –But it's more difficult by far to render fixed thoughts fluid than to do this with sensuous existence. The reason for this has already been given: fixed *thought-determinations* have *the I* as the substance and element of their existence, something having the power to negate, a purely *actual* reality; by contrast all there is to the specifics of sense is [spiritually] powerless abstract immediateness, mere being as such. Thoughts become fluid when pure thinking, this inner mode of immediacy, recognizes itself to be a moment [of a larger relation], when pure self-certainty abstracts from itself, not by leaving itself out or setting itself aside, but by abandoning the rigidity with which it affirms itself as well as the fixity of any sheer concretion that has the I pitted against a differentiated content: by letting go of such fixed differences established in the element of pure thought as contribute to an I that exists unconditionally. Via this process pure thoughts become *concepts* and are for the first time what they are in truth: self-moving cyclical dynamisms—entities consisting of spirit—this being their very substance.

45 The dynamic integral to pure entities such as these determines the nature of the scientific process overall. Looked at with regard to its interconnecting their substantive content, this dynamic necessitates and articulates their formation into an organic whole. By virtue of their movement, the pathway by which one arrives at the conceptual thinking integral to knowing likewise constitutes a necessary and complete process of becoming. Hence the preparatory stage of science ceases to consist in the kind of casual philosophizing that latches onto this or that object, relationship, or idea as randomly met with in an unmaturing consciousness, or which, by means of a mean-

dering process of arguing, syllogizing, and deducing, tries to establish what's true on the basis of fixed and settled notions. Rather does the pathway to conceptual knowledge, owing to the movement of conception itself, come to encompass every aspect of consciousness's world-orientation in its inherent necessity.

46 Such an exposition is by the same token but the first part of science, since spirit's initial presence is nothing but what it immediately is: a beginning, [M28] the outset but not yet a return to itself. The elementariness of this immediate presence is the characteristic that makes this part of science distinct from the others. –Accounting for this distinctness leads us to discuss a few entrenched notions that tend to crop up in this context.

47 Spirit's direct existential presence—consciousness—has two moments: knowing and the objectivity négative of knowing. Since consciousness is the element within which spirit develops and unfolds its moments, the latter all have within them the tension integral to consciousness and indeed emerge as permutations of consciousness. The science pursued along this path is the science of what consciousness experiences, with substance entering into consideration in whatever way it and its dynamic are consciousness's object. Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what is within its experience; for in experience all that's there is spiritual substance, and indeed as the object of this same substance's self. But spirit becomes object by virtue of its being a dynamic in which it turns into something other than, that is, becomes the object of, its own self and sublates this otherness. And 'experience' is an apt expression for this movement in which something unmediated, something that hasn't really been experienced (i.e., some abstraction, be it one derived from sensuous being or one consisting of a simple entity of thought), becomes alien, then returns from such alienation to itself, and is only then manifest in its actual reality and truth no less than as a possession of consciousness.

48 The disparity that arises in consciousness between the I and the substance it has as object is differentiative of them both—is essentially a form of negation. While this could be viewed as a "deficiency" of sorts in each, it's their very soul, what's stirring in them. For this reason some of the ancients⁶ conceived of the void as mover, for indeed they comprehended it as négative, albeit without yet grasping this as self. Now although first coming to light in the form of a disparity integral to the I in relation to its object, the negating equally consists in a disparity integral to substance in relation to *itself*. What seems to be going on outside and directed at substance is substance's own doing: substance shows itself to be fundamentally subject. When it has shown this completely, spirit has made its existence congruent with its essence. Spirit is then an

6. Democritus in particular.

object evident to itself just as it is, and [M29] the abstract element of immediacy and the separation between knowing and truth are surmounted. Being is then mediated through and through, a substantive content that, even thus, is the direct property of the I—is integrally self, that is, conceptual. –With this the phenomenology of spirit concludes. What spirit prepares for itself in phenomenology is the element of knowing. At this point spirit's moments display themselves within that element in the form of simplicity, knowing its object as part *and* parcel of itself. These moments no longer dissociate into an opposition of being and knowing, but abide in the simplicity of knowing—are truth in the form of truth, varying solely in content. Their movement, organizing itself into a whole within this element, is *logic*, speculative philosophy.



49 Now because this system comprised of spirit's experience deals only with spirit's process of *appearance*, the progression from this to the science of truth embodied in the form of truth seems to be sheerly negative, and one might want to dispense with whatever is negative as something false and insist upon being led to the truth without further ado. Why bother with what's false at all? The proposal advanced above, namely that we should begin with science straight-off, can be addressed now with an eye to the blanket characterization of the negative as "false." Here conventional notions are a special hindrance in gaining access to truth. This will give occasion to discuss mathematical cognition, esteemed by the unphilosophical mind as the ideal that philosophy must strive to attain even though thus far to no avail.

50 True and false belong to a number of set notions purported to be motionlessly in place as essences unto themselves, one of them here, the other over there: static, isolated, and with nothing in common. Counter to this it has to be said that truth isn't like minted coin, a "given" ready-made for pocketing.⁷ There *is* no such thing as falsity any more than there *is* such a thing as evil. To be sure, evil and falsity aren't as bad as the devil, in whom they've even been cast as distinctive subjects. As false and evil they exist only as generalities, while nonetheless having [M30] an essence of their own vis-à-vis each other.

51 –Falsity (focusing only on it for now) would seem to be what's other than—the negative complement of—the substance that, as the content of knowledge, is what's true. Yet such substance is itself by nature negative, existing in part as differentiative and determinative of a content, and in part as a simplex distinguishing, that is, being present basically as self and knowing. One can, of course, know falsely. To know something falsely means that the knowing is discrepant with its substance. Yet precisely

7. An echo of Lessing's *Nathan the Wise*, act 4.

such disparity is broadly speaking a matter of distinguishing—an indispensable moment [of knowing the truth]. Indeed it's on the basis of such distinguishing that knowing and its substance are adequated, an adequation that, when arrived at, is truth. Yet with the truth thus achieved it isn't as though what's discrepant had been separated off (like dross from pure metal), or stays separate (like instrument from product); rather is what's discrepant, as negative complement, itself still directly present as self in the truth as such. But this doesn't entitle us to say that falsity is a moment, let alone a permanent part, of truth. The saying "In everything false there's something true" treats the two like oil and water, which don't mix and are combined only externally. Precisely in order to designate the moment in which they're completely heterogeneous, the terms 'true' and 'false' mustn't still be used where their otherness has been sublated. Just as an expression like 'the unity of subject and object' (or of finite and infinite, of being and thought, etc.) is awkward in that its terms indicate what these are outside rather than within that unity, so is the false as false no longer an integral moment of truth.

52 The dogmatism typical of various ways of thinking met with in the learned disciplines as well as in philosophical inquiry consists in nothing but the notion that truth consists in some proposition involving a fixed result, one readily known. Questions such as 'When was Caesar born?', 'How many yards in a furlong?', and so on deserve a straightforward answer, just as it's undeniably true that in a right triangle the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares [M31] of the other two sides. But the nature of a so-called truth of this kind is different from that of philosophical truths.

53 To make brief mention of historical truths, inasmuch as they're considered to be purely informational it's taken for granted that they're concerned with particular matters of fact—some content viewed in keeping with its contingent and arbitrary aspect, its specifics having nothing necessary about them. Yet even such unshod truths as the examples cited above aren't exempt from the critical workings of self-consciousness. To be knowledgeable about such truths one has to do a lot of collating, consulting records or doing some manner of investigating; and even having been given direct scrutiny, only when such knowledge is accompanied with supporting reasons does it have real merit (despite the bare end-product supposedly being all that really matters).

54 As for mathematical truths, we'd hardly call a man a geometer who had an outsider's rote knowledge of Euclid's theorems without their proofs, without, so to speak, knowing them inside out. Similarly, if in the course of making many a measurement someone came to the realization that the sides of right triangles exhibit the familiar relation mentioned above, this would hardly be deemed adequate. Yet even in mathematical apprehension proof, while critical, gives as yet no indication of being or having the nature of an integral moment of the result, but is something finished and done with so soon as one arrives at it. While no doubt a theorem is, as result, "seen to be true,"

this added circumstance bears not on its substantive content but only on its relation to the knowing subject. Rather than being integral to the object, the procedure of mathematical proof is an activity external to the subject matter. As presented in the kind of construction needed to prove the proposition articulating the right-triangle relation, it isn't the triangle's own nature that's manifesting itself; the manner in which the result is produced is wholly a means and procedure employed by cognition.

55 –Moreover in philosophical discernment the way in which something that matter-of-factly exists [M32] develops as thus existent is different from the way in which that entity's *essence* or inner nature develops. Philosophical discernment is inclusive of both of these modes of becoming, whereas mathematics demonstrates only the development of what's matter-of-factly present, that is, such *being* as that entity's nature has in discernment as such. Beyond that, philosophical discernment integrates these [thus far] separate dynamics. The emergence of that nature's substance from within (i.e., its becoming) inseparably involves its crossing over into what's outside it—into its *ex*-istent presence, the being it has in relation to what's other than it. And conversely, the development of that existent presence is tantamount to its withdrawal into an essence. The dynamic is thus dually processive, and brings into being an integral whole: even as each of the two movements is establishing the other, each therein has both itself and the other as integral aspects of itself; they're jointly constitutive of a whole by dissolving themselves and turning into its moments.

56 In mathematical apprehension gaining insight is an activity that operates upon its subject matter externally, from which it follows that the true subject matter is altered in the process. Even though the means employed—construction and proof—undoubtedly do contain true propositions, the content, it has to be said, is false. The triangle in the example given above is dismantled, and its parts added to other figures which the triangle's construction allows for. Only at the end is the triangle we're really concerned with reconstituted, it having been lost sight of in the process and brought back into view only in fragments that had been integrated into other [geometric] wholes. –Here again we see the negativity of the content enter in, which would just as plausibly have to be characterized as a form of “falsity” as would the turnover of purportedly fixed ideas in the processual dynamic of concepts.

57 But the telltale deficiency of mathematical apprehension has as much to do with the mode of discernment itself as with its overall material. The first thing noteworthy about this way of apprehending is that it isn't apparent why such and such construction process is necessary. Its necessity doesn't proceed from the way things are conceived in the theorem but is simply imposed; and the instructions directing one to draw precisely such and such lines (where any number of others could be drawn just as well) have to be blindly obeyed without one's knowing better than to take it on good faith that this will be conducive to the proof. So in retrospect, while the relevance of

the construction does indeed become evident, it's extraneous to the proof since it's seen only in the aftermath, once the proof is [M33] in place. Moreover, beginning as it does who knows where, one has no idea at that point how the course of the proof connects to the result that's supposed to issue from it. And as the proof proceeds, taking up such and such specifics and connections while ignoring others, one has no direct sense of what makes any of this necessary. An external purpose governs the procedure throughout.

58 Such self-evidentness as this deficient way of apprehending comes up with (of which mathematics is proud even to the point of putting on airs vis-à-vis philosophy) rests solely on the poverty of its aim and the inadequacy of its material, and is therefore the sort of thing that philosophy needs spurn. What it aims at conceptually is quantity, just the sort of relationship that is unessential, nonconceptual. The movement of such knowledge is all on the surface and doesn't get at the matter itself—its essence or conceptual nature—and so doesn't really comprehend. –The material from which mathematics furnishes us with such a gratifying treasury of truths consists of space and the numerical unit. Space is a presence into which conception inscribes its distinctions as into an empty inert element, one in which they neither move of themselves nor have any life to them. Actual reality isn't spatial in the way that mathematics considers what's spatial; such nonrealities as comprise the things of mathematics are of concern neither to concrete sense-intuition nor to philosophy. In such an unreal element there's accordingly only unreal truth: nothing but static, lifeless propositions. One can stop at any of them; the next starts afresh as relating only to itself, without the preceding one having led up to it and so without any necessary interconnection emerging from the nature of the matter itself.

59 –Furthermore, by virtue of its principle and element (and herein consists the formalistic aspect of mathematical self-evidentness) such knowledge runs in a rut of equations. Anything so lifeless doesn't of itself move, hence doesn't get at differences that really matter, at any crucial contrariety or discrepancy—doesn't make the move from oppositeness to opposition, arrive at anything qualitative, immanent, or that of itself moves. For all that enters into consideration in mathematics is quantity, non-essential difference. Mathematics abstracts from the fact that it is *conception* that divides space [M34] into the dimensions it has and defines the connections between and integral to them. It doesn't even consider, for instance, the relation of line to surface; and when comparing the circle's diameter and circumference, it hits upon their incommensurability—a conceptual relation, something infinite that eludes mathematical specification.

60 Nor does immanent, so-called pure mathematics contrast (as further material for consideration) time as such with space. While applied mathematics does of course deal with time as well as motion and other actual things, it takes the relevant synthetic

propositions—which concern the interrelation of these realities and are determined by *their* conceptual nature—out of their experiential context, proceeding then simply to assume them and apply its formulae. That the so-called proofs of various propositions that mathematics abundantly provides come to be accepted as proofs (such as those concerning the equilibrium of the lever, the relation of space and time in gravitational fall, etc.) proves only how great is the conventional understanding's need for proof—especially considering how in the absence of anything better it is so attentive to and satisfied with the empty semblance of such. A critique of “proofs” of this sort would be no less worthy of attention than instructive, one that aims at purging mathematics of its pretensions and pointing out its limitations, thereby showing the dire need for another way of knowing.

61 –Concerning time, one would think that, as space's counterpart, it would be the subject matter of the other part of pure mathematics, since it's a form of matter-of-fact conceptual existence itself. But the principle of quantity, of nonconceptual differentiation, like the principle of sameness, of abstract, lifeless oneness, can't encompass the sheer unrest of life and its radical heterogeneity. Only in a paralyzed form, namely in terms of the numerical unit, does such negativity become the second subject matter of mathematical apprehension, which, functioning externally, reduces what's actually self-moving to sheer stuff, so as to come up with its wonted external, lifeless, inconsequential content.

62 By contrast philosophy's concern is with specificity insofar as it's essential rather than nonessential; [M35] its elemental component and substantive content isn't the abstract or the unreal but the actual—something that's self-establishing and has life in it, existing within the conceptual dynamic integral to it. What's actual is process originating and traversing its moments; and the positive aspect and the truth of what's actual is determined by the entirety of this dynamic. In equal measure this dynamic involves something negative, which, were it to be regarded as something from which one could abstract, might be referred to as “false.” Yet what turns out to be ephemeral in the process is sooner to be regarded as itself essential—not something predetermined as cut off from truth and left lying who knows where outside it, any more than truth is to be thought of as something that for its part just sits there in the manner of a lifeless positivity. The process of appearance is a coming into being and passing away that doesn't itself come to be and pass away but is self-inhering, comprising the reality and dynamism integral to the life of truth. –Truth is thus a bacchanalian revel in which there's nary a single participant who isn't drunk, since whenever any sets himself apart he dissolves straightaway, while the revel itself just goes on as placid and pellucid as you please.

63 –Weighed in the balance of this dynamic, although the individual permutations of spirit are no more lasting than are specific ways of thinking, these moments are also

every bit as positive and necessary as they are negative and evanescent. In this process, viewed as a totality at rest, whatever distinguishes itself, presenting itself as something special, something to be remembered, does get preserved—as a way of life consisting in knowledge of self, just as such knowledge is of itself a way of life.

64 Although it might seem necessary at the outset to run on at length about the method of this, the dynamic of science, actually its cohesive principle is in evidence in what we've already said, and its proper exposition belongs to, indeed is, logic. For a method is but the structure of a whole, mapped out sheerly as it is. But as for the hitherto dominant thinking in this matter, we need to face the fact that even systematized schemes of ideas concerned with philosophical method are quite outdated. Should this sound boastful or revolutionary (a tone far from my own), it's noteworthy that by now [M36] informed opinion itself regards the scientificity paraded by mathematics (its explanations, divisions, axioms, sets of theorems, its proofs, principles, deductions and inferences therefrom) as being at the very least antiquated. Even if the inappropriateness of all this isn't clearly recognized, little or no use is made of it anymore; and although it isn't exactly condemned, there's little love lost over it. And we should be sufficiently biased toward what's excellent to trust that this will be put to good use and find favor in the public eye.

65 –But it isn't hard to see that this mannered technique of asserting a proposition, adducing reasons for it, and refuting its contrary with reasons isn't a form amenable to truth's emergence. Truth is its own self-inhering dynamic, whereas the above method is a way of cognizing that's external to the substantive material it confronts. That's why such a method is peculiar to mathematics (which, as we noted, has as its principle the nonconceptual relationship of quantity and, as its material, dead space and the equally dead numerical unit) and needs be left there. Of course a method such as this, in a casual style more in keeping with the arbitrary and the accidental, may still have a place in everyday life, say in conversation or when providing historical information designed more to pique curiosity than provide knowledge (which, by the way, is just about what a preface does). In everyday life consciousness is saturated with snippets of information, sundry experiences, concrete sensations, thoughts, maxims—be these deemed as matters of current or of lasting import. Workaday consciousness sometimes carries on in this vein, sometimes breaks continuity, playing fancy-free with the content, redefining and manipulating it from without. In due course it refers the content back to something or other it's sure about, even if this be but an inspiration of the moment, confidence being restored as soon as some familiar resting place has been reached.

66 But once conception's logical necessity has dispelled the casual way in which things are discussed in argumentational reasoning as well as the stuffier displays of scientific pomp, we should bear in mind that these aren't to be replaced by the

nonmethod of hunch and hurrah or the arbitrariness of prophetic utterance, both of which scorn [M37] not only the above kind of scientificity but science as such altogether.

67 Nor is the use of triplicity—which in its Kantian version had been only instinctually rediscovered, had no life to it, and was as yet uncomprehended, but then re-emerged as having undeniable relevance in enunciating a true form integral to a true content, thus anticipating scientific conception—to be construed as scientific when we see this form reduced to a lifeless schematic, a virtual phantom configuration, while scientific organization is reduced to a mere table of terms. Formalism, about which we spoke above only generally and whose routines we want to take into account more closely here, fancies that it has comprehended and articulated the nature and vibrancy of a given embodying form by attributing to that form some schematized mode of specificity as predicate (be this subjectivity or objectivity, magnetism or electricity, contraction or expansion, East or West, or what have you): a procedure admitting of endless application since in this way either the mode of specificity or the embodying modality can be used as the form or schematic moment of the other, with each being more than ready to reciprocate and, along with the other, forming a circle of reciprocities in which one way or the other we don't find out anything about the actual matter at hand. Sometimes sense designations are taken from everyday intuition, intended, of course, to mean something other than what they convey; and sometimes purely noetic designations that of themselves have meaning (e.g., subject, object, substance, cause, universal) are used, albeit in the same unreflective and uncritical way as when we use everyday terms (e.g., strong and weak, expansion and contraction), so that this manner of "metaphysics" is just as unscientific as these sense representations.

68 Instead of the inner life and self-movement of scientific conception's living presence, formalism proffers one or another simplistic characterization drawn from "intuition" (meaning, here, from sense knowledge) in keeping with some superficial analogy—this being the vapid procedure referred to as "construction," of applying a formula externally. And such formalism is [M38] much like any other. One would have to be a little dense in the head if one couldn't be taught in a quarter of an hour the theory that there are "asthenic, sthenic, and indirectly asthenic" diseases and as many modes of treatment. And who wouldn't, since until recently such instruction sufficed, have every right to expect to be promoted in as short a time from a medical practitioner to a medical theorist? When a formalistic philosophy of nature teaches, say, that intellect consists of electricity, or that animals consist of nitrogen, or are "like" South or North, and so on, whether represented as baldly as this or brewed up with more terminology, the ability to bring together in this way what had seemed so far apart, and the violence suffered by the inertly sensuous at the hands of such combinations, which bestow on it the semblance of something conceptual while not bothering with the main concern—the conception itself, the meaning of the sense-representation—all

this may fill a wide-eyed innocent with wonder, prompt him to admire the profound originality of it all and to delight in the brilliance by which such characterizations replace abstract concepts with something intuitively palpable and so more pleasing, and indeed to congratulate himself on his feeling spiritual affinity for such a capital way of going about things.

69 –The knack of such wisdom is as quickly come by as it is easy to practice. But once it is familiar, its repetitiveness becomes as tedious as the repetition of a conjurer's trick already seen through. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is no harder to handle than a painter's palette having only two colors, say red and green, the one for surface coloration if a historical scene is wanted, the other for landscapes. It's hard to decide what's more impressive here, the ease with which everything in heaven, on earth, and down below is indiscriminately coated with these colors, or the delusion that this is a splendid way of classifying everything: each supports the other. –To deck out everything mundane and divine, natural and spiritual, in one or two determinations of an overall schema and array them in order is no mean feat, [M39] nothing short of a sun-clear report⁸ on the organization of the universe: a cosmic chart not unlike an anatomist's skeleton arrayed with identification tags, or like rows of neatly sealed and labeled tins in a grocer's shop. In no less revealing a fashion does such formalism, like the skeleton stripped of flesh and blood or the similarly lifeless stuff packed away in tins, keep the gist of the thing either absent or hidden away. We've already noted that such an approach culminates in a kind of absolutist, monochromatic painting which, ashamed of the distinctions made in its schematization and part and parcel of such reflection, drowns even these in the emptiness of "the absolute," producing a "pure identity" of sorts, sheer amorphous whiteness. A schematic monochrome such as this with its lifeless characterizations, its "absolute identity," and the plunge it makes from the one to the other, altogether make for a deadened understanding and an externalistic way of apprehending.

70 It's not just that excellence [in scientific endeavor] is unavoidably doomed to be devitalized and dispirited in this way, seeing its skin stripped off and put on a body of "knowledge" this lifeless and vacuous; yet even in its being so fated, one can discern in it a power to influence hearts if not minds, as well as a development of form—both in the general comprehensibility and the specificity wherein such excellence is perfected—this development being alone what enables its common comprehensibility to be put to such superficial use.

71 Science is able to attain organic integrity only via the distinctive vitality characteristic of conception. In science specification—which, when otherwise derived from

8. A swipe at Fichte's *Sun-Clear Report to the Public at Large Concerning the Exact Nature of the Newest Philosophy*.

some manner of schematizing, is externally tacked onto whatever is there to be apprehended—is the self-moving soul of a fully substantive content. The movement that matter-of-fact being undergoes consists partly in its turning into something else (something other that's in this way contained immanently within it), and partly in re-integrating what has thus unfolded (this other presence of itself) into itself—which is to say it turns itself into a moment of itself and simplifies into something specific. The negativity evident in the former dynamic consists in diversification and the positing of a matter-of-fact presence; the negativity evident in the subsequent self-reintegration consists in the emergence of a *specific* simplicity. In this way the content shows that, [M40] instead of its specificity being derived from elsewhere and pinned onto it, it specifies itself—spontaneously ranking itself as a moment and assigning itself its place in the whole.

72 –The tabular understanding [by contrast] keeps to itself the conceptual nature and necessity of the content it sorts through—that which defines the concrete, actual, and vital dynamic of the subject matter—or rather, doesn't so much keep this to itself as know not a whit about *it* (since if it had any such insight, surely it would give some indication that it does). Understanding of this sort isn't aware of even the need for such insight. Otherwise it would stop its schematizing, or at least no longer make do with such knowledge as a table of contents provides. And a mere table is all it comes up with; the content itself it doesn't supply. Even regarding an inherently concrete and actual form of specificity such as magnetism, the latter ends up reduced to something inert, predicated of some other mode of existence, and left unrecognized either as the immanent vibrancy that it is or as generating and presenting itself in its own indigent and unique way. Formalistic understanding leaves this, the most important thing, to be provided by others. Instead of entering into the immanent content of the matter, it's forever looking over the whole and standing aloof from the particular mode of existence it's talking about—that is, overlooking it altogether.

73 –Scientific comprehension, however, demands considerably more: respect for the life of the object, focusing on and articulating its inner necessity. Such comprehension, steeped thus in its object, forgets all about gaining an overview, which really only amounts to knowledge reflecting out of the content and back into itself. But once immersed in a substantive matter and progressing inside the dynamic integral thereto, scientific comprehension does come back to itself, albeit not until the full gist of the matter, the substantive content, reintegrates internally, simplifying into something specific—reducing to but one aspect of its presence and passing over into that content's higher truth. Thereby a simplex, self-surveying whole emerges from within this substantive abundance in which scientific comprehension's own way of reflecting seemed to have lost its way.



74 Since, as expressly stated above, substance is in all instances inherently subject, all the content of experience reflects into itself on its own. What sustains or substantiates an existent presence is self-identity, for absent that [M41], it would dissolve away. Yet self-identity consists in pure abstraction—in just what thinking is. When I say “quality” I’m referring to simplex specificity. It’s via quality that one existent entity is distinguished from others—indeed is an existent presence, one that exists in relation to—or abides with—itself by virtue of this simplicity. Yet via this simplex specificity an existent presence is in essence noetic. –It’s here that being is grasped conceptually as thinking. Here one realizes why, concerning the identity of thinking and being, one does well to break with conceptually impoverished ordinary language. Now since what sustains an existent presence is self-identity, a process of pure abstracting, it sustains itself by abstracting itself from itself—in its being discrepant with itself and disintegrating while also abiding within and being reintegrative of itself: in its becoming.

75 –Because this is the nature of what exists, and inasmuch as what exists has this nature for knowledge, knowing consists neither in actively manipulating some sort of content as one might a foreign object, nor in reflecting into oneself in separation from it. Science doesn’t consist in an idealism that has replaced a dogmatism of assertion with either a dogmatism of assurance or one of self-assurance. Thus as knowing sees the content recede into *its* distinctive inwardness—being the content’s immanent self—the activity of knowing consists in immersing itself in that inwardness; as it is doing so, knowing is returning into itself in that its activity consists in pure self-identity in otherness. Thus noetic activity cunningly abjures the active role, seeming simply to look on as the object’s specificity and the concrete life thereof—even when set upon sustaining itself and pursuing a separate, special interest—brings about the reverse, resolving itself into a moment of the whole [object/subject relation].

76 Whereas earlier we discussed what it means ‘to understand’ with respect to substance that’s self-conscious, the point just made sheds light on what this means regarding the specificity of substance in the form of matter-of-fact being. What’s thus present is quality, self-identifying specificity, that is, specific simplicity, specific thought—which is the understanding of what’s there. Thus is it *nous*, as Anaxagoras first recognized essence as such to be. Those who came after him conceived the nature [M42] of existence more precisely as *eidos* or *idée*, that is, specific universality, *species*. It would seem as though the term ‘species’ is too commonplace, too inadequate for the beautiful and the holy and the eternal, the kind of ideas currently in vogue. But as a matter of fact ‘idea’ expresses nothing more and nothing less than species. Nonetheless we nowadays often see an expression that exactly designates a concept spurned in favor of one which, perhaps because it’s of foreign extraction, veils the concept in obscurity and so has a more edifying ring to it.

77 –That whatever is present is, as species, specific, is exactly why it exists in the form of simplex thought. *Nous*, simplicity, is substance. Due to its simplicity, its self-identity, substance appears to be stable and enduring. But even so this self-identity is a form of negativity, this stable existent presence being thereby in process of dissolution. At first glance a given mode of specificity appears as a stable presence sheerly by the way it relates to other such modes, and any movement on its part seems compelled by some alien force; but that it contain its otherness within it and be self-moving is implicit in the simplicity of thinking; for simplicity of this sort consists in self-moving and self-differentiating thought, and, within its own distinctive form of internality, in being purely conceptual. Thus does intelligibility evolve—and in so doing exists as rationality.

78 That it's in the nature of whatever exists to have its conceptual cohesiveness integral to its very being is basically what logical necessity consists in. This alone is the reason and rhythm of organic integrity, consisting as much in knowledge of a substantive content as it does in that content being both conceptual and substantial: this alone is what is speculative. As it activates, a concrete embodiment resolves itself into simplex specificity, thereby attaining logical form and existing in its own manner of being. Its concrete existence consists solely in this dynamic and is directly constitutive of a logical mode of existence. It's thus unnecessary to impose anything formalistic on the concrete content from without; the latter is from within itself in transition into a form that no longer has anything to do with external formalism, because it's the formation process indigenous to the concrete content itself.

79 The nature of scientific method, which as already noted is in part inseparable from its substantive content yet in part defines [M43] its rhythm on its own, is properly set forth in speculative philosophy. While what's been said here does give expression to the relevant concept, it can't amount to more than an anticipatory assurance. The truth of such an assurance isn't to be found in this more or less narrational exposition, any more than it can be refuted by some contrary assurance—say, by reciting conventional notions as though these could be taken for granted as undeniable truths, or by dishing up and swearing by the latest divinely inspired intuition. The initial reaction of conventional wisdom to the unfamiliar tends to be adverse, a reaction designed to defend its own independence, insight, and authority from what's alien (which is how something taken up in this initial form appears), and to avoid being put to shame as one supposedly is by having had to learn something—whereas were it to react by greeting the unfamiliar with applause, this would in a different [i.e., nonspeculative] sphere be tantamount to ultrarevolutionary speech and action.



80 It is therefore incumbent upon scientific study to take upon itself the strenuous work of conceptualization. This requires attentiveness to conception as such, to simplex modes of conceptual specification such as 'being in itself,' 'being that's present to itself,' 'self-identity,' and so on, which are in motion so sheerly of themselves they could be called souls were it not that the conceiving process integral to them is indicative of something higher than soul. –For thinking habituated to representation, having its routine interrupted by conception is every bit as irksome as this is to formalistic thinking, which argues ad hoc about notions having nothing to do with reality. The former might be called concrete thinking, a contingency-bound mentality wholly submerged in whatever stuff is at hand, being quite disinclined to rise clear of this and have a life of its own. By contrast argumentative reasoning in its arrogance feels itself at liberty to have its way with any given [conceptual] content. It's thus incumbent upon it that it abandon such license, and instead of acting as an arbitrary motive principle, that it immerse [M44] itself in the content and—allowing *it* to be moved by *its* own nature and as a self in motion all on *its* own—be attentive to *its* dynamic. In declining to interfere (either on impulse or as prompted by some manner of wisdom garnered elsewhere) with the immanent rhythm of concepts, we have a manner of restraint that's itself an indispensable moment in attentiveness to the functioning of conception.

81 Two aspects of the argumentational approach that are at odds with conceptual thinking merit further comment. For one thing, such ratiocination is negatively oriented toward the content it apprehends, is quick to deny and dismiss. The realization that something just isn't so is sheerly negative, a conceptual terminus that, instead of itself issuing out from itself into a new content, requires procurement of something other from elsewhere in order to have a content. This utterly negative approach reflects into the I in its vacuity, into the vanity of what it thus knows—which isn't just indicative that this content is vain, but that the insight itself is too, being negative toward it without taking note of what's positive in it. Failing even to secure its own negativity as content, such reflection is scarcely immersed in the matter at hand but always somewhere beyond; in thus proclaiming the void, it imagines itself to be always a step ahead of any content-laden realization. –By contrast in conceptual thinking, as previously shown, negativity is integral to the content itself, and—being part and parcel not only of the immanent dynamic and specific nature of the content but also of the emergent whole of it—is moreover positive. Grasped as a result, what issues from this dynamic is a negation that *specifies*, and therein a positive content as well.

82 Now in view of the fact that argumentational mentation does have a content of sorts, whether this consists in representations or in thoughts, or in some mixture of the two, it has a second aspect that makes comprehension difficult for it. As indicated above, the peculiar nature of this aspect is closely linked with the nature of ideation itself, or rather demonstrates how it comes to light as a process of noetic apprehension.

—In its negative way of functioning, as discussed above, argumentational mentation in effect comprises the self into which any given content continually reverts. And when by contrast it cognizes positively, this [M45] self functions as a representationally projected subject to which any content is related as accidental property and predicate. This subject comprises the basis to which the content is bound and upon which the movement progresses this way and that.

83 —The subject functions differently in conceptual thinking. Since conceptual being comprises any given object's own proper self, showing itself to be the processual being of that object, it isn't some inert subject motionlessly supporting accidental properties, but is instead self-moving, and is the conceptual being reintegrating that object's specifics into itself. In this dynamic the would-be inert subject itself founders; instead of remaining separate from the differentiae and content, it turns into them and constitutes what's being specified—in other words is the content differentiated as well as the course of the dynamic. The static foundation that argumentational reasoning has in the inert subject thus starts shifting; and it's just this very movement that becomes the object. The subject in process of fleshing out its content ceases to transcend the content and no longer admits of any extraneous predicates or accidental properties. Conversely, the otherwise diffuse content is thereby bound under this self—isn't some universal applicable to various things independent of the subject. The content is then in fact no longer a predicate of the subject but rather the substance, the essence and conceptual being of what's being discussed.

84 —Representational thinking, by nature tied to the accidental properties or predicates it seeks to transcend (understandably so, since they're nothing more than predicates and accidents), finds its progress hindered because what in a proposition has the form of a predicate is the very substance of the proposition. One might envision it as sustaining a counterblow. Starting out from the subject as though from a stable foundation, representational thinking discovers that, since it's instead the predicate that's the proposition's substance, the subject has passed over into the predicate and in so doing been superseded. And since what thus seems to be a simple predicate has become the whole self-sufficing sum and substance of the matter, thought, rather than being able to range free of this difficulty, is brought to a halt by it.

85 —Ordinarily a subject is at first taken for granted as being the fixed self of some object, from which a progression to multiple specifics or predicates inevitably ensues. It's here that the knowing I comes into play, stepping into the place of the fixed subject and connecting all these predicates with the [M46] subject that contains them. But since the initial subject enters into the specifics themselves and is what ensouls them, the subsequent subject [the knowing I] finds that the initial subject, which it means to transcend and be done with by returning into itself, is still present in the predicate—

and so, instead of being able to play the active role in the predicative process, debating whether to accommodate this or that predicate, still has to cope with the *content's* self, having to abide not just with itself but with it.

86 What was said above can be expressed formally: the nature of a judgment, or of any proposition that involves distinguishing subject and predicate, is subverted when reformulated speculatively, and turns into a proposition of identity the thrust of which runs counter to any such relation. Generally speaking, this conflict between propositional form and the conceptual unity that undermines it resembles that between meter and accent in rhythm. Rhythm results from the fluctuation between and confluence of the two. Likewise in a philosophical proposition: instead of the identity of subject and predicate obliterating the distinction between them as expressed in the proposition's form, their unity issues forth in a kind of harmony. The proposition's form brings to light a specific sense of what's meant, an accentuation that distinctively fills out the proposition. Yet in that the predicate expresses the substance, and the subject per se lapses into what's common to both, a unity is formed in which what's accentuated keeps fading away.

87 To clarify by way of examples: in the proposition 'God is being' the predicate is 'being,' this having a substantive meaning in which the subject dissolves. Here being isn't supposed to be a predicate but rather the essential nature, with God then apparently ceasing to be the fixed subject that God's made out to be as positioned in the proposition. –Thinking, instead of making progress in the transition from subject to predicate, feels hindered by the loss of the subject and, missing it, feels compelled to reflect upon it. In other words, since the predicate has itself been enunciated as the subject, as the being or essence exhaustive of the subject's nature, thinking locates the subject directly in the predicate—and now, instead of [M47] having entered into itself in the predicate, preserving the free posture of ordinary reasoning, thought is, or at least feels the need to be, still immersed in the [proposition's] content. –So likewise when one says, "The real is the universal," the real as subject vanishes in its predicate. 'The universal' isn't just supposed to signify a predicate, as though the proposition were asserting that 'the real' equates to 'the universal,' but rather indicates what the essential nature of the real is. Thus even as thinking is losing the solid objective foundation it had in the subject, it's being forced back upon such foundation as it has in the predicate—therein returning not into itself but into the content's subject.

88 This unwonted sense of thought's being somehow hindered [by the predicative process] is in large measure the source of the complaints about the intelligibility of philosophical works on the part of individuals otherwise sufficiently cultivated to understand them. Here we see the reason behind the emphatic reproach that a good deal of what such works contain has to be read more than once before it can be understood,

a reproach intended to suggest that this is all highly improper and, if justified, admitting of no further reply. – What’s really at issue should be clear from the above. A philosophical proposition, as a proposition, evokes the common prejudice that the usual subject-predicate relation and routine ways of knowing obtain. But such prejudice and routine is undermined by the proposition’s philosophical content. Conventional thinking learns that its opinion as to what was meant isn’t what the proposition means, and the would-be knower, his opinion having been corrected, is then compelled to go back and apprehend the proposition in another way.

89 One difficulty worth avoiding stems from mixing up the speculative approach and that of conventional reasoning, so that what’s said of the subject sometimes conveys what its concept signifies and at others merely what its predicate or accidental property signifies. The one approach interferes with the other, and only by rigorously precluding the usual way of relating the proposition’s parts will philosophical exposition be able to achieve the requisite plasticity.

90 While nonspeculative thinking has in fact a [M48] legitimate place too, its validity isn’t a consideration in speculative propositions due to the way that they function. Superseding the form of such a proposition isn’t to take place in direct fashion via its bare content. Rather does the contrasting dynamic of such a proposition have to be expressed; it mustn’t just be left bottled up inside itself: conception’s return into itself has to be explicitly demonstrated. This movement back into itself—which actually does accomplish what formal proofs were once presumed to be doing—is the dialectical movement of the proposition itself. This alone is what’s genuinely speculative, the presentation of which consists solely in this being given expression. As set forth in a proposition, what’s speculative is just inwardly bottled up, and isn’t even present as an essential nature returning into itself. Thus we’re often referred to “inner” intuitions by philosophical expositions that seek to circumvent what we’ve insisted upon, namely a systematic presentation of the proposition’s dialectical movement. The proposition should express *what* the truth is, although in essence truth is subject and as such consists solely in dialectical movement—in a progression that is self-generative, leads itself forth from itself, and is self-reintegrative. In ordinary cognition this aspect, namely the full articulation of what lies within, is comprised in some “proof.” But once dialectic has parted with the need for proofs, the notion of a “philosophical proof” has indeed lost cogency.

91 On this matter we might recall that dialectical movement, too, has propositions for its parts or elements, and so the difficulty discussed above seems to keep recurring and be inherent in the process itself. This is similar to what goes on in ordinary proof, where the reasons given are themselves in need of reasons, and so on ad infinitum. But the formal stipulating and justifying that’s part and parcel of such proof is quite at variance with dialectical movement and is thus a merely externalistic way of knowing.

92 –As for dialectical movement itself, its element is that which is purely conceptual, having then a content that within itself is subject through and through. Hence no content emerges that would bear some relation to an underlying subject whose import would be forthcoming in a predicate; taken just as it is, a proposition is just blankly formal. Beyond the confines of the sensuously [M49] intuited or represented self all that remains to designate the pure subject, this vacuously nonconceptual unit, is sheerly some name. For this reason it would, for instance, probably be better to avoid the name ‘God,’ since taken just as it is this word isn’t also a concept, being instead just the name of one, the fixed repository of an underlying subject, whereas ‘being,’ ‘unitary entity,’ ‘unity,’ ‘subject,’ and so on are directly suggestive of concepts. Even when speculative truths are predicated of this underlying subject, there’s nothing conceptual immanent within their content since such content is present only in the manner of an inert subject; and under these circumstances they easily lapse into a form of mere edification. So too, from this perspective the drawback inherent in the common practice of rendering a speculative predicate in propositional form instead of as concept and essence might be magnified or mitigated by the very way in which a philosophical presentation is worded. Such a presentation, in keeping with its insight into the nature of speculative truth, must retain the dialectical form and admit nothing except insofar as it’s comprehended and conceptual.



93 Just as the argumentational approach is a hindrance to philosophical study, so also is an attitude of unreasoning smugness, one based on putative truths the possessors of which see no need to reexamine, believing themselves entitled simply to assume and assert them, as well as to judge and pass sentence in their name. In this regard it’s all the more urgent to reestablish philosophy as serious business. In the various sciences, arts, skills, and trades everyone knows that their mastery requires strenuous learning and practice. But when it comes to philosophy the prevailing prejudice is that, although not everyone who has eyes and fingers and is given leather and last is at once competent to make shoes, everyone knows how to philosophize and evaluate philosophy without further ado by virtue of his being innately endowed with reason—as if he didn’t just as readily possess the measure for a shoe in his own foot. One would think that philosophical competence [M50] resides precisely in the absence of knowledge and study, as though philosophy left off where they began. Philosophy is commonly construed as a formalistic, contentless mode of knowledge, and no notice is taken of the fact that whatever truth the content of any science or learned discipline has is worthy of the name only by virtue of this substantive content having been engendered by philosophy, in the absence of which the other sciences, try as they might and for all their reasoning, can have no vitality, no spirit, no truth.

94 In place of the long process of cultivation required by genuine philosophy, in place of the dynamic, as rich as it is deep, through which spirit arrives at knowledge, we're asked to accept revelations directly from heaven, or again to simply maintain a healthy common sense as untroubled as it is uncultivated by philosophy or other modes of knowledge, as though these were fully on a par with philosophical cultivation (as good a substitute as some claim chicory is for coffee). It's no pretty sight to see ignorance, bereft of form or taste, putting itself forth first as freedom of thought and tolerance, then as nothing short of genius, when all the while it can't even focus on a single abstract proposition, let alone the interrelation of several. As once in poetry, so now in philosophy, genius, we all know, is the rage; but even when its ingenious productions have made some sort of sense, it has churned out not poetry but trite prose or, when venturing beyond that, demented rhetoric. So now this "natural philosophizing," convinced that it's too precious to trouble itself with concepts and that in fact its intuitive and poetic power is enhanced when conceiving is avoided, peddles the arbitrary concoctions (which are neither fish nor fowl, poetry nor philosophy) of an imagination driven to distraction by its own mentations.

95 When on the other hand this natural philosophizing immerses itself in the slower stream of sound common sense, the best it does is spout trivial rhetorical truths. And when reproached with their insignificance, it assures us that their meaning and profundity abides in its heart and no doubt in the hearts of others too, [M51] since merely to mention the innocence of the heart, purity of conscience, and the like is of course to invoke ultimate truths to which no exception can be taken and which require nothing more. But one's concern should be to bring what's best out of the labyrinth and into the light of day rather than leaving it locked up in the recesses of the inner. Bringing forth "definitive" truths of the above sort is hardly worth the trouble, their having long been available in catechisms, old saws, and the like.

96 –Surely it isn't hard to grasp how vague and distorted such truths are, or to show that the mind entertaining them tends to hold the exact opposite to be true at the same time. Struggling to work itself free of the confusions it has wrought, such a mentality simply slips into new ones, and inevitably ends up insisting that "this question has been settled," that the truth is such and such and everything else mere sophistry. Common sense is quick to use epithets like these against cultivated reason, just as the expression 'idle daydreaming' sums up once and for all what philosophy is to those who know nothing about it. Having made its appeal to feeling, to the oracle within, common sense makes short work indeed of anyone attempting to disagree. And the only explanation it feels called upon to give is that it simply has nothing more to say to anyone who doesn't have the same inner promptings and feelings. In plain terms, it tramples underfoot the roots of humanity. For to press toward agreement with others is in the very nature of humanity, which truly exists only in an actually realized community

of minds. To remain under the sway of feeling, able to express oneself only through it, is antihuman, is bestial.

97 Should anyone ask for a royal road to scientific wisdom,⁹ tell him that there's no smoother way than to rely on healthy common sense, and beyond that, to keep up with the times and with new developments in philosophy, reading reviews of philosophical works, on occasion even their prefaces and first paragraphs. This last will provide the general principles on which everything else hinges, while the reviews, buttressed by historical surveys, will add a dimension of critical acumen that as such must have already gone beyond what's being judged. On this well-worn road casual dress will do. But as for those devotees [M52] of the Eternal, the Holy, and the Infinite, they sally forth in the raiment of high priests on a quest for the inner sanctum at which they've in fact already arrived: being in its immediacy, that wellspring of ingenious profundities and meteoric aperçus. But just as yon profundities somehow fail to disclose the wellspring of essentiality, neither do these skyrocketers herald the empyrean. True ideas and scientific insight are won only by strenuous conceptual effort. This alone can bring about the universality integral to knowledge in its cultivated and perfected state, capable of becoming the common property of self-conscious reason at large—something completely different from the all-too-common vagueness and shabbiness of common sense, and altogether unlike that most uncommon commonplace that issues from a self-corrupting faculty of reason glutted with laziness and pretensions to genius.

98 Since what I maintain is that science owes its very existence to the self-movement of conception, and since current notions about truth's nature and mode of embodiment diverge from, indeed collide head-on with this (both in the ways mentioned above and in various more or less peripheral ones), it would seem that any attempt at setting forth the system of science in the form just proposed stands little chance of being favorably received. But I find solace in recalling that although there were periods when, for instance, the excellence of Plato's philosophy was somehow seen as located in his scientifically worthless myths, there have also been times (albeit called times of unbridled enthusiasm by some) when Aristotle's philosophy was esteemed for its speculative depth, when Plato's *Parmenides* (surely the greatest artistic achievement of ancient dialectic) was regarded as the true revelation and positive expression of divine life, and when, despite the haze that surrounds the products of so-called ecstasy, this so often misunderstood ecstasy was meant to be nothing short of conception in its purity. Further, at its very best the philosophy of our time knows full well that its value lies in its scientific character and that, despite what anybody else might think, it's by virtue of this alone that it has any value at all. Accordingly, I too may hope that

9. A play on Euclid's assertion: "There's no royal road to geometry."

my attempt to vindicate the conceptual nature of science and to set it forth in this its proper element will, because of the truth inherent in it, be granted [M53] a fair hearing.

99 –We have to hold to the conviction that truth by its very nature wins through when its time has come, and makes its appearance only when that time has come—never too soon, never for an unripe public. And the individual needs this to happen as confirmation of what had thus far been only his own solitary undertaking—needs to experience that this conviction, which was once the property only of the exceptional, is something now held in common. In this, however, it's often necessary to distinguish between the public and those who put themselves forward as its representatives and spokespersons. In many respects the attitude of the former is quite different from and even contrary to the latter. While the public is inclined good-naturedly to blame itself when it doesn't find a philosophical work to its liking, these others, certain of their own competence, place all the blame on the author. The impact of a work like this upon the public is certainly a good deal quieter than the activity of these dead burying their dead.¹⁰ While the overall level of public acumen is now more highly cultivated, its curiosity sharper and its judgment more swift (so that the feet of those who will carry thee out are already at the door¹¹), one can betimes discern a slower effect that puts into proper focus all the publicity aroused by grandiose claims and contemptuous dismissals, an effect which eventually gives one party a place in the coming era while leaving another without a place in posterity.

100 Be that as it will, in an age in which spirit at large has gained so much in strength while individuality has befittingly come to matter that much less—with spirit in possession of and intent upon maintaining its entire compass along with the abundance it has brought to refinement—the part falling to the individual in the collective work of spirit can only be very small. For his part the individual must all the more, as the very nature of science entails, forget himself. While he must of course strive to become and do what he can, less need be required of him, just as he may expect less of and demand less for himself. [M57]



10. Matthew 8:22.

11. Acts 5:9.

INTRODUCTION

1 It is natural to suppose that in philosophy, before getting on with one's main concern, that of actually knowing what in truth is, one first has to understand the intellect, this being commonly regarded as an instrument with which to get hold of the absolute truth or as a medium through which one beholds it. There seems good reason for concern whether there might be various kinds of knowledge, one perhaps better suited to this end than another, so that by choosing the wrong one—or, assuming the intellect to be a faculty finite in kind and scope, by failing to determine with precision its nature and limits—one might embrace clouds of error instead of the clear skies of truth. Such concerns are bound to lead to the conviction that the whole idea of undertaking to secure for consciousness what things are in themselves by means of the intellect is absurd, and that between the intellect and absolute truth there lies a barrier that quite simply separates them. For, supposing that the intellect is an instrument for apprehending what absolutely is, it readily occurs to us that when we apply an instrument to an object we aren't letting the object be what it is in its own right but are undertaking to alter it or change its form. Supposing, on the other hand, that the intellect isn't a tool we actively employ but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then once again what we receive isn't the truth as it is in itself but only as it is in and through this medium. Either way we're employing a means that brings about the direct opposite of its purpose—which is to say that the absurdity lies instead in our making use of a means at all.

2 –It might of course seem that we could find a way out of this predicament by figuring out exactly how this “instrument” works, since that would enable us to take the representation of absolute truth that we obtained by means of it, subtracting the portion of the end product [M58] that's due to it and thus leaving us with what's clearly

true. Yet a remedy such as this would in fact only bring us back to where we were before. For were we to subtract from anything whose form has been altered by an instrument whatever effect is due to the instrument, then the thing (here absolute truth) becomes for us exactly what it was before this consequently pointless effort. Even supposing absolute truth to have somehow merely been brought closer to us without alteration by the instrument (like a bird caught with a lime twig), then it itself, were it not by its very nature and of its own accord by our side all along, would doubtless find this artifice laughable. For an artifice is just what the intellect would then be, pretending through elaborate labors to accomplish something altogether different from what would be achieved merely through a direct and hence effortless relation. –Or again, supposing the intellect to be some sort of “medium,” were we to examine it to ascertain the “law of its refraction” so as to remove this effect from the result, once again we’d gain nothing. For knowledge isn’t a refraction away from the ray through which truth reaches us, but rather is that refracted ray itself; and were *this* removed, nothing would be indicated to us but a sheer direction [namely that of our gaze]—in effect a blank spot.

3 If, meanwhile, worry about falling into error makes one mistrustful of science, which goes right to work without such misgivings and actually does come to know, it’s hard to see why one shouldn’t instead mistrust this mistrust and be concerned as to whether dread of error isn’t itself already an error. Indeed it takes a good deal for granted, basing its doubts and conclusions on assumptions whose truth is itself in need of prior critical scrutiny. It presupposes that the intellect is validly represented as instrument or medium, and even as something distinct from ourselves. But above all it assumes that ‘what absolutely is’ stands fixed on one side and the intellect by itself on the other—separated from it, yet somehow still reliable—in other words takes for granted that an intellect excluded from it, and hence from the truth as well, nonetheless holds true: a presupposition whereby what calls itself [M59] fear of error sooner gives itself away as fear of the truth.

4 The basis for so concluding is that only *what is* absolutely is true, that is, that the truth alone is what absolutely is. One might disregard this, subtilizing that an intellect that doesn’t comprehend what absolutely is in the way that science does may nonetheless be true too, and that, even if the intellect were to prove incapable of grasping such, it might still be capable of truth of another sort. But by this point it’s obvious that all that comes of such mealy-mouthing is a murky distinction between absolute truth and some other kind of truth, and that the terms ‘absolute,’ ‘intellect,’ and so forth presuppose a meaning that’s yet to be ascertained.

5 Instead of troubling ourselves with such useless notions and locutions concerning the intellect as ‘instrument for apprehending what absolutely is’ or ‘medium

through which we behold the truth' (the sort of relations one ends up with when the intellect is thought of as cut off from the absolute and the absolute as isolated from it); instead of putting up with the evasions that scientific incompetence concocts once having presupposed such relations in order to avoid the rigorous demands of science while still appearing to be earnestly and zealously engaged; instead of bothering to refute all this, we could simply reject these arbitrary notions out of hand. And the concomitant use of words like 'absolute' and 'cognition,' 'objective,' and 'subjective,' and countless others whose meaning is presumed to be familiar to all, could be regarded as just so much cant. For the claim that their meaning is generally familiar, or even that anyone is in possession of their concept, has every appearance of an attempt to avoid doing what matters most, namely to provide this concept. With greater justification we could instead just ignore such locutions and notions whose effect would be to preclude scientific knowledge; for the vacuous appearance of knowledge they provide vanishes [M60] so soon as science emerges.

6 –Yet the fact that science does emerge means that it is itself something in process of appearing; in its first emergence it isn't yet sufficiently articulated and elaborated to be true science. Hence it doesn't matter whether we portray incipient science, emerging as it does alongside some other way of knowing, as the initial appearance of true science, or portray that other, untrue form as its initial appearance. Either way, science has to work free of this mere apparentness, and can do so only by confronting it head-on. For science can't just dismiss a way of knowing that isn't true as being a vulgar view of things, giving assurance that it itself is knowledge of a wholly different sort and that the other is of no significance to it. Nor can it look to the other for portents of something better to come. By the former assurance science would be as much as declaring that sheerly because it exists it holds sway—but then an untrue way of knowing could just as well appeal to the fact that *it* exists, and give assurance that so far as *it's* concerned science is of no relevance; and one bare assurance is worth as much as another. Even less is science in a position to argue its case by alluding to the "better aspects" of an untrue way of thinking, those pointing in its own direction; for then not only would it again be making appeal to the sheer fact that it exists, but to itself as present in that untrue way of thinking, that is, to a defective version of what it is—as it appears to be rather than as it is in and present to itself.

7 –For this reason, we're here obliged to undertake an exposition of knowledge in the very process of its emergence.

8 Now because its object is knowledge that's only in process of coming to light, this exposition doesn't itself seem to qualify as science freely unfolding in properly scientific form, but it can from this standpoint be viewed as the odyssey of natural consciousness pressing on toward true knowledge, or as the journey of the soul wandering

through a series of transformations as through stages preordained by its very nature, that it might attain clarity of mind by so completely experiencing itself that it comes to know what it inherently is.

9 Natural consciousness will prove to be knowledge only in concept, not in reality. Yet since it straight away thinks that it does really know, it views [M61] its experiential path in a negative light, deeming the realization of its way of conceiving as instead the loss of itself, in that along this path such consciousness does lose its truth. Thus the course it follows could be viewed as the path of doubt or, more accurately, as a passage to despair. For what happens along it isn't what one ordinarily understands by doubt—a bit of jostling with this or that supposed truth, followed in due order by dissipation of doubt and return to supposed truth, so that in the end the matter is viewed just as before. Rather is this the path of conscious insight into the untruth of knowledge that's still in process of appearing, which takes as most reliable what in truth is merely some unrealized concept.

10 –Such thoroughgoing skepticism is thus hardly the manner of knowledge with which well-intentioned zeal for truth and science imagines itself armed and ready—resolved not to submit to the authority of what others think in scientific matters, but always to examine things oneself and follow one's own convictions—or better yet, to produce everything oneself and accept only one's own achievement as tried and true. Rather does the series of transformations that consciousness undergoes along this path recapitulate the comprehensive history of the education of consciousness itself to science. Whereas the above resolve, in the facile manner characteristic of such simplistic designs, misconceives education as a task no sooner set than done, the progress of natural consciousness involves actually seeing this education through.

11 –Now of course following one's own conviction is by all means more impressive than just submitting to authority. But simply to take an opinion held by an authority and turn it into an opinion held on the strength of one's own conviction doesn't necessarily change the content of the opinion and replace error with truth. The only difference between being caught up in a system of beliefs and prejudices based on the authority of others and one based on one's own conviction lies in the conceit accompanying the latter. Nothing short of a skepticism directed against the entire compass of emerging consciousness can render the mind sufficiently adept to examine what the truth is, since it's this that leads one to despair of all so-called natural representations, thoughts and opinions [M62] regardless of whose they are, notions that so encumber any consciousness proceeding headlong into such a test as in fact to render it incapable of doing what it means to do.

12 As for the exhaustiveness of the forms of unreal consciousness to be considered, this follows of itself by virtue of the necessity of the progression and the way that these

forms interlink. To make this clearer we can note generally, and by way of anticipation, that exposing untrue modes of consciousness in their untruth isn't entirely a negative procedure. Of course natural consciousness tends as a rule to adopt just such a one-sided perspective. And indeed one of the forms of immature consciousness that we'll consider in its place along the way is a manner of knowing that makes such one-sidedness its very principle: the kind of skepticism that always sees everything come down to nothing and remains abstractly out of touch with the fact that this "nothing" is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results. Nullity is a genuine result only when grasped in the context of that from which it proceeds. But thus is it a *specific* nullity, one with substantive content. A skepticism that ends up with abstract nullity or vacuity has nowhere to go; it can only wait for something else to turn up so that this too can be "identified" and thrown into the same abyss. When by contrast a negative result is grasped as it is in truth—as a specific negation—then by this very fact a new form of awareness has arisen; moreover in such negation a transition is effected whereby progress through the whole series of transformations takes place all by itself.

13 For knowledge, however, the goal it has thus set for itself is as ineluctable as its successive advances. The goal is there where knowledge no longer has need to go beyond itself, where it discovers its own nature, where concept corresponds with object and object with concept. Accordingly progress toward this goal is equally inexorable, and at no stopping place short of it is satisfaction to be found. Any being that's confined by nature to a given way of life is unable on its own to transcend its immediate way of existing, but sooner or later is driven from it by external forces—an uprooting [M63] tantamount to its death. Consciousness, however, is integrally conceptual, hence immediately transcends its confines—and, inasmuch as these confines are its own, transcends itself. To establish anything singular is, for consciousness, at the same time to establish that there's something beyond it, even when, as in spatial intuition, this beyond consists merely in what's next to the space being delimited.

14 –Consciousness, then, suffers at its own hands the violence of having all limited satisfactions spoiled for it. Under the goad of a taskmaster such as this it may in its dread shrink from the truth and struggle to hang on to what it's in danger of losing. But it can find no peace. Suppose it tries to remain in a state of thoughtless indolence: thought intrudes upon its thoughtlessness, and its own unrest rouses it from its inertia. Suppose it fortifies itself with a kind of sentimentality that gives assurance of finding everything "good in its own way": such an assurance suffers violence at the hands of reason, which finds anything *not* to be good insofar as it's good merely "in its own way." Or suppose that in fear of truth it hides from self and others behind a façade of such burning zeal for truth that it becomes difficult or even impossible for it to find any truth—other than that of a vanity ever more clever than any idea one comes by on one's own or via others. Such vanity, so expert at fending off truth and withdrawing

into itself, and so delighted with its unfailing ingenuity in eviscerating ideas and finding in them no content save that of a barren ego, is a form of satisfaction we'll have to leave to its own devices, for it's in flight from human community and prefers to abide all on its own.



15 So much for general and preliminary remarks about the nature and necessity of the progression. It might be useful, however, to point out something about the method to be employed in seeing it through. Inasmuch as this exposition purports to relate science to knowledge in process of coming to light as well as to investigate and examine the reality of such knowledge, it would seem that we can't get anywhere without some presupposition that would serve as our basic criterion of evaluation. For an examination consists in applying an accepted standard and deciding whether something is correct or incorrect on the basis of [M64] whether it is or isn't in accord with that standard. Whatever standard we accept—including scientific knowledge, if that's to be the criterion—would thereby be accepted as fundamental, as something inherently so. But since science is only making its first appearance at this point, neither it nor anything else has been rightly established as fundamentally or inherently so; and in the absence of such, it would seem that no examination can be made.

16 This perplexity and its resolution can be put into clearer focus by first calling to mind the abstract terms 'knowing' and 'truth' as met with in consciousness. Consciousness distinguishes something from itself even while relating itself to it—or, as we say, something is present to consciousness—and the defining aspect of this relation, the being that something has for a given mode of consciousness, is what's "known." –But we distinguish between the being that anything has in relation to what's other than it and the being it has in itself; what's related to a given way of knowing is accordingly distinguished from that way of knowing and posited as also existing outside this relation—existing thus in itself, this being the aspect referred to as "truth." What exactly these terms may turn out to involve doesn't concern us further here, since our object is knowledge in process of appearing. Its specifics will accordingly be taken into consideration directly as they present themselves, being grasped then in keeping with what they indeed present.

17 If, now, we investigate a given way of knowing as to its truth, it would seem that we're seeking to know what such knowledge amounts to in itself. Yet as we investigate it, it becomes *our* object—is what it is for us—and its 'being in itself' as thus brought to light would just be what it is for us. Whatever we might assert as its essence, rather than being the truth of it, might be only what *we* know of it. The essence or criterion would lie within us, and any way of knowing that's supposed to be compared with it in order to reach a decision wouldn't necessarily have to recognize the validity of that standard.

18 But the nature of the object we're examining obviates this disjunction (or semblance of such) and the presupposition underlying it. Consciousness provides its criterion from within, and so the investigation will consist in consciousness comparing itself with itself, since the moments [or dynamic components] of the distinction just made [between 'incipient knowing' and 'truth'] both fall within the purview of consciousness. In consciousness [M65] one of the two is relative to the other—that is, consciousness in all instances contains within it what's determinative [i.e., negative] of the moment consisting in a given way of *knowing*. Moreover it's evident to consciousness that this other moment *isn't* in turn just relative to that given way of knowing but also exists outside this relation, that is, in *itself*, the moment consisting of the *truth*. Thus whatever consciousness attests from within as being what's inherently so, as what's true, provides us a standard that it itself sets up by which to gauge its knowledge.

19 –If we refer to a given way of knowing as a way of 'conceiving' and refer to the essence or truth as 'what matter-of-factly is' or 'the object,' then the examination consists in seeing whether this conception accords with that object. On the other hand if we refer to the object's essence, what it is in itself, as the 'concept,' and understand by 'the object' the object *as object*—being in this way relative to something that's other than it—then the examination consists in seeing whether the object accords with that concept. Clearly it comes to the same either way. But it's essential to bear in mind throughout the entire investigation that both moments—concept and object, whichever is [deemed] relative and whichever a being in itself—fall within the purview of the very way of knowing that we're investigating. Hence we've no need to import criteria or bring notions of our own into the investigation; it's precisely by leaving these out that we succeed in viewing the matter *as it is in and present to itself*.

20 Yet it isn't just in keeping with this aspect (that conception and object, standard and test-subject are already present in consciousness) that contributions from us are superfluous, but also in that consciousness is self-examining, sparing us even the trouble of setting up a comparison and actually conducting the test; all that remains for us to do is watch from the sidelines. For consciousness is aware of an object, and on the other hand is aware of itself—is both conscious of what it deems true and conscious of its knowing it thus. Since both aspects exist for the same consciousness, it is itself their comparison: it becomes evident to this very consciousness whether or not its knowledge of the object accords with the object.

21 –Now it seems that an object will be present to consciousness only in the way that it knows the object. There seems no way for consciousness to as it were "get behind" the object so as to examine it for what it is in itself rather than simply for consciousness, and in so doing also [M66] test its knowledge.

22 –Yet precisely in that it knows of an object at all, a differentiation of moments is already in hand—that of its awareness of something that exists in itself, and that of its

knowledge, the being that the object has for consciousness. This differentiation present within consciousness provides the basis for the examination. If knowledge and object don't correspond when compared, then it seems evident that consciousness has to modify its knowledge so as to bring it into conformity with the object—although in fact, as knowing alters, the object itself alters too, since the way of knowing at issue was essentially knowledge of that manner of object. The object that in essence belonged to the former way of knowing becomes other than what it was, doing so right along with the knowing. In this way it becomes evident to consciousness that what it previously took to be something as *it* is in *itself* isn't that at all, but was such only for consciousness. Thus when consciousness finds that within its object its knowledge isn't corresponding to that object, the object itself doesn't stay the same. Moreover the standard of the examination changes when that for which it was supposed to be the standard fails to stand the test; this isn't just a test of a given way of knowing but of the test's own criterion as well.

23 The dialectical progression that consciousness sees through internally, affecting both its knowledge and its object in such a way that a new, true object issues from it, is what's really meant by the word 'experience.' With this in mind, we can further clarify the scientific nature of the following exposition by paying special attention to a particular phase of the process. –Consciousness knows "something." The object is the essence of that something, what it is in itself; but it's also something in itself *for consciousness*—whereby the dual significance of this truth enters in. We see here that consciousness has two objects: the first, what the object is in itself, the second, such being as the object in itself has for consciousness. The latter object appears at first to be merely an internal reflection on the part of consciousness, a representation not of the initial object but only of such knowledge as it has of that object. Yet as already shown, that object is thereby changed for consciousness; it ceases to be something in itself and becomes an object that exists in itself only as present to consciousness. [M67] But with this, such being as this entity in itself has for consciousness is *just what it in truth is*—meaning that this *is* the essence, the object of consciousness. This new object contains the nullity of the first—is what has been experienced of it.

24 In this exposition of the course of experience there is a moment by virtue of which it doesn't seem to concur with our ordinary understanding of experience. Concerning the transition from the first object and our knowledge of it to the second—the one ordinarily said to occasion the experience—we maintained that the way in which the first object is known, the way in which this entity in itself is initially present to consciousness, should itself become the second object. Usually it seems that we instead experience the untruth of our initial conception by, in external fashion, happening upon some other object, so that all that's left for us to do is "assimilate" this other entity existing self-containedly on its own. But in our view the new object shows itself to have come into being through a turnabout on the part of consciousness itself. This way

of looking at the matter, whereby the successive experiences of consciousness advance scientifically, is our contribution and isn't within the purview of the mode of consciousness under scrutiny.

25 –This development is in fact the same as that encountered above when, in discussing the relation of the present exposition to skepticism, we said that whenever a given way of knowing proves to be untrue, the result isn't to be construed simply as a collapse into vacuous nullity, but perforce as the resultant nullity solely of that way of knowing, that is, a result that retains whatever is true in that previous way of knowing. As is then evident, since what at first appeared as the object dwindles before consciousness to but a certain way of knowing it, with this entity in itself turning out to be such as it is for consciousness, that way of knowing is itself the new object, whereby a new embodiment of consciousness emerges as well, one for which the essence is something other than the one that preceded.

26 –This same development governs the whole series of consciousness's embodiments as they follow of necessity. It's just this necessity, the emergence of a new object presenting [M68] itself to consciousness without the latter knowing how that happens, that falls within our purview while taking place as though behind consciousness's back. As it progresses in this way there is a [recurrent] moment in which what exists in itself, while evident to us, isn't apparent to the consciousness caught up in the experience. The substantive content of what emerges for us is nonetheless evident to it, and what we alone comprehend is only how consciousness is taking form, the pure process of its emergence; what has come about is present to it only as object, to us as genesis and development as well.

27 Inasmuch as this progression is necessary, the road toward science is science already, and indeed, given the nature of its content, is the science of the experience of consciousness.

28 In keeping with its conceptual nature, the experience of self that consciousness completes can comprise nothing less than the systemic whole of conscious existence, the entire realm of spirit's truth, in order for the moments of experience to be manifest in the character distinctive to each—existing then not in pure abstract form but as they are for consciousness, or as it emerges in relation to them, whereby these moments of the whole are indeed embodiments of consciousness itself. As it presses on toward its true existence, consciousness will reach a point at which it sheds the illusion that it's beset with something alien, something it apprehends only subjectively and that exists as something other than it—the point at which appearance and essence become identical, at which consciousness's own exposition coincides with the science of spirit proper. There at last, as consciousness comprehends this its own essence, it will disclose the nature of absolute knowledge itself. [M69]



I

SENSE-CERTAINTY

The This and Meaning

1 The way of knowing that is our first or immediate object can be none other than knowing that's itself immediate: knowledge of what's directly present or matter-of-factly *is*. We accordingly have to take a direct or receptive approach, changing nothing in what's there from the way it presents itself, apprehending it without preconceptions.

2 The concrete content of sense-certainty readily appears as knowledge of the richest kind, indeed knowledge of such infinite bounty that, were we to venture out into the expanses of space and time over which its content extends, or take some portion of this plenum and delve into it bit by bit, we'd find no limit to it. Moreover, this seems the most reliable form of knowledge since, having as yet deleted nothing from the object, it has the object in *its* entirety right there before it.

3 –Yet in fact such certainty presents itself as truth of a most paltry and abstract sort. All that it tells about what it knows is that this *is*; and its truth entails only the bare *being* of the matter, while consciousness for its part exists in this certainty only as pure I—that is, I exist here only as sheer This, and the object likewise as sheer This. I, *this* I, am certain of *this* matter at hand, not because through it I've undergone some sort of development or am moved to any complexity of thought, nor because this entity of which I'm certain is an aggregate of distinct properties, something comprising a rich nexus of relations either in itself or by relating variously to other things. Neither is the case with sense-certainty's truth; neither I nor the matter at hand is here indicative of a complex mediation: the I gives no indication of involving a complex process

of imagining or thinking, nor does the matter at hand give indication of having a multiplicity of properties; instead, such and such matter at hand *is*—and it is, simply because it is. “It *is*”: this is what’s of the essence to sense-knowledge. And this sheer being, [M70] this simple immediateness, is what its truth consists of. Insofar as this manner of certainty interrelates anything, it does so in a sheerly immediate way: consciousness is “I” and nothing more, a sheer This, a single being who knows a sheer this, a single particular.

4 Yet as we watch, we see that a lot more is in play in the “sheer being” that constitutes this certainty’s essence and that it asserts as its truth. In actual occurrence sense-certainty isn’t just “pure immediacy,” but rather an *instance* of such. Throughout the countless variations of it thus encountered, we everywhere observe a fundamental incongruity: in sense-certainty both of the two thises mentioned previously (this as I and this as object) extend beyond sheer being. As we reflect upon this incongruity, it becomes evident that in sense-certainty neither this is purely immediate, but rather each is at the same time mediated. My being certain of anything is due to something besides myself, namely the matter at hand, which in turn is present in sense-certainty due to something other than it, namely the I.

5 This distinction between essence and instance, immediacy and mediation, isn’t made only by us; rather do we find it in sense-certainty itself—and it’s to be taken up in the form in which it exists there rather than as we just specified it. In sense-certainty, as one this is being put forth as a simple matter of immediate fact—the essence, the object—another this is being put forth as something unessential, mediated, existing not in itself but only via something else—the I, the knowing—which knows of such and such object only because that object exists, and which could for its part be or not be. But the object, as essence and truth, exists whether known or not, and continues to exist even if not known—whereas, if there’s no object, there’s no knowing it.

6 The object accordingly has to be considered as to whether it in fact exists in sense-certainty as the sort of entity the latter gives it out to be, whether this conception of it—as essence—accords with the way it is present there. To this end we don’t have to reflect on and ponder over what the object might be in truth but need [M71] only consider it as it is present in sense-certainty.

7 Sense-certainty is then itself to be asked: What is this ‘this’? Taking it in the two-fold form of its matter-of-fact being—as here and as now—the dialectic implicit within it will become as comprehensible in form as the this itself. To the question “What is now?” we answer, for instance, “Now is night.” To test the truth of this sensuously evident certainty a simple experiment will suffice: we write it down. A truth can lose nothing by being recorded any more than by being retained. But if now, at noon, we look again at our recorded truth, we’ll have to say that it has gone stale.

8 The now that's night is carried over, that is, treated as just what it's given out to be, as something that matter-of-factly *is*—yet turns out to be something that matter-of-factly *is not*. The now as such does indeed endure, but as a now that isn't night; and it likewise sustains itself in face of any day that it is, as a now that also isn't day—as something in all instances negative. Hence this self-sustaining now isn't immediate but mediated, being specified as an enduring and self-sustaining now by the fact that another now (day, night) is *not*. Thus specified, it's just as simply now as before, and in this simplicity what's at any time instantiative of it is a matter of indifference: as little as its being is comprised in night and in day, it nonetheless *is* day and night, and it's unaffected by this its heterogeneity. A *simplex* entity of this sort, existing via negation, as neither this nor that but as a “non-this,” and which nonetheless is this or that indifferently, is what we call a *universal*—the universal being then what's in fact true in sense-certainty.

9 It's also as a universal that we give utterance to the sensuous. We say: “this” (the universal this), or “It is” (the being of anything at all). We don't of course envision the universal this or being at large, yet it's the universal that we express: we simply don't give utterance to the this as we mean it in such sense-certainty. But it is language, as we [M72] see, that's the more truthful; in speaking, we ourselves directly refute what we thus mean. And since sense-certainty's truth is the universal and language expresses this alone, it's not even possible for us ever to voice any being of sense in the way that we mean it.

10 The same will turn out to be the case with the other form of the this: the here. “Here is,” for instance, “a tree.” No sooner do I turn around than this truth is lost from view and the here turned into something contrary: “Here isn't a tree, but a house.” The here itself doesn't vanish; it continues to exist despite the vanishing of the house, tree, and so on, and is house or tree indifferently. Here again the this manifests itself as mediated simplicity, as a universal.

11 So, for such sense-certainty, having shown from within that the truth of its object is the universal, ‘sheer being’ is still what it takes to be its essence—not, however, being in its immediacy but rather being to which negation and mediation are indispensable, hence no longer as what we mean by ‘being’ but rather being specified as abstract, as pure universal; and all that remains counter to this vacuous or contentually indifferent now and here is our act of meaning, for which the universal *isn't* taken to be what's true in sense-certainty.

12 As we compare the initial relation of knowledge and object with that in which they've come to stand in this result, we see that it's been reversed. The object that was supposedly essential is now unessential to sense-certainty, since the universal that it turned out to be is no longer what such certainty supposed it in essence to be; what's certain is now instead located on the opposite side of the relation—in knowing—

which previously was unessential. Sense-certainty's truth now resides in the object as *my* [meinem] object, in what it is that I *mean* [Meinen]: the object exists because I know of it. Now while the certainty of sense has thus indeed been expelled from the object, it hasn't as yet been sublated thereby, having merely been shoved over into the I. –Yet to be seen is what experience shows us about such certainty's reality.

13 The force of sense-certainty's truth thus lies now in the I, in the [M73] directness with which I see, hear, and so on, and the ephemerality of the single nows and heres that we mean is held in check by the fact that I hold them fast. "Now it is day, because I see it," and "Here is a tree," for just the same reason. Yet in this relation what sense-certainty goes through internally is the very dialectic seen above. I—this I—see a tree, asserting it as here, but another I sees a house and asserts "Here's not a tree but a house." Authenticating both truths is one and the same thing—firsthand seeing—and both I's are completely confident and sure of what they know, even though each vanishes in the other.

14 What doesn't vanish in this process is the I as universal, whose seeing isn't the seeing of a tree or house, but a simplex seeing, one mediated by the negation of any given house, and so on, precisely thereby remaining simple and indifferent to whatever (tree, house, etc.) instantiates it. In all instances the I is but a universal like the now, here, or this. Of course I mean a single I; but I can't articulate the singular by saying "I" any more than I can when I say "now" or "here." When I say "*this* here," "*this* now," "*this* particular," I'm saying *all* thises, heres, nows, *all* particulars, just as, when I say "I, this one and only I," I'm still speaking of something general—*all* I's—each and every one of which is what I'm giving utterance to: I, this one particular I. So when [philosophical] science is challenged with the impossible task of deducing, constructing, or determining a priori (or however one puts it) something referred to as "this" thing or "this" person, it's only fitting that the challenger should say which 'this thing' or 'this person' is meant—although to *say* anything of this sort is impossible.

15 Sense-certainty thus experiences that its essence is comprised neither in the object nor in the I, and that unmediatedness applies neither to the one nor to the other; for in both what I mean is instead something nonessential—object and I turning out to be universals in which the now, here, and I that I mean don't hold their own or so much as exist. What we [M74] end up having to affirm as sense-certainty's essence is the integral whole of sense-certainty itself, not just one or the other of its moments, as in the above cases where first the object as opposed to the I, and then the I itself, were supposed to be its reality. Thus only as such a whole does sense-certainty keep hold of itself in its unmediatedness, shutting out all the previously-met-with evidence to the contrary.

16 Sheer immediacy of this sort is thus no longer concerned with the otherness experienced in a 'here that is a tree' turning into a 'here that isn't a tree,' a 'now that is day'

turning into a 'now that is night,' or in there being some other I that has something else as object. The truth of such immediacy is sustained in a static, homogeneous relating that admits of no distinction between I and object, essential and nonessential, a way of relating that's impervious to difference. Accordingly, I—this I—assert the here to be a tree, and I don't turn around so that for me the here isn't a tree; I pay no attention to there being some other I that doesn't see the here as a tree, or that at another time I myself don't see the here as a tree or the now as day. On the contrary, I am intuition pure and simple; for my part I maintain that now is day or that here is a tree, and I don't compare here and now with each other, but hold fast to a single straightforward relation: now is day.

17 Since certainty of this sort will pay scant heed to us if we call its attention to a now that's night or to an I for whom it's night, we'll go to it and let it show us the now that it affirms. And indeed we'll have to let it just show this to us, since the truth of a manner of relating that's as direct as this is that of an I reduced to a single now or here. Were we to take it up after the fact or stand at any distance from it, we'd miss the whole point of such truth, since we'd then have sublated the immediacy essential to it. Thus we have to enter the very same point of time or space, letting this certainty itself do the showing, letting it make us into this I that knows for sure. –So then, let's see how the immediacy it points out to us is constituted. [M75]

18 The now gets pointed out—this now: "Now!"—which even as it's pointed out is already gone. The now that *is* differs from the one pointed out, and we see that the now is something that, once it is, is no more. The now as pointed out is a now that *has been*; and this is the truth of it; it doesn't have the truth of being. So this much is still true: it has been. But what *has been* is in fact nothing that is; it *isn't*—and the point at issue is, after all, what *is*.

19 What we see in this process of pointing out is a progression along the following lines: (1) I point out the now, asserting it as what's true, but therein show it to have been, to be nullified, and in thus sublating the first truth (2) I'm now in effect asserting as a second truth that the now *has been*, it having been superseded. Yet since what has been is not, I (3) am thereby also sublating the second truth (its having been, its having been thus superseded), negating the negation of the now and returning to the first assertion, that the now *is*. Hence the now and the process of pointing it out are such that neither is simple and direct; rather do both progress through various moments: while 'this now' is to be affirmed, another now turns out to be affirmed instead, with this now ending up sublated; and the being of this 'other now' that superseded the first ends up itself sublated in turn, hereby reverting to the first. –However, this 'first now,' once reflected into itself, isn't quite the same as what it was at first, namely something immediate, being instead something indeed reflected into itself—something simplex—which remains what it is amidst its own otherness, a now that is literally any number of nows.

And this is the genuine now: the now as a simplex day, which contains many nows (hours) that contain many other nows (minutes), which in turn contain still other nows. –The act of pointing out the now is thus itself a processive articulation of what the now is in truth, namely a resultant now, one comprising a multiplicity of nows apprehended together: to point out the now is to experience that the now is a universal.

20 Similarly, when I hold on to some here that's been pointed out to me—a 'this here'—it too turns out to be not this here, but a before and behind, an above and below, a right [M76] and left. Likewise the above is itself a heterogeneous manifold of aboves, belows, and so on. The here that was supposed to be designated vanishes into other heres which themselves in turn vanish. What gets pointed out, held fast, and sustained is a negative This that *is* such solely in that these heres are being taken as they should be taken—yet of course are therein sublated, such a here being a simple complex of many heres. The here that was meant would be a point; but a point has no existence; when a point is nonetheless pointed out as existent, the act of pointing it out brings no direct knowledge to light, but rather progresses from some here that is meant, through many other heres, to a universal here which—just as a day is a simplex plurality of nows—is a simplex plurality of heres.

21 Clearly the dialectic of sense-certainty is but the simple history of sensuous process, sensuous experience; and all that sense-certainty itself amounts to is this mere history. Natural consciousness thus keeps arriving at this result, which is what's true in it and constitutes its experience—yet keeps forgetting this and starting the process all over again. Thus it's astonishing when, in the face of such experience, it is persistently alleged as a matter of universal experience, even as a philosophical tenet, indeed as the ultimate conclusion of Skepticism, that the reality or being of external things taken as thises (as sense objects) has—exclusively so—truth for consciousness. To make such an assertion is not to know what one is saying, is to be unaware that one is saying the opposite of what one means to say. The truth of the sensuous 'this' is for consciousness supposed to be a universal experience; but what's in fact universally experienced is quite the reverse. Each moment of consciousness sublates one such truth as 'here is a tree' or 'now is noon' and expresses one contrary to it such as 'here isn't a tree, but a house.' And no sooner does this first sublative assertion affirm a new sensuous this than it too is sublated. Throughout all of sense-certainty all that's really experienced is just what we've seen: the this is a universal, the complete contrary of what's claimed in the above proposition.

22 –Having thus [M77] invoked universal experience, we might take the liberty of anticipating something to be dealt with in our consideration of the practical realm. Those who assert that the reality of sense objects is what's true and certain are well advised to go back to the most elementary school of wisdom, to the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, as they've yet to learn the secret of the eating of bread

and the drinking of wine. For one who is initiated into these “secrets” not only comes to doubt the being of sensuous things but to despair of it, and sees that both he and they play a part in bringing about their nullity. Even animals aren’t excluded from this wisdom but prove themselves deeply initiated into it; for they don’t stand in awe of sensuous things as though before inviolable beings, but, despairing of their having any such reality and certain of their insignificance, they fall right to and eat them up. And indeed all of nature, like them, celebrates these open mysteries that teach the truth about sensuous things.

23 Those who make assertions like the above say (as we’ve noted) the direct opposite of what they mean, a phenomenon quite appropriately encouraging reflection upon the nature of sense-certainty. They talk about the existence of “external” objects, or more precisely “actual, utterly unique, wholly personal, individual things, none of which has an exact like”—this being, then, the kind of thing that has “absolute certainty and truth.” They mean, for instance, *this* piece of paper on which I’m now writing “this”—or rather have written it. But what they mean isn’t what they say. If they really did want to *say* the piece of paper that they mean (which is what they said they wanted to do), it would prove quite impossible, since the sensuous *this* that one means is inaccessible through language, which belongs to consciousness, to the inherently universal. In the attempt to say it, it would crumble away. Once begun, their description of it could never be completed, and would have to be handed on to others who’d later have to confess that they’re talking about a thing that no longer [M78] even exists. So while they do indeed mean this very piece of paper, which here is quite other than the one referred to above, they speak of “actual things,” “external (sensuous) objects,” “entirely unique entities,” and so on; that is, they invoke nothing but the universal in speaking of them.

24 –What’s commonly termed “inexpressible,” then, is precisely what’s untrue, irrational, what’s merely meant. If nothing more is predicated of a thing than that it’s an actual thing, an external object, then it’s merely being characterized in terms of the most general of all generalities, hence in the sense in which it’s identical to everything else rather than different. When I say “a single thing,” I’m saying something that’s entirely generic, since everything is a single thing; and so too, “this thing” can be anything you please. When more precisely designated as “this piece of paper,” still, each and every piece is a ‘this piece,’ and what I’ve said is always only the universal. So even when I try to help out language—whose divine nature instantly undercuts what I mean, changing my meaning into something else, not letting it have its say—by actually pointing to this piece of paper, I experience what the truth of sense-experience actually is. I point the thing out as a here that is a here of other heres, as one that contains a simplex togetherness of many heres: a universal. Thus do I grasp it as it truly is, and instead of knowing something immediate, I *perceive*. [M79]



II

PERCEPTION

Things and Illusoriness

1 Immediate certainty doesn't grasp truth; for while its truth is the universal, it tries to lay hold of the this. What perception on the other hand regards as matter-of-factly existent, it does regard as universal. Just as universality is its generic principle, so also are the moments differentiated within it: the I exists as a universal, and the object as a universal. With this principle now an established result for us, in taking up perception we'll no longer, as in sense-certainty, simply be receptive to whatever appears but apprehend what emerges of necessity.

2 –As this principle was emerging, both of the above moments, which came to light simply by extending beyond each other, came into their own: the one a manifestation process, the *perceiving*, and the other the same dynamic present in simplex form, the *object*. The object, while basically embodying the same process of unfolding and differentiating these moments, is the nexus of the two. As is implicitly evident (namely to us), the universal, as perception's principle, is the essence that perception is concerned with; and in the context of this abstraction the two moments differentiated—the perceiving and the perceived—are each by itself unessential. Yet because in fact the two of them together comprise a universal, an essence, they're essential after all—although since they relate to each other as contraries, only one of them can be essential in the context of their relation; and so differentiating which is essential and which not has to be sorted out between them. The one determined as being simplex, the object, is essential whether it's perceived or not, while the perceiving, which can occur or not, is unessential.

3 To specify the object more closely now by brief elaboration on our results thus far (anything more exhaustive being out of place at this point): since its principle, the universal, is, owing to its [M80] simplicity, *mediated*, an object of perception cannot but exhibit this mediated universality as integral to its nature, doing so as a ‘thing of multiple properties.’ The wealth of sense knowledge thus belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, for which this was merely an abundance of instances; for of the two only perception has negation—variation, complexity—integral to its essence.

4 The this is thus established as a ‘non-this this,’ a sublated this, hence not as just nothing but rather as a specific nullity, the nullity of a content, namely the this. What’s sensed is itself still present, albeit not in the way it was supposed to be there in immediate certainty (as some particular thing that one means) but rather in the form of a universal, one to be characterized as a ‘property.’ Here the true, dual significance of sublation, already encountered in connection with the negative thises, is evident: to sublata is at once to negate and to retain. Nullity that is the nullity of a this retains immediacy and is itself sensuous—an immediacy nonetheless present in the form of a universal.

5 –Yet being exists as a universal by virtue of its having mediation, a negative element, integrally within it—which it exhibits in its immediacy in the form of some specific property distinct from others. In this way multiple properties, each negative of others, are in play simultaneously. Exhibited in the simplicity of anything universal, and considered genuinely as properties only by virtue of some additional specificity of their own, these specific properties relate only to themselves and have no bearing on the others, with each then existing by itself independently of the others. But simplex, self-identical universality is itself in turn distinct from and independent of its specific properties, forming a pure self-to-self relation or *medium* within which these all subsist on their own, interpenetrating as though in simplex unity yet without touching one another—existing unaffectedly on their own simply as participants in that universality.

6 –This manner of abstract universal medium—which might be referred to generally as ‘thinghood’ or [individually] as some ordinary ‘entity’—is nothing but what the here and the now turned out to be, namely a simplex togetherness of many heres and nows each of which is, in its [M81] specificity, itself a simplex universal. This salt is a here that’s at once simple and complex: it is white, and *also* tangy, and *also* cubical in shape, and *also* has a certain density, and so on. These properties all exist in one simplex here, in which they accordingly interpenetrate; the here of each is no different from the here of any other, each being at all points in the same here as the others. At the same time, while not kept apart in diverse heres, they don’t affect each other as they interpenetrate: the whiteness doesn’t affect or alter the cubical shape, and neither of these affects the tanginess, and so on. Rather, since each simply refers to itself, it leaves

the others alone and relates to them solely via this indifferent ‘also.’ The also, then, is the pure universal itself, the medium, the thinghood that incorporates them thus.

7 In the relationship so far in evidence, our discussion has focused only on the character of positive universality; but there’s another aspect that still has to be taken into account. If each of these specific properties related only to itself and had nothing to do with the others, none of them would in fact be specific; for they’re specific only insofar as they’re at once *distinct from* other properties and *relate* to them as contraries. But being contraries, they can’t exist together in the simplex unity of their medium, even though it’s as essential to them as is negation. Their differentiating by excluding, their negating others rather than simply having nothing to do with them, has them falling outside any such simplex medium. Their medium is no longer just an ‘also,’ an indifferent unity, but is a ‘one’ as well, a manner of unity that excludes. The one is the negative moment of the medium itself as it relates simply to itself and excludes everything other than it, this being the moment whereby thinghood is specified as a given thing. In a property, negation exists as specificity that’s directly one with the immediacy of being—which in turn, via this oneness with negation, exists in the way that universality does. Yet in existing as a one, negation is freed from this unity with its counterpart and exists in and relative to itself. [M82]

8 Taken together these moments round out what a ‘thing,’ taken as what’s true in perception, amounts to so far as needs be done at this point. It is (1) an indifferent, passive universality: an also composed of several properties or rather forms of materiality; (2) a form of negation that’s nonetheless simple: a one, something that excludes contrary properties; and (3) the several properties themselves, which interconnect the first two moments: negation attaching to the indifferent element and diffusing throughout it to form a host of variations—a single point radiating into multiplicity within a sustaining medium. In that the various properties belong to an indifferent medium, they are themselves universal, relate solely to themselves, and don’t affect one another. In that they belong to a negative unity, they’re moreover exclusive, of necessity relating antithetically to properties outside the context of “their” also. *Sensuous* universality, a direct union of being and negating, exists as a property only insofar as a one and a *pure* universality [an also] develop from within it, are differentiated from each other, and merge with one another—this interconnection of sense properties with the pure fundamental moments [one and also] being what finally completes the ‘thing.’

9 So, then, this is how the thing of perception is constituted; and consciousness is said to perceive insofar as it has some such thing as its object. It need only take this object and conduct itself as pure apprehending—whatever it thus secures being what’s true. Were it to do anything actively while assimilating its object, it would, by whatever it thus added or deleted, alter the truth. Since the object is what’s true and universal, is something self-same, while consciousness sees itself as variable and nonessential, it’s

conceivable that consciousness might apprehend the object incorrectly and deceive itself. A perceiving consciousness is well aware of the possibility of deception since, in the universality serving as its principle, alternative modes of the object are readily evident, even if only by their absence, that is, their having been sublated. Its criterion of truth is thus self-sameness, and it tries to apprehend the object exactly as *it* is. Whenever any variation becomes evident to it, it has to connect these disjoint [M83] moments of its apprehension; and if in comparing them any dissimilarity shows up, this nontruth is due to perception, not to the object since it is self-same.



10 So now let's see what consciousness experiences when it actually perceives. This is already implicitly evident to us from the way in which the object was just now laid out and the way in which consciousness approaches it, and will consist merely in unpacking the contradictions present therein.

11 –While an object that I apprehend presents itself sheerly as one, any property that I'm aware of within it is universal, thereby extending beyond it in its singularity. Hence the objective entity's initial being—its being a one—wasn't its true being; yet since the object is what's true, what's untrue here falls on me: my apprehension wasn't correct. Due to the universality of the property, I have to reinterpret the object as a kind of 'community' [of it and its properties]. –So as I then further perceive that any given property is specific, being contrary to and incompatible with others, I realize that I didn't perceive the objective entity correctly when interpreted as a community with others or as a 'continuum.' Due to the specificity of each property I instead have to disrupt this continuum and redefine the objective entity as a one that's exclusive [of otherness]. –Within this now discrete one I find that there are several properties that don't affect each other and even have nothing to do with each other, and hence that I've perceived incorrectly in apprehending the object as excluding such. Rather than being a mere generic continuum, as considered above, the object is now an all-inclusive 'common medium' in which several properties are present as sensuous universals, with each existing on its own while, as specific, excluding the others. –But then the simple and true entity I'm perceiving isn't a universal medium either, but in fact just some 'isolated property' by itself which, as such, is neither a property nor anything specific, since now it neither inheres within a one nor exists in relation to any other property. Only within a one is it a property; and only in relation to other properties is it specific. Relating, as it does, solely to itself, this isolated property is basically just a form of sensuous being, since it [M84] no longer has within it the character of negativity, while consciousness, in attending thus to ordinary sensuous being, is now reduced to mere meaning, having, in other words, altogether ceased perceiving and involuted into itself. –But sensuous being and meaning mutate into perception. I'm being thrown back to the beginning and drawn into a cycle that sublates itself in each of its moments and as a whole.

12 So consciousness has of necessity to go through this cycle again, though not in the same way as it did the first time, having experienced that perception's end result as well as what's true for it is self-dissolutive, that is, that it is reflecting out of what's true and into itself. In this way the essential makeup of the perceptual process is settled for consciousness, namely that it doesn't consist in pure and simple apprehension, but instead reflects, while apprehending, out from what's true into itself. This involution on the part of consciousness, having shown itself to be indispensable to perception, directly interferes with any pure apprehension, altering what's true. Moreover consciousness is aware that this aspect of experience is its own doing, and takes this upon itself so as to retain the true object in its purity. That consciousness is forced back into itself just as occurred in sense-certainty is an experiential aspect now evident in its perceiving—albeit without being construed as that aspect was construed there, that is, as though perception's *truth* were here accruing to it; instead it now realizes that what's accruing to it is the *untruth* that comes to the fore in perception. But realizing this, it's also able to sublate this untruth, by distinguishing its apprehension of what's true from the untruth of perception, correcting the latter; and insofar as consciousness sets out to put things right in this way, what accrues to it is most certainly the truth—perception's truth. So what's now to be considered is how consciousness conducts itself at this point: no longer merely perceiving, it is also aware that it's reflecting into itself and has in mind to separate this out from simple apprehension.

13 I first become aware of a thing as one, and I have to hold fast to it in this true determination, and when anything [M85] shows up in the process of perceiving that contradicts this, it is to be recognized as due to my reflection. Now although in perception diverse properties are encountered that appear to be properties of the thing, the thing is one, and we realize that this diversity that would obviate its being unitary is due to us. So actually a thing is white only to *our* eyes, and also tangy to our tongue, and also cubical to our touch, and so on. The utter disjointedness of these aspects is due to us, not the thing; they dis-integrate in us—for example, on our tongue, where the thing is wholly different from what it is in our eyes, and so on. Thus we ourselves are the universal medium within which such moments fragment and exist by themselves. By considering the thing's having the character of a universal medium as due to our reflection, we retain the self-sameness and truth of the thing as one.

14 But the diverse aspects that consciousness apprehends, when regarded each by itself as encountered in the universal medium, are specific: white exists only in contrast to black, and so on, and even the thing itself exists as one only in contrast to other ones. But a given thing doesn't exclude others simply insofar as it's one, since to be one is to be in every respect self-related; its being one sooner makes it like all others. Rather is it via its *specificity* that a thing excludes others. Things are themselves specific, then, in and of themselves, having properties that distinguish them from other things. And since any given property of a thing is its *own* property, forming a specificity that's

integral to it, a thing has to have more than one property. For a thing is, first, something true: it exists *in itself*; and whatever is within it is there as part and parcel of its own essence, not on account of some other entity. Hence, secondly, its specific properties aren't due to or relative to any other thing but to *it* integrally; they are specific simply within it, forming a plurality of properties distinct from each other. And, thirdly, by existing within the realm of things in this way, these properties abide in and relative to themselves and have no bearing on each other. Thus in truth it's the thing itself that's white and also cubical and also tangy, [M86] and so on. It's an also, a universal medium within which multiple properties are sustained outside of, and without disturbing or sublating, one another; and when apprehended thus, it's perceived as something true.

15 Now in the course of its perceiving, consciousness is at the same time aware that it's also reflecting into itself and perceptually encountering the moment contrary to the also—the thing's being one with itself to the exclusion of diversity. Thus is it this oneness that consciousness has to take upon itself, since the thing is what sustains the many and varied independent properties. So one might say of a thing: *it* indeed *is* white and also cubical and also tangy, and so on—but insofar as it's white, it's *not* cubical, and insofar as it's cubical and also white, it isn't tangy, and so on. Unifying these properties takes place only within consciousness, which accordingly has to see to it that they aren't on the other hand allowed to collapse into one in the thing, to which end it invokes the 'insofar,' securing both the separateness of the properties and the also-ness of the thing. Consciousness correctly assumes responsibility for the oneness of the thing at first so that what otherwise would have been referred to as a property is now to be portrayed as "free materiality." In this way the thing achieves the status of a genuine Also in that it's then no more than an assemblage of material modes, a sort of outer wrapping, rather than a one.

16 Reviewing what consciousness previously took and now takes upon itself, and what it then attributed and now attributes to the thing, we see that it alternately makes both itself and the thing into a stark one bereft of complexity, and an also diffused throughout independent modes of materiality. By making this comparison it finds that the incongruity of involuting in the act of apprehending doesn't occur only in the process of its grasping what's true; rather does what's true—the thing itself—appear in this dual way. What's thus experienced is that even as a thing is exhibiting itself in a specific way to an apprehending consciousness, it's reflecting [M87] out from that way of appearing and into itself—that implicit in what's thus true there is a contrary truth.



17 Consciousness is here thus well beyond its second way of proceeding in perception, beyond taking the thing to be truly self-same, and itself as not—as receding from

sameness into itself; moreover it now regards the object as embodying the entire dynamic, which was previously divided between object and consciousness. The thing is one, reflecting into itself, existing in relation to itself and also in relation to what's other than it—and indeed not just by relating to other things as something other than them, but to itself as something other than itself. Hence a thing is relative to itself and also to what's other than it, a being that's doubly diverse and yet also one. But this oneness contradicts its diverseness; so consciousness itself would again have to do the unifying rather than leave this to the thing—would have to say that insofar as the thing is self-related it's not relative to anything else. Yet as consciousness has experienced, oneness also appertains to the thing itself, it being reflected into itself essentially. So too with also-ness; indifferent diversity is just as integral to a thing as is oneness—although since these are mutually at variance, they're not integral to the same but to “different things,” with the contradiction in the objective essence as a whole being viewed as split into two objects. Thus in and of itself the thing is surely self-same, but its oneness is subject to disruption by other things, this being how its oneness is sustained and otherness kept out of it—as well as out of mind.

18 So now although the contradictoriness of the objective essence has been parceled out to diverse things, what's still integral to each single separate thing is differentness. Thus are these diverse things set forth as existing by themselves, and as so complementary in their incompatibility that each is at variance only with other things and not with itself. Hence each is defined as a distinct entity, and has within it what decisively distinguishes it from other things, but in such a way that this doesn't introduce into it anything that would be contrary to it. Rather does it embody, all by itself, a “simple specificity” definitive of [M88] an “essential character” distinguishing it from other things. Of course, being in fact immanent within it, this diverseness is necessarily there as a real difference integral to the thing's own complex constitution. Yet since this specificity defines the essence of a thing—that whereby it differentiates itself from others and exists on its own—this further complexity of its makeup is something unessential. Thus implicit within the very oneness of the thing is a dual ‘insofar’ of unequal import, whereby the above contrariety doesn't actually turn into a contrariety integral to the thing itself: to whatever extent a thing becomes involved in contrariety via some [allegedly] “absolute” distinctiveness it has, this occurs vis-à-vis some other thing outside it. So this further complexity, although necessarily and hence indispensably integral to the thing, is nonetheless “unessential” to it.

19 The specificity constitutive of the thing's essential character and distinguishing it from all others is now so defined that the thing exists in contrast to others, but is therein supposedly sustained in relation to itself. But it is a thing—a self-related one—only insofar as it doesn't stand in such a relation to other things, since that would instead establish its being interconnected with other things; and to be interconnected with others is to cease being self-related. It's precisely via its unequivocal character and

contrariety that a thing relates to other things; essentially it is nothing but its so relating—a relatedness that negates its independence, leaving it sooner undone by its own essential property.

20 That consciousness inevitably experiences the undoing of the thing by the very specificity constitutive of its essence and of the being it has in relation to itself can be conceptually summarized as follows: Affirmed as something that exists self-relatedly, the thing is utterly negative of all otherness. Being thus absolute, such negation relates solely to itself. Yet negation that relates in this self-to-self manner is self-sublative—is tantamount to the thing having its essence in something other than it.

21 Actually the definition of the object thus provided entails exactly this and nothing more. The object is supposed to have within it [M89] both an essential property constitutive of its simple self-relatedness and, despite this simplicity, a diversity that, although “necessary,” isn’t supposed to specify anything “essential” to the object. But this distinction is sheerly verbal; anything unessential that’s nonetheless allegedly necessary is self-sublative, that is, constitutes exactly the sort of self-nullifying entity we referred to above.

22 With this, the last ‘insofar’ separating self-relatedness and relativity to other things comes to naught. The object is now in one and the same respect the opposite of itself: it is self-related insofar as it’s relative to what’s other than it, and relative to what’s other than it insofar as it’s self-related. It is self-related, internally reflected, one; yet this self-related, internally reflected oneness is affirmed in union with its opposite, its existing in relation to what’s other than it; thus is its oneness affirmed only in sublated form; that is, this self-relatedness is just as nonessential as that which alone would supposedly make it nonessential, namely its being relative to other things.

23 So even in its pure specifics, those supposedly constitutive of what it fundamentally is, the object gets sublated just as it did in its sensuous being. From sensuous being it turns into a universal, albeit one that, originating as it does in the sensuous, is essentially conditioned by its sensuousness, and so isn’t really self-same at all but a manner of universality that’s affected by an opposite, splitting then into extremes: the singular and the universal (the one in which the properties inhere and the also comprised of independent material modes). While these pure determinants appear to articulate the essence of the object, all that they consist of is self-relativity beset with relativity to other things. Yet since both the one and the also do exist essentially in unison, we now have before us a manner of universality that’s not conditioned, one that is absolute—it being here that consciousness first truly enters the realm of understanding.



24 Thus sensuous particularity does indeed disappear in the course of immediate certainty's dialectic, turning into a form of universality, even if one that's merely sensuous. The [penchant for] meaning has played itself out, and perception takes [M90] the object as it is in itself—as altogether universal, with the singularity evident in it present there as singularity truly is: as the being that a one has in itself, being that's reflected into itself. But this manner of being is still conditioned, encountered only along with another mode of self-related being, namely the universality contrary to and conditioned by this singularity. Yet contradictory extremes such as these don't exist just “along with” each other but in a single unity, which is to say that the union of the two, this manner of self-relatedness, is altogether beset with opposition—that is, is at the same time anything but self-related.

25 –A sophistical perception tries to rescue these moments from their contradictoriness and lay hold of the true object by distinguishing the various “respects” in which they can be taken, by hanging on to its “also's” and its “insofar's,” and finally by distinguishing between what's “essential” and the “essence” contrary thereto. But far from warding off perceptual illusions, such expedients prove to be entirely self-defeating. The truth supposedly won through this manner of perceptual “logic” proves to be in one and the same respect the very opposite—the essence it ends up with being a form of universality devoid of distinctions and specificity.

26 Vacuous abstractions such as ‘singularity and the universality contrary to it,’ ‘essence bound to the unessential,’ ‘the unessential yet necessary,’ do nonetheless have an impact, their interplay comprising the stuff of perceptual, so-called commonsense understanding. While deeming itself securely in touch with reality, such understanding's sole function in perception is to trifle with such abstractions, being consistently poorest where it imagines itself richest. Fumbling around with such nonentities, banded by one into the arms of another, urged on by its own sophistry to hold fast and affirm the one, and then the direct opposite, it sets itself against truth and opines that philosophy is concerned with things that exist sheerly in thought. In point of fact philosophy is concerned with such, recognizing them as pure essences, the absolute elemental components and potencies that they are. But philosophy, being also [M91] attentive to their specificity, is master of them, whereas perceptual understanding mistakes them for truth and is led on by them from one error to another. Perceptual understanding never wakes up to the fact that it's under the sway of simple essences of this sort, but thinks that it's always dealing with a wholly tangible material content, just as it never occurs to sense-certainty that its essence is the empty abstraction ‘pure being.’ Yet in fact it's in terms of just such essences that perceptual understanding shuffles about, processing all manner of material content, the cohesiveness and manageability of which lies in them—they alone being for this mentality the essence of all that's sensuous, what defines the ways it is interrelated with that essence, and how the perceptual dynamic and its truth unfold.

27 –This process of alternately defining a truth and then sublating that definition is what the daily life and strivings of perceptual consciousness, thinking itself to be progressing in truth, actually consists of. This relentless mentality ends up sublating all these “substantive” essences or specifics, although in each single moment it’s aware of only this single specific as the truth, and then in turn the opposite. It no doubt suspects their insubstantiality, and even tries to rescue them from danger by sophistically asserting as true what it had itself just declared untrue. What all these untrue essences would induce perceptual understanding naturally into doing is to take all its thoughts concerning such nonentities (notions having to do with universality and singularity, also-ness and oneness, essentials necessarily linked to nonessentials, and something nonessential that’s nonetheless necessary), integrate all of them, and thereby supersede them. Such understanding struggles against doing so, invoking “insofar’s” and various “respects,” or by assuming responsibility for one idea so as to keep another separate from it, as one that holds true.

28 –But such abstractions coalesce naturally in and of themselves; and “sound common sense” is victim to this maelstrom. At one moment [M92] trying to establish their truth by assuming responsibility for their utter lack of it, at another invoking their deceptiveness as indication of the unreliability of things—separating what’s essential from what’s necessary but allegedly unessential yet clinging to the former in opposition to the latter as their real truth—sound common sense fails to procure their truth, but does succeed in giving itself the lie. [M93]



III

FORCE AND UNDERSTANDING, APPEARANCE AND THE SUPERSENSUOUS WORLD

1 In the dialectic of sense-certainty consciousness was witness to the transience of seeing, hearing, and so on and arrived, in its perceiving, at thoughts that it could bring together only in a manner of universal that isn't conditioned [by sensuousness]. Were this unconditioned universal construed as an inert simple essence, it would now itself in turn be nothing but a one-sided extreme, that of self-relatedness, since then anything contrasting with it would be unessential—although in being interrelated thus with what's unessential it would itself end up being unessential, and consciousness wouldn't be extricating itself from the illusoriness of perception. However, this unconditioned universal has shown itself to be something that's withdrawn from any such conditioned self-relatedness into itself.

2 –The unconditioned universal that's now consciousness's true object is still just its *object*; it hasn't yet grasped its own conception as indeed a *concept*; and it's essential to distinguish the two. From consciousness's perspective the object has withdrawn from its relation to anything other than it and into itself, and so in and of itself has turned into something conceptual. But it isn't evident to consciousness that it itself is doing the conceptualizing here, and so it doesn't recognize itself in this self-reflected object. As is evident to us, this object came into being via the activity of consciousness, with consciousness full well involved in the object's formation and with the reflection under way on both sides being but a single event. But since the sole content consciousness had in the process was the objective entity and not consciousness as such, from

its viewpoint the result is to be construed as something objective, with consciousness still distanced from what thus came into being, deeming *it*, as objective, to be the gist of the matter.

3 The understanding has in this way indeed managed to sublate its own untruth and that of the object; and what has thereby come into its purview is a conception of something that's true, as matter-of-factly true in itself but not yet conceptual—being, in other words, bereft of the self-relatedness of consciousness and given free rein by an understanding that's oblivious to its involvement therein. Something that's true in this way impels [M94] its essence all by itself, with consciousness thus playing no part in its spontaneous realization but sheerly looking on and apprehending. Hence it falls on us to step in for a time and serve as the concept giving form to what this ultimately entails; only once the object thus informed presents itself as something matter-of-factly existent will consciousness realize that it is here conceiving.

4 The result [of perceptual experience] was an unconditioned universal first of all in the negative and abstract sense that consciousness has negated and drawn back from its one-sided conceptions, in effect abandoning them. But a positive implication of this result is that hereby a unity is established between 'self-related being' and 'being that's relative to some other being'—that is, an utterly tensive opposition directly comprised in one and the same entity. Although at first this seems to concern only the *form* of these moments vis-à-vis each other, self-relatedness and relativity to otherness are moreover the substantive *content* of this opposition. This is because the nature of an opposition as it truly is can't be at variance with the truth in which it results—here namely that a content held to be truly perceived is in fact wholly a matter of form and is resolved in the unity that that form forms. Content such as this is moreover universal: there can be no alternative content that, owing to its particular makeup, could elude reversion into this unconditioned universality. Such a content would consist of one or another specific way of being at once self-related and other-related. But *any* way of being self-related and other-related qualifies that content's nature and essence as being in truth an unconditioned universal—a result universal in any case.



5 Yet due to its being an object *present to* consciousness, within the unconditioned universal a difference between form and content emerges after all, and as embodied in that content the above moments [other-relatedness and self-relatedness] appear just as they did initially: on the one hand as a generic medium consisting of multiple subsistent material modes, and on the other as a one reflected in upon itself in which the independence of these modes is extinguished. The former dissolves the independence of the thing, has it in a passive role as being relative to something else, while the latter consists in self-relatedness. It remains to be seen what these moments bring to light

within the unconditioned universality constitutive of their nature. As is readily evident, [M95] existing thus solely in the way such universality does, these moments are no longer separate at all but are in themselves basically self-sublating correlates, it being then settled that they're simply in transition into each other.

6 The one moment thus appears correlatively as essence, a generic medium comprised of independently subsistent material modes. Their independence is one and the same as the medium: a *universal* consisting entirely of a plurality of disparate *universals*. That this universal and the manifold of universals are indivisibly one means, however, that [both the medium and] the material modes each exist right where the other does, reciprocally interpenetrating yet having no effect on each other, since conversely the plurality of different universals is independent all the same. Hereby it's also established that both are "permeable" or reciprocally sublative. And their being then sublated—the diverseness of both having reduced to sheer self-relatedness—is in turn constitutive of nothing other than the medium, the independence of the different material modes. In other words, no sooner is their independence established than they reduce to a unity that is even then in process of unraveling, initiating the reduction all over again.

7 –This is the dynamic referred to as 'force,' one of whose moments, force as a display of independent material modes in whatever way they exist, is force's "expression," while force as the latent presence of these modes is force "repressed" into itself without being expressed: "force proper." Yet firstly, repressed force *must* express itself; and secondly, when expressed, force inheres within itself just as much as force inhering within itself is an *expression* of force.

8 –While we [serving here as concept] accordingly keep these two moments together in their direct unity, it's actually the understanding, to which the concept of force is integral, that conceptually sustains the distinctness of the two moments distinguished. For they're not supposed to be distinct in and of themselves—they being distinct sheerly in thought. In other words, all that's been set forth above is the concept of force, not its reality. Force is in fact an unconditioned universal—which in its relation to what's other than it is exactly what it is inherently in itself—a universal to which difference, which is nothing but relatedness to something else, [M96] is integral. So, in order that it be what it truly is, force has to be left altogether free of thought and be established as the substance of these distinct moments—that is, first as integrally whole force remaining essentially in and relative to itself, and then with its distinct moments established as substantial, as subsisting on their own.

9 –Force as such (as repressed into itself) exists thus on its own as a one that's exclusive of everything else, in relation to which the unfolding of material modes is something else that matter-of-factly exists—there being then two distinct and independent aspects of force that have been affirmed. Force is nonetheless also an integral

whole, that is, remains what it is *conceptually*, with these its distinct moments abiding as sheer forms, superficial and fleeting. If these distinct moments (force proper, i.e., as repressed into itself, and force as the unfolding of independent material modes) were *not* each subsistent, then neither would exist—nor would force itself exist if it didn't exist in this antithetic way. That force does, however, exist antithetically means nothing other than that these two moments are themselves independent too.

10 –So, what we need to examine is the dynamic of these two self-sustainedly independent, and in turn self-sublative, moments. As is evident, this dynamic isn't on the whole at variance with that of perception, in which both correlates alike (perceiving and perceived) are one and inseparable in the apprehension of what's true—even though, in doing so, each reflects into itself, existing on its own. In the present instance the two correlates are moments of force, existing in a unity that, even while appearing to function as a middle term for extremes that exist on their own, is ever disintegrating into just such extremes, which in turn both exist solely thereby. This dynamic, which in the preceding demonstrated how contradictory concepts self-destruct, here assumes objective form in the dynamic of force, as a result of which there emerges an unconditioned universal having no objective presence, one comprising the 'inner' being of things.

11 Force thus defined (set forth as 'force as such,' i.e., as reflected into itself) is one aspect of its concept, albeit one affirmed as a substantialized extreme [M97] as well as under the species of 'oneness.' In this way the subsistence of such material modes as have unfolded is excluded from force and is something other than it. Since it's necessary that force itself be what sustains these modes (expressing itself by so doing), in outwardly asserting itself thus force is setting itself forth as a force "other" than it, one that supervenes and incites it to so express itself. –Yet, it being indeed necessary to force that it express itself in this way, what's here set forth as another entity is in fact integral to force itself. Accordingly, the notion that force is unitary, while its essence—its asserting itself—would be set into motion by something other than it that supervenes from without, has to be revised: force is itself a universal medium sustaining these moments as material modes—in other words *has* already been expressing itself, while this supposed "other" that's inciting it is instead force itself. So now force exists as a medium consisting of whatever material modes have unfolded. –Yet it's equally essential to force that it have a form—namely oneness—that's sublative of their continued subsistence; thus in its being affirmed as a material medium, its being unitary is now "other" than it and its very essence is outside it. –Yet since force must of necessity be what here it isn't as yet affirmed as being, the force that's "other" than it comes into play and incites it to reflect into itself, thus sublating its expression. Force is in fact itself a form of being that's reflected into itself, an expression that's sublating—the oneness that appeared as "other" being thus evanescent: force is itself a oneness, is force repressed into itself.

12 As is readily evident, what here turns up as something other than force and incites it both to express itself and return inside itself is itself force—showing itself to be as much a universal medium as it is something unitary, with both these forms of embodiment turning out to be evanescent moments. Hence force, existing as it does in relation to another force that exists in relation to it, hasn't thus far deviated from what it is conceptually at all—although now there are two forces simultaneously present. While the concept of both is of course the same, it has gone from that of a 'oneness' to that of a 'duality.' Instead of the opposition of the two continuing to be in essence comprised wholly in these mere moments, it appears that by dividing into two entirely "independent forces" it has eluded subjection to oneness. –We need to take a closer look at the implications of their [M98] existing thus independently.

13 –Initially the second force appears as inciter and, in content, as a generic medium contrasted with the force designated as the one that's incited. But since the second force has the roles of the two moments essentially reversed and is itself force, so likewise is it in fact a generic medium only when incited to be such—and moreover a negative unity that incites force's withdrawal into itself only when incited to become such. Thus the difference between the two (one supposedly inciting, the other incited) also turns into one and the same reciprocal role reversal.

14 The interplay of the two forces consists thus in the antithetic character of each, their reciprocal relativity as defined, and the total, direct interchangeability of their roles—which exist solely in a transition that gives them the appearance of functioning independently. For example, while the one that's inciting is set forth as generic medium and the one incited as force repressed, the former is a generic medium solely because the latter is force repressed, which means that, relative to the former, it's the latter that does the inciting and solely thereby is turned into a medium. The one doing the inciting derives its character solely from the other, and incites only to the extent that the other incites it to incite; and no less surely does it lose the character thus given it, which passes over into the other—or rather has already done so. The alien agency inciting force from without functions as a generic medium, but only by having been incited to do so by force itself, meaning that the latter *makes* the alien force act that way and is itself in essence a generic medium; it does this because that other determinacy is indispensable to it—or rather *is* that determinacy itself.

15 To facilitate a full appreciation of the way this dynamic is being conceived of here, it should be pointed out that the above variants appear in two different ways: as differing in content, with internally reflected force as one extreme and the [M99] medium of material modes as the other, and as differing in form, with one force as inciter and the other as incited (one active, the other passive). While, as we see, in content these variants do really differ, in form they're independent, so that even when conjoined they're self-separating and antithetic. That the two of them don't amount to anything

in themselves as extremes—the stance in which each supposedly sustains its distinct nature being instead an evanescent moment forthwith undergoing transition into its opposite—is what accordingly becomes evident to any consciousness perceiving the dynamic of force. But as noted previously, to us something more is apparent: implicitly the differences between them both in content and in form have disappeared. What in form essentially presented itself as agent, inciter, as self-related force, in content presented itself as force forced back into itself; and what in form was supposed to present itself as being passive, incited, or relative to another force, in content presented itself as a generic medium consisting of several material modes.

16 From this it's evident both that the concept of force becomes actual via a dualization of forces, and how this is so. Although the two forces exist as entities in their own right, they exist so thoroughly in flux relative to each other that the being of each is "established" as purely relative to the one other than it—which is to say that the being of each sooner gives clear indication of its transitoriness. They don't exist as extremes holding fast unto themselves and imparting merely some extrinsic property to each other in their middle term where they're contiguous, but are what they are solely in that middle term and in being contiguous. Thus in its immediacy force's being consists just as much in being repressed into itself or in self-relatedness as it does in expression, in inciting and being incited; so instead of these moments being split into two independent extremes presenting themselves as antitheses, their nature is plainly such that each exists solely via the other—and what each is via the other it forthwith no longer is, since each is just such a moment.

17 –Thus really neither moment has any substance of its own to sustain and [M100] preserve it. Rather is it force's own conceptual nature that is sustaining *itself* as essence, doing so in its actual reality; as something that's actual, force clearly exists only in being expressed, which is tantamount to self-sublation. When actual force is represented as independent of its expression and as existing on its own, it merely consists in internally repressed force, a specific mode of it that, as we've seen, is in fact only a moment of force's expression. The truth of force remains then only the idea of force, and the moments constitutive of its reality, its substantive elements and its dynamic, collapse forthwith into an undifferentiated oneness that isn't force repressed into itself (which is just one such moment) but rather a conception as such of force. Force's realization is thus at the same time a loss of reality, it having therein instead turned into something else entirely—namely a manner of universal that the understanding right at the start directly discerns as force's essence, and which moreover proves to be its essence in such reality as it is alleged to have in actual substances.

18 Insofar as we take the first of these universals to be the understanding's *concept* of force, in which it doesn't yet exist in its own right, then the second is force's *essence*, the way it presents itself in and relative to itself. –Were we, conversely, to consider the

first universal to be something that's directly present as an actual object of consciousness is supposed to be, then the second we could characterize as sensuously objective force's negative presence, force as it is in its true essence—strictly as an object of the understanding—the former being force repressed into itself, force as a form of substance, while the latter is the inner reality of things, an inner that's one and the same with force's conceptual nature as such.

19 The real essence of things has now been ascertained as something that isn't directly present to consciousness, which instead relates to the inner only indirectly and, as understanding, peers via this middle term—this “play of forces”—into the “true behind-the-scenes realm” of things. This middle term encompassing both extremes (the understanding and the inner) is the fully developed *being* of force, which, so far as the understanding itself is concerned, is now something evanescent. Being of this sort is termed ‘appearance,’ whereas being [M101] in which *nonbeing* is directly immanent we refer to as ‘seeming.’ But the former, rather than just seeming to be, is indeed appearing, is the whole and intact presence of what seems to be. This integral whole as such—this all-inclusive universal—is what constitutes the ‘inner,’ the interplay of forces as the internal reflection of force. Within this interplay entities of perception are set forth for consciousness just as they are objectively in themselves, namely as moments that, without pausing or abiding, at once turn into their counterpart—the unitary directly into the universal, the essential directly into the unessential, and vice versa. The interplay of forces is thus a full-blown negativity the truth of which is nonetheless positive: the universal, the object as it is in itself.

20 –The being that the universal has for consciousness is mediated through the dynamic of appearance, in which perceptual being and sense-objectivity in general have only negative significance; consciousness accordingly reflects out of such being into itself as into what's true. Yet it again, as consciousness, construes what's in this way true as being an objectively existent inner, and distinguishes this ‘reflection of things’ from its ‘reflection into itself’—even considering the process that's doing the mediating to be objective. Thus to it this ‘inner’ exists opposite it in the manner of an extreme, albeit one that's something true since therein, as ‘what in itself *is*,’ it also has the basis of its self-certainty, the experiential moment in which it is self-relatedly present to itself. But it's not yet aware of there being any such ground, since the self-relatedness that the inner is supposed to contain would consist in nothing save the above negative dynamic, which it still thinks of as objective evanescent appearance rather than its own presence to itself. Thus while to it the inner is indeed conceptual, it isn't yet cognizant of the nature of conceptual being.

21 Within this inner truth—this universal that is absolute, having been rid of the opposition of universal and particular and so come within the purview of the understanding—there now opens up above the sensuous or apparent world a ‘super-sensuous’ or ‘true’ world, an enduring ‘beyond’ above the ephemeral here and now: a

form of being-in-itself that's the first and hence imperfect appearance [M102] (as merely the rarified element in which truth has its essence) of reason.

22 Hence by this point *our* object is [functionally] a syllogism having the 'inner being of things' and the 'understanding' as its extremes, and 'appearance' as its mean. But the dynamic of this syllogism further delineates what the understanding discerns in the inner via this mean, and what, via experience, it makes of the relation interconnecting these extremes.

23 Consciousness, as yet finding itself nowhere within the inner, regards the latter as something purely beyond it—as something vacuous, being devoid of all appearance, and (positively) as a simple generality. This manner of inner readily resonates with those who say that one can't know the inner being of things—although one has to remember that they base their argument on a different premise. Nothing is known of such an inner as here set out in its immediacy, not because reason is too short-sighted or limited or however one puts it (a consideration that hasn't even come up as yet since we haven't gone deep enough), but rather because of the simple nature of the matter itself: because there's nothing to know in a *void*, or, conversely, because such an inner is defined precisely as something *beyond* consciousness. –For a blind man placed amidst the riches of the supersensuous world (supposing it has such content, whether intrinsic to it or supplied by consciousness) or a man with sight placed in pure darkness—or in pure light (supposing that to be more appropriate to the supersensuous)—the result would clearly be the same. The man with sight sees as little in pure light as he does in pure darkness, which is exactly as much as the blind man sees of the riches that lie before him.

24 –If this were all that the inner and our interconnectedness with it via appearances amounted to, then there'd be no option but to stop with appearances, accepting as true what we know isn't true. Or, in order that there be at least something to this void (which started out as devoid of objective things but, as an inherent vacuity, has also to be considered as devoid of all intelligible relations and every distinction made by consciousness as such)—in order that this [M103] utter void (which some even call the holy of holies) still amount to *something*—there'd be no option but to fill it in with daydreams, with apparitions that consciousness itself fabricated. And the inner would have to put up with such mistreatment, for it would deserve no better, even daydreams being preferable to its vacuousness.

25 The inner, this supersensuous beyond, has nonetheless come into being; it stems from appearance, and appearance is its intermediary—is what's essential to it and in fact its content. The supersensuous is the sensuous and perceptual set forth *as* it is 'in truth,' whereas the truth of what's sensed and perceived consists in being 'what appears.' The supersensuous is thus appearance as appearance. To think that on this

account the supersensuous is the sensuous world, the world as it is for immediate sense-certainty and perception, would be to misunderstand totally, since appearance isn't the world of sense-knowledge and perception as it is, but rather as superseded—set forth as it is in truth: as inner. While the supersensuous is commonly said to be something that's not in the realm of appearance, in that context 'appearance' isn't to be understood as what just apparently is, but rather the sensuous world as itself constitutive of genuinely actual reality.

26 *Our* object—the understanding—now finds itself at a point where it views the inner as having turned into a mere generality, a being-in-itself that's not yet fleshed out. The interplay of forces is significant only negatively, not inherently, its sole positive significance being that it mediates something *outside* it. The understanding's relating to the inner via this intermediation is, however, the understanding's own dynamic—through which the inner will be fleshed out for it. –Although the interplay of forces is what's directly evident to the understanding, it takes the simple inner to be what's true, the dynamic of force being then true at all only as a simple inner. Yet as we've already seen, in their interplay, as one force is being incited by another, it's inciting the other in turn, which only thus becomes itself an inciting force. All that's in this way made evident is a direct exchange or total switch-around of the specificity [M104] defining the sole content of what's thus appearing, whether it be a universal medium or a negative unity. Even while making its appearance in one specific role, their interplay is ceasing to be what it thus appears—inciting, by appearing in such and such specific way, the other correlate to express *itself*, meaning that the latter at once turns into what the former was supposed to be.

27 –Each of the two correlates, the incitive relation and the one involving a specific antithetical content, is by itself a radical inversion and transmutation. Yet both end up being the same again: the formal distinction between incited and inciting is the same as the distinction in content, namely that between what's incited as such (the passive medium) and what incites (the agent, the negative oneness, i.e., the one). And with this the entire distinction supposedly found in this dynamic between different, *particular* forces disappears, since their distinctness rests exclusively on the above differences, and as they collapse into one, so does the distinction between the two forces.

28 –Thus what this absolute flux comes down to is neither force, nor inciting and being incited, nor the specificity comprised in the sustaining medium and inwardly reflected oneness (existing neither singularly by itself nor as several contraries); rather does it consist in *variation that's universal*, to which the many contraries have reduced. Variation such as this—as universal—embodies the simplicity integral to the interplay of force itself, and is what's true of it: the “law of force.”



29 This all-out flux of appearances, via its relation to the simplicity of the inner—that is, of the understanding—turns into a simplex form of variation. The inner is at this point only an implicit universal, albeit one essentially consisting in utterly universal variability, since it's the result of change itself, change being its very essence. Yet in being put forth thus in the inner as it is in truth, change is therein also being apprehended as absolutely universal, quiescent, *consistent* variation. In other words, negation is an essential moment of the universal, and so is present [M105] within the universal, intermediating a manner of variation that is universal. Universal variation is what's expressed in a 'law,' which is in turn a *constant* depiction of unstable appearance. The supersensuous world is thus a serene realm of "laws" that's indeed beyond the perceptual world (which exhibits law simply by ceaselessly changing) yet is also present in it, directly capturing its likeness in still form.

30 While this realm of laws does embody the understanding's truth, the content of which consists in the variations contained in the law, this is but its initial truth, and it's hardly exhaustive as regards appearance. Although present in appearance, law isn't appearance's entire presence; under ever-varying circumstances law has an ever-varying reality. Thus does appearance retain a dimension of its own that's not present in the inner, and hasn't truly been set forth yet *as* appearance, as the sublated being that it is by itself. This is a defect in law that has to be brought out in the law itself—its evident defect being that, although it does have variation per se within it, it does so in a generalized, indefinite way. Specificity is nonetheless integral to it insofar as it's *a* law and not *the* law at large—there being then an indefinite number of laws.

31 –But this multiplicity is sooner itself a defect: it contradicts the very principle of the understanding, for which, as consciousness of the simple inner, an inherently universal "unity" is what's true. The understanding accordingly has to get all these laws to coalesce into one. For example the law whereby a stone falls and the law whereby heavenly bodies move are to be grasped as a single law. Yet as they merge, these laws lose their specificity; the law becomes ever more superficial, and what ultimately turns up isn't in fact the unity of these specific laws but a law that omits their specificity. A law that, for example, unifies the law of falling bodies on earth and the law of celestial motion doesn't really give expression to either. The unification of all laws into, say, 'universal attraction' is in content no more expressive than the sheer concept of law itself [M106] affirmed as matter-of-factly extant in attraction. All that's asserted in universal attraction is that "everything varies in a constant manner relative to everything else."

32 –The understanding, thinking that here it has found a general law comprehensively expressive of actual reality, has in fact only hit upon the concept of law itself—yet nonetheless proceeds to assert that "all reality is inherently conformative to law." So inasmuch as the term 'universal attraction' serves to combat thoughtless representational ideation, for which everything presents itself in the guise of sheer contingency,

and for which definiteness has the form of sensuous autonomy, it is of considerable importance.

33 Universal attraction—that is, the pure concept of law—thus stands in contrast to specific laws. If this pure concept is viewed as the essence or true inner, the specificity of any given specific law is relegated to appearance, or rather to sensuous being. Yet the pure concept of law doesn't transcend just one specific law vis-à-vis another, but even transcends law as such. The specificity at issue here is really only a transitory moment of law and can no longer be deemed essential; for all that's in evidence here as holding true is a specific law, while the *concept* 'law' runs counter to any such law. This is to say that, in such a law, variation per se is apprehended directly as it is and is grasped in some manner of universal—although thereby the moments whose interrelation is articulated by that law are sustained as matter-of-fact entities that exist unto themselves and have no bearing on one another. –Yet these components distinguished in the law in and of themselves also constitute the law's specific correlates; a law conceived purely as the law of universal attraction has to be grasped in its true import, as something thoroughly simplex, with such variables as it involves reverting in turn into 'the inner' as a simplex unity. It's this simplex unity that comprises the inner necessity integral to law.

34 The law is then present in two ways: as law in which variables are [M107] expressed as independent moments, and as law in which these are expressed in the form of something simplex, something that has returned into itself—which could once again be referred to as "force," albeit not force repressed but force overall, the *concept* 'force,' an abstraction that itself spans the distinction between what attracts and what is attracted.

35 –Thus for example while electricity, as something simplex, is a force, the articulation of its variant forms (as positive and negative) falls within the purview of law. Or, in the motion of falling bodies, the force involved is something simplex (gravity) whose law in turn is that the magnitudes of the various factors involved (time expended and space traversed) relate as root and square. Electricity itself isn't inherently at variance, that is, isn't in essence a duality composed of positive and negative electricity. Hence [in German] we commonly say that it "has" this law whereby it exists in this way, or "has" this property of expressing itself thus. And indeed this property is essential and peculiar to this force—is "necessary" to it. But necessity is here an empty word: force [thus conceived] "has to" dualize itself just because it "has to." Now of course given positive electricity, negative electricity is necessarily implied as well, since anything positive exists solely in relation to something negative (i.e., it, like the negative, entails that which is distinguished from it). But that electricity per se should render itself into such components isn't inherently necessary. Electricity in the sense of a 'simplex force' is unaffected by the law whereby it exists as positive and negative;

indeed, were we to call the former its ‘concept’ and the latter its ‘being,’ [we’d in effect be saying that] its being is unaffected by its concept. It merely “has” this property of dualizing, which simply means that this *isn’t* inherently necessary to it.

36 –Such indifference assumes another form when it’s said that “by definition” electricity exists as positive and negative—that this is its very concept and essence. Its ‘being’ would then mean broadly its existence, even though there’s nothing in the definition that necessitates its existing. Electricity exists as it does either because that’s simply how one finds it (with nothing at all necessary about its existing this way), or due to other forces (in which case the [M108] necessity of its existing in this way lies outside it). Yet since necessity turns then into a form of determinacy (existing by means of something else), we find ourselves slipping again into a plethora of specific laws, precisely the sort of multiplicity that we abandoned in our effort to regard law *as law*. Only “law as law” could correspond to law’s concept as concept—its necessity—but then in every one of these forms necessity has still only shown itself to be an empty word.

37 Yet another way in which law and force, that is, concept and being, have no bearing on each other is the law of motion, where, for example, it’s necessary to “divide” motion into time and space, or again into distance and velocity. Since motion is but the relation of these moments, motion (the universal) is of course “inherently divided”—albeit into components (time and space, or distance and velocity) that of themselves give no indication of having originated from a *single* entity. They’ve no bearing on one another: space is portrayed as able to exist without reference to time, time without reference to space, and distance without reference at least to velocity, in much the same way that their magnitudes have no bearing on each other, since they’re not related as ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are, and so aren’t essentially interconnected. While the necessity of their having been thus [procedurally] divided is obvious, their being necessarily interrelated components is not. But then even the former necessity is itself merely illusory and false—which is to say that motion isn’t being represented as something simple, as a pure essence, but as *already* divided, with time and space being then motion’s “independent” components, that is, entities unto themselves, while distance and velocity are modes of being or representation each of which is quite capable of existing without the other; and motion is then merely the superficial relation of the two, not their essence. Motion set forth as something simplex or as a force is, say, gravity—which doesn’t however entail distinctions of the above sort at all.

38 In both instances what’s at variance involves no inherent difference: the universal (force) doesn’t affect what’s divided in the law, nor do these variants (the components of the law) affect [M109] each other. The understanding nonetheless “has” this concept that they’re inherently different precisely because the law is embodied in an ‘inner’ that matter-of-factly inheres in itself—yet is also something distinguished within that

inner. In that the latter would then constitute an inner difference, it's evident that here what's law is simplex force existing as the *conceptual being* of this difference—hence a conceptual difference.

39 –But this inner difference exists as yet solely within the understanding and isn't established in the objective matter itself. It's then only its own necessity that the understanding is here setting forth, so wording the distinction as not to ascribe this necessity to the matter itself. This merely verbal necessity is accordingly but a litany of the moments delineating the circularity of such necessity. While these moments are of course distinguished from each other, their difference expresses no difference in the matter itself and is thus self-vitiating. –This procedure is called “explanation.”

40 –A “law” is thus asserted, from which something inherently universal (the basis of the law) is distinguished—namely as “force”—although it's said of the latter that it isn't a basis that's distinct from the law but one constituted wholly as is the law. –For example, a particular occurrence of lightning is taken as typical, as a universal expressive of a “law” of electricity. Via explanation the law gets conjoined to force as the substantive essence of the law. The force is then so constituted that, when it manifests itself, opposite electrical discharges occur, which thereupon disappear into each other, meaning that the force is constituted exactly as is the law, and each is then declared to be in no way distinct from the other. The terms distinguished, the ‘pure universal manifestation’ (i.e., the law) and ‘pure force,’ both have the same content, the same constitution. Hence the distinction between them in the sense of a difference in content, a difference applying to things themselves, ends up being retracted as well.

41 Throughout this tautological process the understanding, as seen above, doggedly adheres to the object's static unity, and such movement as takes place is all in the understanding itself, not in the object. What we have here is a way of clarifying that not only doesn't clarify anything, but is so thoroughly clear that whenever it tries to say [M110] anything different from what it has already said, it merely repeats itself. Certainly with regard to the matter itself this process gives rise to no new information, and is worth consideration at all solely as the action of the understanding. Yet we do discern here exactly what was missing in the law, namely wholesale flux; for if looked at more closely, this “dynamic” is the direct opposite of itself: it establishes a distinction that doesn't distinguish anything—and not just as is obvious to us but as a distinction nullified by the distinction itself. This is the same sort of flux evident in the play of forces, where inciting and incited force, force expressing itself and forced back into itself, were distinguished: distinct moments that weren't really distinct and as such in turn canceled themselves out forthwith.

42 –But what we then have isn't just oneness (whereby no distinction could even be established), but a dynamic in which a distinction is no sooner made than superseded since it doesn't distinguish anything. In such explanations, then, mutation and flux,

which previously were outside the inner and relegated to the realm of appearance, have penetrated into the supersensuous world itself. But with this our attention has shifted away from the inner as object over to the other correlate, the understanding itself, finding the flux there within it.

43 Such change isn't as yet a change in the matter itself, but sooner shows up as "pure" flux simply because in content its moments stay the same. Yet since as a concept of the understanding this sheerly conceptual flux is nonetheless identical with the 'inner being of things,' the understanding takes it to be the 'law of the inner.' The understanding then "discovers" it to be a 'law of appearance' that variations come into being where there are no variants (e.g., that what's homogeneous "repels" itself from itself), and similarly that variations turn out not to be variations at all, and cancel themselves out (e.g., that what's nonhomogeneous "attracts" or draws itself into itself). With this we have a second law, the import of which is totally contrary to the one previously asserted regarding constant, self-sustaining variants; for what this new law says is that "Unlike [MIII] becomes like, and like becomes unlike." The conceptual expectation here is that these two laws not be left thoughtlessly apart but brought together, and that their antithetic character be taken note of. Granted the second law is a law too, a manner of being that's internally self-consistent, the self-consistency of what's inconsistent, the constancy of the inconstant.

44 –This law, precisely in the form of such radical transitivity and pure flux, was evinced in the interplay of forces: something homogeneous (force) splits up into an opposition, which at first appears as a self-sustaining variant but in fact proves to be nothing of the sort, since what is "repelling itself from itself" thus is precisely what's homogeneous, and in being self-repelled it's what in essence is "drawn to" itself—that is, since [throughout the process] it's one and the same. Since the distinction here made doesn't distinguish anything, it cancels out again. It's portrayed as a variation occurring in the matter itself, that is, as something absolutely at variance; and this "variation integral to the matter itself" is none other than something homogeneous that has repelled itself from itself and so established an "opposition" that's nothing of the sort.

45 Via this principle, the initial supersensuous world (the static realm of laws, the direct copy of the perceptual world) is turned into its very opposite. Whereas previously the law, both in general and in its variants, stayed the same, now each is affirmed as the opposite of itself: 'what's like itself' instead now repels itself, and 'what's unlike itself' is affirmed as like. Actually it's only when thus specified that difference is internal, is difference that inheres within itself—with like then unlike itself, and unlike like itself. –This second supersensuous world is thus a world "inside out," and indeed, with one dimension [of the inner] already present in the first supersensuous world, is

an “inverted” form of the first, the ‘inner’ being in this way fully fleshed out as ‘appearance.’ For the first supersensuous world was just the perceptual realm elevated directly into the element of universality, and had its necessary antitype in the perceptual world—which nonetheless kept flux and mutation as its principle, a principle lacking in the first realm of laws yet now being introduced in the guise of an inverted world.

46 According to the law of the inverted world, what’s [M112] self-similar in the first supersensuous world is thus unlike itself, and what’s unlike itself in the first is likewise self-similar, turning out to be like itself. –Specifying the law’s moments in this way yields such notions as the following: “what by the law of the first such world is sweet, is implicitly in its inverted being sour,” and “what by the former is black, is in the latter white”; “what by the law of the first is a magnet’s north pole is implicitly in its other supersensuous being (namely here in the actual world) the south pole, while what’s there the south pole is here the north pole”; similarly “what by the first’s law of electricity is the oxygen pole turns out in its other supersensuous essence to be the hydrogen pole, while conversely what’s there the hydrogen pole turns out here to be the oxygen pole.” –In a different context, getting even with an enemy is, from the standpoint of primitive “law,” the best an injured individual can do toward obtaining satisfaction. Yet this law in accordance with which I stand up to anyone who doesn’t treat me as really being somebody (showing him that I’m indeed somebody and that he’s nobody) gets inverted by the principle of the other supersensuous world into the very opposite, so that my act of restoring my own status by undermining his turns into an act of self-destruction. If this inversion that occurs when a “crime” is “punished” is then itself made into a law, it too is in turn merely the law of a world over against which there stands an inverted, supersensuous world, where what’s despised in the former is instead revered, and what’s honored is found to be utterly contemptible. A punishment that by the law of the former world disgraces a man and brings him to ruin is transmogrified in the inverted world into a pardoning grace that preserves his status and restores his honor.

47 Looked at superficially, the inverted world is the opposite of the first in that it has the latter outside it and “pushes it away from itself” as a “reality” that’s inverted—the one world being then “appearance,” the other what that reality is “in itself,” the one a reality that’s relative to something other than it, the other a reality all by itself. So, using the above examples, what tastes sweet would really (i.e., “inside” the thing itself) be sour; and what appears in a real magnet to be the north pole would, in its inner or natural essence, be the south pole; what presents itself in the phenomenon of electricity as the oxygen pole would be the hydrogen pole in the [M113] nonphenomenal realm. Again, an act that’s ostensibly a crime might in its inner nature actually be good (a bad act having a good intention, say), and punishment only apparently punishment, being implicitly in itself—that is, in some other world—a godsend for the criminal.

48 –However, no such opposition between inner and outer, appearance and the supersensible, in the sense of two separate realities, is any longer in evidence here. The variants thus repelled don't realign into two substances enabling them to abide and be sustained separately, whereby the understanding would have left the inner world and reverted to its original position. The one correlate or substance would then be the world of perception, whose essence is animated by one of the two laws, opposite which would be an inner world every bit as sensuous as the first, albeit as imagined in representation. As such it couldn't exactly be referred to as a sensuous world (couldn't be seen, heard, tasted) yet would be set forth in imagination as a sensuous world nonetheless. –But if the one world thus set forth is in fact the 'perceived' world, while what that world is 'implicitly in itself' is—as the inversion the first—set forth in representation as equally sensuous, then the sourness that would be what a sweet thing is implicitly is just as real a thing as is a sour thing; and the black that would be what white is implicitly, is then actually black; and in a magnet the north pole that would be what the south pole is implicitly, is then actually present there as the north pole; and in a voltaic pile the oxygen pole that would be what the hydrogen pole is implicitly is then present there as the oxygen pole. –As for an actual crime, its inversion, what it is implicitly, that is, as a possibility, lies in intention as such, albeit not in a good one, since the truth of intent is but the act itself. When actually punished according to its content, it is reflected into itself or inverted, this being what reconciles the law with the challenge posed by the crime. Actual punishment ultimately entails an inversion of its own, enforcing the law in such a way that the latter's punitive activity annuls itself, with law turning from active engagement to being serenely in force again, all activity by [M114] the individual versus the law and the law versus individual having been quelled.



49 This representation of an inversion that defines the nature of one of the supersensuous world's dimensions is to be kept free of any sensuous representation of its various instances as being tied up in a separate sustaining element; and this radical conception of difference is to be grasped and presented purely as *internal* difference, as the repulsion of homogeneity from itself as homogeneous, the unlike's likeness as unlike. What needs to be thought through is pure flux, internal contrariety, contradiction. For in difference that's internal, what's contrary isn't just one of two contraries (were that so, it wouldn't be a contrary but just something that matter-of-factly is) but rather is 'the contrary of what's contrary'—what's other than it being directly present within it.

50 –Now of course I locate the one counterpart "here" and the other (of which it's the counterpart) "there," the former being then on one side all by itself without the other. But precisely because what I have here is in and of itself a counterpart, *it is its own* counterpart, in fact containing what's other than it right there within it. –Thus

the inverted supersensible world at once overlaps the other and contains it within itself, that is, is inverted in relation to itself—is the inverse of itself, is the supersensible world and the latter’s contrary all in one. Only thus is this inversion an internal difference, difference integrally self-contained, difference as a form of *infinity*.

51 It’s via its infinity that we see law fully attaining to immanent necessity and incorporating all the moments of appearance into something internal. The simplex nature of law is a form of infinity, meaning (as already seen) the following: (a) Law’s simplicity consists in a form of self-identity that is inherently at variance—a self-repellent or self-diversifying homogeneity; what’s referred to as “simple” force is self-dualizing and, via this its infinity, is law. (b) The dichotomy that defines the factors set forth in a law manifestly continues to exist; and absent a concept of internal difference, such factors as the [M115] space and time, or distance and velocity that appear as moments of gravitation, are just as indifferent and unnecessary to each other as they are to gravity itself, or as gravity (considered simply) is to them, or as electricity (without further specification) is to positive and negative charges. (c) But conceived of as internally at variance, such distinctness—what’s unlike and indifferent (space, time, etc.)—is null, that is, is but the variance of something that’s homogeneous and in essence unitary. Such components animate each other as do positive and negative, and their being consists in affirming their nonbeing and annulling themselves in unity. Both variants continue to exist, exist in themselves, exist in themselves as contraries—contraries of themselves—containing within themselves an other that’s integral to them and comprising but a single unity.

52 This simplex infinity, this absolute conceptual principle, can be characterized as the simplex essence of Life, the world’s very soul, the universal life-blood that surges through all things, undisrupted and unimpeded by any manner of difference in that it itself is all of them as well as their sublation: an infinity quietly pulsing within, internally vibrant yet wholly at rest. It is self-identical, for its differentiae are tautological, are in no wise at variance. This self-identical essence thus relates solely to itself: to *itself*—it being itself then the other to which it relates, this relating to itself being thus a self-diversification, its very self-identicalness being internally at variance. Its dichotomies exist thus both in and relative to themselves, with each the opposite of the other, so that when one is invoked, the other is being invoked right along with it. In other words each isn’t the opposite of something else but is purely an opposite, being then immanently its own opposite—or isn’t really an opposite at all but a sheerly self-identical entity that, having nothing different within it, relates purely to itself.

53 –Hence we’ve no need to ask (let alone think that worry about such questions constitutes a philosophical concern or something about which philosophy can make no reply): “How is difference, heterogeneity, to be derived from a pure [homogeneous] substance such as this?” For its diversification is by this point a fait accompli; [M116]

difference has been excluded from what's self-same and set aside, with what was supposed to be self-same already one part of something diverse rather than a would-be absolute entity.

54 –That the self-same is self-diversifying thus also means that it sublates itself as something already diverse, subsuming itself as heterogeneous. The oneness which people usually have in mind when they say that “difference can't derive from oneness” is in fact merely one of the moments integral to diversification: the sheer abstraction ‘simplicity’ as contrary to diversity. Yet since simplicity is, as an abstraction, but one of the contraries involved, it's as good as already said that this simplicity is a diverse simplicity; for if something unitary is set forth as negative—as a contrary—it's also set forth as having contrariety inherent within it. ‘Difference via diversification’ and ‘becoming self-same’ are thus each alike a self-sublative dynamic, since the self-sameness that's initially supposed to diversify, turning into its very opposite, is an abstraction—is already itself diversified—its diversification being sublative of what it is, and hence of its present diversity. To become self-same is thus to diversify as well: becoming self-same contrasts thus with its diversification—meaning that it's set to one side [of a relation], ending up dichotomized instead.

55 Infinity, this absolute agitation—this sheerly spontaneous movement in which anything that gets in any way specified (e.g., as being of such and such kind) is instead the very opposite of that—has been the very soul of everything experienced up to this point, although only here in the inner realm is it of itself openly in evidence. Appearance, that is, the interplay of forces, already evinces this same infinity, but is at first openly emergent as explained; and now that it's at last an object present to consciousness as the infinity that it is, consciousness is *self-consciousness*. For all of its explaining the understanding affords but an initial sketch of what self-consciousness is. It sublates the already purified (albeit still mutually indifferent) distinctions present in law, and establishes them in a single unity, force. Yet even as this sameness is coming into being, [M117] it is diversifying, since the understanding manages to sublate these distinctions and establish the oneness of force solely by making a new distinction between law and force—albeit one that even then doesn't distinguish anything, for which reason the understanding proceeds in turn to sublate this nondifferentiative distinction, leaving force constituted as law.

56 –This progression, this necessity, is, however, still then a necessity and progression of the understanding; as such it isn't its object. Rather does the understanding have in its course positive and negative electricity, distance, velocity, force of attraction, and a thousand other things as the content of this dynamic's moments. This is why there's so much satisfaction in “explaining” things; when it does so, consciousness is, so to speak, merely enjoying its own company by talking to itself, looking as though it were plying all manner of things while really it's just entertaining itself.

57 But when comprehended in inverted form as the contrary of the first law, that is, when comprehended as internal diversity, infinity does indeed become an object of the understanding, although here again the understanding fails to do it justice in that it parcels out difference as such (the self-repulsion of the homogeneous and the self-attraction of the nonhomogeneous) to two worlds, two substantive elements. As far as the understanding is concerned, the dynamic it experiences is something that just “happens,” and homogeneity and nonhomogeneity are then “predicates” whose essence is to be looked for in some matter-of-fact substrate. What for the understanding is an object enshrouded in a veil of sense is present to us in its essential embodiment as something purely conceptual. The comprehension of difference as it truly is, grasping infinity as such, falls to *us*—it being here still implicit. Thus while the exposition of infinity’s conceptual nature is the task of science, consciousness, in grasping infinity in an im-mediate way, advances yet again into another of its indigenous forms, a new permutation in which it doesn’t recognize the essential role of infinity in what led it to this point, but looks upon this as utterly alien.

58 –When it does have this concept—infinity—as object, consciousness is aware of a manner of difference that’s at once directly evident yet sublated. Consciousness is then present to itself, is a distinguishing of something that isn’t distinct from it, [M118] is *self-consciousness*. Here I distinguish myself from myself, and so am directly aware that what’s thus being differentiated isn’t distinct. I, something homogeneous, “repel” myself from myself; but what’s thus distinguished, what’s set forth as unlike me is evident to me, even as it’s being thus distinguished, as *not* different. Indeed consciousness of any other entity, of any object whatever, is self-conscious being, being that’s reflected into itself, a cognizance of self in its own otherness. What’s brought to light in the necessary progression through the preceding permutations of consciousness, in which what’s true was some *thing*, something other than that embodiment itself, isn’t just that consciousness of a thing is possible only for a self-conscious entity, but that self-consciousness alone is the truth of all these embodiments. But this truth is evident only to us, not yet to consciousness. Basically self-consciousness has only become *present to itself*, not yet *one with* consciousness.

59 We now see that in appearance’s ‘inner’ the understanding is experiencing nothing but appearance itself—albeit not as it is in the play of forces but rather as it is in its wholly comprehensive moments together with their dynamic. And in so doing it’s in fact just experiencing itself. Now well beyond mere perception, consciousness demonstrates its interconnectedness with the supersensuous via appearance, the intermediary through which it peers into what’s behind the scenes. The two extremes—the ‘pure inner’ and ‘the inner that beholds the pure inner’—have now coalesced; and having disappeared in their roles as extremes, so also has their intermediary as something other than them.

60 –Thus is the veil concealing the inner drawn away, affording an inside view of the inner: the vision of something undifferentiatedly homogeneous that, in repelling itself from itself, sets itself forth as a distinct inner, albeit as one to which the nondistinctness of the one inner as well as the other is just as readily apparent: self-consciousness. It's now evident that behind the so-called veil concealing the inner there's nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind it, as much so that we may thereby see as that behind it there may actually be something there to be seen. Yet as is also evident, we can't just go [M119] behind this veil without further complication, since it's only as the result of an intricate dynamic that we gain knowledge of what the truth of this way of representing appearance and its inner consists in, a dynamic in which the role of the preceding modes of consciousness (meaning, perceiving, and understanding) is much diminished. And as will additionally become clear, to discern what consciousness knows when it knows itself entails still further complications, as the following will spell out. [M120]



IV

SELF-CERTAINTY'S TRUTH

1 In the preceding modes of certainty what consciousness deems to be true is something other than consciousness itself. But this conception of what's true disappears in the course of experiencing it. What the object consisted of directly in itself—sense-certainty's 'matter-of-fact being,' perception's 'concrete thing,' the understanding's 'force'—rather than proving to be the object as it is in truth, shows only how such an entity-in-itself is present to an entity other than it. The object as thus conceived is superseded in the actual object; that is, the initial direct representation is sublated in experience, with such certainty being lost sight of in face of the truth.

2 –What has thus emerged is a form of certainty unrealized in any of the earlier relations, namely one that matches its truth, since here certainty takes *itself* to be its object, with consciousness taking itself to be what's true. Of course otherness is still in play here too: consciousness does still distinguish [what's other than it], but in such a way that for it this other is also *not* distinct. Were we to refer to the processive dynamic of knowing as 'conceiving,' and refer to the steadily sustained unity of knowing—the I—as the 'object,' then we see that here, not only for us but also for just such knowing, the object corresponds with the way it's being conceived. Alternatively, were 'concept' to refer to what the object is in itself, while 'object' were to refer to what an object is *as* object, that is, as present to something other than it, then it's clear that this being-in-itself and the being that's present to some other are the same. For the being that exists here in itself is consciousness—which is likewise that to which something other than it (something existing in itself) is present. And it's evident to consciousness that what this object is in itself and the being that it has for this other are the same. The I is both the content of the relation and what's doing the relating—is itself vis-à-vis an other, and also encompasses this other that for it is but the I itself.

3 Thus with the emergence of self-consciousness we have now entered into the homeland of truth. We need to take a look at self-consciousness in its initial form. [M121]

4 –When we view this new permutation of knowledge, ‘knowing that knows itself,’ in relation to the preceding, ‘knowing what’s other than it,’ it’s indeed evident that the preceding form has diminished in import. Nonetheless its moments have been carried over, the “loss” sustained here coming down to no more than their being present now just as they are in themselves. The ‘being’ of [the sensuous dynamic of] meaning, the ‘singularity’ and contrasting ‘universality’ of perception, the vacuous ‘inner’ of the understanding no longer exist as substantive essences but rather as moments of self-consciousness—that is, abstractions, forms of difference that for consciousness itself are at the same time null—entities that aren’t really distinct and are sheerly evanescent. Hence what seems to have been lost is solely what in them is of greatest moment, namely some manner of simple independent subsistence that’s present to consciousness.

5 –Yet in fact self-consciousness is a reflection out of the being of the sensuous and perceptual world and in essence a return from otherness. As self-consciousness it itself is this very dynamic—although so long as all that it’s distinguishing is *itself* from itself, the otherness of anything thus distinct is for it instantly nullified; no such difference exists, and self-consciousness is statically tautological pure and simple: “I am I.” So long as it doesn’t consider what differs from it to be embodied in the way that *being* is, it isn’t self-conscious.

6 –Hence otherness is present to it as some form of being, that is, as a distinct moment [of its experience]. Yet also evident to it, as a second distinct moment, is its *oneness* with that distinct being. In the first of these moments self-consciousness exists as consciousness, and has the full expanse of the sensuous world available to it—albeit solely as tied into the second moment, its oneness with itself, by which it’s evident to it that this expanse has the manner of subsistence that mere *appearance* has, that is, something distinct that has no being in itself.

7 –But this [experiential] tension between ‘what’s appearing’ to it and its ‘truth’ has only the latter as its essential nature—namely its oneness with itself—which becomes perforce indispensable to it, self-consciousness being the very epitome of *desire*. As self-consciousness, consciousness now has a dual object: one that’s directly present to it as an object of sense-certainty and perception while in character striking it [M122] as non-self-conscious, and a second object consisting of self-consciousness itself, which is its true essence yet is at first present only vis-à-vis the first. Here self-consciousness manifests itself as a dynamic in which this opposition is nullified and its identity with itself comes into being.

8 Yet implicitly (as is evident to us) this object that self-consciousness deems to be its negative counterpart has thus involuted on its side just as consciousness has on the other. By thus reflecting into itself this object has taken on a life of its own. What self-consciousness, *within* itself, is here distinguishing *from* itself—and to that extent also affirming as matter-of-factly existent—isn't just something sensed and perceived but a manner of being that is moreover reflected into *itself*, with the object of immediate desire being something that's *alive*. For what's implicit in the understanding's relation to the inner being of things, that is, the overall outcome of that relation, is that something ended up being distinguished that isn't supposed to be distinguished, that is, that the entities thus distinguished are one and the same. Yet as we've already seen, [mutually reflective] oneness such as this is to that very extent 'self-repelling,' bifurcating conceptually into an opposition between self-consciousness and life: the former is the unitary entity to which the infinite unity of these distinct entities is evident, while the latter is simply this same unity without being at the same time present to itself thus. Hence to whatever extent consciousness exists independently, so likewise, implicitly, does its object. Self-consciousness that exists strictly for itself and forthwith attributes to its object the character of a negative complement—that is, self-consciousness that consists first and foremost of desire—will thus all the more experience the independence of its object.



9 The definition of Life derived conceptually from the overall result [of the understanding's experience] suffices to delineate the sphere we're now entering, there being no present need to elaborate life's nature further. It encompasses the following moments: Its *essence* is an infinity consisting in the sublated being of all the variants instantiative of it; a pure axial dynamism that is itself at rest amidst its utterly tumultuous boundlessness; the independence in which alone the dynamic's variants are resolved [into individuals as such]; the simplex nature of Time, which in this [M123] self-identicalness has the enduring appearance of Space. Its *variants* nonetheless exist as distinct entities within this simplex universal medium in that the negativity of this all-pervasive flux's nature is due solely to its being their sublation—and it can't sublimate them if they don't in some way subsist. Precisely this flux consisting in self-identical independence is itself the sustaining element or *substance* in which variants inhere as distinct constituents and components existing for themselves. Here 'existing' no longer refers to being in the abstract, nor does the pure 'essence' of the variants refer to some universality in the abstract; rather does their being consist precisely in the simplex fluid substance of this dynamic astir purely within its own ambit—the distinctness of these constituents relative to each other being not at all different from that of the moments of this infinity, this pure dynamism itself.

10 Although these independent constituents exist for themselves, self-relatedness of this sort consists just as readily in their reflecting into unity as it does in a oneness dividing into independent life-forms. The oneness divides because it is negative through and through, a nonfinite oneness; and because this is the sustaining element, any variant has independent existence solely within it. As a separate entity, a given life-form's independence appears as something determined by—relative to—what's other than it; and to whatever extent this dividedness gets sublated, this occurs by means of some such other. But sublating this dividedness is coequally intrinsic to each life-form itself, since the substance of the independent life-forms consists precisely in the flux—a substance that's infinite, so that any life-form, in sustaining itself, is of itself dividing, that is, sublating, its self-relatedness.

11 As we further sort out the moments involved here, we see that first we have independent life-forms subsisting unto themselves, the moment in which variation per se (a variant being something that doesn't exist in and of itself and has no subsistence of its own) is suppressed. The second moment, by contrast, is one in which the sustaining element is subject to the infinity that such variation entails.

12 –The first moment concerns the subsisting life-form: existing for itself, functioning in its [M124] specific way as an infinite substance, a life-form pits itself against substance at large, denying its fluid continuity with the latter, and asserting itself as something that, instead of being dissolved in the universal, sustains itself by keeping separate from—and indeed consuming—this nature that's not organically part of it. In just this way, life, whose life-forms are otherwise placidly separate from each other in the universal fluid medium, turns into an interactive dynamic: life as *process*. The simplex universal flux inheres within itself, while the variety of life-forms is heterogeneous. Yet due to this variety the flux itself becomes heterogeneous, since it is then existing in relation to a variant of itself—one that exists in and relative to *itself* and as part and parcel of the infinite dynamism consuming the placid medium: life as any given living entity.

13 –Implicit in this reversal of roles there is, however, yet another reversal: what's getting consumed is life's very essence; in maintaining itself at the expense of the universal and coming away with a sense of its unity with itself, individuality is sublating its own contrariety to what's other than it, sublating that whereby it exists for itself—the 'unity with self' that it thus secures being precisely that of the flux of variants: that is, their wholesale dissolution. On the other hand what's here dissolving individual subsistence is the very process that engenders it. For since any individual life-form's essential nature (life as common to all) and any such entity that exists for itself together form an inherently simplex substance, whenever it establishes such an other within itself it's sublating the simplicity essential to it—dividing that simplicity—and it's precisely this division of the undifferentiated flux that establishes individuality. Life's sim-

plex substance is thus dividing into sundry life-forms while also dissolving these subsistent variants—and the resolution of its so dividing consists equally in a dividing (its formation into constituents).

14 –Thus do the two heretofore distinct correlates of this entire dynamic coalesce: life forming inertly separate permutations subsisting independently in a universal medium, and the process of life. The process of life consists as much in the formation of life-forms as it does in the sublation of each such life-form; and the formation [of such constituents] consists as much in superseding [the universal medium] as it does in a resolution into constituents. Of [M125] itself the fluid element [or universal medium] is but an abstraction of life's essence, which is to say that only in being embodied as a life-form is this essence actual; and its forming itself into such constituents in turn sets them at variance—is dissolutive of them. This entire cycle is what life consists of: not the unmediated continuity and solidity of its essential nature that we discussed first, not any of the embodiments or discrete instances of that nature, not the sheer and utter process that they undergo, not even the simple sum of all these moments, but rather the whole of it as it unfolds and evolves, and dissolves and undoes what it unfolds, and throughout the course of the dynamic simply sustains itself.

15 Having in this way gone beyond its initial immediate oneness and, via its formative and processual moments, returned to their unity and therewith to its original simple substantiality, this *reflected* oneness is quite unlike the first. As opposed to the initial unmediative oneness, something expressly matter-of-fact, this oneness is all-comprehensive, a unity containing all the above moments in sublated form. Such unity comprises a simplex genus that exists integrally within the life-dynamic itself; but rather than being present to itself *as* the simplex genus that it is, this culmination relegates life's presence to a form other than it is here—namely to conscious being, to which life is present as a reflected unity, that is, as a genus.



16 This other form of life, to which life's genus as such is present, and which even comprises a genus unto itself—namely self-conscious being—is, however, initially aware of itself only as 'this simple entity' and has *itself* as 'sheer I' for its object. In the course of its experience, which we'll now examine, this abstract object will grow in richness and continue to unfold, just as we saw with life generally.

17 The simple I is a genus of this sort, a simple universal for which any variants aren't distinct from it since it *is* the negative essence of the independent moments embodying it; and self-consciousness is self-certain only by sublating any other moment that presents itself to it as independently alive: self-consciousness is *desire*. Certain of the nullity of any such other, it proceeds to make overtly evident to itself that nullity is

indeed the other's truth—annulling the object as something *independent*—thus affording it a certainty of self that's "verified," [M126] one that as such is reckoned by it as having come about "objectively."

18 But in indulging itself thus, self-consciousness [as simple I] experiences the independence of its object. Desire and the self-certainty attained in satisfying it are contingent upon the object; such certainty is had by sublating the other [as independent], and to do that, the other [still] has to exist. Thus self-consciousness can't sublate the other by relating to it negatively, sooner finding itself generating otherness anew together with the desire. The other is then indeed other—as self-consciousness, an entity of desire—that being the truth brought home to it via this experience.

19 –Nonetheless self-consciousness is at the same time self-oriented through and through, and is so only by sublating the object; moreover, as it sees it, it *has* to get such satisfaction, since it is the [living embodiment of] truth. But due to the object's independence, self-consciousness can attain satisfaction only when the object, on its own, brings about this negation in itself; and it has to do so, since such an object is inherently the negative complement [of the simple I] and must be inevitably present to such an other as what it is. This manner of object—inherently negative [of the simple I] and thereby also independent—is a conscious being.

20 –Within life that is an object of desire, negation is present either in the form of some *other* (i.e., as it does in desire), or as one *specific* life-form disposed indifferently to another, or as something *inorganic* in its overall nature. But an independent, universal natural entity of the above sort, within which negation is absolute, is as such—that is, as a self-conscious being—itself constitutive of a genus: a self-conscious being attains its satisfaction only in another self-conscious being.

21 Only in the course of these three moments is the conceptual nature of self-consciousness fully realized: (a) Its initial, immediate object is sheer undifferentiated I. (b) But such immediacy is itself an absolute form of mediation, existing only as sublation of any object independent of it—existing as desire. As desire is satisfied, self-consciousness actually reflects back into itself, its certainty having turned into truth. (c) But the truth of certainty such as this moreover entails a *dual* reflection, a dualization of self-consciousness itself: (1) Self-consciousness presents consciousness with a manner of object [M127] that establishes the nullity of any otherness or differentness within it, and in so doing exists independently. But, while of course any distinct life-form functioning merely at the level of the animate sublates, in the very process of living, both itself and its independence (and therein ceases, along with what's distinct about it, to be what it is), (2) the object of *self*-consciousness is independent amidst the negativity integral to *it*—and is thus a genus unto itself, an all-pervasive flux within the uniqueness that sets *it* apart: *it* is living self-conscious being.

22 A self-conscious being exists in being present to a self-conscious being. Only thus does it in fact exist at all, since only thus does its oneness with itself in its otherness become evident to it. An I that's but the object of its own conceiving isn't in fact an object. But an object of desire is independent only in its being part and parcel of an all-pervasive indestructible substance: a fluid self-identical essence. When a self-conscious being is an object, it is as much I as object. –And with this we've already arrived at the concept of *spirit*. What lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is: this consummate substance that, amidst the perfect freedom and autonomy of its antithesis, namely diverse self-conscious beings existing for themselves, is their unity: an I that is a we and a we that is an I. Only in self-consciousness, as the conceptual embodiment of spirit, does consciousness reach its turning point, striding forth from the colorific shimmer of the sensuous here-and-now and the empty night of the supersensuous beyond into the daylight of spirit's presence.



IV.A. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT: MASTERY AND SERVITUDE

23 A self-conscious being exists in and for itself in and through its existing thus for another self-conscious being: it exists only as a being that's *recognized*. The conceptual nature of self-consciousness's unity in duality, the infinity realized in self-consciousness, comprises a nexus [M128] so complex and ambiguous that one has to bear in mind that its moments when carefully sorted out aren't, as thus distinguished, at the same time heterogeneous—the significance of each having always to be grasped in relation to its opposite. The dual significance of the moments thus distinguished lies within the essential nature of self-consciousness, namely its being infinite, that is, directly contrary to any determinate mode in which it's set forth. An analysis of this concept, this spiritual unity in duality, will show us what the dynamic of recognition involves.

24 For a self-conscious being there is some other self-conscious being: self-consciousness “has gotten outside itself.” This has a dual import: first, it has lost itself in that it's thus encountering *itself as another* entity, and second, it has thereby superseded that other in that what it sees in the other is *itself*, not anything whereby that other would be essential too.

25 Self-consciousness has to sublate this its own “otherness,” nullifying the above ambiguity and in so doing giving rise to another: first, it has to set about sublating this other independent entity in order to be sure that it is itself the entity that's essential; and second, in so doing it proceeds to sublate itself, since this other is then it itself.

26 This sublating in a double sense of self-consciousness's otherness in a double sense is every bit as much a return to self in a double sense; for by this means self-consciousness recovers itself, since by sublating its otherness it becomes identical with itself again—yet by the same stroke restores the other self-consciousness to *itself*, since it supersedes its own being in the other (the presence it had therein), thus letting the other go free again.

27 This portrayal of the interactive dynamic of one self-conscious being with another has, however, only one of the two doing all the acting. But the action of even a single self-consciousness has a dual import, involving the other's action as much as its own; for the other is just as independent and self-contained as it itself is, there being nothing in the other that isn't there by that other's own doing. The object that the first self-consciousness has before it is no longer the mere object of desire that the other was at the outset, but rather an independent object existing for *itself*, hence one over which the first self-consciousness, by itself, has no power, unless whatever it does [M129] to the object the object does to itself. Plainly then, this is a dual dynamic involving both self-conscious beings: each sees the other do what it itself is doing; each itself does what it demands of the other, and hence does what it does only insofar as the other does the same. Unilateral action would be useless here, since what's supposed to take place can come to pass only via both.

28 Such action is thus ambiguous not just in its being as much action upon self as upon another, but also in being indivisibly the action of the one self-conscious being as well as the other.

29 In this dynamic we see once again the process exhibited in the interplay of forces, albeit here within consciousness itself. What had there been evident only to us is here apparent to the extremes themselves. Mediating them both is self-consciousness, which dis-integrates into these extremes, each of which consists in exchanging its determinacy vis-à-vis the other and utterly transforming into its opposite. While, as consciousness, self-consciousness does end up "outside itself," even thus it retains a hold on itself, is still present to itself, and its being outside itself is still within its purview. It is evident to it that, as immediately present, it *is* and *isn't* another conscious being; and it's likewise evident that this other "exists for it" only in sublating *itself* as an entity existing for *itself*—and that only in the existence-for-self of the other does any self-conscious being exist for itself. Each is for the other the means by which each mediates and integrates itself; and while each is, to itself as well as to the other, an entity that exists for itself without any such mediation, it exists thus for itself solely via this mediation. It is as reciprocally self-recognizing entities that they recognize themselves.

30 We'll now examine how this pure concept—recognition: the dualization of self-consciousness within its own unity—becomes evident to self-consciousness itself.

The first aspect it will bring to light is the inequality of the two self-conscious entities, that is, that what mediates them diverges into extremes that as such relate as opposites—the one getting all the recognition, the other doing all the recognizing.

31 Self-consciousness is initially a simple self-related being, self-identical by virtue of its shutting out everything other than it: to it, its essence and sole object is I, and in this unmediated state, the being of its own presence-to-self, it exists as [M130] a single individual. Any 'other' is for it unessential, an object whose significance is that it has the character of a negative complement [i.e., a non-I]. But this other is also a self-conscious being: here individual is showing up opposite individual. Arriving so abruptly on the scene, they're present to each other in the manner of common objects: "independent" life-forms, conscious beings immersed within animate being—objects each of which has matter-of-factly established that it is alive, but without as yet having completed for the other the radically abstractive process of nullifying all immediate being so as to exist solely as a purely negative, self-identical consciousness—that is, having not yet demonstrated to each other that they exist sheerly for themselves—that is, as self-conscious beings.

32 –While indeed each of them is sure of itself, it isn't sure about the other, and so doesn't yet have verification of its self-certainty; for that would require that its existing-for-itself be nothing short of overtly evident to it in the manner of an independently existent object, or equivalently, in the object's making clear that *it* is certain that *it* exists for itself. But that isn't possible unless, in keeping with the conceptual nature of recognition, each does for the other what the other does for it, unless each, by its own action as well as by that of the other, completes this pure abstraction, this 'existence-for-self.'

33 But demonstrating that one exists in the purely abstract manner of a self-conscious entity entails showing oneself to be the utter negation of any mode in which one has objective being, showing that one is bound to no specific way of existing, not even to the mode of existence common to every such individual being: life itself. The action that demonstrates this is twofold, the other's and one's own. So far as an *other* is taking such action, each is bent upon doing away with the other—although with this the second action is in play, that of acting on one's own part, since such action involves placing one's own life in jeopardy. The relation between the two self-consciousnesses is thus defined in terms of their "proving" themselves and one another through a life-and-death struggle.

34 –They have to engage in such a struggle because each has to have the certainty of its existing for itself verified in the eyes of the other as well as in his own. Only by risking life itself is freedom proved, is it shown that, [M131] to self-consciousness, it

isn't sheer 'being'—existing directly as it first emerged—that is, as *submerged* in the vast profusion of Life—that's of the essence, but rather that there be nothing present within it that it wouldn't take to be just a fleeting moment, that it exist sheerly and purely for itself. An individual who hasn't risked life may perhaps be recognized as a "person," but hasn't truly attained the independent self-conscious existence commensurate with such recognition. Each has to risk his own life just as he has to try to kill the other, since he no longer regards that other as himself. His own essential nature is confronting him in the form of another being; he's gotten "outside himself" and has to put an end to this—while the other, a factually existent, multifacetedly engaged conscious being, inevitably looks upon the otherness confronting him as a being that exists sheerly for *itself* or is utterly negative of him.

35 Yet the very act of proving oneself thus—by dying—altogether obliterates the truth that's supposed to come of it, not to mention one's certainty of self. For just as life is a conscious being's positive natural state (existing independently without being negated entirely), so is death its natural negation (its being annihilated regardless of its independence), leaving him without the required recognitional status. Fighting to the death does make certain that each of the two put his life on the line and had as little regard for it as for the other's, but not for two who've withstood such a struggle. These nullify the realization they've instilled in the entity they deem alien, this [otherwise mere] natural presence—in effect nullifying themselves and being nullified as [self-conscious] extremes who would exist unto themselves. In this way the moment essential to the interplay—that of there being opposing determinants that have disintegrated into extremes—vanishes, and the mediating link between them collapses into a moribund "unity" in which the two are disengaged into inert extremes that merely "exist" instead of being tensively engaged with each other. There is no give-and-take between the two via their consciousness of each other; each just lets the other go its way—with both as indifferent to the other as they are to mere things. What they've achieved is an abstract negation, not the manner of negation in which consciousness, subsuming in such a way as to preserve and sustain what it sublates, survives the process of its being itself sublated. [M132]

36 In the course of this experience it becomes evident to self-consciousness that life is as essential to it as is sheer self-consciousness. In immediate self-consciousness the simple I is an object that is absolute, albeit one that in itself, as is evident to us, is absolutely mediative, and has the sustainment of its independence as an essential moment. Self-consciousness's initial experience results in the dissolution of this simple unity; this sets the stage for the emergence of a pure self-consciousness and also a consciousness that doesn't exist purely for itself but rather for one other than it, the latter being matter-of-factly existent in the manner of a thing. Both moments are essential, although, starting out as unequal and antagonistic, their reflection into unity having not yet taken place, they embody conscious existence in contrary ways: the one is

independent, existence-for-*self* being to it essential; the other is dependent, existing in relation to an other that's essential to it. The former is master, the latter slave.



37 The master is a conscious being who exists for himself—doing so no longer by just conceiving of such but via the intermediation of another conscious being, one whose essence involves it in a synthetic relation with independent being, thinghood at large. The master interrelates with both of these moments: with things as such—objects of desire—as well as with this consciousness for whom thinghood is of the essence. And since the master, in embodying the conceptual principle of self-consciousness, is (a) a being who relates directly to himself, but (b) also a being whose presence-to-self is mediated, who exists for himself only via another being, he thus relates to both the other consciousness and to things (a) directly and (b) indirectly (each via the other).

38 –Through his relation to independent being the master is indirectly related to the slave, since independent being is precisely that to which the slave is bound, it forming the chain from which he was unable to break free during the struggle, thus proving that he wasn't independent—or was so only amidst things. The master, on the other hand, is sovereign over such being, having proved in the struggle that, so far as he's concerned, being per se matters only as something negatively complementary to him; and since he holds sway over it, which in turn holds sway over the other consciousness, he (in this manner of reckoning) [M133] holds sway over the latter as well. By the same token, via the slave the master is related indirectly to things; as basically a self-conscious being, the slave is negatively oriented toward things and sublates them—although for him they're at the same time independently existent, so that instead of being able to be done with them by negating them to the point of annihilation, the best he can do is work upon them. For the master, by contrast, a direct relation is brought about by this means, one purely negative of thing-like being: *enjoyment*. What desire failed to achieve, he does achieve—therewith getting the thing done and satisfying himself in enjoyment. Desire failed to accomplish this due to the independence of things; but the master, who has interposed the slave between himself and them, is in touch with things only insofar as they're at his disposal. He simply enjoys them—leaving it to the slave to labor over this independent aspect.

39 In both of these moments it becomes evident to the master that he is being recognized via a conscious being other than himself; for in both moments this other confirms—in laboring away upon things and in the dependency typical of the existence to which *he's* destined—that *he* is nonessential; in neither can the latter assert his mastery over being and succeed in totally negating it. So here the one moment of recognition (in which the other consciousness sublates his own being for himself and hence does to himself what the first is doing to him) is in play, as also is the other (that

in which the act of the second consciousness is also the act of the first, in that whatever the slave does is really the master's doing). To the master all that matters is existence-for-self: *he* is the purely negative power for whom things are nothing, *his* is the pure activity that is essential in this relationship, whereas the slave's activity is neither pure nor essential. –Yet something essential to any genuine recognition is missing here, namely the moment in which the master does to himself what he does to the other, and in which the slave does to *himself* what *he* does to the master. The recognition thus far achieved is one sided and unequal.

40 The unessential consciousness thus objectifies for the master the “truth” of his certainty of self. But clearly this objectification doesn't fit with the master's conception of it; on the contrary, for him the very [M134] consciousness in whom he establishes himself turns out to be anything but an independent conscious being. No such being even exists for him, only this dependent consciousness; hence he's not sure that he truly does exist for himself, it being sooner this unessential consciousness and its insignificant activity that's the truth of him.

41 Accordingly, the truth of the independent consciousness is comprised in the servile consciousness, which at first no doubt seems peripheral to him and hardly the [living] truth of self-consciousness. But just as mastery turned out to be in essence the reverse of what it means to be, so too will servitude, turning out in the course of its maturation to be quite the opposite of what it is immediately: in being “forced back” into itself the servile consciousness will come to terms with itself from within and transform itself into a truly independent consciousness.



42 All that we've seen of servitude so far is what it is relative to mastery. Yet it is self-aware, and we need to consider now what it thus is in and for itself. –Initially servitude looks upon the master as the one who's essential, and so to it this independent conscious being existing for himself is a true reality—albeit one that's present to rather than integral to servitude. Nonetheless this truth consisting in sheer negativity and existence-for-self has in fact been internalized by servitude in that it has experienced this essence within itself. Rather than having been anxious about this or that, or on one or another occasion, the servile consciousness feared for his very being; his was the fear of [imminent] death, an absolute master. In experiencing this he came unglued, was shaken to the core, had every steady fiber within him set atremble. Yet being motivated with such clarity and thoroughness, having everything solid within one utterly liquefy, is self-consciousness's simplex essence: a radical negativity, a pellucid self-orientedness that in this way becomes integral to servile consciousness. This latter moment, pure existence-for-self, is also *present to* the servile consciousness as objectified for him in the person of the master. What's more, the servile consciousness isn't

just all-pervasively dissolutive “by and large”; via the service he renders he succeeds in *actually* effecting this—sublating, moment by moment, his dependence on natural existence and working his way free of it.

43 But this felt experience of undoubted potency, both generally and in [M135] the specifics of service, is dissolutive only in principle; and although fear of the lord is indeed the beginning of wisdom,¹ the servile consciousness is therein hardly present to himself as a being who exists for himself. Yet through his work he does come into his own. In the experiential moment corresponding to desire in the master’s consciousness, the “unessential” relation to things maintained by him did seem to him to be his lot since in that relation things retain their independence. Desire reserves for itself the experience of negating the object outright and the unalloyed sense of self that comes with it. But such satisfaction is fleeting, since it has no objective dimension, nothing to sustain it. Work, by contrast, is desire held in check, ephemerality arrested: work establishes form. This négative way of relating to an object turns into the form of that object, into something that lasts inasmuch as, for the very one who works on it, the object has independent existence. This négative intermediary—formative action—is moreover comprised in the individuality or sheer existence-for-self of a conscious being who’s working out of such existence into the element of duration, thereby coming to look upon independent being as [an extension of] himself.

44 But the positive import of formative activity isn’t just that hereby the servile consciousness comes to see himself as pure existence-for-self becoming factually existent; rather does it also involve a negative moment related to its fear, one running counter to the first. For as the servile consciousness gives form to things, it becomes evident to him that by sublating the matter-of-fact form they have vis-à-vis him he’s objectifying his own negativity, *his* way of existing for himself. But this—objectively existent négativeness—is precisely the alien nature before which he’d trembled. Yet now he undertakes to destroy that alien négativeness, asserts himself as a négative agent in the element of enduring being, and thereby comes into his own as a being who exists for himself.

45 –In the master, existence-for-self is for the servile consciousness “somebody else’s,” or is merely present to him; but in his fear existence-for-self is internalized. In his giving form to things, existence-for-self becomes present to him as his very own, and he comes to realize that he exists both in and present to himself. By being externalized thus, form doesn’t become for him something other than him, since this form is nothing but his own pure existence-for-himself, [M136] which is thereby being verified for him. It’s precisely by rediscovering himself in work, which seemed to leave him only with a sense of alienation, that he comes on his own to a sense of his self.

1. Psalm 111:10; Proverbs 9:10.

46 –Both moments, that of fear and servitude as well as that of formative activity, are in any event necessary for this reflection to occur, and both have to be present in an all-pervasive way. Without the discipline of dutiful service, fear clings to formulaic activities and doesn't broaden itself so as to grasp the noetic reality of what's in this way made present. And until the servile consciousness gives form to things, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness doesn't become present to itself. Engaging in formative activity without having experienced primal absolute fear leaves consciousness with but a vacant sense of self, since then its form—negativity—isn't negative within it itself, and its formative activity affords it no awareness of its being itself essential. If it hasn't endured absolute fear but merely a measure of anxiety, then this its negative nature remains external to it instead of permeating its substance through and through. Unless all the ways in which its natural consciousness can fulfill itself have begun to fail, it of itself still belongs to a set and defined existence: here sense of self equates with contumacy, a manner of freedom still mired in servility. Such a mentality can no more see pure form as something crucial than it can see form as spanning the realm of particulars, as universally formative, as unrestrictedly conceptual; its aptitude extends only to this or that without ever mastering this sweeping power and therewith the whole objective realm.



IV.B. THE FREEDOM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: STOICISM, SKEPTICISM, AND THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS

47 The independent self-consciousness takes only a pure abstraction—the I—to be its essence. As this abstract entity develops and sorts out what's different from it, it doesn't regard anything different as an objective self-inhering entity. Hence this manner of self-consciousness doesn't actually diversify in its simplicity or remain self-identical in the course of this radical diversification. [M137] The repressed consciousness, by contrast, in its formative activity objectifies itself as the form of the things it fashions, while also beholding in the master a presence-to-self that exists as a conscious being. But to a consciousness that's servile these two moments—that of itself as [seen in] an independent object, and that of an object that exists consciously and therein comprises its own essence—are separate from each other. Yet since implicitly, as we've seen, 'form' and 'presence-to-self' are here the same, and since even in the independent consciousness's own conceiving 'what's self-inhering' is consciousness, the aspect of being-in-itself or thinghood that took form in and through work is in substance none other than consciousness. –And with this we see the emergence of a new embodiment of self-consciousness, one that regards something infinite, conscious-

ness's own pure dynamic, as essence: a consciousness that *thinks*, existing as a free self-conscious being. For to be one's own object, not in the manner of an abstract I but rather as an I of significance in that it's also self-inhering—or alternatively to relate to an objective entity in such a way that it conveys the presence-to-self of the consciousness to which it is present—is to think.

48 –In *thought* an object unfolds not in representations or in imagery, but rather in concepts, that is, in a manner of distinct self-inhering being that's directly evident to consciousness as being no different from it. Anything represented, physically depicted, or matter-of-factly existent has as such a form other than consciousness; but while a concept is something matter-of-factly existent too—and is moreover something *distinct* that, in being present *within* consciousness, comprises the latter's specific content—inasmuch as this content is conceptual, consciousness remains directly aware of its *unity* with this specific and distinct, factually existent being. Unlike what happens in representation, where consciousness has to go out of its way to remind itself that what's represented is its own representation, when I conceptualize it's directly evident to me that whatever I've thus conceived is my own conception. I think, and thus am I free because therein I don't find myself in something other than myself but remain entirely within myself; the object that I take as essence is inseparably one with my own presence to myself, and my activity in conceptualizing is an activity that takes place within me myself.

49 –As we proceed to flesh out this embodiment of self-consciousness, it's essential [M138] to bear in mind that in all instances it consists in 'thinking conscious being': its object is the immediate oneness of being that is both self-inhering and present to itself. A self-conforming consciousness that projects itself out from itself becomes present to itself as a self-inhering element, although at first only in a general way: as an 'all-inclusive essence' rather than as an entity objectified in the development and dynamic of its own complex being.



50 When this emancipated self-consciousness arrived on the scene in the history of spirit as the epiphany of freedom in consciousness, the name it was given, as is well known, is Stoicism. Its principle is that consciousness is a manner of being that thinks, and that anything is of substance—is true and good—for consciousness only insofar as consciousness relates to itself therein as a thinking entity.

51 The object with which desire and work contend is the expansiveness, diffuseness, and material complexity of life in all its intricate and immanently spontaneous variability. Here, however, this elaborate effort is compressed into a simple distinction intrinsic to the pure dynamic of thought. Difference, whether present in the form of

some specific thing or in a specific natural mode of conscious being (some feeling, or some desire and what it strives for, be this a purpose set by me or by some “alien” consciousness), no longer has any essential significance. The only decisive differences are those occurring in thought, namely those that aren’t directly distinguishable from myself. Hence this consciousness reacts negatively to the master-slave relation: it doesn’t, as master, have its truth in the slave, nor does it, as slave, find its truth in the will of the master and in serving him. Regardless of its particular situation, be it on the throne or in chains, the thrust of its action is to remain free, sustaining an impassivity that steadfastly withdraws from the tumult of existence, from active engagement as well as passive acquiescence, into the simple ways characteristic of thought. As opposed to the contumacious mentality encountered above—a manner of freedom entrenched in its own particularity and thus condemned to servility—Stoicism is a form of freedom ongoingly in process of emerging from preoccupation with particulars directly into the pure universality of thought. Only in an age of [M139] widespread fear and enslavement, yet also an age that’s on the whole cultivated, one in which culture has attained to the level of thought, could Stoicism have emerged as one of the universal forms of the world-spirit.

52 Now while indeed this manner of self-consciousness considers its essence to consist neither in anything other than it nor in the sheer abstraction ‘I,’ but rather in an I within which otherness is present—albeit as something that this I *thinks of* as being different from it, so that in this very otherness it finds itself right back within itself—its essence turns out to be a sheerly abstract one after all. Self-conscious freedom of this sort is indifferent to natural existence, which is thereby left equally free—a reflection that is thus dual. Such freedom as is had in thought alone has only pure thought for its truth; it isn’t fulfilled by being lived, and so is but the conceiving of freedom, not freedom that’s itself vibrantly alive—‘thinking’ being basically all that’s essential to it, form as such that has withdrawn from the independence of things into itself.

53 –Yet since individuality, as actively engaged, is supposed to be vibrantly manifesting itself or, as thoughtfully engaged, comprehending the world of real life in a system of thought, there has to be in thought itself some *content*: for its practical dimension ‘that which is good,’ and for its theoretical dimension ‘that which is true.’ Only thus would whatever is present to consciousness have no ingredient other than the conceiving that’s of the essence. Yet conception is here, in the fashion of an abstraction, divorced from the multifariousness of things, with no content within it save what’s “given” it. Whereas such consciousness does manage to extirpate content when thinking it (as being something alien), conceptualizing is specific, and this specificity is an alien element internal to what’s being conceived. So when questioned concerning a general criterion of truth—actually, concerning the very content of thought as such—Stoicism became perplexed. To the question “*What*, then, is good and true?” it responded with an idea void of content: “The true and the good shall consist of

reasonableness.” But such self-sameness in thinking reduces again to sheer form, in which nothing is made definite. While ‘truth and goodness,’ ‘wisdom and virtue,’ the general [M140] terms to which Stoicism remains ineluctably bound, are no doubt generally uplifting, since they don’t really lend themselves to any substantive elaboration they soon become rather tedious.

54 This cogitative mentality, having defined itself as a form of abstract freedom, thus negates otherness only imperfectly; by simply withdrawing from existence at large into itself it hasn’t succeeded in wholly negating the latter’s presence within it. While indeed content matters to it only as something being thought, thereby content also matters as something *definite*—with specificity as such mattering too.



55 Skepticism realizes what Stoicism merely conceives, and actually experiences what freedom of thought is: it’s inherently negative, and cannot but manifest itself accordingly. As self-consciousness reflects into simple self-thought, whatever exists independently of, or embodies the specificity enduringly counter to, this manner of reflection, *de facto* falls outside such infinity: in Skepticism it occurs to consciousness that anything other than it is utterly nonessential and wholly dependent upon it. Here thought becomes consummate thought—thought that utterly deconstructs the very being of the world in all its intricate specificity, self-consciousness that, unfettered, comes to see *its own* negativity as a negativity that’s actually real in the manifold structure of life.

56 –As is quite evident, whereas Stoicism corresponds to the *concept* of independent consciousness (as seen in the master-slave relation), Skepticism corresponds to what that consciousness *realizes* by way of its negative orientation toward otherness (as seen in desire and work). But whereas desire and work were incapable of seeing the above negation through to completion for self-consciousness, this polemical disposition toward the independence of things very well can, since it comes at them as an already complete, internally free self-consciousness—more precisely, because *thinking* is integral to it, that is, something *infinite* that views independent entities (in keeping with the difference between it and them) as being merely infinitesimal. Distinct entities that exist sheerly as abstractions in pure self-thought here become the only distinct entities that there are, and all distinct [M141] being reduces to whatever self-consciousness distinguishes.

57 This delineates what Skepticism basically does and how it does it. It exhibits the dialectical dynamic constitutive of sense-certainty, perception, and understanding, as well as the insubstantiality of everything deemed to be settled once and for all either in the relationship of mastery and servility or for abstract thinking. The master-slave

relation is imbued with an aura of “definiteness” in which even moral laws are felt as the commands of a master; but in abstract thinking specifics serve as the concepts of a science that imparts vacuous notions, and in fact merely attaches conception in external fashion to the being comprising its content, which stands independent of it—with only “definitive” concepts such as these being deemed valid, even though they’re sheer abstractions.

58 As directly experienced by consciousness, dialectic at first appears as a negative dynamic, as something to which it is subjected and not something that it itself engenders. However, as embodied in Skepticism this dynamic is an integral moment of a manner of self-consciousness for which it doesn’t just “happen” that what it takes to be true and genuine vanishes without its knowing how, but which, certain of its freedom, sees to it that anything other than it that gives itself out as genuinely real vanishes. What’s dissolving here isn’t just objectivity as such, but rather this consciousness’s very relation to objectivity, the relation whereby objectivity is affirmed and validated as objective—hence also [compromising] its perception of things as well as threatening the bulwark of its sophistry and the “truth” it has defined and established from within its own resources. By self-consciously negating objectivity this mentality generates in its own mind the sure sense that *it is free*, realizes this certainty experientially, and in this way elevates such certainty to truth. What’s vanishing here is anything that’s definite, anything distinct that, regardless of the manner of its existence or whence it comes, asserts itself as something fixed and immutable. There’s no permanency to such distinctness, and it inevitably evanesces under the gaze of thought, since anything thus distinguished consists not in its existing in and of itself but in having its essence solely in something other than it—whereas thinking sees into the nature of what’s distinguished, is the entity doing the negating plain and simple. [M142]

59 What skeptical self-consciousness accordingly experiences amidst this ceaseless flux of everything that would present itself as fixed and enduring is its own self-engendered and self-sustained freedom: it knows the serenity (*ataraxia*), the immutable and veracious self-certainty, of thought thinking itself. But this skeptical self-certainty doesn’t come in wake of the collapse of a multifariously developing external reality, a culminating event no longer in the making; rather is this consciousness itself an utter dialectical tumult, a welter of sensuous and intellectual representations whose distinctions collapse and whose consistency—the very basis of its certainty in the face of inconsistency—time and again disintegrates.

60 –But for that very reason, far from being self-consistent, this mentality in fact gets hopelessly entangled in contingency, dizzying itself with its own endlessly self-engendered disorder. Moreover it’s quite aware of this, since it itself is what’s fomenting and perpetuating the rampant confusion with which it’s beset. And it admits as much, acknowledging that it’s a consciousness wholly oriented to the contingent and

particular: one that's 'empirical' but allows itself to be governed by what it considers unreal, a consciousness submissive to what it regards as having no substance, a consciousness acting on and actualizing what it deems to have no truth. Yet even as it's thus taking itself to be a particular, contingent, and downright brutish form of life, an altogether forlorn self-consciousness, it's also redefining itself as the opposite, as something universally self-consistent—it being, after all, what's negative of all particularity and all difference. And from this self-consistency, or rather *within* this very self-consistency, it once again lapses into fortuitousness and confusion; for all that this self-propelling negation can do here is entertain itself with particular, isolated experiences and sheerly contingent events.

61 –This mentality thus unwittingly oscillates between extremes, between a self-consistent self-consciousness and a contingency-ridden consciousness that's as bewildering as it is bewildered. Left to its own devices, it's unable to reconcile these two ways of thinking about itself: one moment it recognizes that its freedom consists in surmounting all the entanglements and vicissitudes of existence; the next it acknowledges that it has reverted to preoccupation with matters of no [MI43] substance. It sees to it that all this unessential material dissipates in the course of its thinking, yet even in so doing is engrossed with the unessential; it asserts the sheer and utter ephemerality of things, yet thereby underscores its own flightiness; it proclaims the nothingness of seeing, hearing, and so on, and all the while is itself seeing, hearing, and so on. It declares ethical principles to be null and void—even while empowering them to rule its conduct. Its actions and its words keep contradicting one another, and it's aware that it's doubly self-contradictory: immutable and consistent, yet utterly contingent and inconsistent. But it keeps the terms of this inner contradiction apart, and maintains the same attitude toward *it* as it does in its sheerly negative approach to things in general. Show it how two things are consistent, and it points out their inconsistency; try confronting it now with what it just said, and it starts noting their consistency. Listening to it rather reminds one of the squabbling of contrarious brats one of whom says A when the other says B and B when the other says A, each of them taking delight in contradicting the other at the price of contradicting himself.

62 What consciousness truly experiences in Skepticism is consciousness itself as internally contradictory—an experience from which a new embodiment emerges, one that brings together the two ways of thinking that Skepticism keeps apart. Skepticism's thoughtlessness regarding itself is inevitably fleeting because both of its ways of thinking are contained in a single consciousness. This new permutation of consciousness is one to which it's thus evident that it is of two minds concerning itself—as self-liberating, immutable, and self-consistent yet also consummately self-bewildering and self-pervverting—and it's accordingly a consciousness focused upon this its contradictoriness. In Stoicism self-consciousness is simple freedom of self; in Skepticism this

freedom realizes itself, annihilating the other dimension of determinate existence, yet all the more dualizes *itself*, being now dualized in its own mind. Thus, whereas previously the duality of self-consciousness was split up into two self-conscious individuals (master and slave), now it coalesces within a single individual. But even though the [M144] internal duality of self-consciousness so essential to the conceptual nature of spirit is already in evidence here, its unity is not—and the conscious awareness that its being is thus dualized and downright contradictory is [epitomized in] the Unhappy Consciousness.



63 Since this unhappy, internally bifurcated consciousness realizes that the contradictoriness of its essential nature is comprised in a single conscious being, each of its two conscious orientations inevitably involves the other; and so no sooner does it imagine itself to have prevailed and found peace in the single-mindedness of either one than it is expelled therefrom. But once it honestly makes its way back inside itself, becomes reconciled with itself, it will exhibit the manner of conceiving characteristic of a vitalized spirit actively engaged in existence, since by then it's already evident to it that it is dualized as one integrally indivisible consciousness: it itself *is* the gazing of one self-conscious being into another—and itself *is* both of them. Yet, while it so much as deems the unity of both as essence, what's *not* yet evident to it is that *it itself is* that essence—that it is itself this unity.

64 Since at first it comprises only the *im*-mediate unity of the two, with both being present to it as contraries rather than as one and the same, it deems one of them, self-consciousness simple and immutable, as 'essence'; the other, self-consciousness multifarious and variable, it deems 'unessential.' To it these two natures are foreign to each other; and due to its being itself a consciousness embodying this contradiction, it identifies with the variable consciousness and deems itself unessential. Yet due to its being conscious of the immutable, the simple essence, it also feels compelled to set about freeing itself from its nonessentiality—that is, free itself from itself—since, even though variability is all that it sees in itself, and immutability is to it something alien, this divided consciousness itself is [in part, as the unity of the two] simple and hence immutable, and so is aware of the immutable as something essential to it—albeit again in such a way that it isn't evident to it that it itself is this essence. The way it sets them up thus precludes their mutual indifference—hence too its own indifference to the immutable; instead, while embodying both of them directly, it sees itself as a nexus conjoining a substantive [ideal] essence with a nonentity, with the latter needing to be superseded. [M145] Yet since to it both are as essential as they are contradictory, at work here is a sheerly contradictory dynamic in which each, instead of finding repose in its counterpart, is merely engendered anew in that counterpart as the opposite of *it*.

65 Hence in this struggle victory over the enemy is sooner defeat: to have gained the one is to lose whatever was gained in its counterpart. Just being aware of life, existence, and activity is but grief over what consciousness is and does; for all that it has here is mindfulness of the substantive character of its counterpart and its own nothingness. It aspires to rise above its nothingness, to rise to 'the immutable.' Yet this very aspiration is just what this consciousness already is: instantly mindful of its nemesis—mindful, namely, of itself as single individual. Such immutability as is attained in this manner of consciousness is thus likewise tainted with individuality and is always present only along with it; instead of being extinguished in consciousness of the immutable, individuality is ever emerging anew therein.

66 Indeed what consciousness experiences in this dynamic is precisely the emergence of individuality from within immutability, and immutability from within individuality. It will become evident to it that both individuality at large and its own individuality are integral to the immutable essence. For the underlying truth of this dynamic is precisely the oneness of this dual consciousness—although initially what it will find most striking about this unity is the disparity between the two. Accordingly individuality's interconnectedness with the immutable is evident to this consciousness in a threefold manner: First, individual consciousness recurrently emerges as itself antithetic to the immutable essence, ending up thrust all the way back to the beginning of its struggle—'struggle' being the sustaining element of this whole way of relating. Second, as becomes evident to this consciousness, individuality is integral to the immutable itself—singular individuality being its embodying form, with this whole manner of existence carrying over into it. Third, consciousness, as this single individual, finds itself within the immutable. Although initially deemed by consciousness to be an entity that's alien to and judgmental of the individual, since subsequently the immutable turns out to be [M146] individually embodied just as it is, consciousness finally attains to spirit, knows the joy of finding itself therein, and comes to realize that its singular individuality is reconciled with the universal.

67 What here appears as the way in which the immutable comports itself turned out to be what the divided self-consciousness experiences in its distress. Now of course it isn't just its own one-sided stirrings that the divided self-consciousness is experiencing, since it is itself an immutable consciousness [in being immutably related to the immutable], hence one that's moreover present as a single consciousness involved in this dynamic to the same extent as is the other. For the moments of this dynamic proceed from the immutable as altogether antithetic to the individual, then as itself an individual at odds with the other individual, and finally as one with that other.

68 –But this account provided by us is premature in that the only immutability that's evident to us at this point is consciousness's, which accordingly isn't a true

immutability but one still beset with opposition; the immutable in and of itself having not yet emerged, we don't know how it will interrelate. All that's clear thus far is that, for the consciousness that's here our object, the above defining permutations come to light within the immutable.

69 For this reason a consciousness oriented to the immutable moreover remains mindful that the immutable is characteristically and fundamentally divided from individual consciousness—and is a presence-to-self at odds with it. That the immutable should take on the form of singular individuality at all is then, from the perspective of the individual consciousness, something that “just happens”—as also is its simply “finding itself” to be antithetic to the immutable, it being “in the nature of things” that it has such a relationship. That it eventually finds itself in the immutable seems to it partly its own doing, or as having come to pass because it is itself individual; but that such a unity comes into being, or to this extent even exists, is partly attributable to the immutable—with the opposition between individual and immutable persisting even in this unity.

70 –It's in fact because the immutable has been thus embodied that the moment in which it exists beyond [the individual] not only persists but becomes all the more firmly established. For even if it seems to consciousness that the beyond is made to approximate to it by being incarnated in the form of an actual individual, [M147] on the other hand that beyond is from then on encountered as a single individual whose presence is opaquely sensuous, exhibiting all the unyielding intransigence of actual fact. Any hope of becoming one with such an entity must remain but a hope, never to be fulfilled or made present, since standing between it and its fulfillment is precisely the utter fortuitousness, the frustrating indifference implicit in this incarnation that provided grounds for hope in the first place. By the very nature of matter-of-fact existence as one [individual], in having so taken upon itself to be actual, this single individual inevitably ends up as having vanished in a time long ago and existed in a place far away—and remains now altogether remote.

71 If what the divided consciousness initially had in mind to do was to sublimate its individuality and turn itself into an immutable conscious being, henceforth its ambition is directed at sublating its relationship with the sheerly disincarnate immutable and establishing a connection to the incarnate immutable. For now its essence and object is the solidarity of the individual with the immutable, whereas previously it conceived of its object only as amorphously, abstractly immutable; and a relationship of the sort that comes of such total conceptual bifurcation is henceforth to be averted, its initial connection to the incarnately immutable (as to an alien reality) having to be strengthened to the point of total unification.

72 The process whereby the unessential consciousness strives to attain this solidarity is threefold, corresponding to the three ways in which it will relate to its ‘incarnate be-

yond': first relating to *it* as a form of pure consciousness, then as a single entity relating thereto via desire and work, and finally as conscious of its being therein present to itself. –We'll now examine the role and specific function of these three orientations in the overall relationship.



73 Regarded then initially as a 'pure conscious being,' the incarnate immutable would seem, in being present to pure consciousness, to be affirmed just as it is in and present to itself. But what it is in and for itself, as we [M148] recall, hasn't yet come to light. For it to exist in consciousness as it is in and for itself is of course something that would have to be brought about by it itself rather than by consciousness. The way it's present here, however, is thus far only such as was one-sidedly made present by consciousness, being then neither perfect nor authentic but still incomplete, beset as it is with opposition.

74 Now while the Unhappy Consciousness hasn't secured the presence of the immutable, it has at least gone beyond pure thought as such inasmuch as it has advanced beyond the abstract thinking (altogether detached from particular individuality) of Stoicism, and also beyond the turbulent thinking of Skepticism, which is actually only a form of individuality whose inadvertent contradictions have it in ceaseless turmoil. It's beyond these, bringing and keeping pure thinking and individuality together; but it hasn't yet attained to a manner of thinking for which it's evident that consciousness in its single individuality is reconciled with pure thought itself. It's instead midway—where abstract thinking and the individuality of consciousness as single individual are in contact. It itself *is* the point of contact, a unity of pure thought and singular individuality; moreover this thinking individuality or pure thinking and the immutable as itself essentially individual are both present to this consciousness. But what's not yet evident to it is that this its object, the immutable it takes to be essentially embodied in the form of individuality, is it itself—that this is its own individuality.

75 Thus in this initial mode, in which we're looking at it as a form of pure consciousness, the Unhappy Consciousness doesn't relate to its object in a thinking way; instead, even though it itself and its object do inherently consist in pure thinking individuality, inasmuch as what interconnects them *isn't* of itself pure thinking, this consciousness is so to speak a mere approximation to thought, a sort of devotional rumination. Its thinking is like the jumbled clanging of bells or a pleasant whiff of incense, a sort of musical mentation that never arrives at anything like a concept—the sole form of objectivity immanent within thought. Such pure and boundless inner feeling does, to be sure, make its way into its object, but uncomprehendingly, as though into something alien. This is, [M149] then, an internal process of pure sentiment that provides a feeling of self, albeit a self painfully divided: a process of infinite longing that's convinced

that its essence consists in pure sentiment, in this pure “thinking” that thinks of itself as an individual, and that’s certain of its being recognized by and on close terms with its object because the object too thinks of itself as an individual. But then of course what’s here essential is at the same time something unattainably beyond it, something that, when taken hold of, flees, or rather is found to have already flown.

76 –This, the essential entity, has already flown since, for one thing, it is an immutable being that thinks of itself as individual, and any consciousness coming into *its* own directly in it does so as the same consciousness that *it* itself is—one antithetic to the immutable. Instead of seizing upon what’s here of the essence, such a consciousness just “feels” it and lapses back into itself. Being thus unable to keep from attaining to itself as the antithesis of the immutable, instead of having laid hold of what’s essential, all it has availed itself of is its own nonessentiality. Just as in striving thus on its side to attain a substantive essence it has secured only its divided reality, so on the other side it finds itself unable to get this ‘other’ in its grasp as anything individual, anything that’s actually real. Wherever it might seek, no such other is there to be found—it being indeed something supposedly ‘beyond,’ something that can’t be found.

77 –Such an other, sought after in the form of a single individual, isn’t a universal, thought-sustained individuality—isn’t conceptual—but something individual in the manner of an object: something actual, an object of immediate sense-certainty—and for that very reason something that turns out to have simply passed away. What consciousness perforce ends up with in any present moment is accordingly but the grave of the life that this other had. Yet in that this grave is itself something actual, and in that it’s contrary to the nature of actual reality to grant lasting possession of anything, to maintain its presence is a strenuous undertaking doomed to failure. But once having experienced that even the grave of its ‘actual immutable essence’ has no actual reality—that this vanished individual isn’t, having vanished, a true individuality—it will give up trying to find immutable individuality in something matter-of-factly actual, trying to hold on to what’s now gone. Only then does it become capable of finding individuality as it truly is: as universal. [M150]



78 Initially, however, this sensibility’s return to itself is to be understood in terms of its experience of itself as a single actual entity. As is evident to us, in itself it exists sheerly as a feeling of having found itself and being internally satisfied; for although it feels that what’s essential is separated from it, this feeling is nonetheless in principle still a feeling of self. It has felt the object of its sheer feeling, and that object is the self. Accordingly, it acts here in the capacity of a self-sentient entity, an actual reality that’s present to itself. In returning thus into itself, its second orientation has come within our view—that of desiring and working—in which, through the sublation and enjoy-

ment of something extrinsic (in the form of independent things), consciousness confirms the inner certainty of self that we know it to have now attained. But an Unhappy Consciousness “finds” itself only as desiring and working; it isn’t aware that finding itself presupposes inner self-certainty, and that its sense of what’s essential *is* its sense of self. Since it isn’t evident to it that it has such certainty, it itself, in its innermost being, remains as yet only fragmentarily self-certain; and the self-confirmation that it’s supposed to obtain through its labor and enjoyment is thus likewise fragmentary—or rather, it has to deny itself this confirmation in order thereby to confirm what it takes itself to be, namely a bifurcated being.

79 For this consciousness the actual reality upon which desire and work are directed is no longer something in itself inconsequential, something merely to be sublated and consumed; rather is it something akin to itself, a reality broken in two—being only from one perspective of no inherent significance, since from another it is a world rendered inviolable: an incarnation of the immutable in that the latter has in this way integrated singular individuality into itself. And because the immutable as such is that which is universal, the singular individuality of the immutable basically has the import of ‘everything that’s actually real.’

80 Were consciousness to regard itself as autonomous, while deeming actual reality as of no significance in and of itself, then its labors upon and enjoyment of the latter would provide it with a felt sense of its autonomy by virtue of its having been what sublated that reality. But in deeming actual reality to be instead [M151] an incarnation of the immutable, consciousness finds that it’s unable to sublate that reality all on its own. On the contrary, inasmuch as such a consciousness does manage to negate some actual state of affairs and enjoy itself in so doing, in its view this occurs because the immutable is of itself “sacrificing” *its* incarnate form and “granting” consciousness this enjoyment. –Herein consciousness is on its side likewise making its appearance as something actual, albeit something that’s also internally fragmented—there being a bifurcation evident in its labors and enjoyment, its way of relating to actual reality: a split into a form of [active] self-relating and a form of being-in-itself. This way of relating to actual reality consists in altering or acting upon it, the manner of self-relating appropriate to an individualistic consciousness as such. But therein this consciousness, too, is something in itself—the aspect attributed to the ‘immutable beyond’: the potentials and capabilities that the immutable grants it as a “gift from afar” to make use of.

81 Thus while, in acting, consciousness is initially interrelating two extremes, it stands on its side as a locus of activity vis-à-vis a passive reality on the other, albeit with both extremes having also withdrawn into immutable roles, keeping steadfastly unto themselves. What each side contributes in its interplay with the other is then quite superficial. The one extreme, actual reality, ends up sublated by the active ex-

treme, although the only way the former *can* be sublated is for that reality's 'immutable essence' to sublimate itself, that is, impelling itself out from itself and relinquishing to the active extreme whatever of itself it has thus cast off. This active force appears as the power in which actual reality is dissolved; and this consciousness accordingly takes this 'being-in-itself,' the 'essential entity,' to be something other than it, construing this power in evidence whenever consciousness engages in such action to be instead a power beyond its own. So, rather than being brought back to itself by its action and consciously confirming its self-relatedness, this action reflects *its* dynamic into the other extreme, which is then portrayed as purely and simply all-pervading, as the absolute power from which movement on all sides proceeds, and in which the very essence of these self-destabilizing extremes is comprised, both as they first appeared and as they then interact.

82 Through these two moments in which both parties engage in 'mutual self-surrender'—with [M152] the immutable consciousness withdrawing from and sacrificing its incarnate form, and the individual consciousness giving thanks (that is, denying itself the satisfaction had in realizing that it is independent, attributing the substance of its action to what's beyond it rather than to itself)—consciousness does indeed become aware of its unity with the immutable. But this unity is also riddled with division, is once more internally fragmented, with universal and individual emerging as opposites yet again. For even while to all appearances disclaiming the satisfaction it derives from its sense of self, consciousness attains actual satisfaction anyhow, since it has itself been this desiring, working, enjoying—has consciously willed, acted, and enjoyed. Even the expression of gratitude in which it effaces itself, acknowledging the other extreme as the one that's essential, is its own action—which counterbalances the action of the other extreme and reciprocates its self-sacrificing beneficence in kind. While the immutable contributes only something superficial, the latter acknowledges its "indebtedness" and so actually ends up doing more than the other; for in this way, instead of merely dispensing with something superficial, it goes so far as to disclaim its own agency, something that's essential to it.

83 –Thus the entire dynamic—not just the actual desiring, working, and enjoying, but even the acknowledgment of gratitude (in which one would think the very opposite to be taking place)—ends up reflected into the extreme of singular individuality. Here consciousness feels itself to be precisely *this individual* consciousness and refuses to let itself be deceived by its own merely apparent act of renunciation—the truth of the matter being that it hasn't given itself up. All that's taken place is a dual reflection into two extremes, once again dividing consciousness into a consciousness of the immutable and a contrasting consciousness of willing, achieving, enjoying—and also even renouncing—itsself, that is, a manner of individuality existing altogether for itself.



84 The third relation encountered in the dynamic of this consciousness accordingly begins here, emerging from the second, in which consciousness proved itself to be truly independent through what it has willed and accomplished. In its first orientation this consciousness never got beyond just *conceiving* of an 'actual conscious being,' that is, beyond an inner sense of something that isn't [M153] yet actual. While its second orientation makes this real via outwardly directed action and enjoyment, in wake of its encounter with externals consciousness *experiences* itself as actual and effectual, that is, as a conscious being to which it's true that it exists in and for itself.

85 –But with this the enemy is exposed in his own truest form. In struggling with such feelings, individualistic consciousness is merely engaging in an abstractly detached moment of bemusement; in turning this insubstantial state of being into something real, in its labor and enjoyment, consciousness is readily able to forget itself and, by acknowledging its gratitude, minimize its distinctive role in the reality thus wrought—although in truth being thus put in its place brings it back to itself, to itself as the reality it actually takes itself to be.

86 This third relation, which has 'truly actual reality' as one of its extremes, interconnects that reality—viewed as a nullity—to 'what's all-pervasively essential.' The workings of this connection have yet to be considered.

87 With regard to this consciousness's contrarious way of relating—wherein it forthwith views its "reality" as a nullity—by the very fact that it does so, anything else that it manages to do turns into an empty accomplishment, with its very sense of enjoyment turning into dissatisfaction. In this way action and enjoyment lose their whole substantive content and significance; for if they had any, they'd be something in and of themselves and would draw consciousness back into just the sort of individuality that it's bent upon superseding. –Consciousness is aware of its existing as 'this particular actual individual' in its animal functions. But these, instead of being performed uninhibitedly (as in and of themselves amounting to nothing, incapable of becoming important or essential to spirit), become instead the objects of the most strenuous effort—it being in them that the enemy shows his true colors—and so come to be precisely what matters most. Yet since an enemy such as this is regenerated in his very defeat, and since consciousness, by fixating on him, far from becoming free of him remains hopelessly bound to him and thus considers itself forever defiled (just as the content of its zealous effort proves to be what is basest rather than anything of substance, something utterly individual rather than universal), what we have here is a personality impacted within itself and its piddling activity, brooding [M154] away over itself, as miserable as it is pitifully impoverished.

88 But the sense of its misfortune and the paltriness of its action nonetheless bind this consciousness to some manner of unity with the immutable. For this attempt at summarily obliterating its actual being is mediated by its thinking about the immutable, and takes place in the context of that connection. This indirect connection in

essence defines a negative dynamic in which consciousness turns against its individuality—yet which, in establishing such a connection, is nonetheless implicitly positive and will serve to elicit for it a unity between it and the immutable.

89 This indirect connection thus delineates a syllogism of sorts in which an individuality initially defining itself as the antithesis of something that's self-inhering is conjoined with this other extreme solely via a third term. Through this intermediary the one extreme, the consciousness of the immutable, is made present to the unessential consciousness, while the latter (again, solely via this intermediary) is in turn made present to the former—with the intermediary both representing and ministering to each extreme in its involvement with the other. Such an intermediary, since it is to actively mediate consciousness as such, is of course itself a conscious being, with the content of the action being the destruction that consciousness has in view with respect to its individuality.

90 In such an intermediary, then, consciousness frees itself from any sense that action and enjoyment are its own—distancing itself from its will (as an extreme essentially existing for itself), transferring to the intermediary or minister any freedom of decision attributable to it and hereby any guilt for its action. The intermediary, being in direct contact with the immutable, in turn ministers by giving counsel concerning 'what's right.' Action of this sort (going along with what someone else has resolved upon) ceases—so far as anyone engaging in (i.e., willing) such is concerned—to be his own. And yet there still accrues to this conscious nonentity an objective aspect of it itself: its having enjoyed the fruits of its labor. So it forswears these too. Just as it manages to renounce its will, it disclaims what it has realized in its work and enjoyment—in part denying the hard-won truth of its self-conscious independence (in letting itself be moved [M155] by something that presents itself and speaks to it in an utterly alien way), in part disowning its external possessions (in giving up some of the property it acquired by toil), and in part abjuring enjoyment already had, by again, via fasting and penance, wholly denying itself such.

91 Through these moments—surrendering its power to decide for itself, then some of its property and enjoyment, and finally (this being the positive moment) engaging in activities it doesn't even understand—this form of self-consciousness truly deprives itself of any cognizance of its inner and outer freedom, its reality as a being that exists for itself. What it thus has is the certainty of its having truly alienated its very I and turned its immediate self-consciousness into a thing, into a form of objective being. —Now, the only way that such a self-renunciation could be authenticated is for the sacrifice to be actually carried out. For only then does the deceptiveness implicit in such a "heartfelt" acknowledgment of gratitude, conveyed so articulately and with such conviction, disappear—an acknowledgment whereby consciousness, while indeed shifting from itself all power to exist for itself and ascribing this to a gift from above, holds on

to an external identity (the property not surrendered), an inner identity (having itself decided as it did), and a purposive content specified by it (instead of being exchanged for a head full of alien gibberish).

92 But in actually seeing such a sacrifice through, consciousness, having sublated any sense of the action being its own, has implicitly also been absolved of its wretchedness. That this tacit absolution has taken place, however, involved action by the syllogism's other extreme: the one that's self-inherently essential. The insubstantial extreme's sacrifice wasn't a unilateral act, having entailed the action of the other extreme as well. For conceptually (i.e., implicitly) surrendering one's will is only in one sense negative, being at the same time positive, affirming the will as 'other'—specifically as a universal rather than a particular individual will. The Unhappy Consciousness construes the latter, positive significance of the negative, individualistic assertion of will as the will of the other extreme, a will that, precisely in being construed as a will other than this consciousness's own, is made known to it by a third party, the intermediary as counselor, rather [M156] than from within.

93 –Thus while it does become evident to this consciousness that its will is universal and exists in itself, it doesn't regard *itself* as inherently integral to that will; to it the surrender of its individual will isn't conceptually a positive component of a universal will. Similarly, giving up possessions and enjoyment has but negative significance, and the universality being made evident to it thus isn't its own accomplishment.

94 –Because this oneness of objectivity and existence-for-self that's implicit in the very conceiving of an action, becoming then evident to consciousness as essence and object, isn't regarded by this consciousness as the way it conceives of its own action, it also doesn't see that it, by its own doing, is what's making this oneness directly present to it as an object. Instead it lets the mediating minister express the as yet halting certainty that actually, albeit only implicitly, its unhappiness is quite the reverse: that in acting it is actively indulging in self-gratification, a blessed form of enjoyment; that likewise its feeble effort is latently just the opposite, is entirely efficacious; and that, conceptually, action is action at all solely as the action of a particular individual.

95 –But so far as it's concerned anything it does and anything it actually accomplishes remains inadequate, enjoyment is still pain, and the nullification of pain in the positive sense lies in the realm beyond. Nonetheless in this object, in which it's evident to it that what it does and is as an individual conscious entity is what being and action consist of inherently, there dawns for consciousness the idea of *reason*: consciousness's certainty that in its very individuality it exists wholly within itself—that it is all reality. [M157]



V

REASON

Its Certainty and Its Truth

1 Having grasped in its thinking that the consciousness of the single individual is an entity that is inherently absolute, consciousness returns into itself. For the Unhappy Consciousness such self-inherency was something utterly beyond it. But its dynamic brought forth within it a fully developed individuality comprised in *an actual consciousness* established as [having integrally within it] the negative complement of itself—established, namely, as its own *objective* extreme. In other words, it wrested its presence-to-itself out from within itself and turned it into a form of matter-of-fact being. Moreover, when it did so, its oneness with the universal thus formed became evident to it, a unity that, as evident to us, no longer falls somewhere outside it, since the individual thus sublated *is* this universal. And since it's in this its own negativity that consciousness sustains itself, it is in just such a universal that the essence of conscious existence consists. Its truth is comprised in the manner of consciousness that appears as intermediary, entering the picture to syllogize extremes that had become hopelessly dissociated, attesting to the immutable that the individual has renounced itself, and to the individual that for consciousness the immutable is no longer an extreme of that sort but is reconciled with it. This intermediary knows them both directly, conjoins them, and is cognizant of their unity, a unity that it attests to consciousness, and hence to itself: the certainty of being all truth.

2 With this, self-consciousness is reason, turning its hitherto negative relation to otherness into something positive. Until now its sole focus was on its freedom and

independence, on self-preservation and self-sustainment at the expense of either the world at large or its own reality, both of which appeared to have a negative effect on its essential nature. But now, possessed of reason's self-assuredness, it has come to terms with them and can take them in stride, since it's certain of its being a reality—that all that's actually real is nothing other than it. Its thinking is, right within itself, an actual reality; accordingly, this manner of self-consciousness relates to what's actual in the way that Idealism does. To this reasoning self-consciousness, [M158] grasping itself in the way that it does, it seems as though the world had only just now come into being. Till now it didn't understand the world, which it instead desired, labored over, withdrew from into itself, and nullified in its own mind—while effacing itself as a conscious being, as cognizant of the world's essentialness and its own nothingness. Only now—this sepulchral truth having been lost, the attempt to stifle its own reality having stifled itself, and with the individuality of consciousness seen by it as a manner of being that is in itself absolute—does self-consciousness discover the world as its own, a new and actual world the perpetuation of which is now of as much interest to it as was the latter's ephemerality previously, since to it the sustainment of this world is turning out to be its own truth and presence: it is certain that it's encountering only itself therein.

3 Reason is consciousness's certainty of being all reality: this is the way that Idealism expresses its concept. And just as consciousness that's emerging as reason is in direct possession of this certainty, so also does Idealism outright state as much: I am I, in the sense that the I that's my object—rather than being just an insignificant object as encountered in self-consciousness generally, or an object that, as encountered in free self-consciousness, stands aloof from other objects that are nonetheless of import beside it—is instead the one and only object, an object that is *all* reality, all that's actually there, an object that's aware of the nonbeing of any other object.

4 –But self-consciousness is all reality—not just in its own mind but also in itself inherently—only by *becoming* this reality, or rather by *proving* itself to be such. And this it does in its course: first in its dialectical progression through [sensuous] meaning, perceiving, and understanding, in which otherness taken to exist 'inherently in itself' vanishes; then in traversing such independence as consciousness has in mastery and servitude, the thought of freedom, skeptical liberation, and the struggle of the internally divided self-consciousness to liberate itself totally, in which otherness, inasmuch as *it* exists 'merely for consciousness,' *of itself* vanishes for consciousness. These two aspects of otherness became evident to consciousness in turn: in one of them what's of the essence, that is, what's true, had for consciousness the definitiveness of matter-of-fact being, and in the other, otherness existed merely for consciousness. But both ended up reducing to a single truth: that what *is*, that is to say, what exists in itself, exists only insofar as it's present to consciousness, and whatever is present to consciousness moreover exists [M159] in *itself*.

5 –A consciousness that exemplifies truth of this sort, in that it's right in the midst of emerging as reason, isn't just then mindful of the experiential course now behind it; arriving on the scene as abruptly as it does, such rationality is only 'certain' of this truth. Hence all it can do is give assurance that it is all reality, without itself comprehending this, since that same forgotten path is what needs to be grasped in this outright assertion. And this is why when anyone who hasn't made this journey hears this so starkly put, he finds it incomprehensible even though he embodies it concretely in his own person.

6 So too, an Idealism that starts off with such an assertion without recounting the path that leads to it consists in sheer assurance, neither comprehending itself nor able to make itself comprehensible to others. It asserts certainty vis-à-vis other such certainties that it lost track of along the way. Alongside this assured certainty these other certainties then take their place with equal validity. What reason appeals to is the self-consciousness of each and every conscious being: *I am I*, my object and essence is I—and no one will deny it this truth. Yet in basing itself on this appeal, reason sanctions the truth of another certainty: that *there is for me an other*, that something besides me is my object and essence—that, even as I take myself to be both object and essence, this is so only in that I altogether draw back from that other and proceed as an actual reality alongside it.

7 –Only when reason emerges reflectively from this contrasting certainty does its assertion about itself stand forth not merely as certainty and assurance but as truth—and not just one truth alongside other truths, but the one and only truth. The directly emergent presence of reason's truth is an abstraction of truth's presence, the essence and inherent being of which consists totally in conception—the dynamic whereby this essence and inherent being came to be. –Consciousness will define its relation to otherness (i.e., its object) in various ways, exactly in keeping with the level to which the world-spirit's developing self-awareness has attained. How consciousness at any given time finds and ascertains what it and its object are—that is, how it is present to itself—depends upon [M160] what it has already become, what spirit already in itself is.

8 Reason is the certainty of being 'all reality.' Yet this manner of self-inherency, this reality, is an utter generality, a pure abstraction of reality. This is the first form of positive being in which self-consciousness in itself is present to itself, with the I then being only the sheer essence of matter-of-fact existence: the *simple category*. Whereas 'category' used to designate matter-of-fact existence's essential nature *unspecified* as to whether this is the essential nature of whatever exists at all or of what exists over against consciousness, now it designates the essential nature, the *simplex oneness*, of something that matter-of-factly exists solely as an actual thinking reality, with self-consciousness and being comprising one and the same entity—not the same by comparison [with what's other] but inherently and self-relatedly. Only a one-sided,

spurious Idealism lets this oneness wander off to one side again as [though present only in] consciousness, leaving some manner of self-inherency over against that unity.

9 –Now, however, this category, this simplex oneness of self-consciousness and being, has diversity integrally within it, since its essence consists precisely in being self-same directly within otherness, within sheer and utter diversity. Thus while there is indeed diversity, it is perfectly transparent—is diversity that at the same time isn't diverse at all. Diversity of this sort shows up as a multiplicity of categories. Since Idealism asserts that the simplex oneness of self-consciousness is all reality—and is such directly—without having grasped this reality as an utterly negative essence (this being the only form in which self-consciousness has negation, specificity, difference within itself), its second assertion, namely that within the category there are different kinds or “species” of categories, is even more incomprehensible than its first.

10 –This catchall assurance, as well as any assurance regarding exactly how many of these categorical species there are supposed to be, constitutes a new assurance, albeit one implying that, since this is merely an assurance, we don't really have to give it further credence. For since this diversity originates within the pure I, inside the pure understanding itself, it's thus settled that what's needed here is to abandon this preoccupation with immediacy (what's been “assured” and just “found” to be so), and start *comprehending*. But to then turn around and collect categories again as though one just happened to find them lying about (in judgments, for example) and to be willing to settle for that, can only be [M161] regarded as scientifically outrageous. Where is the understanding, the demonstration of pure necessity, supposed to demonstrate necessity if it can't even do so in its own instance?

11 So now, with the pure essence of things as well as their diversity being ascribed to reason, reference to ‘things’ (i.e., the kind of entity that consciousness would regard as only the negative complement of what a conscious being is) couldn't properly be made at all anymore. Indeed, that the multiple categories are ‘species’ of the ‘pure category’ implies that the latter is still their ‘genus,’ still their very essence rather than something contrary to them—although, given their multiplicity, they're already equivocal, implicitly involving an otherness at odds with the pure category. In fact, by their multiplicity they contradict the pure category, whose pure oneness necessitates their being sublated within it, thereby constituting itself as the ‘negative unity of these differences.’ But as a negative unity it excludes both this diversity as such and the immediate pure oneness as such that it started out with; it is ‘singular individuality,’ a new category, a manner of conscious being that excludes [either extreme], meaning that there is something other that is relatedly present to it.

12 –Singular individualization is the pure category in transition from conceiving to *external* reality: a pure ‘schema’ which, in that it consists in consciousness as well as in something individual and exclusively unitary, suggests that there is something other

than it. Yet all that there is to constitute this “other” are the other primal categories, namely pure essence and pure diversity, in which—precisely when this other is positively established, indeed *is* such an other—consciousness is still just itself. While each of these distinct moments refers to another, in none of them does it arrive at any otherness. The pure category refers to the species of categories, which turn into the negative category, individuality—which in turn refers back to the pure category, it being the pure consciousness which in each and every species retains its transparent oneness with itself: a oneness ever suggestive of some sort of other that, when it exists, disappears, and, in disappearing, is regenerated.

13 Here we see pure consciousness cast in a double role: in the one it bustles about, [M162] making its way through all its moments in pursuit of the otherness that looms before it in them, yet nullifies itself as other in being grasped; in the other it maintains a serene unity in which it is certain it has the truth. In its unitary role what does all the moving is otherness; in its bustling role otherness is what’s serenely unitary. Moreover consciousness and object keep switching their roles: thus in one moment consciousness finds itself searching here, there, and everywhere while its [elusive] object is pure reality and essence, and in the next moment it finds itself in the role of simple category while its object does all the diversifying. Yet, as essence, consciousness itself comprises the whole sequence, transiting from itself as simple category into singular individuality and object, intuiting this sequence as occurring in the object, subsuming the object as thus distinguished, appropriating the latter as its own, and declaring itself to be certain of being all reality, of being both itself and its object.

14 All that such consciousness initially asserts is comprised in a vague and abstract phrase—that everything is “its own”—since what this certainty of being all reality initially amounts to is only the pure category. This inchoate form of reason that discerns itself in its object gives expression to a vacuous Idealism in command merely of a naïve rationality, and fancies that simply by showing how in one’s own mind everything that exists is “mine,” and by referring to things as sensations or representations, it has demonstrated this “mine” to be a full-fledged reality. Thus Idealism of this sort must also be a form of radical empiricism, since, in order to flesh out this airy “mine”—in order to have *it* diversify, develop, and take form—its reason demands that there be some external stimulus as source of the multiplicity of all these sensations or representations. Such Idealism accordingly ends up equivocating in the same self-contradictory way as Skepticism—save that, instead of expressing itself in negative terms, it does so in positive terms. Still, it fares no better than Skepticism in bringing together its contradictory notions about a pure consciousness that is all reality, and some sort of external stimulus (sense-impressions and representations) that’s nonetheless real too. Instead of bringing these together, it keeps shifting back and forth from one to the other, thus getting caught up in a spurious (namely sensuous) infinity.

15 –In that reason is all reality—in the sense of a reality that’s [M163] abstractly mine, with its “other” becoming for it then just some extraneous element—what’s here being put forth as reason’s knowledge of an other is exactly the same as that which accrued to it in sense-impression, perceiving, and the understanding that comprehends these impressions and perceptions. At the same time such knowledge is held, by this Idealism’s own way of conceiving, *not* to be true knowledge, since only in the unity of apperception does the truth of a way of knowing consist. Thus the reasoning of such Idealism, in order to come up with the other that’s essential to it—the ‘in *itself*’ that it doesn’t have within it—is by its own doing thrown back upon just the sort of knowledge that isn’t knowledge of what’s true. In so doing it knowingly and deliberately condemns itself to a form of pseudoknowledge that can’t get away from sensuous meaning and perceiving, though these have no truth for it. It finds itself entangled in a direct contradiction, claiming that something so plainly antithetical as to be dualized—namely the ‘unity of apperception’ and the ‘thing’—is the very essence of the real; and regardless of whether that essence is referred to as an “external stimulus,” “empirical entity,” “sense-object,” or “thing in itself,” conceptually it all comes to the same, namely something extraneous to that unity.

16 Idealism of this sort contradicts itself because what it asserts as true is reason’s *abstract conceiving*, which is why it forthwith sees a reality emerge that isn’t reason’s reality, even though reason is supposed to be all reality. Such reason thus remains a troubled seeking which declares that, for all its rummaging about, having the satisfaction of finding what it’s looking for is simply impossible. –Actual reason, on the other hand, is by no means so inconsistent. On the contrary, being at first merely “certain” that it’s all reality, it is, consistent with this way of conceiving, cognizant that as certainty—as I—it isn’t yet reality in truth, and is driven to raise its certainty to truth and see its vacuous “mine” brought to fulfillment. [M164]



V.A. OBSERVATIONAL REASON

17 As we now see, this manner of consciousness, which construes ‘being’ as equating to that which is ‘its own,’ proceeds to revisit sensuous meaning and perceiving—albeit not just as in being certain of something other than it, but as being certain that it is itself that other. Whereas previously consciousness “just happened” to perceive and encounter various aspects of things, now it is itself the initiator of its observations and experience. The meaning and perceiving that, as we previously saw, sublated themselves, are now being sublated, as this very consciousness sees, by it itself: reason is setting out to know the truth, to find out what sort of thing meaning and perceiving

involve conceptually—if only to have an awareness of its part in thinghood. So now reason's interest in the world is all-pervasive, since it's certain that it has a presence there, certain that what's present there is rational. It seeks what's other than it because it knows that in possessing this it possesses nothing other than itself: after all, it's just seeking its own infinity.

18 While at first having but a presentiment of its presence in the realm of the actual, being only in a general sense cognizant of the world as its own, reason nonetheless strides forth intent upon the wholesale appropriation of all its assured possessions, and plants the symbol of its sovereignty high and low. But this superficial “mine” isn't its ultimate interest; for while delighting in its act of wholesale appropriation, it still finds among its possessions the alien other that abstract reason doesn't have within it. Suspecting that its nature runs deeper than the sheer I, reason feels compelled to insist that what's different from it—being, in all its multifacetedness—become its very own, so that it might see itself as an actual entity, finding itself present as concretely embodied in the manner of a thing. But even if it penetrates to the very entrails of things and taps their every vein so as to see itself gushing out from within them, reason still won't be satisfied; rather does it have to complete its own internal development before it can thus experience its complete consummation.

19 Consciousness *observes*: reason wants to find and be in possession of itself in the manner of a matter-of-factly existent object, one that's *sensuously* present and actual. As observer, [M165] consciousness has in mind to do just as it says: to gain experience not of itself but of the gist of things as things. While intending and saying that this is implicitly so in that it is, after all, reason, it isn't yet evident to it that reason as such exists as an object of that sort. If it knew that reason is as much the essence of things as of itself, and that only in consciousness can reason be present in *its* proper embodiment, then it would plunge into its own depths and seek reason there rather than in things. Only once it had found reason there would it direct itself back to the actual realm so as to behold reason as sensuously expressed, without any hesitation taking this to be essentially conceptual.

20 –But as it is here, right in the process of emerging as consciousness's certainty of being all reality, reason apprehends its reality as it would immediate being, construing the unity of the I with this objective mode of being to be accordingly a direct oneness whose moments (I and being) it hasn't yet sorted out, let alone reintegrated—moments, in other words, that it has yet to recognize for what they are. Thus while it approaches things as an observational consciousness intending to apprehend them as the sensuous things contrary to the I that they really are, what it actually does contradicts its intention. For it *knows* things, transforms their sensuousness into concepts, into being that's also self—by the same stroke converting mere thought into matter-of-factly existent thought, being into noetic being, in fact maintaining that it's only as concepts

that things have any truth. In this way all that becomes evident to observational consciousness is what *things* are, while we come to see what it itself is. Nonetheless the result of its progress will make evident to it as well what it itself is.

21 We'll now examine the several phases of observational reason's activity as it proceeds to assimilate nature, then spirit, and finally the connection of the two, apprehending them in the manner of sensuous being and pursuing itself as an actually existing reality. [M166]



V.A.a. OBSERVATION OF NATURE

22 When consciousness thoughtlessly asserts that observing and experiencing are the wellspring of truth, it may indeed sound as if tasting, smelling, feeling, hearing, and seeing are all that it's concerned with. In its enthusiastic endorsement of tasting, smelling, and so on, such a consciousness moreover forgets to mention that it has in fact already specified (as is equally crucial) the kind of object to be sensed—this specification being at least as important to it as its sense-experience. Moreover, as it will readily admit, its concern isn't confined simply to perceiving; it won't, for instance, allow 'This penknife is lying next to a tobacco pouch' to pass for a legitimate observation. What's perceived is supposed at least to have the import of something universal, not a sensuous This.

23 The universal thus defined at first just stays as it is, its dynamic consisting merely in the uniform repetition of the same action. Finding nothing in its object besides such "universality" as it thus comes by—namely what's abstractly "mine"—consciousness has to take upon itself what's properly the object's dynamic; while not as yet understanding the object, it at least retains the latter in memory, in which what's present in external reality solely in the manner of something individual is conveyed instead in the form of something universal. But neither this superficial extraction from what exists individually nor this equally superficial form of universality in which the sense object is merely assimilated without having become something that's in itself universal, this 'describing' of things, as yet captures the dynamic unfolding in the object. The only process under way here is the describing.

24 –So once an object is described, interest in it wanes; as one is described, another has to be brought forth and the search kept going ever onward lest the describing come to a halt. When it's no longer easy to find new things to describe whole and intact, consciousness has no recourse but to go back to those already found, dissect them further, analyze them again, so as to ferret out yet other aspects of their thinghood. And there's simply no end to the material at the disposal of an instinct as indefatigable and

insatiable as this. The discovery of an extraordinary new genus, [M167] or even the discovery of a new planet (which, though individual, possesses the nature of a universal), can at best be the lot of a lucky few. But the line between genus and species (the line demarcating species such as elephant, oak, or gold) shifts gradually into endless particularization, into a veritable chaos of animals, plants, and minerals (e.g., the metals, earth elements, etc., which can be extracted only forcibly and with technical skill).

25 –In this realm where universality is tantamount to indeterminacy, where particularity approximates to uniqueness and in certain instances even reverts to it completely, there opens up an inexhaustible store of things to observe and describe. Yet at this threshold of the universal where an incalculable expanse opens up for it, instead of immeasurable wealth, all that the descriptive instinct *can* have found are the limits of nature and of its own efforts—it being no longer able to discern whether what seems to be inherent isn't just some accident. Anything whose structure is so bewildering or inchoate as to be only faintly discernible and barely developed beyond elemental indeterminacy scarcely makes enough of an impression to so much as get described.

26 Now while all this searching and describing seems to be concerned only with things as such, we see that actually it's not just carrying on as sense-perception is wont; what makes things intelligible is instead more important to it than all else that rounds them out (the sense-properties that of course the thing itself can't do without but consciousness can very well dispense with). By distinguishing between what's essential and what unessential, the conceptual process rises above distraction with the sensuous, and the intellect makes it clear that its essential concern is at least as much with itself as with things. Having hit upon this bifurcation integral to anything's essential nature, it vacillates over whether what's essential and necessary for the intellect is equally so for things. While characteristic features are supposedly of service only to the intellect in differentiating one thing from another, on the other hand what makes things intelligible isn't supposed to be anything *unessential* to them, but rather that whereby the things themselves break out of the general continuum of being [M168] at large, separate from others, and exist unto themselves. The principal relevance of such features isn't supposed to be their relation merely to the intellect, but their being essentially definitive of the things themselves; and any system of our devising must conform to nature's own system and be solely expressive of it.

27 –This is necessitated by the conceptual nature of reason, whose instinctual systematizing (when observing, reason operates solely on instinct) moreover attains systemic unity when its objects are themselves so constituted that they have something essential—a self-relatedness—that's integral to *them*, and aren't just accidents of a given moment or locale. The distinguishing characteristics of animals, for instance, are their claws and teeth; for in fact it isn't just the intellect that distinguishes one animal from another by means of them, but the animal itself—with these weapons

keeping itself oriented to itself and set off from the general run. Plants, by contrast, don't attain to such existence-for-self but merely border on individuality, it being at that threshold (where they manifest something at least resembling a division into sexes) that they've accordingly been categorized and catalogued. Anything that exists on a still lower level can't distinguish itself in that way, sooner blending in with whatever is contrasted with it. 'Inert being' and 'being-in-relation' conflict with each other, a thing in relation being other than what it is inertly, whereas an individual sustains itself in relation to what's other than it. Anything that can't so sustain itself (e.g., anything that in chemical combination turns out to be other than what it is empirically by itself) perplexes discernment, occasioning conflict as to whether the one *and* the other aspect should be held on to, since the thing itself isn't constant, and its own aspects dissociate within it.

28 Thus in systems like these, based on 'universal self-consistency,' the relevance of this consistency applies as much to discernment as to the things themselves. However, any such vast array of constant specifics, each of which runs its own orderly course and occupies its own proper place, essentially turns into its very opposite: an utter chaos [M169] of such specifics, since the distinguishing characteristic, the specificity they all have in common, is a unity of contraries—of specifics and what's inherently universal—hence a unity that inevitably dissociates into an opposition. Thus even as specificity on its side takes precedence over the universality in which it has its essence, on the other side the universal takes precedence over specificity, pushing specification to the limit, with essentials and mere variations starting to get mixed up. The observational consciousness that had them all neatly sorted out and believed that in them it had something settled once and for all now finds one principle overlapping with and usurping the place of another, crossovers occurring, confusions arising, and that what it at first took to be plainly separate is combining with something else—even as what it thought to exist only in combination is turning out to exist separately. Hence for a consciousness that clings to 'being that stays just as it is,' it's precisely when defining its most general classifications (e.g., the essential characteristics of animals, plants, etc.) that it inevitably finds itself teased by instances that rob it of specificity, suppress the universality to which it had risen, and reduce it once again to thoughtless observing and describing.

29 By thus confining itself to what's simple—that is, using the universal to hem in the sprawling diversity of the sensuous—observational consciousness ends up finding its object to be a muddled version of its own principle. For whatever has been specified must by its nature be lost in its counterpart, with reason then having to proceed beyond inert specificity that has but the look of permanence to observation of specificity as it is in truth: as interconnected with its counterpart. Characteristics that are referred to as "essential" are static specifics that, in being expressed and apprehended as "simple specifics," don't convey what makes up specificity's very nature, namely the

transitory moments of a dynamic of self-reintegration. In now finally getting around to looking for specificity in a form commensurate with the latter's nature—as essentially existing in transition into what's contrary rather than in relation to itself—the reasoning instinct begins searching for the law and concept of such transitions. While it is searching after these, as of course after something that actually exists, it becomes evident to it that this actuality is in fact transitory, and that the [M170] correlates of the law turn into sheer moments—abstractions—with the law itself then turning out to have the nature of a concept, something that has in essence deleted the substantively inconsequential aspect of sensuous reality.

30 For an observing consciousness the truth of a law consists in experience, the way that sensuous being is present to consciousness, not the way such being exists in and relative to itself. Yet when its truth isn't conceptual, a law is merely contingent, not a form of necessity—that is, not in fact a law. But a law's existing essentially in the manner of a concept not only doesn't conflict with its being present for observation; the law necessitates this existence and presence for observation. Whatever is universal in the sense of *rational* all-pervasiveness is (as the above implies) also universal in the sense of exhibiting itself as something present and actual to consciousness—with what's integrally conceptual manifest in the way that thinghood and sensuous being are—but without thereby losing its nature and being reduced to sustained inertness or to a sequence of events that have no bearing on each other. What's *valid* universally is also *in effect* universally; what “ought” to exist does in fact exist, and anything that “ought” to exist but doesn't in actual reality has no truth. On this point the reasoning instinct rightly holds firm to its position, not letting itself be led astray either by thought constructs—hypothetical entities—that are supposed to exist and, existing thus solely on supposition, are supposed to have truth even though they're nowhere to be met with in experience, or by any of the other unobservable forms of the perennial “ought.” For reason is precisely the certainty of having actual reality; and whatever isn't of itself something that's present to consciousness, whatever doesn't appear, is to it nothing at all.

31 Of course for a consciousness that's sticking to observation, that the truth of any law essentially consists in reality turns the law into something once again in tension with the conceptual and the inherently universal; such a consciousness doesn't, in other words, consider its law to be an entity of reason, thinking that it's dealing with something “extraordinary” here. Yet it itself belies this supposition by not interpreting the law's universality to require that every single [M171] sensuous thing have demonstrated the law in order for it to be able to assert this as being true. To prove that stones fall when raised above the ground and let go, this consciousness doesn't require experimental confirmation with each and every stone, although it does assert that this has to be done with at least a good number of them, from which one can then—by

analogy—draw an inference about the rest with maximal probability—that is, with “perfect justification.”

32 –Yet analogy not only provides no perfect justification, but by its nature disproves itself so often that the only inference to be drawn from it is that it doesn’t permit any inference to be drawn. Probability, which is what analogical reason comes down to, fails, vis-à-vis truth, of any distinction between greater or lesser; let it be as great as it may, probability is nothing as against truth. But in fact instinctual reason does take “laws” of this sort for truth, and only in a situation in which it doesn’t discern their necessity does it hit upon the above distinction—reducing the truth of the matter itself to probability—thus illustrating the imperfect way in which truth is present to a consciousness that hasn’t yet attained insight into what’s purely conceptual; for indeed universality is evident to it solely as a simple and immediate form of universality. Nonetheless it’s due to its being universal that any law has truth for consciousness; [for instance] it’s evident to it that a stone falls because it’s evident to it that the stone has weight—which is to say that in gravity a stone in and of *itself* bears a fundamental relation to the earth, a relation exhibited in falling. Thus does consciousness have experience of this law’s existence as well as its conceptual nature; and only due to both conditions obtaining is it true for consciousness, qualifying then as a law because it’s evident in the phenomenal realm as well as being inherently conceptual.

33 Because such a law *is* inherently conceptual, the reasoning instinct of observational consciousness necessarily—without realizing that this is its aim—sets about “refining” the law and its moments conceptually. It subjects the law to experiment. As initially manifest, a law exhibits itself impurely, enveloped as it is in the particulars of sensuous being, with what’s constitutive of its conceptual nature immersed in the stuff [M172] of the empirical. As it experiments, the reasoning instinct undertakes to find out what takes place under such and such circumstances. While in this way the law seems to be all the more immersed in sensuous being, actually the latter is disappearing in the process. Implicit in this sort of investigation is the need to find the “pure conditions” under which the law can exist, which is the same as saying (even if the consciousness expressing itself in this way were to suppose it’s saying something else) that it’s raising the law wholly to conceptual form and annulling everything that would confine the law’s moments to some specific mode of being.

34 –For example, although negative and positive electricity might at first appear respectively as resin- and glass-electricity, through experimentation they lose such designations entirely and become simply positive and negative electricity, neither of which is any longer attached to a particular kind of thing, so that one couldn’t really say that there are some bodies that are electropositive, others electronegative. Or again, the interrelation and interaction of acid and base define a law in which they’re physically

evident as opposites. In isolation, however, these things have no such actuality; whatever agency is used to extract them one from the other can't prevent them from instantly [upon contact] engaging in process again, since this relation is all that they are. Unlike a tooth or a claw, they can't just stay as they are by themselves and be exhibited thus. That it's in their nature to transform into a neutral product makes of them an inherently sublative mode of being—a universal: and indeed [the concepts] 'acid' and 'base' hold true solely as universals. Just as glass and resin can each be either electropositive or electronegative, so likewise acidity and alkalinity aren't tied to any given actual instance thereof as inherent properties—any such thing being instead only relatively acidic or alkaline (what seems "decidedly" base or acid being given a contrary designation vis-à-vis the other in so-called *syndromes* [e.g., in amalgamations of minerals]).

35 –Experimentation results in the sublation of such moments or dynamisms [Begeistungen] as properties of specific things, and frees the predicates from their subjects. These predicates are then found only as universals, which is what in truth they are; and because of their independence they're referred to as [M173] forms of 'materiality,' these being neither bodies nor properties thereof—and indeed no one would think of referring to oxygen, positive and negative electricity, heat, and the like, as bodies.

36 Matter, instead of existing as some manner of thing, is being that exists as universal—in the way that a concept does. Reason, which is still instinctual here, makes this distinction correctly without being aware that in putting a law to the test in the context of all sensuous being it sublates that law's mere sensuousness; and when reason apprehends the law's moments as forms of materiality, their essence turns for consciousness into something universal, something (as use of the above expression would suggest) nonsensuously sensuous, a bodiless yet objectively existent form of being.



37 Now to be seen is what's in store for consciousness once it has arrived at this result, and what new manner of observation will come of it. The truth attained by the experimenting consciousness is, as we see, pure law freed from sensuous being; we see that law is something conceptual that is present in sensuous being yet functions there independently and unrestrainedly, is immersed in it yet free from it: a simplex mode of conceptual being. Although this pure law truly is the result of observation and is the kind of entity that's being observed, it appears on the scene for this consciousness as being now embodied in the form of an object that such consciousness doesn't exactly grasp as exemplifying the result of, or as bearing any connection to, the

preceding dynamic. This is indeed a special kind of object, with consciousness's relation to it emerging as another way of observing.

38 An object such as this, internally processive in the simplex manner of a concept, is organic. Organic being is something totally fluid in which any determinant that would reduce it to existing merely in relation to something else is dissolved. An *inorganic* thing has determinacy as its very essence, being then fully comprised in all its conceptual moments solely in conjunction with some other thing, and accordingly disappearing in the course of that dynamic. By contrast, all the determinants through which an organic entity is exposed to other entities are bound under an organic simplex unity, with none of them appearing as an essential determinant that would, free of that unity, be related to some other entity. An organic entity thus sustains itself in the very way that it interrelates. [M174]

39 The correlates of the law that the reasoning instinct now undertakes to observe are, as thus defined, organic and inorganic nature, each in relation to the other. *Vis-à-vis* organic being (in particular its simplex conceptual nature) inorganic being embodies a contrasting form of freedom, that of the loosely bound determinants into which individuated nature keeps dissolving even while separating from their continuity and existing on its own. Air, water, soil, latitude, climate—such are the generic elements roughly constitutive of the simple nature of individual entities, as well as that in which they're reflected into themselves. Neither this manner of individuality nor elemental being of this sort is totally self-contained and self-related. In the autonomous freedom that both observably exhibit, they also interrelate as essentially linked but do so in such a way that their independence and indifference is predominant and only partially amenable to abstraction [into the moments of a conceptual dynamic]. This is then a law such as would relate one of the above elements to the physical formation of a given organic entity which in the one correlate has that form of elemental being over against it and in the other exhibits that being within its own organic reflexivity.

40 –But “laws” such as these (e.g., animals that fly have a bird-like structure, while aquatic animals have fish-like attributes, and animals in northern latitudes have thick, hairy pelts, etc.) exhibit a poverty of content out of keeping with the multifariousness of organic nature. Aside from the fact that organic being in its liberality time and again eludes such characterizations of its various forms, and of necessity everywhere presents exceptions to such laws (or rules, or whatever one wants to call them), even in the case of animals to which these characterizations have some relevance they're so superficial that the necessity of these laws can't be formulated any less superficially, and so amount to no more than a “major influence,” an expression leaving one clueless as to what is and isn't to be attributed to this influence. Such connections of the organic to the elemental can't then really be called laws at all; for, as we've seen, such a linkage

not only doesn't materially exhaust the range of the organic; its [M175] moments continue to have no bearing on each other and exhibit no necessity at all.

41 –Implicit in the concept 'acid' is the concept 'base,' just as the concept 'negative electricity' is implicit in that of 'positive electricity'; but no matter how often we encounter thick, hairy pelts "in conjunction" with northern latitudes, piscine structure with water, or avian structure with the air, the concept 'thick, hairy pelt' simply isn't contained in the concept 'north,' nor the concept 'piscine structure' in the concept 'sea,' nor the concept 'avian structure' in the concept 'air.' And it's because of the reciprocal independence of these correlates that there indeed are land animals that have the essential characteristics of a bird, of a fish, and so on.

42 –Necessity, since none can be conceptually grasped as internal to the essence [of such a relation], ceases to be sensuously present as well, and is no longer observable in actual reality, being thus extrinsic to it. Not to be found in any actual entity, this is what's referred to as a "teleological" relation, which is *external* to the entities related and hence quite the opposite of a law. It consists in thought that's wholly freed from what's necessary in the natural realm, which it leaves behind and hovers above in a world all its own.

43 Whereas the correlation of organicity with elemental nature touched upon above does nothing to elucidate the essential nature of organicity, this nature *is* by contrast comprehended in conceptual being that's purposive. Of course observational consciousness doesn't regard this as something that's integral to organic being's essence proper, but as falling outside it, hence again as just another external teleological relation. –Yet in fact organicity as defined above is real purpose itself. For by sustaining itself in relation to other things organicity is precisely the sort of natural being in which nature reflects into a form of conceptual being, and in which the two moments set out separately in necessity—namely cause and effect, activity and passivity—coalesce, so that what emerges isn't just the result of that necessity; rather, because organicity is self-reintegrative, its last moment (the result) is as much its first moment (the one initiating the process), it being itself the purpose that it actualizes. Organicity isn't bringing anything into being but merely sustaining itself—or what's [M176] being produced is as much already present as it is something that will be produced.

44 This purposive determinant has to be looked at more closely, regarding both what it is in itself and what it is for the reasoning instinct, in order to see how the latter comes to find itself in purposiveness without recognizing itself in what it has thus found. The conceptual being of purposiveness to which observational reason has worked its way up, being thus present in reason's conscious conceiving, is equally present in actual entities—and not as interrelating such an entity merely externally, but as comprising its very essence. –That an actual entity that's itself a purposive being bears upon some other entity purposively means that this relation is contingent with

respect to what both are in their immediacy: as unmediated, both are independent and indifferent to one another. The essential nature of their relation is other than what they themselves seem to be, and the workings of this relation indicate something other than what's directly evident to sense-perception. The necessity inherent in what's under way here is obscured, and first becomes evident only in the end, albeit in such a way that this end shows that what necessitates it has indeed been there from the first. The end manifests its priority by the fact that nothing is forthcoming in the alteration effected by the action other than what was there already.

45 –In other words, if we start out with what's there at first, we see that such an entity ends up turning back into itself as the result of its action—thereby proving to be something that has itself for its end, being then already in process of turning back into itself from the first—existing within and as oriented to itself. What it arrives at in the course of its action is it itself; and its arriving solely at itself provides it a sense of self. While a difference between what it is and what it's striving for is thus evident, this difference is largely apparent; hence an entity of this sort is integrally conceptual.

46 This, however, is exactly how self-consciousness is constituted, distinguishing itself from itself without thereby producing anything different from itself. Hence in observing organic nature, self-consciousness finds nothing other than this manner of entity—finds *itself* as a thing, a living thing—while nonetheless proceeding to distinguish between what it itself is and what it has found, making a distinction where there is no difference. Just as an animal, in its instinctual search for and consumption of food, comes away with [M177] nothing but itself, so too does reason's instinctual searching find only itself. But whereas an animal ends up with a sense of self, the reasoning instinct is at the same time a form of self-conscious being—although, in that it is merely instinctual, it contrasts with conscious being, having in *it* something at odds with itself. Because of this, satisfying the reasoning instinct sets it at variance with itself: it does find itself, namely *purpose*, and moreover finds this purpose in the form of a *thing*. While initially deeming purpose as extrinsic to any given thing that exhibits purpose, the reasoning instinct then goes on to deem purpose—*objectively* extant as purpose—not as something integral to itself as a form of conscious being, but as consisting in 'some other form of intelligence.'

47 But under closer scrutiny the designation 'end in itself' is seen to be implicit in the concept 'thing' as well. A thing sustains itself—it being in its nature, too, to obscure necessity, exhibiting it in the form of an accidental relation; for the kind of freedom or self-relatedness that a thing has consists precisely in its being indifferent to whatever necessitates it, hence exhibiting itself as something whose conceptual nature is extrinsic to its being. Such [instinctual] reason is perforce compelled to regard its own conceptual nature as likewise falling outside it—as a thing toward which it is indifferent, and which in turn is indifferent both to it and to its conceptual nature. As instinct,

reason comes to a standstill within this manner of being, this indifferentness, and for the reasoning instinct any given thing, even while exhibiting its conceptual nature, remains something other than anything conceptual, with the thing's own conceptual nature being construed then as something other than the thing.

48 –For reason of this sort an organic thing is thus an end in itself only in that the necessity obscurely exhibited in its action—since in this the agent is functioning as a self-related being that's indifferent to such necessity—is extrinsic to organicity itself. But organicity can't function as other than the end in itself that it is, it being present and evident even to sense that it is such, and is so observed. Organicity shows itself to be self-sustaining, as returning and having returned to itself. –But observational consciousness doesn't recognize purposive conceptual being in being of this sort—or rather that purposive conceptual being doesn't exist off in a mind somewhere but [M178] right here in the form of a thing. It makes a distinction between purposive conceptual being and existence for and preservation of self, a distinction without a difference. That there is no such difference isn't apparent to it; instead, the action appears to be accidental and of no relevance to what it brings about, with the unity that does still bind the two (that interlinks action and purpose) dis-integrating for observational consciousness.

49 In the above way of looking at things, what's attributable to organicity proper is the action that occurs between organic functioning's initial and final phase so far as that action is characteristic of a solitary occurrence within organicity, whereas insofar as the action is characteristic of a universal—with the agent accordingly affirmed as being the same as what was brought about thereby—purposive action would not as such be attributable to organicity. A single action that's merely a means [from X to Y], due to its singularity falls under the classification of utterly individuated (chance) necessity. –Whatever organicity does to sustain itself as individual or as species is then, commensurate with the immediacy of that content, in no wise subject to law, since on that view the universal and the conceptual are extrinsic to it. Organicity's action would thus amount to nothing more than an empty functioning with no point to it; it wouldn't even operate in the manner of a machine (for a machine has a purpose, its operation being to some point). Its functioning, being then extrinsic to the universal, would be that of a matter-of-fact activity that just matter-of-factly occurs, like that of an acid or a base, which isn't simultaneously reflecting into itself, and which could neither detach itself from what it is in its immediate presence nor relinquish that immediate presence (which an acid or base loses in interacting with its opposite) while still sustaining itself.

50 –Yet the kind of being whose functioning is under consideration here has been established as a thing that does sustain itself in relation to what's contrary to it. Activity of this sort is as such nothing but the pure form, unbound to essence, of organicity's existing self-relatedly for itself; this activity's substance doesn't exist merely in the man-

ner of determinate being but rather in that of a universal, its purpose being in no wise extrinsic to it. Such activity proceeds back into itself spontaneously rather than being steered back into itself by some alien agency.

51 But on account of this, it isn't evident to an observing consciousness that organic universality and activity are one and the same: this [M179] oneness is in essence organicity's *inner* dynamic, capable of being grasped only conceptually, whereas observation is still looking for [defining] moments in the form of what 'is' and what 'stays as it is.' And since an organic whole is essentially something that neither contains such moments nor enables them to be found in it, this consciousness recasts the contrast into one conforming to its view.

52 In this fashion organic being emerges for observational consciousness as interrelating two factually existent and fixedly defined moments—a contrast both of whose correlates appear available for observation, while on the other hand exhibiting a contrast in content, that between purposive conceptual being and actual reality—albeit at the cost of emerging in a murky and superficial way, with thought having lapsed into representation, since conceptual being as such has here been effaced. What we thus see is the one moment roughly designated as the 'inner,' the other as the 'outer,' with their interrelation giving rise to a law: "The outer is a manifestation of the inner."

53 As we examine more closely this 'inner' along with its opposite, and the interrelation of the two, it's evident that these correlates no longer function as in previous laws, where they appeared as independent things each of which has a particular kind of body. Nor does the universal supposedly exist somewhere outside what matter-of-factly exists; rather is the content of both inner and outer being wholly and inextricably grounded in organic being. The contrast between them is as yet a purely formal one whose actual correlated aspects have one and the same form of inherency as essence; but since inner and outer each also comprise a contrary reality and exist as separate modes of being for observation, each would seem to have a content distinctively its own. But since this distinctive content is one and the same substance—organic unity—all that it can in fact amount to is a different form of the same thing, which is what observational consciousness itself suggests when it calls the outer a mere "manifestation" of the inner. The terms interrelated here are the same as those we encountered in purposive conceptual being: the independent existence of distinct, unrelated aspects and the unity of these aspects even in their independence, [M180] a unity within which their distinctness disappears.



54 Now to be seen is how inner and outer are matter-of-factly embodied. The inner as such has to have an outer and be embodied no less than does the outer as such,

since it's an object—something set forth as matter-of-factly existent and present for observation.

55 Organic substance as inner is the simplex soul, pure purposive conceptual being: a universal that, even in dividing, stays all-pervasively fluid and so manifests in its very being the action or dynamic of a *transitory* reality—in contradistinction to which in organicity's inert being there is an outer that contrasts with the matter-of-fact inner. The content of a law expressing the relation of inner to outer is accordingly present in universal moments or simplex modalities of essence and on the other hand in materially actualized modalities of something essential, that is to say in some physical embodiment.

56 –The former, the simplex “properties,” so called, of organicity are sensibility, irritability, and reproduction. These—at least the first two—don't seem applicable to organisms generally, but only to animals; and in fact plants exhibit only the simplex conceptual being of a manner of organism that doesn't develop these moments. Hence to the extent that these moments are supposedly amenable to observation, we'll have to confine ourselves to the kind of organism that does exhibit them in their developed presence.

57 As for the properties themselves, they derive directly from the conceptual nature of self-purpose: Sensibility basically manifests the simplex conceptual being of organicity's internal reflexivity, its all-pervasive fluidity, while irritability manifests organicity's elasticity, its ability to react even as it's reflecting into itself, realizing itself in a way opposite that of its initially inactive internal state—in a way that renders this abstract self-relatedness into being that is present to what's other than it. Reproduction, however, is an action of the whole internally reflected organism: its activity as end in itself or as species, in which the individual projects itself out from itself, either generating [M181] its organic parts or reproducing another whole individual. Considered broadly in the context of self-preservation, reproduction manifests organicity's formal conceptual being (sensibility); but properly speaking, reproduction is *real* organic conceptual being—the integral whole turning back into itself either as individual, by producing its single parts, or as species, by producing individuals.

58 These organic elements are significant in another way, namely as elements of the outer—the way in which they're embodied, in accordance with which they're present as physically actual but also as universal components or organic *systems*: sensibility as a nervous system, irritability as a muscular system, and reproduction as a visceral system enabling the preservation of individual and species.

59 Laws dealing specifically with the organic realm address the relation of the moments of organicity in their dual significance: as components of an organic embodiment and as a form of universal, fluid determinacy suffusing all these systems. Hence

a law of this sort might have it that such and such mode of sensibility as moment of the whole organism is manifest in a nervous system with such and such physical structure, or is moreover linked to the reproduction of specific organic parts of the individual or to the reproduction of another whole individual, and so forth. Both correlates of such a law are observable. In concept an 'outer' is a manner of being that's present to what's other than it: sensibility, for example, is directly embodied in a sensate system, and as an objectively existent entity is manifest in various ways as the universal property that it is—the aspect referred to as "inner" having an outer aspect of *its* own, not to be confused with the outer of the [organism as a] whole.

60 While both correlates of such a law of organicity would of course be observable, the laws whereby they're interlinked would not. Observation is inadequate to perceive such laws—not because as observation it's too short-sighted, nor because we ought to start with ideas instead of proceeding empirically (since, if [M182] genuinely real, such laws would in fact have to be actually present and hence observable)—but because the thought underlying this sort of law proves, all by itself, to have no truth to it.

61 The relation thus submitted as a law would have an all-pervasive organic property turned into a thing, an organic system, having in this its physically embodied replica—with property and system having the same essence, present in the one as a universal, in the other as a thing. But beyond that, the inner correlate is in its own right an interrelation of correlates, thus giving us the first inkling of a law interrelating the universal functions or properties of organicity. Whether such a correlation is possible has to be decided from the nature of the property in question. Because of its all-pervasive fluidity an organic property isn't, in the manner of a thing, circumscribed by and confined to a distinct part of the entity supposedly embodying it, but, as with sensibility, goes beyond the nervous system and pervades all the other systems of the organism. On the other hand this same property, as a universal moment, is essentially indivisible and inseparable from reactivity (i.e., irritability and reproduction), since in reflecting into itself it obviously entails reactivity. To be merely reflected into self is passivity, lifeless being, not sensibility, just as action that equates to reaction without being reflected into self isn't irritability.

62 –What organicity consists of is precisely the unity of reflexivity in action or reaction, and of action or reaction in reflexivity, a unity synonymous with organic reproduction. From this it follows (as we first consider sensibility's relation to irritability) that in each mode of organic reality the same "quantity of sensibility" and "quantity of irritability" has to be present, and that an organic phenomenon can be apprehended and defined (or, if one prefers, "explained") just as readily in terms of the one as of the other. What one might consider to be "high sensibility" someone else might with equal justification regard as "high irritability," indeed irritability of the same degree. Were these referred to as "factors," and supposing this isn't a meaningless term, all that's

being asserted is that [M183] they're moments of a concept; a real object whose nature is conceived of in this way contains them both alike, and were it characterized as "very sensitive," it would also have to be referred to as "no less irritable."

63 Distinguished as they need to be, these organic properties are conceptually distinct, and the contrast between them is qualitative. But when set forth outside this true difference—as they well could be in representational thinking that construes them as the matter-of-fact variable correlates of a law—then they appear in some manner of quantitative variation.

64 –In the latter the distinctively qualitative character of their opposition reduces to magnitude, and laws of the following sort turn up: "Quantitatively, sensibility and irritability are inversely related, so that as the one increases the other decreases"—or better (taking quantity itself to be the meat of the matter), "The size of something increases as its smallness decreases." Were we to give such a law positive content—for example, "The size of a hole increases as we take away what it's filled with"—then we might as well just go ahead and change the relation from an inverse to a direct one: "The size of a hole increases in direct proportion to the amount of filling we take out of it"—a tautological proposition whether expressed as a direct or an inverse relation. All that it says is "As magnitude increases, it increases." While the hole and the filling that gets taken away are qualitatively contrary to each other, the real content and its specific quantity are the same for both (as are increasing largeness and decreasing smallness), and the meaningless contrast between them reduces to tautology. The real content and the quantity of organic moments (the latter being but the quantity of the content) are in like manner indivisible; the one decreases and increases only as does the other, for it has relevance solely in reference to the other. In other words it makes no difference whether an organic phenomenon is considered as irritability or as sensibility, either generally or when discussing their quantity. It makes no more difference than if we referred [M184] to an expanding hole in terms of an increase in emptiness instead of an increase in the filling removed from it. A number (three, say) is the same quantity whether I take it positively or negatively. If I increase the three to four, then both the positive and the negative become four—just as a magnet's south pole is exactly as strong as its north pole, a positive electric charge exactly as strong as its negative charge, and an acid exactly as strong as its negative counterpart (the alkali it neutralizes).

65 –An organic being is a quantitative entity in the manner of the number three, a magnet, and so forth. It can be increased or diminished; and when it's increased, both its factors increase (just as do the poles of a magnet or both electrical polarities when the magnet is made stronger). Were one to try sorting them out on the basis of how "intensive" or "extensive" they are (with one of them, for instance, decreasing in extension and increasing in intension while the other decreases in intension and in-

creases in extension), the result would be merely another conceptually vacuous contrast; the real intension is exactly as great as the extension, and vice versa.

66 As is evident, what's really going on in law-framing of this sort is that, while irritability and sensibility initially constitute a specific organic contrast, this substantive content gets lost and the contrast turns into one that's formal: an increasing and diminishing quantity, or varying intension and extension, a contrast no longer expressive of, or even having anything to do with, the nature of sensibility and irritability. The trivial game of framing such laws is thus by no means bound to organic moments but can be played anywhere and with anything, and is generally based on a lack of familiarity with the logical nature of such contrasts.

67 If, finally, instead of contrasting sensibility and irritability, reproduction were to be considered in relation to one or the other of them, then no opportunity for framing such laws even arises. For reproduction doesn't contrast with either of these moments as they do with each other. And since framing such laws depends on some sort of contrast, even the mere semblance of a law is precluded. [M185]

68 The law-framing just considered takes into account an organism's variations in their relevance to the moments of its *conceptual* nature, and strictly speaking should be an a priori undertaking. But essential to law-framing is the realization that these moments are indicative of something factually present, and in any case sheerly observational consciousness has to confine itself to their actual presence. Necessarily implicit in organic reality is the manner of contrast that its conceptual being manifests, a contrast that can be defined in terms of irritability and sensibility, with both appearing again as distinct from reproduction. The externality in which the moments of organic conceptual being are considered here is the direct external manifestation of the inner proper, not the outer comprising the organism's outer and physical embodiment as a whole (an outer whose relation to the inner we'll examine later).

69 When the contrast of these moments is apprehended in the way that it's actually present, sensibility, irritability, and reproduction reduce to common properties—universals that are as casually related to each other as are specific gravity, color, hardness, and so on. One might observe that a given kind of organism is more sensitive or irritable or has a greater reproductive capacity than another, or again that the sensibility, and so on, of one organism differs in kind from that of another, responding to a given stimulus in a different way. A horse, for example, reacts differently to oats than to hay, while a dog reacts in yet another way to both. Such variations are as readily observable as that one body is harder than another, and so on. But sensed properties like hardness, color, and so on, as well as such phenomena as an attraction to oats, muscle responsiveness under loads, and the number and breed of young produced, when related and compared with one another, essentially defy formulation into law.

For due to the sensuous character of such things, they have no bearing on each other and exhibit nature's freedom from the sway of the conceptual rather than the unity of such a relation—nature's irrational way of playing randomly across the scale of accidental quantitative variations betwixt conceptual moments instead of exhibiting these moments themselves. [M186]

70 Only the other correlate, in which the simplex moments of organic conceptual being are compared with the moments of its physical formation, might provide us with a law legitimately stating that the true outer is a replica of the inner. –Now because these simplex moments are fluid, mutually pervasive properties, they have no discernibly actual impact within organic entities, that is, don't occur in the form of so-called individual systems of the organism's physical embodiment. In other words, even if three such moments are accurately reflective of the abstract idea of an organism in that they're not static but exist only as moments of its conceptual being and dynamic (i.e., as it is in the process of physical formation), an organism doesn't encompass three systems defined as so laid out in anatomy. Regardless of the extent to which such systems are found actually to exist and are thereby allegedly legitimized, one still has to remember that anatomy doesn't present us with just three such systems, but with a good many more. But more importantly, a sense-system is necessarily quite different from what's referred to as the "nervous system," an irritable system something other than the muscular system, and a reproductive system quite distinct from the viscera of reproduction.

71 –When an organism is apprehended in terms of the systems constitutive of its physical structure as such, it is being looked upon abstractly, as a lifeless entity; its moments then relate to anatomy and cadavers, not to knowledge and the living organism. In these lifeless parts such moments are no longer even there, since they've ceased to be processes. Because the being of an organism is, in reflecting into itself, essentially a form of all-pervasiveness, neither the being of the whole nor of its moments can be comprised in an anatomical system; rather is the actual manifestation and outward presence of universality of this sort to be found in the dynamic coursing through the various phases of [the organism's] physical formation—a dynamic in which what anatomy dismembers and fixates in the form of isolated systems is instead manifest essentially as a flowing moment. So it isn't the kind of reality anatomy finds that's to be taken as the reality of organic universality, but solely this processual universality in which alone the anatomical parts have any significance. [M187]

72 As is then evident, taken by themselves the moments of the organic inner cannot serve as correlates of some 'law of being,' since in a law of that sort each correlate should be expressive of something that actually exists, with each differing from the other and incapable of being referred to interchangeably; nor could they, when correlated in a static system, each have their actual realization in the other, since such a

system would be no more expressive of anything like what organicity truly is than it would of the moments of the inner. What's instead essential to organicity, since it exists inherently in the manner of a universal, consists totally in having its moments themselves be universal in their actual reality—existing, in other words, as thoroughly pervasive processes rather than isolated physical things giving the impression of something universal.

73 In this way the notion that there's some "law" at work in organicity comes altogether to naught. A law seeks to capture and express a contrast in terms of stable correlates, along with something in them that's definitive of their relation. The inner associated with the universality manifesting itself in organicity, and the outer associated with the parts of some static structure, were supposed to be constitutive of the self-corresponding correlates of a law; but kept apart as they are, they lose their organic significance. Indeed underlying such a law is precisely the idea that both of its correlates would subsist on their own unaffected by the other, while their correlation would involve a correspondingly dualized determinacy distributed between them. But each correlate of an organic entity in and of itself consists in just that—in being a simplex universal within which all determinants are dissolved and in being the dynamism doing the dissolving.

74 Some insight into how such law-framing differs from the forms of it encountered earlier will render its nature fully transparent. Looking back at the process of perceiving and understanding, which in its course reflects into itself and in so doing defines its object, what interconnects the understanding's abstract determinations (universal and particular, essential and extraneous) isn't present to it in its object; rather is it the understanding itself that effects the transition between them, without becoming objectively evident to itself in the process. —Here we have by contrast an organic [M188] unity interrelating opposites just like the above, and this sheerly transitional relation is itself the object. Due to its simplicity this transition is directly constitutive of a form of universality; and since this universality entails a variation the correlation of which some law is supposed to express, the moments of that law are this consciousness's 'universal' objects—with the law then reading: "The outer is the manifestation of the inner." Herewith the understanding has grasped the idea of law *per se*, whereas before it was basically just rummaging around for laws whose moments it had in view as some sort of specific content, not as the thoughts underlying the laws.

75 —Thus with respect to content, such laws as seen here, which simply keep a steady record of sheerly matter-of-fact variations in generalized form, shouldn't obtain, but instead laws that contain the stirrings of conceptual being and hence also the necessity interrelating the correlates right inside the variables themselves. Yet precisely because this manner of object—an organic unity—unites inert being directly with a process that's infinitely sublative or totally negative of such, with all moments being in essence

purely in transition, none of the matter-of-fact correlates required for such a law so much as turn up.

76 To come up with the requisite correlates, the understanding has to come to grips with the other moment of the organic relation, organic being's reflectedness into itself. Yet such being is so completely reflected into itself that there's no specific characteristic left to it that's opposite what's other than it. Whereas immediate sensuous being is directly one with specificity as such, and hence gives evidence of some manner of qualitative distinctness within it (e.g., blue as opposed to red, acid as opposed to alkali, etc.), organic being is so involutive as to be completely indifferent to what's other than it; its existent presence consists in simplex universality and denies observation any residual sensuous distinctness—exhibiting the specificity essential to it solely in a flux of matter-of-fact specifics. What precisely 'distinctness' manifested in this matter-of-fact way amounts to is a form of indifferent difference: quantity. But in quantity conceptual being is effaced, and necessity has disappeared. What exactly is made evident by the content and full realization of such indifferently existent being [M189]—this flux of sensuous determinations concentrated in the simplex nature of organic determinacy—is that it does not have the specificity of an immediate property (anything qualitative merely falling in the quantitative realm, as seen above).

77 So even though *conceptual* being is integral to the objectivity that's to be apprehended specifically as organic, and hence differs from such objectivity as lies within the purview of the understanding—which proceeds sheerly as does perception when apprehending the content of its laws—this way of apprehending reverts all the way back to the principle and routine of mere perceptual understanding, with whatever it has thus apprehended to be used as a moment of the law. In this way what's been apprehended acquires a fixed specificity having the form of an immediate property or [conceptually] inert phenomenon, and ends up comprehended in terms of quantitative determinations, its conceptual nature suppressed. Putting something that's merely perceived in place of something that's reflected into itself, putting sensuous in place of organic specificity, is once again to no avail since indeed the understanding hasn't yet advanced beyond law-framing.

78 Taking a look at a few examples of such substitution, we see an animal perceived to have strong muscles characterized as an animal organism with "high [muscular] irritability," or a perceived state of extreme weakness characterized as a condition of "high sensitivity" or, if you will, "abnormal," indeed "exponentially increased" reactivity—expressions that, instead of translating the sensuous into the conceptual, render it in Latin (and bad Latin at that). An animal with strong muscles can just as well be characterized by the understanding as having "great muscular strength," and a weak animal as being "slight of strength." Characterization in terms of irritability rather than strength has the advantage that, whereas the latter conveys only an amor-

phous reflection into self, the former suggests a specific kind of such reflexivity (the force distinctively exerted by muscles being that of irritability)—and moreover has an advantage (as even strength does) over characterization in terms of “strong muscles” in that it also [M190] entails something reflecting into itself. –So too with [muscular] weakness or slightness of strength: organic passivity is to be characterized in terms of sensitivity. But when sensitivity of this sort, taken by itself, is fixated and even bound to quantitative specifications, or when greater or lesser sensitivity is contrasted with greater or lesser irritability, each is reduced to a mere sensuous element and, in form, to an ordinary property. Their relation isn’t then conceptual but on the contrary one of quantity, and with the contrast now falling there, it ends up a thoughtless distinction. Although the amorphousness of expressions such as ‘strength’ and ‘strong and weak’ is thereby ameliorated, there now ensues a pointless rummaging through all manner of contrasts between greater and lesser sensitivity and irritability as they increase or decrease in direct or inverse proportion. Specifications such as greater or lesser sensitivity and greater or lesser irritability capture and communicate sense phenomena just as thoughtlessly as do the wholly sensuous characterizations strong and weak.

79 –Instead of replacing subconceptual expressions like the above with something conceptual, ‘strength and weakness’ are rounded out via a mode of specification that, taken by itself, has a conceptual basis and content yet completely loses this origin and character. Due to the simplistic and direct manner in which this content is turned into a correlate of a law, and due to quantity being constitutive of the element in which such specifications are differentiated, an entity that originally existed and was set forth in the manner of something conceptual remains an entity of sense-perception as remote from adequate comprehension as when characterized either in terms of strength (as strong or weak) or in terms of immediate sense-properties.



80 Still to be examined is what organicity’s ‘outer’ consists of by itself, and how the contrast of its inner and outer is defined, much as above we examined the organic whole’s ‘inner’ vis-à-vis *its* outer.

81 Considered by itself, the outer is basically the [organism’s] physical embodiment: the system of life as articulated in the element of matter-of-fact being, in essence including the being of an organic entity [M191] in relation to what’s other than it, an entity objectively present in its self-related being. –Here the ‘other’ is first evident as the external inorganic nature of an organic entity. As seen above, when the two are considered in relation, namely for a [prospective] law, inorganic nature can’t serve as a correlate of a law contrasting it to organic being, since the latter relates strictly to itself, and relates to anything inorganic in the manner of a universal, being in this way altogether unfettered.

82 But when more narrowly defined, with both correlates integral to the organic embodiment, that embodiment is turned into something that in one aspect contrasts with inorganic nature, while in the other relating to and reflecting into itself. An actual organic entity is a mean that integrates the self-relatedness of life with the outer at large, a form of being inhering in *itself*.

83 –The one extreme, self-relatedness, comprises an inner that, as something boundlessly unitary, reintegrates within itself the moments of physical embodiment *per se* (outside the way that these subsist in and interconnect with the outer)—a contentless extreme that avails itself of a content in the [the specifics of a given organism's] physical embodiment, appearing therein as that embodiment's formative process. In this extreme, organicity, [functioning] in the manner of a simple negativity or sheer singularity, has such total freedom that it's indifferent to and secure against relativity to what's other than it as well as the specificity of whatever moments physically embody it. The moments themselves have this freedom too: the wherewithal by which to appear and be apprehended as they factually are. And just as they're free from and indifferent to what's external to them, so also are they vis-à-vis each other, since this freedom's simplicity is the very being, the simple substance, of these moments. Conceptual being such as this—pure freedom—is what *life* consists in, it being one and the same no matter how multifariously its physical embodiment or relation to other beings may vary. It makes no difference to the stream of life what manner of mills it drives.

84 –The first thing to note here is that conceptual being of this sort shouldn't be thought of in the same way as when considering the inner proper in its processive form (namely in its unfolding moments), but rather in the form it assumes as a *simple* inner constitutive of the purely universal correlate in contrast with the actual living entity, that is, as the sustaining element of the matter-of-fact components of the physical embodiment. This purely universal correlate is what we're concerned with here, and it's precisely in it that the essence of life [M192] subsists as something simple. –Then as for the *specific* character of a given actual embodiment—its relation to what's other than it—this is to be apprehended in [a manner consistent with] this simple universality essential to it: a mode of specificity so simple, universal, and nonsensuous as to be expressible only in terms of *number*. –Number is the common denominator integral to the physical embodiment that links the nonspecific essence of life with some actually occurring life-form, number being simple like the former and specific like the latter. What in life's nonspecific essence, the inner, might be expressed numerically would in the outer have to be set forth as a protean reality (multifarious life-forms, colorations, etc.), in general a plethora of differentiae unfolding in the phenomenal realm.

85 Were both aspects of the organic whole (the inner and the outer, each of which in turn contains both an inner and an outer aspect) compared with respect to the inner aspect of each, we'd see that the 'inner's inner,' as something restlessly abstrac-

tive, is *conceptual*, whereas the ‘outer’s inner’ is something serenely universal and therein also inertly specific—is *numerical*. Hence were the inner’s inner (in which the moments of a form of conceptual being are unfolding) to provide the misleading prospect of a law seeming to interrelate it necessarily with the outer’s inner, this would be instantly disaffirmed, since in the latter’s laws number clearly specifies correlates of the one sort only. For number is a wholly inert, lifeless, and indifferent mode of specificity in which all dynamic processes and ways of interrelating are extinguished, and which can’t bridge the chasm separating it from the vibrancy of [organic] drives, life-forms, and all else having sensuous existence.

86 To thus consider the physical embodiment and the inner of organicity as such sheerly in terms of the former’s inner is in fact to stop taking organicity into consideration at all, since the two aspects supposedly being interrelated are then so set forth as to have no bearing on each other, in consequence of which the reflection-into-self essential to organicity is eliminated. The attempted comparison of inner and outer is instead shifted here into the realm of inorganic nature, where this infinite form of conceptual being is but an essence hidden within—or else something extrinsic that abides in self-consciousness and is no longer objectively present as it is in organicity. –This way of interconnecting inner [M193] and outer has yet to be considered in its own context.

87 Taken, to begin with, as encountered in the simple singularity of an inorganic thing, the physical embodiment’s inner is [say] its ‘specific gravity.’ As something that simply *is*, this can be observed (or, strictly speaking, ascertained by comparing observations) as well as numerically specified (the only way specific gravity can be specified), and so seems to furnish one correlate of a law. The outer correlate would then consist of properties such as shape, color, hardness, toughness, and innumerable others, which would then have to exhibit the specificity of the inner—its numerical value—for the one to have its needed counterpart in the other.

88 Now since here a form of negativity is being apprehended not as a processual dynamic but as something inertly unitary—related simply to itself—it might instead appear to be something whereby a thing is resistant to and sustains itself unaffectedly vis-à-vis process. Yet since this simple self-related being is inertly unaffected by otherness, specific gravity turns out to be but one property alongside others; and hereby the necessity of its being in any way related to this plurality of properties—in other words all conformity to a law—is abrogated. As a simple inner, specific gravity doesn’t involve variation (or only such as is nonessential to it) since its utter simplicity rules out any essential variation. Such nonessential variation as it could involve would thus have to be in the antitype—the heterogeneity—present in the other correlate: the many properties, since only via them does it have anything at all to do with variation. Were this plurality narrowed down to a simplified contrast, and specified as involving, say,

‘cohesion’—hence something relating to itself amidst otherness whereas specific gravity is a form of pure self-relatedness—this cohesiveness would be (unlike a plurality of properties) a pure mode of specificity established at the start as conceptual, leaving us with a law framed in the same way as when we considered the relation of sensibility and irritability.

89 –Furthermore cohesion, as the conceptual being of a form of self-relatedness in otherness, is but an abstraction when correlated with specific gravity—and as such doesn’t [M194] actually exist. For to be self-related in otherness, an inorganic entity would have to processively demonstrate that its self-relatedness is self-sustained, precluding its emerging from that process as culminating moment, as product. Indeed to do so would contradict its very nature, which involves no such purposiveness, no universality of that sort. For an inorganic entity, process is instead just some specific interaction that sublates its self-relatedness (here its specific gravity). Yet even a specific interaction that would sustain an entity’s cohesiveness (as cohesion truly is conceptually), and the exact quantity of that entity’s specific gravity, are entirely irrelevant to each other conceptually.

90 –Were attention wholly diverted from the specific nature of the interaction and confined to quantitative representation, one might think up a characterization such as “Something with a greater specific gravity, as something more densely packed into itself, will resist involvement in any process to a greater extent than would something with a smaller specific gravity.” –But quite to the contrary, this manner of self-relatedness demonstrates how facilely it accommodates involvement in any and every process, sustaining itself in the very midst of multiplicity. Intensivity such as this, devoid of any relations in the realm of extension, is a vacuous abstraction, since it’s only in extension that intensivity has objective existence. That inorganic being sustains itself in any given relation is, as we recall, due to factors outside its nature, since the principle of such a dynamic isn’t intrinsic to it, that is, since its being isn’t negative and conceptual through and through.

91 When by contrast the other correlate of inorganic being is regarded as something inert rather than processive, as with ordinary cohesion, a simple sense-property takes its place opposite a heterogeneous moment that ranges freely over a scattered myriad of properties having no bearing on each other—with cohesion being itself subjected (as was specific gravity) to correlation with a plethora of properties that together comprise the other correlate. –Yet here as there the only specific element is number, which conveys neither any connection between these properties nor any progression from one to the next, but in essence has precisely *no* necessary connection to any of them and, in exhibiting a mode of specificity that’s quite *inessential*, sooner demonstrates the absence of any conformity to law. [M195] Hence a series of bodies differentiated numerically according to their specific gravities by no means parallels a series differ-

entiated according to other properties, even if, to facilitate the parallel, they're considered only singly or a few at a time. For in fact only the whole bundle of properties taken together could [validly] comprise the other correlate in drawing such a parallel.

92 –To bring all these properties into some semblance of order and bind them into a whole, observational consciousness has at its disposal in the one correlate the various quantitative specifications of these properties. But in the other correlate they vary qualitatively. Now exactly what in the latter bunch would have to be designated as positive or negative and hence as subating and being sublated by its counterpart (broadly speaking, how one would internally structure and formulate such an equation, a very complicated matter indeed) would have to be determined conceptually: an impossible undertaking, since all these properties are supposed to be just lying around as objectively existent facts and be apprehended as such. In such being no property exhibits any characteristic negating the status of any other; one counts for as much as another and gives not the slightest indication of its place in the total scheme.

93 –In a series of paralleled variations such as this (whether the correlates are supposed to be increasing in both, or increasing in one while decreasing in the other) all that matters is what in the end simply sums up the whole amalgam of properties comprising the correlate of the law contrasted with specific gravity. But what this one correlate matter-of-factly comes down to is just what it has already been said to be: some single property (such as ordinary cohesion) alongside which, and unrelated to which, other properties (specific gravity among them) are present. And each of these other properties can with equal justification (i.e., just as wrong-headedly) be taken as “representative of” that correlate as a whole: any one of them, like any one of the others, would merely represent, or in plain terms pass for—without actually being—the genuine article itself. Hence trying to find series of bodies that would run in simple parallel to each other, while articulating their essential nature according to some ‘law’ correlating them, has to be considered a way of thinking that knows neither the [M196] nature of its task nor the means for seeing it through.

94 Whereas previously the connection that observation was supposed to describe, namely between inner and outer in the physical embodiment [of organisms], was summarily carried over into the inorganic realm, now such rationale as there is for doing so can be presented more precisely, providing yet another way of forming and establishing a connection for this sort of relation. What in the inorganic realm seems to offer a possible way of comparing inner and outer has no relevance whatever to the organic realm. The inorganic inner is a simple inner that presents itself to perception in the manner of a matter-of-fact property; hence its specificity is essentially comprised in quantity, and it itself appears as a property existing indifferently to what's extrinsic to it (namely to the many other sense properties). However, the self-related being of a living organism doesn't contrast with its outer in this way, having instead

the principle of heterogeneity *integrally within it*. Were we to define such self-relatedness as a 'simple self-sustained interconnecting of self to self,' then [we'd be as much as saying that] its heterogeneity makes it a *simplex* negativity—with its organic unity being comprised in the unity of this homogeneous self-to-self interconnectedness and this pure negativity.

95 –It's this manner of unity that comprises the inner of organicity—whereby organicity is thus intrinsically universal, that is, comprises a *genus*. The freedom of a genus vis-à-vis its actualized reality differs from that of specific gravity vis-à-vis *its* physical embodiment. Such freedom as specific gravity has is matter-of-fact, which is to say that it correlates [with its embodiment simply] in the manner of a particular property. Being thus matter-of-factly free, it is also but one of the characteristics essential to a given physical embodiment (one whereby the latter is determined as *it* in essence is). But the freedom of a genus is all-pervasive and indifferent to how it's embodied or actualized in reality.

96 –Hence in organic being the specificity relevant to the self-relatedness of inorganic being is as such subject to *organic* self-relatedness, just as in the inorganic realm it is subject sheerly to its *matter-of-fact being*. Thus in the inorganic realm, while specificity of this sort exists merely as a property, it nonetheless turns out to have the status of an essence, since it (in the manner of a simple negative complement) stands in contrast to a matter-of-factly existent presence—as to a being that's relative to something other than it. And what this simple negative complement comes down to when ultimately [M197] ascertained is some *numerical* value. But organicity is a form of singular individuality that of itself is sheerly negative, rendering irrelevant within itself whatever fixed numerical specificity is attributable to this indifferent form of matter-of-fact being. Thus to whatever extent organicity involves this moment—involves number, a form of being indifferently at play within it—such can scarcely be regarded as anything more than that, certainly not the vital essence animating it.

97 Now while sheer negativity, the principle of process, is by no means extrinsic to organicity, and [on the other hand] isn't then a form of specification that's integral to its essence (organic individuation being itself inherently universal), nonetheless the moments of this [process of] sheer individuation—being of themselves abstract or generic in organicity—aren't developed and actual therein. Rather does such an articulation take place outside organic universality, which recedes into the realm of the inner, and in between its actual reality or physical embodiment (the self-developing individual) and the organic universal (the genus) there emerges a specific form of universality: the *species*.

98 –Such existence as the universal or genus attains in its negativity is sheerly that of a processual dynamic that has evolved in running its course in such constituent

physical forms as matter-of-factly exist. If the genus were to have these diverse constituents within it in the manner of something serenely simplex—so that the dynamic of its simplex negativity would as such course through them as through the equally simplex, universal constituents directly integral to it (being actual there in the form of such moments)—then the organic genus would constitute a conscious being.

99 –Yet simplex specificity is present in the organic genus in a form bereft of intelligence: as the specificity of a species. Although the actual reality of anything commences with specification, what is thus taking on reality isn't the genus as such, isn't anything noetic at all. In place of the genus as met with in actual organicity is a mere surrogate—namely number—which seems to suggest some progression from genus to individual physical formation, and seems to provide observational consciousness with both of the necessary correlates (some simple form of specificity and the physically embodied form of this specificity in all its articulated multiplicity), but sooner demonstrates that the universal and the individual are free of and have no bearing upon one another. The genus leaves the individual exposed to quantitative variation [M198] of no essential import while the individual demonstrates that, as a living being, he's in turn free regardless of such variation. This true form of universality is here (as delineated above) strictly an inner essence. As definitive of a species, universality is merely formal, while the above true universality sides with individuality as against the species—the individual being what's actually alive (by virtue of this inner within it) and unconcerned about its being determined as a given species. –But this singular individuality does not exist beyond that, in other words, in the manner of a 'universal individual'¹ in which [organic] universality would have extraorganic reality as well; an individual of that sort is instead wholly extrinsic to animate organicity. This all-inclusive individual entity directly comprised in [the host of] naturally occurring physical permutations isn't a conscious entity per se; for it to be such it would have to exist as a single, organic, living individual, an existence that *couldn't* be extraorganic.

100 We see here then a syllogism one extreme of which is all-inclusive life viewed as a universal (as genus), while the other is all-inclusive life viewed as an individual entity (a universal individual); their mean, however, combines the two—with the universal appearing properly as a specific form of universality (a species) and the individual as a real—a single—individual. And since this syllogism is relevant to the whole dimension of physical formation, it encompasses what's distinguished as inorganic nature as well.

1. This manner of entity, exemplified by the planet Earth, is a nonconscious being composed of interacting organic and nonorganic entities, and it displays dynamics on a titanic (planetary and cosmic) scale. It is not to be confused with the 'abstractly universal, *elementary individuum*' referred to in VI.24.

101 Now since on its side of this relation all-inclusive life, the simplex essence of the genus, develops such variations as are integral to its conceptual being and has to exhibit them in a series of simplex specifics, this constitutes a system of indifferently arrayed variation—in the manner of a numerical series. Whereas previously organicity in its individuated form was contrasted with this type of variation, which has nothing to do with life's essence, neither manifesting nor even involving living nature—and whereas the same needs be said regarding inorganic existence as a whole in its myriad properties—here what contrasts with organicity is a universal individual that has to be regarded as free of the individuation process of the genus, yet also as holding sway over it. While quietly going about the business of dividing into species in accordance with the generic specificity of number or in such individual characteristics as it manifests its [M199] presence (shape, color, etc.), the genus suffers violence from another quarter, that of the universal individual: Earth. The latter, as a negativity to which all are subjected, sustains these variations in accordance with the manner in which they're contained in it as opposed to how the genus systematizes them, their nature being different from that of the genus owing to the substance in which they inhere. The action of the genus thus turns out to be a very restricted business at best, one that it can carry on only in the midst of powerful elemental forces, and which, owing to the unbridled violence of the latter, is everywhere likely to be interrupted, sporadic, and abortive.

102 From this it follows that in the realm of physical existence observation can encounter reason only as met with in life at large, whose variegation doesn't actually involve any rational sequence and structure, and doesn't comprise an internally grounded system of physical forms. If in the syllogism of organic embodiment the mean that's inclusive of both the species and the species' actual reality as a single individual were also to include the extremes 'inner universality' and 'universal individual,' then this mean would, in the dynamic of *its* actual reality, manifest and possess the nature of the universal, and would evolve in a self-systematizing way. Consciousness does have such a mean between universal spirit and its singularization (sense-awareness): the system consisting in the permutations integral to consciousness as a form of noetic life that orders itself into a whole—the very system with which the present treatise deals and which is objectified as the history of the world. But organic nature has no history: it plunges from its universal form (life itself) directly into individuated existence, and the only genesis that comes of the moments united in organic reality (simple specificity and individual life) is a process in which—quite accidentally—each just does what it does and the whole [of organic nature] is sustained. But the activity of each is of itself limited to its own sphere in that the whole as such doesn't abide in each; and the reason that it doesn't is that the whole doesn't relate to itself here as whole.

103 So when observational reason contemplates [M200] organic nature, aside from arriving at no more than an intuition of itself as [part of] all-inclusive life in general, it apprehends the formation and realization of the organic realm [on the one hand] in

terms of only very broadly differentiated systems whose specificity—*their* very essence—isn't integral to organicity as such but is instead attributable to the universal individual, and [on the other hand] in terms of such serial progressions as the genus pursues subject to the earth's variability.

104 Since such universality as organic life has in its actual reality is thus, for lack of any genuinely self-relating mediation, given to plunging directly into the extreme of individuality, all that observational consciousness has “out there before it” is sense-impression as met with in things. And although in its idle moments reason can very well indulge its interest in observing such impressions, its efforts amount to nothing more than describing and cataloguing them in keeping with nature's whimsical ways. The mindless liberality of sense-impression no doubt proffers all sorts of rudimentary laws, traces of necessity, hints of order and orderly progressions, ingenious and plausible connections, and so on. But with respect to law and necessity, when observational consciousness relates the organic with the various forms of inorganic fact (the elements, latitudes, climates, etc.), it never gets beyond citing some “major influence.” And the same is the case regarding the other correlate, where individuality doesn't refer to Earth, but to organic life's immanent oneness, which, even while constitutive of a genus (by virtue of its direct unity with the universal), is one whose simple unity is for that reason sheerly numerical in character and so has nothing to do with qualitative phenomena. There, too, observation can't get beyond clever remarks, “interesting connections,” and well-intended approximations to anything conceptual. But observational cleverness is hardly knowledge of necessity; and these “interesting connections” merely make things “interesting” (interest being but a form of fancy concerned with matters of reason). And as for the individual's good intentions in hinting as he does at something conceptual, this is quite childish, especially if he aspires to be or is supposed to be accomplishing something worth doing for its own sake. [M201]



V.A.b. OBSERVATION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN ITS PURITY AND IN ITS RELATION TO EXTERNAL REALITY: LOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS

105 Although the observation of nature does find conceptual being realized in inorganic nature—in laws whose moments consist of ‘things that at the same time function in the manner of abstractions’—conceptual being of this sort isn't a form of internally reflected simplicity. Organic nature's *life* is by contrast nothing but internally reflected simplicity; the tension integral to it—that of consisting at once in the universal and the singular individual—issues in no disavowance within the essence of life internally. Life's essence *doesn't* comprise a genus that, in its own indiscriminately accommodating element, would be self-divergent and self-disturbed, and that, in relating to itself antithetically, would moreover be at variance with itself. Observation can find this

freely functioning conceptual being, which in its universal aspect has a fully developed individuality absolutely integral to it, only in conceptual being that exists in the way that conception itself does—that is, in a self-conscious being.

106 As observation turns in upon itself now and focuses on actual conception as present in freely functioning conceptual being such as this, its first find consists of ‘laws of thinking.’ The individuality integral to thinking consists in the abstractive dynamism of a negativity wholly withdrawn into simplicity; and these laws are extrinsic to any such reality. They have no reality, which basically means that they’re laws devoid of truth. Now of course they’re not supposed to be the whole truth but just the formal truth. Yet pure formality without reality is a thought-concoction, a vacuous abstraction without anything divergent within it that would at least constitute some manner of content.

107 –On the other hand since these are laws of ‘pure thought’—thought being inherently universal and hence a manner of knowing that directly encompasses being itself (and therein all reality)—these laws are totally conceptual and are essential modalities of form as well as of things inseparably. Since internally self-animating universality of this sort consists in self-divergent, simplex conception, such conceiving accordingly has an inherent content, one that is moreover exhaustive—save that it just doesn’t have sensuous existence. This is a content that neither contradicts the form nor is in any way [M202] separate from it, but rather *is* the form itself essentially, such form consisting in nothing but this manner of universal’s way of dividing into its own pure moments.

108 Yet due to the way in which this form—or content—is present for observation to observe, it gets characterized as having been “found,” or as a “given,” that is, a content that just matter-of-factly exists. It fleshes out as an inert body of relations, an aggregate of separate essentials that, as with any such fixed content, are in and of themselves supposed to hold true in their specificity—being then in fact bereft of form. Yet “absolute truth” of this sort, consisting of fixed specifics or a plurality of distinct laws, altogether contradicts the *unity* of self-consciousness, that is, of thinking and form. What’s here alleged to be a fixed, enduring law can exist only as an integral moment of a unitary entity in process of reflecting into itself, making its appearance there only as a fleeting infinitesimal quantum. When such laws are nonetheless considered outside the context of this dynamic and set out individually, what they lack isn’t content (for they have a specific content) but form, their very essence. It isn’t in fact because they’re supposed to be merely formal and devoid of content that these laws aren’t true to what thinking is, but rather for the opposite reason: because in their specificity—precisely as content deprived of form—they’re supposed to be regarded as absolute. Taken for what they are in truth, as fleeting moments within the unity of the thought process, these “laws” would have to be regarded as a form of knowing—of thought in motion—but not as

laws of knowing. Such observation neither is nor recognizes what knowing is, but contorts its very nature into a configuration of *being*, apprehending its negativity in terms of ‘laws of being.’

109 –It suffices here to have pointed out, based on the overall nature of the matter, the invalidity of these so-called laws of thinking. Any more precise development lies within the purview of speculative philosophy, in which they’re shown to be what they are in truth: isolated ephemeral moments whose truth consists in nothing short of the entire thinking process, knowledge itself.



110 The negative unity comprised in thinking exists for itself, or rather is existence-for-self: the principle of [M203] individuality, a principle whose reality consists in consciousness in action. Due to the nature of what it’s thus concerned with, this manner of observational consciousness sets out in pursuit of active consciousness as the reality of these laws. Unaware of how they interconnect, this consciousness envisions thinking as abiding (in one correlate) within the gamut of its laws, while (in the other) sustaining another mode of being in the object it’s now observing—namely this active consciousness that’s so self-oriented as to annul otherness and locate its actual reality in intuiting itself as a negativity.

111 A “new field” thus opens up for observation: consciousness’s *practical* reality. Psychology encompasses the body of laws in accordance with which the mind relates variably to the varying conditions of its actual world as to a realm of otherness found to be already there. The mind does so partly in order to assimilate the latter and conform to the customs, manners, and conventional ways of thinking it finds already in place (as that in which it encounters itself as objectively real), and partly in order to confirm its spontaneity vis-à-vis them, selecting by impulse and inclination only what it finds particularly suited to itself in them—thus making objectivity conform to it—in the one instance behaving negatively toward itself as individual, in the other behaving negatively as a being that’s itself universal. In the former correlate, basically all that the individual’s independence contributes to what it has found there before it is the ‘form’ of conscious individuality, and as regards content it remains quite within this all-encompassing preexistent actual reality. But in the other correlate such independence at a minimum introduces into reality some idiosyncratic modification that doesn’t contradict the content essential to that reality; or it might also introduce some change whereby the individual would (as a particular actual being with a unique purposive content) go against it, violating it by sublating it on a personal scale—or on a universal scale (hence for everyone), substituting another world, another body of right, custom, and law for the one already there.

112 Observational psychology, which starts out by detailing its perceptions concerning the 'common traits' encountered in practical consciousness, turns up all sorts of faculties, inclinations, and passions. And as it, in recounting all these [M204] collected data, inevitably recalls the unity of self-consciousness, it at least has to begin wondering how it could be that such a heterogeneous assortment of casually related things could coexist in the mind as though stuffed into a sack, especially since these manifest themselves not as inert, lifeless things, but as dynamic processes.

113 When reciting the litany of these sundry faculties, observation keeps within the all-inclusive correlate, the contrasting correlate being that of the unity of these manifold capacities: actual individuality. But for it then to embark on a study of the various modes of actual individuality (recounting such facts as that one person is inclined more toward one thing, another toward something else, or that one person is more intelligent than another) is even less interesting than cataloguing species of insects, mosses, and so on. The latter at least entitle observation to take them up thus, singly and nonconceptually, since in essence their element is that of random individuation. But to mindlessly consider conscious individuality as though it were an ad hoc phenomenon is contradictory, since its essential nature is the mind's integral comprehensiveness. Having thus also to get individuality into some form of universality, this way of apprehending likewise finds a law for individuality, and at last seems to have a rational purpose and to be doing something that's really needed.

114 The moments comprising this law's content are, on the one hand, individuality itself, and on the other, individuality's overall inorganic nature (the situation and circumstances, prevailing customs and mores, religion, etc., found to be already in place); and it's in terms of these correlates that any specific mode of individuality is to be comprehended. They entail the specific as well as the general, while also being readily accessible, amenable to observation, and (in the latter correlate) present in a form expressive of individuality.

115 Now what the law interrelating the two correlates would have to account for is the effect and influence that such and such circumstances have on individuality. But individuality consists precisely in being at once oriented to the universal, placidly flowing along in direct unison with presently existing commonplaces such as mores, customs, and so on, and conforming to [M205] them—and also in either turning against them and subverting them, or alternatively in its idiosyncratic fashion reacting with complete indifference to them, neither allowing them to have an influence on it nor making an active response to them. What supposedly influences individuality and in what way (which really both come down to the same thing) thus depends entirely on individuality itself; that this is how it came to be specifically as it is means nothing but that it was so predisposed. Situation and circumstances, customs, and so on that on the one hand are shown to be current, and on the other to be present in such and such

specific mode of individuality, convey only the indeterminate essence of individuality, something that's here irrelevant. If the circumstances, ways of thinking, customs—in short the overall state of the world—hadn't been what they were, then of course the individual wouldn't have turned out as he did; for all that finds a place in that state is part and parcel of that universal substance.

116 –Just as the state of the world is particularized in *this* individual (which is what's supposed to be apprehended here), so would the state of the world have to have been particularized in and relative to *itself*, and have an effect on the individual in his determining himself as such and such; only thus would it have made him into the specific individual that he is. Were the outer [world at large] in and relative to itself constituted just as it appears in individuality, then individuality would be comprehensible in terms of it. We'd have a double gallery of images, each reflecting the other: the one a gallery of external circumstances that are fully determinative and delimiting, the other the same gallery translated into the way these are present in a conscious entity—the one the globe's outer surface, the other the center point representing the latter inside itself.

117 Yet right within that outer surface, the individual's world, there's an ambiguity: while matter-of-factly existing in and relative to *itself* as world and situational context, it's also *his* world, either to the extent that he just flows along with it (relating to it only formally as a conscious entity), or else to the extent that he has changed what he found present there. –He being thus at liberty, and with actual reality accommodative of this ambiguity, his world is quite comprehensible simply in terms [M206] of him himself; and such 'influence' as the reality portrayed as existing in and of itself has on him becomes—by what he's done—perfectly indicative of the exact opposite: either *he's* permitting this stream of objective actuality to flow in upon him, or else *he's* disrupting the flow and redirecting its course. But with this, "psychological necessity" becomes but an empty phrase, so empty, in fact, that it's entirely possible that whatever is alleged to have had this or that influence may very well not have had any at all.

118 Thus does such being as supposedly would exist in and relative to itself and comprise the sole, indeed the all-comprehensive correlate of a psychological law fall by the wayside. Individuality is what its world is as its own world—is itself the compass of its action, within which it has manifested itself as something real: quite simply a unity of what's already there and what it itself has brought into being, a unity the integral aspects of which do not, as psychological law purports, separate into a self-contained already present world and individuality existing for itself; when each is considered by itself, no necessity interconnecting them and no law interrelating them is in evidence at all.



V.A.C. OBSERVATION OF THE RELATION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS TO ITS IMMEDIATE
MATTER-OF-FACT REALITY: PHYSIOGNOMY AND PHRENOLOGY

119 Psychological observation finds no law relating self-consciousness to actual reality at large (the world contrasted with it) and, since these have no such bearing on each other, has no recourse but to fall back on real individuality's own characteristic specificity, existing both in itself and as present to itself—containing, in other words, the now vestigial opposition between self-relatedness and self-inherency within its own unrestricted intermediateness. This has become the object to which observation now turns its attention.

120 The individual exists in and relative to himself: he exists for himself, is a free agent, yet also exists self-containedly, having within himself an origivative determinate being—a determinateness that's conceptually akin to what psychology was trying to find outside him. A tension thus emerges [M207] within him, a duality composed of the dynamism of consciousness and the fixedness of a matter-of-factly apparent actuality directly internal to his own being. The latter form of being, the particular individual's body, is that in which he originates—something not of his own doing. Yet inasmuch as an individual is nothing but what he has done, his body is also a means of self-expression—moreover a sign, which isn't the staid entity it is as directly evident but something enabling him to make known the point of his employing his origivative nature as he does.

121 Comparing the moments here before us with those encountered in the preceding psychological outlook, whereas there we examined generic factors such as custom and culture, here we find generic human physical characteristics, or at least those generalizable across a given climate, region, or people. And whereas there particular circumstances and situations occur in the context of reality at large, here the particular reality under consideration is the particular formation of the individual's physical embodiment. –From another perspective, whereas in the preceding the free action and reality of the individual proper was contrasted with present reality at large, here physical form is employed by the individual himself as expressive of his way of actualizing himself—as traits and characteristics of his spontaneous nature. The reality (general as well as particular) that observation previously encountered outside the individual is here instead the individual's own—the body he was born with—which is precisely that in which any expression relevant to his action occurs. In psychological investigation it was matter-of-fact reality in and relative to itself and individuality as determined thereby that were supposed to be interrelated; but here the object of observation is the specific individual as a whole, with each of the object's contrasting aspects itself integral to that whole.

122 –To the outer whole thus belongs not only the individual's innate being, the body he was born with, but equally the formation of the body, an activity belonging to the inner whole; the body is thus a nexus of a matter-of-fact being in its unformed and its formed state, and of the individual's actual, thoroughly self-oriented reality. The outer whole incorporates the individual's determinate, original, fixed components as well as the character traits exhibited by his action, and is a form of being that's expressive [M208] of an inner whole: the individual as consciously and processively set forth. –By the same token the inner whole is no longer a sheerly formal, contentless or indefinite spontaneity whose substantive content and definition lie, as entertained in the preceding, sheerly in external circumstances, but is an inherently determinative as well as originaive character whose form consists solely in activity. –Thus what's here at issue is how the relationship between these two aspects is to be ascertained, and what's to be understood by the 'expression' of the inner in the outer.

123 It's simply in functioning as an *organ* that the outer aspect first manifests the inner—basically turning it into a being that's present to others—since to the very extent that it's present in the organ the inner is itself what's actively functioning. The speaking mouth, the laboring hand, the legs, if you will, are organs of enactment and efficacy that entail action as action, the inner as such; however, such externalization as the inner achieves through them is that of an *act*—something actual that exists apart from the individual. Speaking and laboring are ways of externalizing in which the individual doesn't keep control and possession in his own hands, but lets the inner get decidedly away from him, leaving it at the mercy of others. Hence it would be equally true to say that these ways of externalizing express the inner both too much and too little: too much, in that the inner itself bursts forth in them, leaving no trace of the contrast between them and it (providing not merely an expression of the inner but the inner directly as such)—and too little, in that in speech and action the inner turns into something else, thereby exposing itself to a transformative element that twists the spoken word and perverts the completed act until they mean something other than what they are in and of themselves as the doings of a particular individual.

124 –In being thus externalized, not only do an individual's practical achievements lose their enduring character in the face of other individuals reacting to them; they may also appear (since they relate as an outer that's separate from and indifferent to the inner they contain) as other than what they are as inner—either by the individual intentionally making them appear as other than what they are in truth, or by his being too inept to present the exterior he [M209] really wanted and so establish his achievements as to be impervious to distortion by others. Thus as an accomplished feat, action is in its import doubly at odds with itself, portending either something inside individuality but not expressive of it or an external reality that's wholly independent of and other than the inner.

125 –Due to this ambiguity we have to look around for an inner that exists visibly or outwardly, yet is still within the individual himself. In an organ the inner exists solely as direct action itself, being externalized in an act that may or may not show its presence. Thus, considered in light of this predicament, an organ doesn't provide the expressiveness being sought.

126 Now if one's exterior could express inner individuality only insofar as that exterior isn't an organ, isn't acting, and so exists as an inert totality, it would be functioning like a thing that sustains a passive presence inertly receptive to the inner as to something that's extraneous to it and of which it gives sign—expressing it then extraneously, fortuitously, without really meaning anything, a “language” whose sounds and sound-combinations, instead of being the genuine article, are only arbitrarily associable with and fortuitously relatable to language.

127 A combination of elements as arbitrarily and externally related as this provides no law. *Physiognomy*, however, is supposed to differ from other misbegotten arts and pernicious pursuits in that it considers determinate individuality in terms of a ‘necessary’ contrast between inner and outer, between character as conscious essence and character as matter-of-fact physical form, linking these moments to each other in the way that they conceptually interrelate, whereby they must perforce constitute the content of a ‘law.’ In astrology, palmistry, and other such “sciences,” by contrast, it seems that the only connections made are between an outer and an outer, between some given thing and something else extraneous to it. Such and such constellation at birth, or (to locate the outer somewhat closer to the body itself) such and such lines of the hand, are external moments indicating a longer or shorter life and broadly predictive of a particular human being's fate. As externalities these interrelate indifferently [M210] and don't have the reciprocal necessity supposedly implicit in the relation of outer and inner.

128 Now admittedly the hand seems to be not so much something external to one's destiny as related to it internally. For all that destiny in turn amounts to is the open playing out of what determinate individuality is latently in itself as an inner original determinativeness. –In reckoning what individuality has latent within it, the palmist, like the physiognomist, takes a bit of a shortcut as compared with, say, Solon, who thought he could know such things only by studying the course of the individual's entire life after it was over. He examined the evidence; they consult what's still latent. It's easy to see that the hand should show what individuality is latently in itself with respect to its fate from the fact that, next to the organ of speech, it's by means of the hand more than by anything else that a man discloses and actualizes himself. The hand is the living architect of his fortune. One could say of it that it *is* what a man *does*, for in it, as the active organ of his self-fulfillment, he's present as animating spirit; and inasmuch as he's originatively his own fate, so will his hand express what's latent therein.

129 Based upon this specification—that the organ of any such activity consists just as much in a form of being as it does in the action going on within it (in other words, that in an organ [an individual's] inner latent being is itself present and has such being as is evident to others)—still another way of viewing the organ is provided. Although organs in general proved incapable of being taken as expressions of the inner, since in them action is present only as action currently under way (whereas action as completed act is a sheer externality, in which inner and outer dissociate and become, or could become, irrelevant to each other), in light of the above determination the organ *per se* has to be looked at again with an eye to its being an intermediary between inner and outer. For it's precisely in its being currently under way in the organ that the action is at the same time the externalization of the inner, and indeed constitutes something other than a completed act—remaining, that is, within and integral to the individual.

130 –Now while this intermediary and unity of inner and outer is from the outset itself external, it's even then in process of integration into the inner; this is a *simple* as opposed to a diversified externalization—taking it to consist either in some merely isolated [M211] accomplishment or vicissitude incidental to the overall individual, or else in a fate that's entirely external, played out piecemeal in a manifold of accomplishments and vicissitudes. In the simple lines of the hand, in the peculiarities of one's speech as reflected in timbre and vocal resonance, in written speech, which via the hand attains greater permanence than does the voice, and of course in the idiosyncrasies of handwriting—in all these we thus have an *expression* of the inner that stands as a simple exterior (in contrast with the manifold playing-out of one's action and fate) that is distinctively *inner*. –Thus if initially the distinctive nature and inborn uniqueness of the individual, together with what these have become through cultivation, are taken as inner (the gist of his behavior and fate), this inner first comes to light and gets externalized via his mouth, hand, voice, and handwriting, as well as in the rest of the organs and permanent characteristics; only then is the reality it has in the outside world more expressly elaborated.

131 Now since an intermediary such as this qualifies as an expression that's simultaneously being reappropriated in the inner, its presence isn't restricted to the immediate organ of action, but extends to the nonverbalized activity and form of one's countenance as well as to one's overall physical bearing. The movements of one's physical features are, in this way of conceiving, forms of action over which the individual retains control, and which relate to what he actually does as an aspect of his action that's being observed and supervised by him himself: an expression [of his inner individuality] in the sense of his reflecting upon what's actually being externalized. –Hence the individual isn't exactly mute in and regarding his outward action, since even as he's taking action he's being reflected into himself and externalizing this internal reflectedness;

and as he contemplates or engages in internal dialogue about what to do, this is perceptible to others, being itself a form of externalization.

132 So in this inner that remains inner even when expressed, it's the individual's reflectedness outside his active reality that's to be observed; and just what this reflectedness has to do with the necessity alleged to exist in the unity [of inner and outer] needs to be seen.

133 –To begin with, this reflectedness is [M212] distinct from the completed act itself, and so can be, and be taken for, something other than it. While one might be able to tell from a man's face whether he's in earnest about what he's saying or doing, what's here supposed to be an expression of the inner also expresses the inner matter-of-factly and so falls under the classification of *being*, something that from the perspective of a self-conscious entity is quite incidental. Thus while it's indeed an expression, it is such only in the way that a sign is, the manner of its expression having then utterly no bearing on the content expressed. Exhibited in this way, the inner is indeed the invisible made visible, albeit without being bound to the way in which it appears; it could as well appear in some other way, just as one that's other than it could appear as this one does. Thus Lichtenberg has it right when he says: "Suppose a physiognomist did for once take the measure of a man; a simple bold move on that man's part is all it would take to make himself incomprehensible again for eons."

134 –In the previously considered [psychological] relationship, preexisting circumstances constituted a matter-of-fact realm from which the individual assimilated what he could and wanted, either adapting himself to it or it to him—the underlying fact being that it didn't contain what's necessary and essential to his individuality. So likewise here, as an individual's immediate being is coming to light, it's either expressive of what he is as reflected outside of reality at large and within himself internally, or else is something he regards as a mere sign having no relevance to what's [otherwise apparently] designated—hence a sign that isn't designating truthfully, it being to him no more a countenance than a mask he can discard. Even though the individual permeates his physical embodiment, moves in it, speaks in it, this entire presence is just as likely to be transformed into a being that bears no relation to what's willed and enacted; the individual obliterates in that presence the significance it previously had—that of being reflected into himself, having his true nature inside himself—instead locating his essential nature in his will and act.

135 Individuality, in thus giving up on such internal self-reflectedness as is evident in features, and engaging what comes natural to it in work, contradicts the relation that the reasoning instinct, committed to observing self-conscious individuality, is trying to establish [M213] concerning what its inner and outer supposedly are. This perspective brings us to the core idea of physiognomic "science" (to so call it). Regarding its form, the contrast that such observation divines here is between the practical and the

theoretical, with both set forth within the former: the tension between individuality actualizing itself through action (broadly understood) and individuality simultaneously reflecting into itself outside that action, having action as its object.

136 –Such observation takes up this contrast in the same inverted relationship that’s characteristic of it in the realm of appearance. It takes deed and accomplishment, whether in the form of speech or of something more durably actual, to be a peripheral externality, and takes individuality’s inwardness to be the essential inner. Of the two aspects integral to practical consciousness—‘intention’ (what one means to do) and ‘act’ (what one actually does)—such observation selects the former as the true inner, with intention as expressed in an actual deed supposedly being more or less irrelevant, but given true expression in one’s manner and mien. Expression of the latter sort is comprised in the individual mind’s direct sensuous presence, with this supposedly true inner consisting then in the idiosyncrasies of intent and the singularity of whatever one is for oneself—both being what the mind intends. What observation has in these objects is thus the mind’s ‘intended presence,’ and amidst the likes of such it goes about searching for a law.

137 Off-the-cuff conjectures concerning the mind’s intended presence are [the stuff of “everyday” or] “natural” physiognomy: snap judgments based on one’s first impression of the inner nature and character of that presence’s physical appearance. The object of such conjecture is in essence truly different in kind from mere sensuous immediate being. Indeed what’s present here is the mind’s own reflectedness out of the sensuous into itself within the sensuous; the object of observation is visible in the sense of its being the visible presence of something invisible. This sensuous immediate presence is the mind’s “actual reality”—albeit merely as thus supposed—and in keeping with this aspect of its reality such observation busies itself with that [M214] purported presence, that is, with physiognomy, handwriting, tone of voice, and such.

138 –It associates this sort of presence with an inner presence that’s “intended.” What’s supposed to be detected isn’t an actual murderer or thief, but the “capacity” to be one; in this way a fixed and abstract form of specificity dissolves into an endless concrete specification of the particular individual, requiring that he then be characterized with more artful attributions than the above. A lot more is said in a well-crafted characterization [of individual propensities] than in attributions like ‘murderer’ and ‘thief,’ or ‘good-natured’ and ‘uncorrupted,’ and so on. Such depictions nonetheless fall as far short of achieving their purpose of expressing intended being or particularized individuality as do the likes of ‘flat forehead,’ ‘long nose,’ and so on, in depicting physical form, since a particular physical form, as with individual self-consciousness, isn’t expressible in terms of “intended” being. Hence this “science” of human nature dealing with hypothetical man (just as physiognomic “science” deals with his hypothetical reality while seeking to elevate natural physiognomy’s witless assessments to

the level of knowledge) is bereft of foundation or finality, and can never succeed in saying what it intends or really means, since all it does is indulge in fanciful opining, the very content of its opinions being itself sheer conjecture.

139 The “laws” that this science sets out to find are correlations of these two conjectural aspects—and so the correlations themselves can’t be anything but sheer conjecture. Moreover, since what exactly this conjectural knowledge concerning the mind’s actual reality has as its object is a mind that’s reflecting *out of* what’s sensuously present *into itself*—while deeming that same determinate presence to be an inconsequential contingency—it has to see at once that the laws it has discovered tell us nothing, that actually this is all pure rubbish, and that it’s just “speaking its mind,” an expression whose truth lies in its doing just that: it states its opinion, thereby providing just an opinion of its own rather than anything about the matter in question. And as regards their content, such observations fare no better than the likes of these: “It always rains at our annual fair,” says the huckster, “—and every time I hang out my wash,” adds the housewife.

140 Lichtenberg, who characterizes physiognomic observation [M215] in this way, adds the following remark: “Suppose somebody came up and said, ‘Of course you behave like an honest guy, but I can tell from your demeanor that you’re forcing yourself to do so and are a rascal at heart.’ Surely to the end of time anybody addressed like that, had he but a whit of self-respect, would retort with a good box on the ear.” This reply strikes home by refuting the primary assumption of such a conjecture-ridden science—namely that a man’s actual reality is but his countenance, and so on.

141 –The true being of a man lies rather in his deed; in it individuality is actual, and sublates both aspects of whatever is merely intended. In the one aspect what’s intended is supposedly evident in some form of inert corporeal being, whereas in action individuality is demonstrated as a negative manner of being that *exists* solely insofar as it sublates something that matter-of-factly is. An act thus also sublates the ineffableness of intention as regards self-conscious individuality, which in conjecture is defined and specifiable ad infinitum. In a completed act this spurious infinity comes to naught. A deed is simplex in its specificity—is a universal—something to be grasped in an abstraction; it is, say, murder, theft, or a good deed, a courageous act, and so on, and what it is can be said of it. It is such and such, and its being isn’t just a sign [of something else], but is the genuine article. It is this, and the individual human being is what the act is; in the simplicity of this manner of being, he is matter-of-factly present to others—an entity that is universal, ceasing to be a subject of conjecture.

142 –Now of course in a deed he isn’t set forth as mind; but when the question concerns what he is, and on the one hand the two aspects of his being (his physical form and his act) are contrasted, with each purporting to be what he actually is, then it’s the

act alone that has to be affirmed as his genuine being—not the demeanor purportedly expressing what he means by his actions, nor for that matter what one “supposes” him to be merely “capable” of doing. Similarly, when on the other hand his accomplishment and his inner potentiality, capacity, or intention are contrasted, it’s his accomplishment alone that’s to be regarded as his authentic reality, even if he himself is deceived in this matter and, by turning away from his action into himself, “intends” in his “innermost being” to be something other than what he is in his act.

143 –When individuality commits itself to the objective element, showing its [M216] hand in work or deed, it no doubt exposes itself to transformation and distortion. But what’s decisive about the character of an act is precisely whether it’s something real that has staying power or something merely “meant to be done” that of itself comes to naught. Objectification doesn’t alter the act itself; it merely shows it for what sort of act it is, that is, whether it’s one that *is* or *isn’t*. The analysis of such being into intentions and other such subtleties, whereby the actual man—that is, his act—is to be explained away once more in terms of intended being (in the same way that he himself might fabricate particular intentions concerning his reality), has to be left to mere conjecture. And should this manner of idle speculation decide to set its half-baked wisdom to work, having in mind to deny the doer the character of a rational being and to so abuse him as to declare that his physical features and demeanor, not his act, are his being, then it can expect a retort like the one alluded to above, a response demonstrating that one’s physical appearance isn’t some sort of latent inner being, but rather an object that one can very well get one’s hands on.



144 Looking now at the overall range of observable relations between self-conscious individuality and its outer aspect, we see that there’s still one left that needs be made an object of observation. In psychology the external reality of *things* has its self-conscious counterpart in the mind, and supposedly renders the latter intelligible. In physiognomy, by contrast, the mind is supposedly made known via its own outer being construed as something existing in the manner of *language*, the visible invisibility of the nature of the mind. Yet to be considered is a determinative aspect of actual reality that would be expressive of the nature of individuality as directly present in its fixed, sheerly matter-of-fact reality.

145 –This last relation differs from that of physiognomy in that there we had the speaking presence of an individual who in actively expressing himself is simultaneously exhibiting his internally self-reflective and introspective presence—doing so in expression that’s itself a procession of inert features that are essentially [taken to be] themselves a form of intermediative being. In the determinant yet to be considered,

the outer is at last something real that's wholly inert, something that [M217] isn't in itself a speaking sign but shows that it exists by itself apart from any self-conscious process—and as a bare thing.



146 To begin with, it seems clear that the connection of the inner to this its outer must be apprehended as a *causal* relation, since any necessary interconnection of one entity existing matter-of-factly in itself to another such entity is a relation of that sort.

147 For noetic individuality to have an effect on the body it must then, as cause, itself be corporeal. The corporeal presence in which it acts as cause is, however, that of an organ—not one acting upon external reality, but rather one in which a self-conscious being's action is internal to him, being exerted only upon his own body; and it's by no means obvious which organs these might be. Were we to make a rough inventory of them, the organ for work would be readily at hand, as well as the organ for sex, and so forth. But organs such as these are to be regarded as instruments or organic components that the mind, as one extreme, uses to intermediate another extreme, that of external objects. By contrast, the kind of organ we've in mind here is one in which the self-conscious individual, as one extreme, acts upon a contrasting reality that's nonetheless his own, sustaining his presence to himself, being inwardly reflected in his action rather than outwardly directed, an organ in which this aspect of his being isn't present to others.

148 –In a physiognomic relation an organ is of course likewise regarded as a presence that's internally reflected and bespeaks some action; but being of that sort exists objectively, and such observation ends up with self-consciousness confronting even this—its own reality—as something bearing no relation to it. This situation isn't in evidence when an organ's internal reflectedness is seen to be itself efficacious, its objective presence thereby coming to have a necessary relation to self-consciousness. But for self-consciousness to have in turn some effect upon its physical presence, it itself has to have (even if not in the strictest sense) some manner of objective matter-of-fact being; and it's as such—as an organ—that self-consciousness is supposed to be manifest.

149 Anger, for instance, as an internal action of this sort, is colloquially said to have its locus in the liver. Plato attributes to the liver an even higher function, one that some regard as the highest [M218] of all, namely prophesying—the gift of making irrational utterances concerning things sacred and eternal. Yet the stirrings of an individual's liver, heart, and so on can't be wholly regarded as an internally reflected dynamic, but would seem to strike the individual as (while indeed inside the body) a form of animal being that's responsive to the external world.

150 The nervous system, by contrast, is the proximate seat of an organic process. While of course the nerves are in turn themselves organs of an already outwardly oriented consciousness, the brain and spinal cord may nonetheless be regarded as the immanent (i.e., nonobjective and nonemergent) direct presence of self-conscious being. So far as this moment, the organ's matter-of-fact being, is present to others—is itself a presence—it's there lifelessly and no longer as the presence of self-consciousness. But self-consciousness's internal being, in keeping with its conceptual nature, is a flux in which the ripples radiating within it disperse forthwith, exhibiting no matter-of-fact variation. Meanwhile, just as the mind itself, rather than being abstract and simple, is a system of processes in which it differentiates into moments yet remains at liberty in so doing—and just as it assigns its body as a whole to a variety of tasks, setting each individual body part to but one task—so too the fluid nature of its internality can be represented as a form of being similarly organized. And it seems that the mind has to be represented thus, since in the brain its internally reflected being is once again only an intermediary between its pure essential nature and its corporeal articulation—an intermediary that has to partake of the nature of both, and so have within *it* in turn the matter-of-fact structuredness of the corporeal aspect.

151 A necessary aspect of any such psycho-organic being is its also having a stable enduring presence; it needs to take a step back as an extreme consisting in [evanescent] presence-to-self and have a stable presence in the form of another extreme opposite it, an object it acts upon as cause. Now if the brain and spinal cord together constitute the corporeal presence-to-self of the mind, [M219] then the skull and vertebral column form the other extreme thus set off from it: a fixed, inert *thing*. But inasmuch as someone pondering the mind's proper locus would hardly think of the back, but instead only the head, we can, in examining this manner of knowledge, be satisfied with such a reason (not at all a bad one, in its estimation) as grounds for narrowing down this locus to the skull. Should it nonetheless occur to someone to think of the back as the locus of the mind, inasmuch as knowing and acting are surely at least in part “induced” and “educated” via it, then—so far as having to accept the spinal cord as part of the indwelling mind's locus (with the vertebral column as its antitypic presence)—this wouldn't prove anything, because it would be proving too much: one could just as easily recall that there are other external paths by which to access the mind's activity so as to stimulate or inhibit it.

152 –The vertebral column is accordingly left behind, so to speak, and rightly so—the fact that the skull doesn't by itself encapsulate the organs of the mind being about as well construed here as are many other doctrines of this “natural philosophizing.” For all of this was precluded by the way the relation is conceived, with the skull accepted as the aspect constitutive of the needed enduring presence. Should it be on the other hand impermissible to call attention to how the matter is being conceived, experience

surely teaches that, while it's with the eye, as organ, that we see, it isn't with the skull that we murder, steal, write poetry, and so on.

153 –Use of the term 'organ' is thus to be avoided regarding the skull (whose significance has yet to be discussed). For even though it's commonly said that reasonable men pay attention not to the word but to the matter itself, this doesn't allow us to describe it in terms inappropriate to it; besides, incompetence of that sort is dishonest, imagining and pretending that it "just doesn't have the right word" while concealing that what it's in fact lacking is the matter itself—that is, the concept—since with it present in mind one would also have the right word. But here all that's been ascertained so far is that just as the brain is the living noggin, the skull is the *caput mortuum*.

154 It's in this dead being, then, that the mental processes [M220] and specific modulations of the brain would have to manifest their outward reality, even while still occurring properly within the individual himself. As for their relation to the skull (which, as a lifeless entity, doesn't have mind dwelling within it), what's initially proposed is an external mechanical relation of the sort established above, meaning that the organs proper, which are all within the brain, push the skull out a little here, and widen or flatten it a little there (or however one wishes to depict such things). Yet being itself a part of the organism, the skull must, like any other bone, be thought to contain a living, self-formative activity so that, from this perspective, it's instead the skull that presses on the brain from its side and fixes its outer boundary, something that it's better able to do since it is, after all, the harder of the two. But thereby the same relation would still obtain in ascertaining their reciprocal activity; for whether the skull is the determinant or what's determined, this would have no bearing at all as to there being a causal connection, save that the skull would then have been made the immediate organ of self-consciousness, since in it, as "cause," one would find the correlate that's self-related. However, since self-relatedness as instantiated in organic vitality is in fact equally present in both, any causal relation between them drops out of account.

155 –The formative development of both would then be connected in the inner and constitute an organic 'pre-established harmony' that would leave both correlates free with respect to each other, with each assigned its own form of embodiment—to which that of the other need not correspond; and this all the more so as regards the relation between form and quality (as for instance the form of the grape and the taste of the wine are mutually independent). But since being present to self is predicated of the brain's side of the relation, while being matter-of-factly present is attributed to that of the skull, a causal connection between them within the organic unity has to be established too, a necessary relation that interrelates them externally—that is, a relation that's itself external, whereby the physical form of each would be determined by the other.

156 As for a mode of determinacy that would have the organ of self-consciousness acting causally upon the contrasting aspect, one can, however, make all sorts [M221] of claims, since then the crux of the matter is the nature of the cause—one considered in the context of its indifferent physical presence (its shape and size), a cause whose inner functioning and self-relatedness should have precisely no bearing on that direct physical presence. The organic self-formation of the skull is, to begin with, indifferent to mechanical influence, and the relation between the organic relation and any mechanical relation—since an organic relation is a self-to-self relation—is indefinite and open ended. Moreover even if the brain were to incorporate mental variations within it in matter-of-fact [physical] variations, and exist as a plethora of internal organs that each occupy a different space—thus contradicting Nature, which gives the moments of conceptual being a presence all their own, relegating the fluid simplicity of organic life to the one aspect, and its articulation and distribution into distinct components to the other (so as to be grasped here as they should, showing up as particular anatomical entities)—even then it would be left unsettled whether a given psychic event would, depending on whether it was originally stronger or weaker, have to have in one instance a more “expanded” brain-organ, in the other a more “contracted” brain-organ, or the very reverse.

157 –The same applies to the question whether the development of the brain would enlarge or diminish the organ, make it bulkier and thicker, or thinner. Since it remains undetermined how the cause is constituted, it’s left equally undetermined how the effect is produced in the skull, be it by enlargement or narrowing and shrinkage. Should this influence be characterized more pretentiously as a “stimulus,” it would still be undecided whether this takes place by swelling (as via the action of a cantharides plaster), or by shriveling (as via the action of vinegar). Plausible reasons can be adduced for all such views, since the organic relation, which exerts its influence in any event, accommodates one as readily as another, and is unaffected by all such considerations.

158 But the manner of consciousness engaging in observation of this sort doesn’t purport to establish such a relation, since in any case the one correlate isn’t the brain as animal part but the brain as the matter-of-fact being of *self-conscious* [M222] individuality. Self-conscious individuality is present to itself and exists within itself both as an abiding character and in being spontaneously consciously active; this presence to and within itself contrasts with its active reality and presence to any other [that’s observing it]. Its presence to and within itself is both essence and subject, which in the brain has matter-of-fact being (one subsumed under that essence and subject) and attains the value that the brain does solely via its inherent relevance [to that essence and subject]. –Here, however, the other aspect of self-conscious individuality, that of its matter-of-fact presence, is so comprised as to exist both as a subject and an independent entity—that is, as a *thing*—namely a bone: “The reality and living presence of a human being

is his skull”—and *that* is just how the two correlates of this nexus are understood and interrelated in the consciousness observing them here.

159 Observation now needs to further specify how these correlates interrelate. While a skull may of course be vaguely suggestive of the mind's direct reality, the mind's multidimensionality gives its outer aspect a corresponding variety of meanings. What needs to be ascertained is the exact significance of each of the particular loci into which this presence is divided, not to mention how they come by such a significance in the first place.

160 The skull is an organ neither of action nor communication: we don't steal with it or kill anybody with it, nor does it in any way change its mien to match the deed so as to have its say in gesture. Nor does this sheerly matter-of-fact being merit consideration as a sign. Look, gesture, tone of voice (even a pillar or post on a desert island) at once bespeak something besides what they simply and directly *are*. They readily identify themselves as signs in that some characteristic within them points to something else not properly belonging to them. Of course all sorts of ideas can occur to us in connection with a skull, like those of Hamlet over Yorick's. But taken by itself the skull is such an impassive, unaffected thing that really there's nothing else to be directly seen in it or thought about it beyond the simple fact of its being a bone. It may well be reminiscent of the brain and its determinate aspect, or of other skulls differently shaped, but not of any conscious process, since no look or [M223] gesture is imprinted upon it, nor indeed anything that hints of its being the product of conscious activity—a skull being something real that supposedly demonstrates another whole aspect of individuality, one no longer consisting in internally reflected being but purely immediate, matter-of-fact being.

161 So while the skull isn't also itself sentient, it seems that perchance a more definite significance might still attach to it in that certain sensations, by virtue of their proximity to the skull, might enable us to ascertain some meaning conveyed by it. And insofar as a given mode of conscious mentation has its feeling in a specific area of the skull, something about this locus of the skull's structure might perhaps be suggestive of this mode and what's distinctive about it. Just as, for example, some people complain of painful tension here or there in their head whenever they think hard, or even when they think at all, so too could stealing, committing murder, writing poetry, and so on each be accompanied by its own sensation, which would surely have to be localized in its own special place as well. The area of the brain which would in this fashion be more affected and activated would probably also develop the area adjacent to the skull—or again, this particular area, prompted by sympathy or empathy, wouldn't remain inert but would enlarge or diminish, or in some way or other change shape.

162 –What makes this hypothesis improbable, however, is that by and large feeling is something nonspecific; a feeling occurring in the head (as the center of all feeling)

could take the form of a generalized malaise, so that mixed in with the thief's, murderer's, or poet's itch or ache in the head there would be other feelings as well. Such feelings would be no more amenable to being distinguished from one another, or from any that one can refer to as strictly corporeal, than a malady can be diagnosed from the single symptom 'headache' (were we to confine ourselves solely to corporeal implications).

163 In fact, whichever way one looks at it, no case can be made for a necessary reciprocal connection between skull shape and mental process, nor even for a hint of such a relation. If a connection of this sort is nonetheless alleged, a conceptually gratuitous 'pre-established harmony' between the character of both aspects is the only remaining alternative, and an inevitable one at that, inasmuch as [M224] one of them is supposed to be a mindless brute fact, a mere thing. Thus on one side of the relation we have a multitude of inert cranial loci and on the other a multitude of mental properties, the enumeration and characterization of which is contingent upon the current state of psychological investigation. The more impoverished one's notion of the mind, the easier becomes the task, partly because the mental attributes become fewer, and partly because they become more detached, rigid, ossified, and thus more akin to and comparable with the characteristics of bone. But though indeed the task is made easier by the poverty of the way in which the mind is represented, there's always a great deal left to do on both sides: observational consciousness is still saddled with the utter contingency of their relation. –If the children of Israel, who were likened in number to the sands of the seashore, were all to take unto themselves the grain of sand which stood for each, such a procedure would be no more haphazard and arbitrary than that of assigning to every faculty of the soul (to every passion and, as must also be considered here, to each nuance of character to which a more refined psychology and knowledge of human nature is wont to make reference) its own special area of the skull and its own special bone formation.

164 –Thus the skull of a murderer, instead of having this or that organ or sign, has this *bump*. Moreover he has a multitude of other properties and bumps—and hollows to go along with the bumps (one has, you see, a choice between bumps and hollows). Furthermore his murderous proclivity can be referred to any bump or hollow, and this in turn to any [mental] property whatsoever, since one who commits murder isn't reducible merely to the abstraction 'murderer,' nor does he have only one bump and one hollow. The observations forthcoming on this point must therefore sound just about as sensible as those made by the huckster and the housewife concerning rain at the annual fair and on washday. The pair of them could as well observe that it always rains when neighbor so-and-so goes by or when there's roast pork for dinner. Such circumstances have just about as much observable bearing on the rain as does a given skull formation on a given mental function. For of the two [M225] objects thus observed, one is a barren form of self-relatedness, a boneheaded mental property, while the other

is a barren form of self-inherency. Anything as bonelike as these is completely unaffected by anything else—it making no more difference to a prominent knot whether there's a murderer in the vicinity than it does to the murderer whether there's a flat patch nearby.

165 There's of course no denying the "possibility" that a bump at some place or other bears a relation to a particular mental property, passion, and so on. One can, after all, imagine the murderer having a prominent knot on his skull here, the thief one there. In this respect phrenology can be expanded even further; for while it seems initially to confine itself to linking a bump with a [mental] attribute in one and the same individual (with both thus belonging to him), "natural phrenology," which must have its niche as surely as "natural physiognomy," goes well beyond such confines. It doesn't just opine that a crafty fellow has a knot as big as your fist situated behind his ear, but envisions the possibility that, rather than the unfaithful wife herself, it is her spouse that has a bump on his forehead. Similarly, one can envision a man who's living under the same roof with the murderer, or maybe his neighbor, or, going further afield, perhaps one of his fellow citizens, as having a prominent bump on some part of the skull—just as one can imagine the flying cow that was caressed by the crab that was riding the donkey, and so on. Were possibility taken not in the sense of imaginary possibility but rather inner or conceptual possibility, then the present object, having the actual reality of a sheer thing, neither would nor could convey anything of the sort, and "can" do so only in imagination.

166 Should the observer, heedless of these "correlates" being mutually unrelated, persist in his efforts to establish connections between them—encouraged by the general rational principle that "the outer is an expression of the inner" and supported by analogy from the skulls of animals (whose character may very well be [M226] simpler than that of humans but is thus all the harder to define since it can't be so easy for just anyone to project himself into the nature of an animal)—he'll find his task of affirming the laws he's resolved to discover conveniently facilitated by a distinction that at this point is bound to occur to us too: The *being* of the mind can scarcely be construed as something utterly immobile and immovable. Man is free. Granted that his originative being consists merely in such propensities as those over which he largely holds sway, or that come to fruition only under more or less favorable circumstances; but this is to say that the mind's originative being is just as well conveyed in terms of something that *doesn't* exist in the manner of being per se at all.

167 –Accordingly, if the observed facts conflict with whatever somebody happens to have put forth as a law—should the weather turn out to be fine at the annual fair or on washday—then both huckster and housewife could still say that "really" it "should" be raining, and that at least there's a present tendency toward rain. So likewise in ob-

serving the skull: a given individual really “should” be what, according to such and such law, his skull proclaims him to be, and he has an “innate tendency” thereto, though it hasn’t developed yet: the given quality isn’t present, but “ought” to be. This possibility, that is, nonactuality, implicit in the law thus instituted—and so also the observations contradicting such a law—inevitably come into play because the freedom of the individual and the circumstances that unfold [as he acts] are indifferent to ‘being’ generally as well as to his innate inner and ossiform outer, and because he *can* be other than what originally he is internally, let alone what he is as a bone.

168 We’re thus presented with the possibility that a given bump or indentation on the skull may be as indicative of a mere propensity as it is of anything actual, indeed one so indeterminate as to [M227] be indicative of something nonactual. And with this we’re witness to what such a poor excuse [of a science] always comes to: it serves to undermine what it’s supposed to support. We see this conjectural opining led on by the nature of its subject matter to say, quite obviously, the very opposite of what it affirms—to say “this particular bone means . . . (whatever),” and in the same breath “. . . but then again it doesn’t.”

169 What hovers before this conjectural mentality throughout all its evasions is a realization that’s ruinous to its whole line of thought: that matter-of-fact being isn’t as such what mind truly is at all. Just as a tendency [or capacity] is an initial form of being that has no role in the mind’s activity, so in its own way is a bone. Any matter-of-fact entity that’s devoid of mental activity is for consciousness but a thing, something that’s hardly the essence of consciousness but sooner the very opposite; consciousness’s efficacy is evident to it solely by negating and nullifying such being.

170 –To pass off a bone as a conscious being’s actual presence must from this perspective be viewed as a complete renunciation of reason; and that is exactly what’s going on when a bone is regarded as the mind’s outer aspect—the ‘outer’ being just that, a matter-of-fact reality. It’s no help to say that the inference being drawn from outer to inner is something other than the above—that the outer isn’t the inner itself, but just an expression of it. For in the interrelation of the two, the distinctive characteristic of the inner aspect is ‘thinking’ and ‘being thought,’ whereas of the outer aspect it’s ‘matter-of-fact reality.’

171 –Thus if a man is told, “You in your inner being are the kind of person that you are *because* your skull is structured in such and such a way,” this means nothing other than, “I take this bone to be your reality.” While responding to such a judgment with a good box on the ear, as was suggested when faced with the kindred judgment made by the physiognomist, would perhaps serve to strip the softer parts of the head of their pride of place (thus proving that at least these aren’t true beings in themselves, i.e., aren’t what the mind really is), the appropriate retort here would involve one’s going

the length of bashing in the skull of the one making the judgment in order to demonstrate, in a manner as palpable as his knowledge, that to a human being a bone is in and of itself nothing, let alone his true reality. [M228]

172 The gut instinct of self-conscious reason is to reject this “skull-science” sight unseen—this other manifestation of reason’s observational instinct that, having developed some inkling as to what intelligence is, has nonetheless mindlessly grasped the outer as an expression of the inner. But as is sometimes the case, the worse the idea, the less conspicuous is that wherein exactly its defectiveness lies, and the harder it is to analyze. For an idea is said to be the worse, the sheerer and emptier the abstraction it deems essential. But the components of the contrast under consideration here are self-conscious individuality and an abstraction that’s been reified—transformed utterly into a thing—with the former, the inner being of the mind, grasped as a fixed and mindless entity just like the manner of being contrasted with it.

173 –But it would then also appear that observational reason has in fact culminated in an untenable position and has no recourse but to turn about, it being of itself directly imperative that anything so totally wretched reverse itself. –For instance, it can be said of the Jewish people that precisely because they stand at the very threshold of salvation they are and have been the most abject. What this people should be in and for itself, its quintessential self, isn’t what it is in its own eyes, but is rather what it projects *beyond* itself. Yet it’s precisely by virtue of an externalization of this sort that such a people creates for itself the possibility, provided that it be able to reclaim its [projected] object, of a higher existence than it would have attained had it remained within the immediacy of its being. For a spirit is all the greater, the greater the opposition from which it finds its way back to itself; but it can generate such a tension only by superseding the *immediate* unity it has [thus with its beyond] and abnegating what it thus is in its own eyes. When such a consciousness doesn’t reflect [out of that *immediacy*], the intermediateness in which it stands becomes for it cheerlessly empty, since what should fulfill it has turned instead into a fixed [unattainable] extreme. –Thus is this final stage of observational reason its very worst, necessitating a reversal in course.



174 An overview of the series of relationships thus far considered, comprising observation’s substantive content and object, shows that in its very first mode, the observation of nature’s inorganic relations, sensuous being was already vanishing from its view, with the moments [M229] of its way of relating showing themselves to be pure abstractions and simple conceptions that, while supposedly fettered to the transitory existence of things, each turn out to be a moment that exists in the way that pure process and universals do. Freely functioning and internally self-complete process such

as this retains the status of something objective yet by this point appears in the form of an integral unit. In nonorganic process the ‘unit’ is an inner that doesn’t exist; but process that does exist as an integral unit is what organicity is. –As a self-related being or negative entity, a unitary entity of this sort stands in contrast to the universal [i.e., life at large], distancing itself therefrom and remaining freely, self-relatedly present to itself; hence a conceptual entity of this sort, realized solely in this element of total individuation, doesn’t find anything in organic existence that’s genuinely expressive of it as the manner of universal that it is, instead finding there something that vis-à-vis it remains external—namely organic nature’s inner.

175 –Organic process is free only latently: an inner that’s still inner isn’t present to itself. In *purpose* presence-to-self comes into its own as free, existing as an entity of another sort: a self-conscious intelligence operating out of organic process. Observational reason accordingly turns its attention to this—to mind: conceptual being that exists in the manner of a universal, a telic entity existing as a telos, its object being henceforth its own proper essence.

176 While initially focusing on it purely by itself, since observational reason apprehends this object that’s spontaneously astir within its various permutations as a form of matter-of-fact being, such reasoning comes to think of it in terms of “laws of thought”—connections of one constant to another; yet since the content of these laws consists sheerly of moments [of a thinking self], they coalesce into the integral unit characteristic of self-conscious being. –This new object, taken likewise as a matter-of-fact being, is the individual self-conscious being in all his contingency; and so observation focuses on the [individual] mind as conjecture makes it out to be and on the contingent relation of conscious to nonconscious reality. Of itself the mind only latently necessitates any such relation; so observation takes a closer look at the body, and begins comparing the mind’s reality in willing and acting with its reality in reflecting and contemplating (however the latter is itself objectively exhibited). Although an externalization of the latter sort is indeed an individual’s way of communicating something he has in him, it’s also a sign—something indifferently related to the content it’s supposed to convey, just as whatever [M230] that sign sets forth is in turn indifferently related to *it*.

177 So observation ends up going from the vagaries of communication back to fixed being and, consistent with its way of conceiving, asserts that something external—not in the form of an organ, nor as speech and sign, but rather in the form of a lifeless thing—is the outer and directly present reality of mind. What was supposed to have been superseded by the very first observation of inorganic nature, namely the idea that conceptual being is present as a thing, is reinstated by this final mode of observation in a way that makes of the mind’s reality such reality as a thing has, or otherwise attributes to dead being the eminence proper to the mind.

178 –With this, observation has come around to openly expressing what our concept of the matter was to begin with, namely that reason’s certainty is in quest of itself in the form of an objective reality. There’s of course no intention here to characterize the mind, represented by the skull, as a thing; there isn’t supposed to be any so-called materialism lurking in this idea—the mind being instead still something other than a bone. But to say that the mind *is* means nothing if not that it’s a *thing*. When being as such—thinghood—is predicated of the mind, it’s then legitimate to say that the mind is something that exists just as bone is something that exists. Thus it has to be regarded as of paramount importance that what previously had all along been merely *said* of the mind—that it *is*—has now finally found its true articulation. Whenever it’s said of the mind that it exists—has some sort of being, is a thing, an individual reality—this isn’t really intended to *mean* that it’s something we can see or take in our hands or strike, or the like. But that’s what is *said*. And so what’s really being articulated is tantamount to the assertion that “the being of the mind is a bone.”

179 This conclusion has a dual import, first of all in that, inasmuch as it rounds out the preceding dynamic—that of self-consciousness—it’s the true result thereof. The unhappy self-consciousness divested itself of its independence and wrung its presence-to-self out of itself in the form of a thing. In so doing it reverted from self-consciousness to consciousness, a mode of awareness the object of which consists of ‘being’—a thing—although the thing here at issue is self-consciousness, existing thus as a unity of the I and [M231] being; the category. With its object definitively present to it thus, consciousness is in possession of reason. Consciousness, like self-consciousness, is actually latent reason, although only when its object is definitively evident to it as categorical can consciousness be said to be in possession of reason—which is still a long way from having knowledge of what reason entails.

180 –The category, an immediate unity of ‘being’ and ‘what is one’s own,’ must permeate both these forms [of its presence], and it is precisely to observational consciousness that the category is present in the form of being. In so concluding, consciousness is as much as asserting something that it is unconsciously certain of [all along], a proposition implicit in the way reason conceptualizes: the infinite judgment that *the self is a thing*, a judgment that sublates itself. –Via this result the category is thus also definitively ascertained as being self-sublatively tensive. The “pure” category, which for consciousness exists in the form of being or immediacy, is an object that’s as yet unmediated—one that’s just matter-of-factly there—with consciousness then functioning in a similarly unmediated way. The thrust of this infinite judgment is that immediacy makes the transition into mediation or negativity. While an object present in this way is accordingly specified as a form of negativity, consciousness, by contrast, is specified as a form of self-consciousness—which is to say that the category, having in the course of the above observations traversed the [permutations of] form proper to *being*, is now established in the form of presence-to-self. Consciousness no longer

seeks in whatever is directly present to *find* itself, but to create itself via its own activity. It itself is the purpose of what it does, whereas in observing it was concerned only with things.

181 The other import of the above conclusion is the already examined outcome of nonconceptual observation. Such consciousness doesn't know of any way of grasping and expressing itself other than to assert outright that the reality of self-consciousness is a bone, something found to exist as a sensuous thing that doesn't at the same time lose its objectivity for consciousness. But it isn't at all clear about what it's asserting here and doesn't grasp its own proposition in the specific context of *its* subject, *its* predicate, and their relation [M232]—let alone comprehend this in the sense of an infinite, self-sublating judgment and concept. Rather does it (operating from some lower-level self-conscious mentation, here in the guise of naïve ingenuousness) manage to conceal from itself the outrageousness of this crude, nonconceptual way of thinking that takes a bone to be the reality of self-consciousness, thoughtlessly interposing a bunch of relations (cause and effect, sign, organ, etc.) that make no sense at all here, and camouflaging the garishness of the proposition with distinctions derived from such relations.

182 Brain fibers and the like, when regarded as the mind's very being, have an imagined, merely hypothetical actuality, not actuality that's matter-of-factly present—that is felt, is seen, is truly real; and when they *are* present, when they *are* seen, such lifeless objects no longer pass for the being of the mind. Still, to be genuine, objectivity has to be direct and sensuous, meaning that in the objective realm the mind is materialized in the form of something lifeless (bone being about as lifeless as anything there is in animate being).

183 –The operative concept of this manner of representation is that reason regards itself as being “all thinghood,” even purely objective things, despite its being such only conceptually—its conceptual nature alone being the truth of it. And the purer the concept the sillier is the representation into which it degenerates when its content is representational rather than conceptual, that is, when the self-sublating judgment isn't apprehended in full consciousness of its infinity but is taken as a definitive proposition whose subject and predicate are independently valid—self fixated as self, thing as thing—even while each is supposed to be the other.

184 –Reason (in essence conception) as present in its immediacy is divided into itself and whatever is its opposite—an opposition that is for that very reason instantly being superseded. But when presented thus as itself and its opposite, with both held fast in the moment in which they're each wholly singularized and functioning separately, then reason is being apprehended irrationally. The more clearly drawn the moments of this separation are, the cruder is the appearance of the content, which either exists solely in the mentality drawing them thus or is expressed by it all too uninhibitedly.

185 –The depth that the mind brings forth from within but leaves only at the level of [M233] representational consciousness, paired with the witlessness of this consciousness with respect to what it is saying, together form a nexus of high and low like that which nature naïvely expresses when in a living being the organ of nature's highest fulfillment, that of generation, is combined with the organ of urination. While the above infinite judgment would, as infinite, be life's culmination—its comprehending itself—a consciousness that, even though cognizant of this infinite judgment, nonetheless remains at the level of representation, is functioning on a par with pissing.



V.B. THE SELF-ACTUALIZATION OF RATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

186 Self-consciousness found that things exist as it itself does, and that it exists as a thing; that is, it's now evident to it that in principle it is something objectively real. It's no longer immediately certain of being all reality, but *is* certain that all manner of immediacy has the form of something sublated—immediate objectivity still being regarded as a mere surface exterior the inner and essence of which is self-consciousness itself.

187 –The object to which self-consciousness is now positively oriented is thus a form of self-conscious being. An object of this sort exists in the form of thinghood, that is to say, independently; but self-consciousness is certain that this independent object isn't anything alien to it—hence realizes that it is in principle recognized by that object. Self-consciousness is *spirit*, which amidst the dualization of its self-conscious being and the independence of both [it and its object], is certain of its unity with itself. This certainty needs now to be verified for it: what it regards itself to be both in principle and in its inner certainty should be entering into its consciousness and becoming evident to it.

188 By drawing a parallel with the preceding course of experience we're afforded a rough indication of what the basic stages of this realization will be. Just as the progression of consciousness through sense-certainty, perception, and understanding was repeated by observational reason in the element of the category, so also will reason retrace the twofold progression of [M234] self-consciousness, passing from independence into its freedom. Active reason is first aware of itself solely as the reason of a given individual, and as such must create and lay claim to his actual reality in what's other than him; but inasmuch as he thus consciously attains to universality, he comes to epitomize reason at large, and is conscious of himself as reason—being already recognized as an individual who unifies all self-consciousness in his pure consciousness.

This manner of individual is a simplex noetic entity that, in coming to this awareness, is the real substance into which the preceding forms [of consciousness] return as into what they fundamentally are—they being, vis-à-vis this substance, but single moments of its emergence, moments that, even as they split off on their own and appear as separate permutations, in fact have existence and reality solely as sustained by it, having such truth as they do only so far as they are and remain within it.

189 Were we to entertain this ultimate aim, the concept already before us—namely that of a self-conscious being who is recognized and certain of himself in another free self-conscious being, and has his truth precisely therein—in such reality as it has at this juncture, or were we to project ahead what this as yet inner spirit will amount to once present in substantialized form, [either way] what would be disclosed conceptually is an *ethical realm*. For ethical substance is nothing other than the wholly spiritual unity of essence that individuals have in their actual independent reality: a manner of self-conscious being who is inherently oriented to the universal, taking himself to so have reality in another conscious being that he is mindful of his unity with that other even while deeming the latter to be (as a thing) completely independent. And only in such a unity with this objectively existent entity is he a self-conscious being of this sort. Considered abstractly, as a generality, ethical substance is but theoretical law. Yet it is every bit as much a form of self-conscious being that's directly and actually present: an ethos. Conversely, an individual conscious being such as this exists matter-of-factly as the one who he is solely in that he in his individuality is aware that this universally shared consciousness is his being—that his action and existence is part and parcel of the ethos at large.

190 It's in the life of a people that the conceptual being [M235] integral to self-conscious reason's actualization—namely my seeing in the independence of others my complete unity with them, my having found in their free thinghood (something negatively complementary to myself) my own objective presence to myself—is in fact fully a reality. Reason is here present as a fluid all-pervasive substance, an abiding simplex thinghood bursting forth from many completely autonomous beings much as starlight explodes from countless self-luminous points: entities that in their absolute self-relatedness not only exist in themselves but are present to themselves as dissolved within this simplex independent substance. They realize both that they're individual, independent entities in that they themselves contribute their individuality, and that this universal substance is their very soul and essence—just as the universal substance in turn is their achievement as individuals, what they themselves have wrought.

191 What an individual does and strives to do at the purely individual level relates to his needs as a natural being, an entity existing as a single individual. Even these his most ordinary functions, rather than reducing to insignificance, have their place in ethical reality via the universal sustaining medium: the might of the entire people. But

in the universal substance the individual doesn't just have the overall sustaining form of his action, but equally its substantive content: whatever he does is the general capacity and ethos of all. In being thus completely individualized, a content such as this actually interlocks with the action of all. The individual's labors in meeting his needs are just as much a way of satisfying the needs of others as of satisfying his; and it's only via the labors of others that he manages to satisfy his. Just as the individual immersed in his solitary labors is already unwittingly performing a societal task, so also does he make the performance of the general task his conscious object: the whole as whole becomes *his* work for which he sacrifices himself and precisely thereby receives himself back from it.

192 –There's nothing that would be nonreciprocal here, nothing whereby the individual's independence, in having its self-relatedness dispersed within that which is negative of it, wouldn't be providing itself with a positive [M236] sense of its existing for itself. While this unity consisting in existence for others (making a thing of one-self) and existence for oneself—this universal substance—speaks in the customs and laws of a people a language common to all, this steadfastly abiding essence is nothing if not an expression of singular individuality itself, the seeming antithesis of such unity. The laws express what each single individual is and does: what he sees in them isn't just a generic objective thinghood, but equally himself therein—seeing it to be individuated in him and each of his fellow citizens. So while in the spirit common to all each individual is certain just of himself (finding in matter-of-fact reality nothing other than himself), he's as certain of others as of himself. –I see in everyone that each takes himself to be an autonomous entity just as am I: I see their free unity with others to be such that, just as this unity exists by means of me, so also does it exist by means of them. I see them as me, myself as them.

193 It's thus among a free people that reason is truly realized. There it is present as a vibrant spirit in which the individual not only finds his destiny—his essence, both universal and individual—fully articulated and present to him in the same way that thinghood is, but finds that he is himself this essence—and moreover has attained his destiny. This is why the wisest men of antiquity said that wisdom and virtue consist in living in accordance with the customs and mores of one's people.

194 But self-consciousness is such that it either finds that it has outgrown this happy state of living in accord with a destiny already attained—or else (since initially it is spirit only in immediate form and in keeping with its way of conceiving) that it hasn't yet attained that state; for either could be said of it equally well.

195 Reason *has* to go beyond this happy state, since the life of a free people constitutes an *actual ethos-based reality* only self-containedly, that is, in its immediacy—which is to say that such a reality exists matter-of-factly and hence, even as a spirit common to all, is itself a single entity; the entire body of laws and mores comprises a “definitive”

ethical substance that extricates itself from its self-containedness only in a higher moment, namely in being conscious of that substance's essential nature. And only in such cognizance [M237]—not in what it matter-of-factly is in its immediacy—does ethical substance have its ultimate truth. While existing in this immediate, matter-of-fact way is for ethical substance constraining enough, for spirit to exist in this form, as matter-of-fact being, would be utterly stifling.

196 Thus an individual conscious being having the whole compass of his existence directly within actual ethical reality, among his people, has genuine trust in them; he has no experience of spirit disintegrating into its abstract constituents, and hence knows nothing of himself as a solitary being existing sheerly for himself. Yet once this consideration has dawned on him, as it must, his immediate oneness with this spirit, the being he has within it—his trust and confidence—is lost: being thus isolated and on his own, he now takes himself rather than the communal spirit to be what's essential. While self-consciousness's solitary individuality is indeed an integral moment of the general spirit itself, this is so only infinitesimally—breaking away right within that spirit immediately upon becoming present to itself, welling up in consciousness as sheer self-confidence. Once the individual, as an integral moment [of the general spirit and hence] of something indispensably essential—each of whose moments must prove to be likewise indispensable—has firmly set upon *his* course, he finds himself at odds with [the general spirit's] laws and mores: to him these epitomize a way of thinking that's by no means indispensable, is abstractly theoretical and unrealistic—whereas he, as this I, is the living truth.

197 On the other hand, self-consciousness may not as yet have attained this happy state of existing as ethical substance, the spirit of a people. For a spirit coming away from observational pursuits has yet to actualize itself as an ethical substance; such a spirit is only set forth as an inner essence, an abstraction. –In other words spirit exists at first only immediately, but therein exists individualistically: a practical-minded being who strides into a world he finds already there before him, intent upon duplicating himself specifically as single individual—creating himself as *this* individual, as his own existential antitype, and coming to see that his actual reality and the essence being objectified are one and the same. He's *certain* of this oneness, taking it for granted that such a unity, his harmony with thinghood, is already at hand, having merely to be made evident by him—which is to say that he's as much finding this unity as creating it. And inasmuch as it's precisely this unity that we know as happiness, the [M238] individual's own spirit launches him upon the world in pursuit of it.

198 Thus while for us the truth of rational self-consciousness is ethical substance, the self-conscious being here under consideration is only just now beginning to experience his world in an ethical light. –From the perspective of a self-conscious being who hasn't yet had this experience, the present dynamic impels him toward it, and what

ends up superseded in the course of it are moments that matter to him one at a time. These take the form of some immediate urge or natural impulse whose very satisfaction provides the content of a new impulse. –From the perspective of a self-conscious being whose contentment within the ethical substance is now lost to him, these same natural impulses dovetail with a conviction that their purpose is what's truly destined and essential, ethical substance being then reduced to a self-impooverished predicate whose actual living subjects have to realize their universality individually on their own and provide for their destiny out of their own inner resources.

199 –The import of the former perspective is accordingly that the above permutations [of natural impulsion] are the wherewithal of ethical substance's emergence, and hence precede it; in the latter they come in its wake and open up for self-consciousness a destiny yet to be. In the former, the immediacy and crudity of such impulses disappear in the process of experiencing what these in truth are, and their substantive content evolves into something higher; in the latter what eventually passes into a higher form is the deluded thinking of a consciousness that would invest everything in just such impulses. In the former, the goal that these attain is immediate ethical substance itself; in the latter the goal is awareness of what such substance is, indeed awareness of its being self-consciousness's own essence—and to that extent would be tantamount to the first emergence of morality, a more advanced embodiment [of spirit] than ethical substance. Yet both embodiments together make up only one aspect of morality's genesis—namely the one concerned with self-orientedness, in which consciousness is promoting its own purposes—not the one in which morality issues forth from within that substance itself. Since thus far neither moment could be construed as having been turned into something at cross-purposes with a lost ethical order, they're of course accepted here in accordance with their straightforward content—the end toward which they press being ethical substance. But since our era approximates more to the form in which these moments appear after consciousness has [M239] lost ethical vitality and, in search of it, revisits these forms, they might be portrayed more appropriately along the lines of the latter of the two.

200 Self-consciousness, which is really only spirit's own conceptual being, ventures forth convinced that it, as individual spirit, is what's essential; it accordingly aims at actualizing and, in so doing, enjoying itself as individual.

201 A self-conscious being who's determined to be an entity existing for himself is negatively oriented toward what's other than him; thus in his own mind he, a positive reality, enters into opposition with something that does indeed “exist,” but not in the sense of having existence in its own right in relation to him. Such a consciousness thus appears divided into a reality it finds already there before it and a purpose it achieves by sublating that reality and actualizing its design in its stead.

202 –His primary purpose, however, is direct, abstract “existence for self,” in other words to see himself as *this* individual in some other consciousness, or see another self-conscious being as [an extension of] himself. Experiencing what such a purpose amounts to in truth issues in an escalation of self-consciousness, and henceforth such a being regards himself as an end only so far as he embodies a universal purpose while also embodying the law directly within his own person. But as he executes this “law of his own heart,” he learns that an individual entity cannot sustain itself, but rather that the good can be realized only by the sacrifice of the individual and by his attaining to “virtue.” And the experience of virtue in turn can only be that one’s purpose is in principle already attained, that one’s happiness is to be found directly in action itself, and that it’s in action that the good consists.

203 –The concept animating this whole sphere, namely that thinghood is spirit’s very presence-to-self, becomes evident to self-consciousness in its course. Having discovered this concept, it accordingly deems reality to consist in an immediate, self-expressive individuality that no longer meets with any resistance from an opposing reality—the sole object and purpose being then self-expression. [M240]



V.B.a. PLEASURE AND NECESSITY

204 While a self-conscious being who basically equates himself with reality has his object integrally within him, this is initially evident only in his own mind, not yet matter-of-factly so: ‘being’ per se stands over against him as an actuality other than he, and he sets out to see to it that he too exists as an independent entity by fully achieving such existence-for-self. The primary objective is to see himself as an individual realized in another self-conscious being—that is, to turn the other into [an extension of] himself; and he’s certain that in principle this other is this already.

205 –Once a self-conscious being has ventured beyond the staid substance of his ethos and roused himself from idly reflective existence so as to exist for himself, the rule of custom and common life, the findings garnered by observation, and the achievements of theoretical inquiry all recede behind him like gray and fading shadows; for the presence-to-self and reality that such knowledge affords scarcely befits this manner of self-consciousness. What drives him isn’t the seemingly godlike spirit of intellectual and practical universality within which personal feelings and pleasures are quelled, but an earthy spirit that holds individual conscious experience to be the only true reality:

Heedless of science and common sense
 Paramount gifts of humankind,
 He's cast his lot with the devil
 And cannot but end in ruin.²

206 And so he plunges into life, realizing the radical individuality in which he first appears on the scene. He's not so much creating his fortune as snatching it up for the enjoying. The shadowy vestiges of science, law, and principle, the only things standing between him and *his* reality, vanish from his mind as concerns too dull and nebulous to rival the certainty he has of his own reality. He lays hold of life as though it were ripe fruit that halfway meets the hand that picks it.

207 Only in one respect is his action characteristic of desire. He isn't seeking the destruction of the objective entity [M241] in its entirety, but only its form—its otherness, its existing independently—which to him is an insubstantial semblance in that he deems it as in principle one and the same entity as himself, that is, part of his selfhood. The element in which desire and its object subsist indifferently and independently of one another is that of living existence—which, so far as it turns into an object of desire, gets sublated as desire is gratified. Here, however, the element sustaining the separate reality of desire and its object is instead a category, which is essentially an entity that has been projected onto reality; it's thus his sense of being independent that sustains each individual separately on his own, whether this be a natural awareness or one refined into a system of laws.

208 –In principle this sense of separateness doesn't exist for a self-conscious being who knows others to be part of his own personal selfhood. He thus has the pleasure of consciously experiencing his realization in an ostensibly independent conscious being—getting to behold this unity of two autonomous self-conscious beings. He attains his purpose; yet in so doing he experiences what the truth of it is. He conceives of himself as “this unique individual existing for himself.” But the very process of actualizing this purpose defeats it, since a self-conscious being objectifies himself not as this isolated individual but rather as a union between himself and another self-conscious being—hence as one whose individuality has been superseded, existing in the manner of a universal.

209 While indulging in such pleasure undoubtedly gives positive indication that he's “come into his own” as an objective self-conscious being, it's also negatively indicative of his having sublated himself; and since he conceived of his self-realization solely in terms of its positive aspect, what he experiences impinges upon his consciousness as

2. Goethe, *Faust* (freely adapted).

an out-and-out contradiction. He sees that the reality to which he has single-handedly attained is being undone by a negative entity the “unreality” of which stands in stark contrast to him—while nonetheless having the power to consume him. The specter here confronting him is none other than the conceptual being integral to what this manner of individuality inherently is.

210 –Individuality of this sort is as yet the poorest embodiment of self-actualizing spirit, since in thinking of itself sheerly as an abstraction of reason—an immediacy consisting in the unity of what it is for itself and what it is inherently—it effectively reduces its essence to an [M242] abstract category. On the other hand, individuality no longer has here the form of simple immediate being as it did for observational consciousness, where it consisted of abstract ‘being’ or (set forth as an extraneous element) ‘thinghood’ generally. Here self-relatedness and mediation have found their way into this [the individual’s own] thinghood. What this thinghood is thus demonstrating is a cycle encompassing the fully evolved pure interrelation of the simplex modalities of essence. Hence all that such individuality has succeeded in doing in its effort to actualize itself is to widen the circle of abstractions played out within the confines of its simple self-consciousness, projecting this out into the element of its presence to itself, the element of objective extension.

211 –What a self-conscious being sees objectified as his essential nature when indulging in pleasure of this kind is accordingly the progressive unfolding of the above contentless modalities of essence: sheer oneness, sheer diversity, and their interrelation. Beyond this the object that the individual experiences as his essence has no substantive content, and is simply what’s referred to as ‘necessity,’ since necessity, fate, and so on is that about which one can’t tell what it’s doing, what are its specific laws and positive content—consisting as it does in sheer unqualified *conception* itself as seen in the form of *being*, a simple and featureless, yet irresistible and imperturbable interrelating whose sole accomplishment is the nullification of individuality.

212 –Such an interconnection binds indissolubly because what’s interconnecting here are these sheer modalities of essence, these empty abstractions. Oneness, diversity, and interrelatedness are categories each of which in and of itself is nothing—except in connection with its counterparts—for this reason being inseparable from them. They are interrelated via their own conceptual nature, since they consist of pure conceptual being itself—the total interconnectedness and abstract dynamism that comprises necessity. Thus, instead of having discarded dead theory and flung himself headlong into life, the solitary individual who starts out in possession of no substantive content save reason’s pure conceptualizing has sooner flung himself into the realization of his own mortality, finding empty alien necessity, an actuality devoid of life, to be his fated lot.

213 The progression is from the form of the one to that of the universal, from one utter abstraction to [M243] another—from the purposive design of a being who exists

purely for himself, and has thrown off all communal ties with others, to his utter nemesis, hence to a self-inherency [necessity] whose existence is every bit as abstract as is his. With this it's clear that the individual has gone to ruin, his individualistic hard-boiled obstinacy having been pulverized on a reality that's quite as hard as his yet unrelentingly actual.

214 –As a conscious being he's a unity of self and nonself, and so is witness to even this his undoing—his purpose and its actualization, along with the contradiction between what he took to be his essence and what this turned out to be inherently. He experiences the ambiguity implicit in his act of “taking life”: in having taken life he embraced death.

215 That his vibrant being turns into lifeless necessity is to him, then, an utterly unexpected reversal. Whatever could reconcile this would have to involve something in which both aspects [of the transition] would be one, with consciousness experiencing the one moment in the other—its purpose and action in fate, its fate in its purpose and action, and its own essence in whatever is thus necessitated. Yet to such a mentality it's precisely this unity of aim and action—the simple singular feel of it—that provides the pleasure, whereas the transition from the purposive moment to that of the true essence is a sheer leap into pleasure's antithesis. And indeed these moments are *not* contained and interlinked within feeling, but only in something that's purely self, something that's universal—namely in thinking.

216 –Thus in the very experience in which its true reality should have become evident to it, this consciousness has instead become a riddle to itself—the consequences of its deeds seeming not to have been brought on by it itself. It doesn't experience what's happening to it as integral to what it inherently is: the transition isn't just a metamorphosis in one and the same nature and experiential content, first as what it imagines its conscious experience and nature to involve, and then as the objectified, directly beheld essence of it itself. In this way abstract necessity is regarded in sheerly negative terms, as the inscrutable power of universality in which Individuality ends up being dashed to pieces.

217 This is the extent of what this manner of self-consciousness brings to light—in the final moment of its existence [M244] thinking itself lost in necessity, or thinking of itself as an utterly alien form of being. Nonetheless self-consciousness has in principle survived the loss, since necessity of this sort—pure universality—is its proper essence: the consciousness reflecting thus into itself, realizing necessity to be its very self, embodies a new form of self-consciousness.



V.B.b. THE LAW OF THE HEART AND ARROGANCE RUN AMOK

218 What necessity truly consists of in self-consciousness is what it is for this new permutation in which self-consciousness takes itself to be what's doing the necessitating: it has direct knowledge that the universal, the law, is contained within it—a law that, being thus directly integral to consciousness's self-orientedness, is here called the "law of the heart." This form of self-consciousness, as with the preceding, takes itself as singular individual to be what's essential; yet it's the richer in that it deems self-orientedness such as this to hold true necessarily, that is, for everyone.

219 This law that's directly its own—the law integral to such a "heart"—is the purpose that this self-consciousness sets out to actualize. Still to be seen is whether what it manages to actualize will correspond with what it has thus conceived, and whether what it does actualize will turn out for it to be law as an established entity.

220 In contrast to such a heart stands actual reality; for at first this law exists all by itself within the heart, isn't yet actualized, and so also is something other than what it [as a law] is conceived to be. The other realm, actual reality, is accordingly characterized as something counter to what is to be actualized, hence something contrary to law and singular individuality. Thus on the one hand the actual realm embodies a law by which personal individuality ends up oppressed, a brutal world-order contradicting the law of the heart, while on the other hand humanity is suffering under the yoke of that world-order, subjected to an alien necessity instead of following the law of its heart.

221 –The reality appearing opposite consciousness in its present permutation is clearly none other than that of the preceding cloven relation of individuality [M245] and its truth, a relation in which individuality ends up overwhelmed by cruel necessity. To us it's thus evident that the preceding dynamic contrasts with that of self-consciousness's present form in that the latter essentially arose from it—the moment from which a given form derives being thus necessary to that form. Yet to the latter this cloven relation seems to be one that it "just finds itself in"; being quite unaware of its source, such individuality considers it crucial that it exist for itself, negating any such positive realm existing unto *itself*.

222 Individuality of this sort is accordingly bent upon sublating the necessity contradicting the law of the heart, as well as putting an end to the suffering that comes in its wake. This is no longer a frivolous individualism such as was encountered in the preceding form of consciousness (intent merely upon its own personal pleasure), but is a serious-minded pursuit of a high purpose—seeking pleasure in demonstrating the excellence of its own being and bringing about the welfare of humankind. What such individuality is actualizing is this very law, with its pleasure being then what all hearts

have in common. In its view the two aren't separate: its pleasure lies in lawfulness, and actualizing the law of humanity at large is what affords it personal pleasure. For in individuality of this sort, individuality and necessity are directly one: The law *is* the law of the heart. Here individuality hasn't as yet budged from its individualistic stance, and the unity between it and law hasn't been achieved as yet via the mediative interaction of both, a process that would subject it to discipline. What here passes for a display of excellence and philanthropic accomplishment is the actuation of a coarse, unmannerly character in all its immediacy.

223 The law counter to the law of the heart, by contrast, exists freely on its own apart from the heart. Rather than abiding in blissful union with the law of the heart, humanity at large, being subject to this other law, either lives in cruel discord and suffering, or at the very least is deprived of any personal enjoyment in obeying the law—not to mention any sense of personal superiority in overstepping it. Because the divine and human order is separate from the heart, the latter considers that order an illusion, something that ought to lose the power [M246] and actuality that's still associated with it. While its substantive content may perchance be in accord with the law of the heart (in which case the heart may find it acceptable), it isn't sheer conformity as such to law that the heart deems indispensable, but rather that, in so conforming, the heart remain consciously focused upon itself and be self-satisfied. Yet wherever the substantive content of what's thus ubiquitously necessary isn't in concordance with the heart, then that necessity is in principle substantively void and must needs give way to the law of the heart.

224 So the individual goes about enacting the law of his heart; it becomes a general ordinance and the pleasure thus afforded an inherently legitimated practical reality. Yet in being actualized thus, the law has in fact eluded him, turning directly into the [cloven] relation that was supposed to have been superseded. Precisely in being actualized, the law of the heart ceases to be the law of a *heart*. For thus it becomes a form of 'the way things are,' existing then as a potency holding sway generally as well as indifferently to *this* heart—meaning that the individual, in the act of instituting his own order, finds that order to be no longer his. By actualizing his law he doesn't establish *his* law but entangles himself in the actual order, which, as something that's "his" only in principle, is alien to him—and not just alien, but actively hostile and overbearing.

225 –By his act he puts himself into the element of matter-of-fact reality at large—or rather as its ubiquitous component element—and his action is supposed, as he intends it, to have the force of a general ordinance. Having thereby freed himself from his [solitary] self, he issues forth—waxing as a universality unto himself and purging himself of insular individuality. But then an individual who recognizes universality solely in the form of his immediate presence to himself doesn't recognize himself in this independently existent universality, even while being implicated in it in that it's some-

thing he himself has wrought. Since it's supposed to be an act of *his* solitary heart—not that of reality at large independent of him—such action has an ironic implication: it *contradicts* his universal order. And while it's intended to establish him as a real being that's independent of reality, it's a de facto recognition of the universal order, an acknowledgment that *that* reality is essential to him. [M247]

226 Conceiving of his deed in the way that he does, the individual more precisely determines the way in which the practical universality he's involved in turns against him. While his deed, as a practical reality, appertains to something common to all, its substantive content is his own individuality, which is bent upon sustaining itself as 'this singular individuality' vis-à-vis any such thing in common. The point here isn't that he's setting up some sort of private or personal law, but rather that the individual heart's direct oneness with the universal consists in its supposedly valid and legitimating notion that, for anything to be law, each heart has to recognize itself in it. But all that an individual's heart establishes via his deed is his heart's reality, which to him is expressive of his existing for himself or his pleasure. His deed is supposed, in all its immediacy, to have the validity of something universal, meaning that really it's something particular that has but the form of a universal—while its particular content is supposed, in all its particularity, to count as universal.

227 –Others, accordingly, don't find the law of their own hearts fulfilled here, but rather the law of somebody else's heart; and precisely in keeping with the universal law (namely that each should be finding his heart in the law) they turn against the reality that he's put forth, just as he'd turned against theirs. So whereas the individual initially encountered a law that was merely inflexible, he now finds the very hearts of men abhorring and opposing his most admirable intentions.

228 –Because this manner of consciousness at first knows universality only in immediate form, and necessity only as that of the heart, it's unfamiliar with the nature of practical action and efficacy. In its true reality, matter-of-fact actualization is inherently constitutive of a universal in which consciousness's singular individuality, having committed itself to such action in order to be *this* individual just as he is, is sooner engulfed. Instead of securing *his* being, his consciousness finds itself immersed in being from which it is estranged. –However, this same realm in which it recognizes nothing of itself isn't a lifeless necessity anymore but rather one everywhere teeming with individuality. Whereas it had previously regarded the divine and human order it found in force to be an effete reality in which neither it (a heart existing intransigently for itself vis-à-vis the general run) nor those who are part of [M248] that reality had any real awareness of themselves, it now finds this order to be pulsating with the consciousness of everyone: a law for all hearts. Even as the heart is enacting its own law, it's in fact experiencing reality as an order that has a life of *its* own—which is to say nothing but that individuality objectifies itself as a universal, albeit one in which it doesn't recognize itself.

229 The truth that this mode of self-consciousness sees emerging from within its experience thus contradicts what it takes itself to be. Yet even what it takes itself to be has for it the form of something that is utterly generic: the law of the heart that's directly one with this self-consciousness. Moreover this vibrant prevailing order is both this self-consciousness's own creation (indeed all that it produces) and something integral to its essence, being to the same extent in direct union with it. Self-consciousness is in this way a constituent of an entity that's doubly at odds with itself, internally discordant and deeply unhinged. While the law of *his* heart is the only one in which such a being recognizes himself, as he enacts this law he finds that the all-prevailing order has thereby become integral to his own essence and his own reality. What's self-contradictory in his thinking is then confronting him both in the form of an [all-pervasive objective] entity and his own actual reality.

230 In speaking openly about this turn of events that spells his self-conscious undoing (and hereby the result of his experience) he shows that he's internally at odds with himself in the manner of a deranged consciousness that literally takes its own nature to be unnatural, its actual reality unreal. Derangement of this sort can't be reckoned as basically involving something insubstantial being construed as substantial, something unreal as real—which would have what's substantial or real for one individual not be so for another, and would leave the consciousness taking it to be real or substantial wholly out of touch with anyone who's aware that it's unreal or insubstantial. If something is in fact real and essential for consciousness at large yet not for me, then amidst my awareness of its nullity I, in being an instance of [M249] consciousness at large, am also aware of its reality; and when both [its unreality and its reality] are fixedly adhered to, the resultant unity is altogether delusory. Nonetheless in this manner of delusion, only an "object" envisioned by consciousness is deranged, not consciousness as such in and relative to itself. –In the experiential culmination reached here, consciousness, abiding within its own law, is aware that it is itself an actuality of this sort. And since this same entity, this very actuality, is moreover estranged from it, it is self-consciously aware of its being—in what's undoubtedly its reality—unrealistic, taking both sides in all their contradictoriness to be directly constitutive of its essence, which is then deranged to the core.

231 Thus do such heart-throbs for the welfare of humankind pass into the rage of a deranged arrogance, a state of fury in which consciousness struggles to preserve itself from destruction by projecting out from within itself the very perversity that it itself epitomizes, while doing its utmost to see and proclaim this to be something other than itself. Accordingly it declares the all-prevailing order to be an utter perversion of the law of the heart and its happiness: a perversion devised by fanatical priests, by depraved despots, and by their minions who seek to compensate for their own degradation by degrading and oppressing others in turn—a perverse order manipulated to the unspeakable misery of a humanity mired in deception.

232 –In its derangement this mentality declares that what’s maddening and perverted is individuality, albeit one that’s “alien” and “adventitious.” But actually it’s the heart itself (the singularity of a consciousness that would be universal in its very guilelessness) that’s maddening and perverted; and all that its action brings about is the emergence of this contradiction in consciousness. For what the heart considers true is the law of the heart: sheer intent which, unlike the prevailing order, doesn’t last out the passing day, but goes the way of things ephemeral. This, *its* law, is supposed to be actual; while thus regarded by the heart as an actual reality and a legitimate order—as end and essence—this same reality, this “legitimate order,” is also deemed by it as null and void.

233 –Even while deeming its own reality (the heart itself as the singular individuality [M250] of a conscious being) to be its essence, it nonetheless regards the assertion of that individuality in the realm of matter-of-fact being to be its purpose—forthwith construing its essential nature to be instead its self as nonindividual, a purpose achieved in the form of a law—hence a form of universality, as its consciousness itself sees. It objectifies its conception via action, but then experiences its self as something unreal, with unreality being its actual reality. And so instead of some “adventitious and alien” form of individuality, it’s this very heart that is in every respect internally perverted and perverting.

234 Yet because individuality, when universalized in its immediacy, is perverted and perverting, a universal order such as this—as the law of all *hearts* (they being what’s perverse)—is itself in principle equally perverted, just as this raging madness had claimed. On the other hand, due to the resistance that the law of any one heart encounters in other individual hearts, this order does prove to be a *law* of all hearts. The body of established laws, as opposed to the law of some individual, is justified by the fact that it, instead of consisting in mindless, empty, death-like necessity, comprises a spiritual commonality and substance in which the individuals within whom it has actual reality live and are conscious of *themselves*. Thus, even when they complain about this order as though it ran counter to ‘the law within’ and defend the private claims of the heart against it, they continue to cling to it with all their hearts as to their very being; and if they’re deprived of this order or place themselves outside of it, they lose everything. Since this is what the activity and efficacy of the public order consists in, it appears as an internally coherent, vibrant essence, with individuality as its form. But even as such it’s a perverted order.

235 For inasmuch as it is the law of all hearts, and all individuals directly embody the universal, all that this order really consists of is individuality existing for itself, that is, the reality of the heart. A conscious being who tries to assert the law of his heart accordingly encounters resistance from others since his law contradicts the equally individualistic laws of their hearts; and they in turn, in resisting him, are merely trying

to establish and validate their [M251] law. Hence the only “universality” in evidence here consists of all-out resistance and a free-for-all in which each asserts his own individuality—albeit unsuccessfully, since he’s resisted by all the others and in turn ends up being undone by them. What gives the appearance of public “order,” then, is this pandemic strife in which each wrests control of as much as he can, summarily exacting justice on the individuality of others even as he asserts his own, which vanishes in like manner at the hands of the others. This comprises the “way of the world”: the semblance of an orderly progression consisting simply in an “intended” universality, the import of which is sooner the trivial game of individuals establishing themselves only to end up being toppled.

236 –If we consider both aspects of the prevailing order at large in contrast to each other, we see that in content the latter form of universality is a turbulent individualism that regards private intent, individuality itself, as law—deeming actual reality to be unreal, and something that’s not actual to be the real. Yet this is also the aspect in which that order has such reality as it does, the self-orientedness of individuality being integral to it. –The other aspect consists of a universal existing in the manner of a quiescent essence, hence merely as an “inner” universality that, while by no means nonexistent, isn’t yet an actual reality, and can become such only by superseding the manner of individuality that has arrogated it to itself. This embodiment of consciousness, which comes to regard itself as abiding (not individualistically but sheerly in essence) within the law, in “the inherently true and good”—which knows that individuality is perverted and perverting, and hence that it has to make sacrifice of consciousness’s singular individuality—is Virtue.



V.B.C. VIRTUE AND THE WAY OF THE WORLD

237 In the first embodiment of active reason, self-consciousness thought of itself sheerly in terms of individuality and a contrasting abyssal universality. In its second embodiment both moments of this opposition (law vs. individuality) are contained within each of the two contrasting components, the one (the heart) comprising their direct unity, the other their opposition. Here, in the relation of virtue to the way of the world, each of [M252] these components at once unifies and contrasts the above moments, forming a reciprocal, albeit adversarial, dynamic of law and individuality.

238 –Virtue-oriented consciousness deems the law to be what’s indispensable and individuality something to be sublated, both within its consciousness as well as in the way of the world. To it, one’s distinctive individuality is to be subordinated to the discipline of the universal, to what’s in principle good and true; it nonetheless remains therein a personal consciousness, whereas true discipline entails sacrificing all that’s

personal as proof that it's not in fact still mired in matters individualistic. In this singular act of sacrifice, individuality, being a simplex moment common to both components, will be simultaneously expunged in the way of the world.

239 –In its dealings with the way of the world, individuality behaves in a manner reverse that of the way it's set forth in virtue-mindedness, making itself what's indispensable while subordinating what's in principle good and true to itself. Even for virtue the way of the world isn't just the perverse general state of affairs brought about by individuality, there being instead a moment of perfect order common to both, although in the way of the world this order isn't present to consciousness as a matter-of-fact actuality but rather as the world's inner essence. Thus strictly speaking virtue doesn't first have to bring about such order, since to do that—to actually do something—is to exist consciously as an individual; and individuality is, after all, what's to be sublated. The sublation of individuality, on the other hand, merely smoothes the path for the inner principle of the way of the world to come into existence all on its own.

240 The overall makeup of the actual way of the world having already become discernible, on closer examination it's seen to consist again in nothing but the two preceding moments of self-consciousness. It was from them that the present embodiment, virtue, first emerged; and since they're its origin, they fall within its purview—albeit as an origin that it is bent upon superseding while realizing itself or, in other words, coming into its own.

241 –Thus the way of the world is on the one hand comprised in singular individuality that seeks pleasure and enjoyment, in so doing finds itself undone, and thereby satisfies what the universal requires. But to satisfy the universal in this way is to embody it perversely and skew its dynamic, just as do the other moments of this way of relating to it. All that such reality [M253] consists of is individualistic pleasure and enjoyment with the universal as its nemesis: a necessity embodying only universality's empty form—sheer negative repercussion, action void of meaning.

242 –The other moment of the way of the world is a form of individuality that's determined to be a law unto itself and, thus deluded, sets out to disrupt the prevailing order. Against such arrogance the general law of course holds its ground, and turns out to be no longer antithetic to consciousness—no longer vacuous, no longer a lifeless necessity but rather one integral to consciousness itself. But the way in which the individualistic consciousness exists, interrelating an utterly contradictory reality, is sheer insanity; and when objectively actualized, it's altogether perverse. So while indeed the universal manifests itself as the power animating both sides of the dynamic, when it does exist this power is naught but pandemic perversity.

243 It is from virtue that the genuine reality of the universal is now to be secured, namely by sublating the principle of such perversity, individuality—virtue's aim being

to turn the perverted way of the world around and bring out its true nature. As yet this true nature exists in the way of the world only as the “inherent principle” thereof; it isn’t yet actual, and so virtue just “believes” in it. Virtue sets out to elevate this believing into a seeing, albeit without enjoying the fruit of its labor and sacrifice. For insofar as it’s embodied in individuality, virtue actively engages in a struggle with the world, its purpose and true essence consisting in its overcoming the way of the world as that world actually is; and as the actual existence of the good is thereby achieved, virtue’s activity or conscious concern with individuality accordingly ceases.

244 –How this struggle will turn out—what virtue will experience in the course of it, whether the way of the world will succumb and virtue triumph by its sacrifice—can only be decided by the nature of the living weapons with which the combatants are armed. For their weapons consist of nothing but their own nature, which becomes evident to them both only reciprocally. Hence they’ve already been armed by what’s inherent in the struggle at hand.

245 For the virtue-oriented consciousness the universal [M254] is a matter of belief, is something true in principle, a form of universality that’s as yet abstract rather than actual, being present in such consciousness itself in the manner of a *purpose*, and in the way of the world in the manner of something *inner*. It’s precisely as thus settled upon that the universal embodied in virtue presents itself to the way of the world; for at this point it just “wills” that the good be carried out, and doesn’t give it out as being actual yet. Thus defined, the good could also, in that it emerges in a struggle against the way of the world, be viewed as appearing to exist in relation to something other than it rather than in and relative to itself—for otherwise it wouldn’t be set upon winning its truth by first overpowering its counterpart. That the good initially exists only as thus relative to something else is substantively the same as what (viewed from the opposite perspective) was previously indicated—that it is at first an abstraction that’s real only in relation to something else, not in and relative to itself.

246 Thus as it turns up here, the good (the universal) consists in what are called “gifts,” “capabilities,” “powers.” This makes of it a mode of spiritual aptitude, setting it forth as something universal in need of the principle of individuality to bestir and animate it—with individuality being then its actual reality. As to this principle per se, insofar as it’s present in a consciousness mindful of virtue, it is being “put to good use”; but insofar as it’s present in the way of the world, it is being “misused”—a passive instrument in the hands of unconstrained individuality, one indifferent to the use made of it, one that can be so misused as to bring about a state of affairs ruinous to it. Having no life or independent identity of its own, this manner of universality is such stuff as can be molded any which way, even so as to corrupt it.

247 Because such a universal is at the disposal of the consciousness intent upon virtue as well as the way of the world, it’s not obvious that virtue, thus equipped, will overcome vice. Their weapons are identical, consisting of their strengths and abilities.

Virtue, though, has placed in hidden reserve its belief that its purpose is innately one with the way of the world's inner nature, intending thereby to ambush the enemy from behind during the struggle and so in principle achieve its purpose. Thus for the knight of virtue what he himself [M255] does and strives to do in fact comes down to his merely pretending to fight; he can't take what he's doing seriously since his real energies are directed toward the good existing in and of *itself*—that it be self-realizing. Indeed he dare not *allow* this mock struggle to become serious, since the force he turns against the enemy and finds turned back upon him, and that's at risk of being damaged or depleted in him and his enemy, mustn't be the good itself; this, after all, is what he's struggling to promote and preserve, whereas all that he's prepared to risk are his [ethically] indifferent gifts and capabilities. Yet precisely these in fact comprise the de-individualized universal that the struggle is supposed to sustain and actualize.

248 –Moreover, by the very way this struggle is conceived, the good is forthwith actualized already, existing “in principle” in the manner of a universal; and for it to be actualized means only that it exist concurrently in relation to what's other than it. The two opposing sides outlined above, in each of which the good was rendered into an abstraction, are no longer separate from each other; rather do they, in and through their struggle, establish the good in both ways simultaneously.

249 –Now while the virtue-oriented consciousness is struggling against the way of the world as though the latter were inimical to the good, the way of the world confronts virtue with a universal that, instead of being a mere abstraction, is the good as it is when animated by individuality and matter-of-factly interrelated with what's other than the good, that is, the good as *actual* good. So, wherever it engages the way of the world, virtue keeps encountering such bastions of the good itself as actually do exist. As the inherent principle of the way of the world, the good is inseparably interlaced with all the ways that world is manifest and present in actual reality—it being thus, for virtue, invulnerable. Just such instances of the good's existence (hence too all the inviolable ways in which these interrelate) turn out to be moments [of individuality] that, in the actual realm, virtue is supposed to have risked and sacrificed. Hence all that a struggle like this can consist of is vacillation over whether to preserve or to sacrifice [one's individuality]—or actually, no sacrifice of one's own efficacy or violation of the other's can even take place. Virtue thus ends up not just looking like a warrior whose only concern in battle is to keep his sword clean; it starts the fight solely to [M256] safeguard its weapons. And it's not just its own weapons that it must refrain from using; it must keep the enemy's weapons intact too, indeed safeguard them from itself, since they're all noble parts of the good for the sake of which it entered into the fray in the first place.

250 To the enemy, by contrast, what's of the essence isn't something that “exists in principle” but rather individuality. The enemy's strength is thus a negative principle

before which nothing is permanent and sacrosanct, and which can abide risking and losing anything and everything. Its victory is thus ensured as much because of it itself as because of the contradiction in which its opponent gets entangled. What virtue regards as an inherent principle, the way of the world, constrained by no such fixed and binding moment, regards as solely at its disposal. Considered thus as something it can just as well nullify as let be, the way of the world has any such moment as could constrain it well within its power (including the virtuous knight who has secured himself therein). The virtuous knight in turn can't escape this moment, as though merely cloaked in it and able to discard it at will, since to him it's the indispensable essence of the matter.

251 Finally, the good-in-principle's hope of cunningly ambushing the way of the world from behind is inherently vain. The way of the world is an alert, self-assured consciousness that's not about to be got at from behind since it fronts in every direction, it being such that everything is evident to it, everything right there before it. As for the good in principle, when within its enemy's sight it engages in the kind of "struggle" seen above, although inasmuch as it's only virtually present it is but a passive instrument: gifts and abilities, materiel put to no actual use. Such existence as it might be imagined to have could only be that of a slumbering consciousness that keeps itself tucked away who knows where.

252 Because its purpose is in fact such an abstract and unreal affair, and because its action, when seen for what this actually amounts to, is based on sheer verbal distinctions, virtue is overpowered by the way of the world. Virtue had in mind to sacrifice individuality in order to bring about the good in actual reality; but here the aspect comprised by actual reality is itself the aspect comprised by individuality. The good was supposed to be something that exists in principle [M257] as opposed to what matter-of-factly is; but when taken in keeping with its reality and truth, what exists in principle is nothing other than something that per se matter-of-factly is. Although what exists in principle exists initially as an abstract form of 'essence' as opposed to an actual reality, this abstraction is precisely what's not really true but something that's so only in the mind of some consciousness. The inference is thus that what [genuinely] exists in principle merits being called 'actual,' since what's actually real by its very nature interrelates with what's other than it, or in other words matter-of-factly is. The consciousness of virtue, by contrast, is based on a distinction between what exists in principle and what is, a distinction that has no truth to it.

253 –The way of the world was alleged to be a perversion of the good because it had individuality for its principle; yet individuality is the principle of actual reality, since it is precisely what embodies the manner of conscious being via which what exists in principle is in equal measure interrelated with what's other than it. The way of the world does indeed "pervert" the immutable, but does so in fact by transforming it from the nothingness of abstraction into the being of reality.

254 –Thus does the way of the world prevail over the virtue opposing it, over virtue’s grasping an insubstantial abstraction as something essential. Yet it’s not winning out over anything real but just over this concoction of distinctions without differences: over a bunch of highfalutin rhetoric about what’s best for humankind and about how oppressed humanity is, about sacrifice for the good and the misuse of gifts. What all such idealistic concerns and purposes amount to are empty words that make the heart swell and leave the head empty, which edify but don’t do anything constructive. The only discernible content of such lofty declamations is that the individual who professes to act for such noble purposes and puts out such fine phrases takes himself to be one first-class fellow indeed, a condition that makes for a swollen head in oneself and others, one puffed up with self-importance.

255 –In ancient times virtue had a well-defined and reliable meaning, for it had a foundation replete with content in the very substance of the people themselves and had for its purpose an already actual and existent good; thus it was hardly set against the realm of the real as something altogether perverted, set against the way of the world. But the sort of virtue we’ve been considering here abides outside that substance, is virtue devoid of everything essential to it—virtue sheerly in imagination and verbiage [M258] without substantive content. This rhetorical vacuousness at odds with the way of the world would be exposed forthwith if it had to say what its fancy phrases mean; instead their familiarity is taken for granted. The demand that what’s thus so familiarly known be stated outright would be met either with a new swell of such phrases, or with an appeal to the heart, which tells only “inwardly” what they mean. The vanity of such rhetoric seems certainly, if not altogether consciously, evident to our own culture as well, since all interest in the whole mass of these utterances and accompanying affectations has dissipated—a loss of interest indicating that all they actually bring about is boredom.

256 What comes of this airy opposition, then, is that consciousness simply lets the idea of an inherent good that would never be real slip off its shoulders like a cloak. In the course of its struggle it has seen by experience that the way of the world isn’t as bad as it looked, since its own actuality is the actual reality of the universal. With this discovery the expedient of producing the good by means of the “sacrifice” of individuality goes by the wayside. For individuality consists in the actualization of what exists in principle; and this “perversion” ceases to be viewed as a perverting of the good, in that it’s just this that transforms the good, as bare purpose, into something actual. –The dynamic of individuality is the actual reality of the universal.

257 But with this, the way of the world as something existing over against the consciousness of ‘what exists in principle’ is also in fact vanquished and left behind. Individuality’s existence for itself had been set in opposition to what’s of the essence, the universal, and had appeared as an actuality dissevered from what exists in principle.

But since that actuality has turned out to be inseparably one with the universal, the self-orientedness characteristic of the way of the world, no less than virtue's inherent principle, prove each in its own way to be but one perspective on all of this. While the individuality integral to the way of the world may very well intend to act only for itself, that is, selfishly, it's better [M259] than it means to be, for its action is at the same time what action is in principle: something universal. If such individuality has in mind to act selfishly, it simply doesn't know what it's doing; and if it insists that all men act selfishly, it's merely asserting that they've no idea what action is. If it acts "for itself," this is precisely that which actualizes what at first exists only in principle. Thus the very objective of anyone who, being "out for himself," has in mind to oppose what exists in principle (namely via his shallow cunning and clever commentary aimed at unmasking selfishness in all quarters) vanishes as surely as does a purpose conceived of as "existing in principle" (rhetorical embellishments and all).

258 Thus do the activity and efforts of individuality constitute an end in itself: making use of one's powers, playing them out to the hilt, is what gives life to these exertions that otherwise would exist lifelessly "in principle." In them lies a manner of self-inherency that, instead of comprising a universal that's unrealized, abstract, and non-existent, embodies directly within itself the presence and reality of actively progressing individuality.



V.C. INDIVIDUALITY THAT DEEMS ITSELF TO BE SELF-CONTAINEDLY REAL AND REALISTICALLY SELF-ORIENTED

259 Having now grasped the concept of itself that was initially only our concept of it—that within its certainty of self it is all reality—self-consciousness henceforth considers its end and essence to consist in the spontaneous interfusing of something common to all (having gifts and capabilities) and individuality. Prior to their coalescing, the individual moments of this process of interfusion and self-realization consist of purposes of the sort already seen. These have all gone by the wayside as abstractions and chimeras typical of shallow, inchoate forms of self-conscious spirit, their truth consisting only in what's purported by the heart, imagination, and rhetoric rather than in reason, which, its reality being now certain both in principle and as evident to it, no longer seeks to realize itself in the form of a purpose counter to immediate matter-of-fact reality, but on the contrary has the category as such as object of its [M260] consciousness.

260 –In other words, the characteristic way in which reason acted in self-oriented or negative self-consciousness—which encountered an actual reality that was negative of

it, and realized its purpose only by sublating that reality—has been superseded. Since purpose and what exists in principle together turned out to be the same as existence interrelated with otherness and reality as actually encountered, truth is no longer divergent from what's certain—whether the purpose set forth were to be taken as epitomizing self-consciousness's certainty of self, and what it actualizes of that purpose taken as the truth, or whether the proposed purpose were to be taken for the truth, and actual reality taken for what's certain. Rather is an end and essence such as this in and of *itself* a certainty—that of a directly present reality: an interfusion of what exists in principle and self-orientedness, the universal and individuality. Action is its own immanent truth and reality, and the manifestation and expression of individuality is in and of itself its purpose.

261 With this way of conceiving, self-consciousness has thus gone beyond such tentative determinations as had the category at odds with self-consciousness and its way of relating (first as observer, then as active agent) at odds with the category, and has made its way back into itself. Self-consciousness has the pure category itself for its object—or is itself the category become conscious of itself. Accordingly such self-consciousness has closed its account with its previous permutations; these lie behind it in a forgotten past, no longer confronting it as a world it encounters, unfolding instead wholly within it itself as its own transparent moments. While these unfolding moments do still constitute separate undercurrents within its consciousness—a dynamic consisting of distinct moments whose substantial unity hasn't as yet been comprehended—in all of them self-consciousness nonetheless holds fast to the simplex unity of being and self that is constitutive of their genus.

262 Consciousness has herewith rid itself of all opposition and of everything that might circumscribe its activity; it starts out afresh from within itself, encountering not something other than it but rather itself. In that individuality comprises an actuality unto itself, the wherewithal of its efficacy and the purpose of its action are contained within action itself. This is why action gives the appearance of a circular dynamic coursing freely in its own ambit as within a void, [M261] effortlessly broadening and narrowing in scope, entirely content to be at play in its own company. The element within which individuality openly fleshes itself out is significant in that this element is perfectly receptive to individuality's being thus embodied—is the broad daylight in which consciousness is intent upon manifesting itself. Action alters nothing and opposes nothing; it is a transition in sheer form from unseen to seen—and such purposive content as is thus brought to light and made manifest is nothing other than what that action already implicitly is. Action is *self-contained*: this is its form as a unity conceived in thought. And it is *actual*: this is its form as a matter-of-factly existent unity. Only in its simplex [thought-sustained] modality in contradistinction to its transitional and processive mode does action itself consist in an “implicit content” at all.



V.C.a. A REALM OF INTELLIGENT ANIMALS AND DECEIT: THE ABIDING CONCERN

263 This self-containedly real individuality is yet another form of individuality that starts out single-minded and resolute. As it is still in process of becoming fully aware of the absolute reality it knows itself to be, it is accordingly abstract, generic, unrealized, and void of content—the mere vacuous notion of a categorical entity such as this. What's yet to be seen is how this concept of a self-containedly real individuality crystallizes in the course of its experiential moments and how the self-concept of such individuality enters into consciousness for it.



264 This conception—a manner of individuality that as such deems itself to be all reality—is but momentarily a culmination; it hasn't as yet manifested its own dynamic and reality, and at this point is set forth directly as something simply self-inhering. Yet there is negativity (which is the same as what appears as process) in this simple self-inherency, namely in the form of determinativeness; such being, simple and self-contained, defines its own compass. Individuality thus enters onto the scene in the form of an “original determinative nature”: ‘original’ in that this nature inheres in *itself*—original and ‘determinative’ in that *negation* is integral to such self-containedness, which accordingly exists in the way that a quality does. Such limitation as this places on its being doesn't, however, limit [M262] the action of consciousness, since here all action is perfectly self-related; any limitation that would be due to a relation to other things has been sublated. The original determinativeness of this nature is thus but a simple principle, a transparent generic element in which individuality remains free and self-identical while unimpededly unfolding diverse aspects of itself, interacting solely with itself in the course of its actualization. Thus it resembles the rudimentary animal life-principle, which as it were breathes the breath of life into the elements (water, air, earth), and within these into ever more specialized principles, merging all its moments with them, holding sway over them and maintaining its integrity regardless of the constraining influence of the elements, and remaining, even in this or that particular organic embodiment, one and the same generic life-principle.

265 This determinative and original nature of consciousness, within which it remains whole and free, manifests the immediate and sole genuine content of what to the individual is his purpose. While indeed constitutive of a specific content, this purpose is “contained” at all only insofar as we view this as yet implicit inherency in isolation; but in truth purpose is a reality suffused with individuality, the actuality contained within individual consciousness and initially affirmed as matter-of-factly there but not yet actively engaged. Determinativeness such as this imposes no constraint upon action that would need be eluded since, regarded as matter-of-factly qualitative, this is but the

neutral coloration of the element within which action goes into motion; besides, such negativity is determinative only of what is to be—whereas action per se is negativity and nothing else. Hence in actively engaged individuality determinativeness is altogether dissolved into negativity, the inner conceptual essence of all determinativeness.

266 This simple original nature proceeds then to act, and gains an awareness of what action is in the incongruity integral thereto. Action is first present as an object—indeed one as yet existing in the mind in the manner of a ‘purpose’ and hence at odds with present reality. Its next phase is the activation of the contemplated purpose, its implementation as a purpose relevant to an actual state of affairs now thought of as a sheer [M263] formality—hence the idea of its being a ‘transition’ or ‘means’ [to an altered actual state]. In its third phase, lastly, the object presents the agent with a purpose he no longer recognizes as directly his own, one that’s no longer under his control and is present to him as something ‘other.’

267 –But as conceived in this context, the above distinct phases are to be so kept in rein that in content they stay the same and no incongruity enters in—whether it involves individuality versus being at large, or purpose versus individuality (its original nature), or purpose versus present reality, or means versus the reality that’s to be the ultimate objective, or the reality that the individual does manage to realize versus his purpose, original nature, or means.

268 To begin with, then, individuality’s original determinative nature, its immediate essence, having not yet been put into action, is referred to in terms of particular abilities, talents, character traits, and so on. This, spirit’s own distinctive tincture, is to be regarded as the sole content of purpose itself, and is considered as a reality all by itself. Were one to entertain the idea of consciousness venturing outside this and as intent upon realizing some other content, one would be fancying it as a vacuity operating in a void. Moreover this original essence isn’t just the substantive content of purpose but also an actuality that enters the picture as the given stuff one has to work with, the actual reality one “happens upon” and is to mold through action. Action is nothing but the pure translation of being from a form in which it isn’t yet manifest into one in which it *is* manifest—the “inherent being” of any reality that consciousness confronts having been reduced to mere semblance. When consciousness decides to act, it isn’t about to be diverted by the specter of “things as they are,” and is equally aware that instead of wandering about with its head full of idle purposes it must remain true to the purposive content originating within its essential nature. –In fact this content originating from within is evident to consciousness only once actualized by it; but by then the distinction between a content that’s evident to consciousness only in its mind and one that’s a matter-of-fact reality outside it in *its* own right has been left behind. Consciousness has to [M264] take action simply in order to be for itself what it is in itself; in other words action is spirit’s coming into being as a conscious entity.

269 –Consciousness thus knows what it inherently is on the basis of what it is as an actual reality. This is why the individual can't know what he is until he realizes himself in action. –But then it would seem that the individual can't determine the purpose of what he does until he's done it, even though, as a conscious entity, he has to be aware of the act as entirely *his* beforehand, that is, be aware of it in the form of a purpose. As he undertakes to act, the individual thus seems to find himself caught up in a circle each of whose moments presupposes the other, leaving him unable to initiate anything since only by acting does he come to know the original nature that has to be his purpose—which in turn he has to possess in advance in order to act. But this being so, he has to go right ahead regardless of circumstances, without further deliberating the point of departure, means, and end, and get the job done, since his essential and inherent nature is starting point, means, and end all in one.

270 –As starting point, his nature is present in the very circumstances of the action; and the interest he has in this or that is already the answer to the question of whether or not to act and, if so, what to do. For what seems to be an externally encountered reality is implicitly his own original nature, which has but the look of external being (a specter that lurks in a conception of action as inherently self-dissociative)³ yet bespeaks a reality integral to his original nature by the very interest he takes in it.

271 –As for the How, the question of means, in sum and substance this has likewise been settled. Talent is nothing but determinative original individuality viewed as one's own inner means, as purpose's bridge to actual reality. But the actual means and real transition is a union of talent with the nature of the enterprise [latently] present in the interest—the former (talent) setting forth the active aspect of the means, the latter (the nature of the enterprise) the contentual aspect, with both together comprising individuality itself as an interfusion of being and action.

272 –What's thus in play are the circumstances the individual encounters as implicitly part of his original nature, then the interest that established them as his—as his purpose—and finally the integration of the two and sublation of any opposition between them in the [M265] means. The integration itself as yet takes place within consciousness, and the totality just considered is still one side of an [apparent purpose-vs.-reality] opposition. This vestigial semblance of resistance is superseded by the transition itself—the means—it being a union of outer and inner, something quite contrary to such determinativeness as it has while still inner, a manner of determinativeness that the means sublates, establishing a unity of action and being that's moreover outwardly present: individuality itself become actual, made present to itself as matter-of-

3. An apparent allusion to Newton's third law: "For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction."

factly existent. In this way the entire action at no point—neither in the circumstances, purpose, means, nor the completed act—goes beyond itself.

273 Yet right within what's thus accomplished a disparity between original natures does appear to enter in: like the original nature it expresses, an accomplishment is specific, since once it's out of the agent's hands and matter-of-factly actual, the negation effected is present in it in the manner of a quality. Consciousness defines itself in a way counter to the specificity of what's been accomplished in having determinacy present within it in the form of negativity as such—as action—hence existing as something universal vis-à-vis any given accomplishment's specificity. Consciousness is thus in a position to compare one accomplishment with others, and apprehend how modes of individuality vary among themselves. An individual whose accomplishments are more comprehensive in scope possesses, say, greater strength of will or a more bountiful nature, a nature whose original determinativeness is less confining than that of someone possessing a weaker or humbler nature.

274 –In contrast with this quantitative distinction that tells us nothing of substance, a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' would be expressive of an undoubted difference. Yet nothing of the sort arises here: one way or the other whatever we consider is in like manner the action and effort, the exhibition and self-expression of individuality, and hence is all to the good; one couldn't really tell what "bad" is supposed to be. An allegedly bad deed would be but the way that a specific nature's individual life is actualizing itself—having been contorted into a bad act by a judgmental comparison that's null and void since it strays outside the deed's basic nature—the self-expression of individuality—seeking and demanding of it who knows what.

275 –Such thinking [M266] could at best make reference to a distinction like that cited above, which, as a quantitative distinction, in itself differentiates nothing of substance—all the more so here, since what's supposed to be compared are disparate deeds or modes of individuality that have nothing to do with one another and relate only to themselves. One's original nature is alone the inner principle of one's deed, the sole criterion upon which to criticize it or establish its foundation. But deed and original nature correspond to each other: for individuality there's nothing save what exists by means of it, that is, no reality that isn't individuality's own nature and action, and no action or inner principle of individuality that isn't actual—and these are the only moments here to compare.

276 Hence there's no place here for exultation, or for lamenting or regretting: sentiments that follow from the mind's envisioning a purposive content and inner principle other than the individual's original nature and its consummation in reality. Whatever the individual does and whatever happens to him, this is what he's done, this is what he himself is: all that he's in a position to be aware of is the sheer transition from the obscurity of mere possibility to the daylight of the actual present, from abstract inner

principle to the meaningfulness of actual being—and he can be sure that what's issuing forth there is nothing other than what lay dormant before. While just being aware of this unity in effect compares the two, they only seem to contrast: an illusion in form that any rational self-conscious being, knowing individuality to be in and of itself what's actually real, regards as no more than semblance. Aware now that he can find nothing in his reality that isn't one with him (i.e., nothing save his own self-certainty in its [objectified] truth), and hence that he always achieves his purpose, such an individual can experience nothing but delight in himself.



277 This is the self-concept fashioned by a mentality certain that it is a total interfusing of individuality and being. Let's see whether this concept is confirmed by experience and whether reality coincides with it.

278 –Achievement is the reality that a conscious being gives himself, it being that in which what he is in himself [M267] is evident to the individual, and in such a way that the consciousness to which he becomes present in that accomplishment isn't just one consciousness in particular but rather consciousness at large: in actually achieving something the individual has basically exposed himself to public scrutiny, placing himself in an existential gray area. Consciousness, in stepping back from its achievement, in fact itself assumes a universal perspective at odds with what it has wrought, the latter being determinate whereas consciousness is by contrast wholly negative, wholly active; it thus transcends itself as present in its achievement, becoming itself a locus of indeterminacy not fully fleshed out by its work. If prior to this a unity between consciousness and achievement had nonetheless been conceptually attained, this occurred precisely because the idea that the achievement might matter-of-factly exist [on its own] had been dismissed. But an achievement is supposed to *exist*, and we've yet to see how individuality will, in such being as its achievement does have, sustain the latter's universality while attaining its own satisfaction.

279 –First to be considered is what an achievement of itself is. It incorporates the whole nature of individuality; its being is thus itself a form of action in which disparate ways of embodying individuality all interpenetrate and cancel out. It's thus something tossed into the ebb and flow of ongoing existence in which the determinateness of any one original nature is in fact pitted against that of others, encroaching upon them as they in turn encroach upon it—ending up lost as a fleeting moment of the overall dynamic. While the moments involved in the conceptual mind-set of individuality that takes itself to be self-containedly real (the circumstances, purpose, means, and actualization) all figure in equally, and one's original determinative nature is viewed simply as an elemental component they have in common, nonetheless as this

component gets matter-of-factly objectified in some achievement, its determinate character as such enters the light of day and attains its truth—amidst its dissolution.

280 –Viewed more closely, while this dissolution demonstrates that the individual has become actual to himself as ‘this individual’ in that determinate way, this determinateness isn’t only the substantive content of his reality but its form as well; actuality as such, reality at large, precisely epitomizes this determinateness at odds with self-consciousness. In this respect it appears as an externally encountered, alien reality that has come loose from its conceptual moorings. An achievement exists, that is, is present to other individuals and constitutes for them an alien reality in whose place they have to put their own so as to [M268] give themselves by what they do a conscious sense of being in unison with actual reality; in other words, the interest that they each (in accordance with their original natures) take in it is other than the personal interest that any of the others has in it, in this way making of it something else. Anything achieved is thus transitory, is obliterated by the counterplay of other forces and interests, while the reality of the individual is shown to be ephemeral rather than something brought into being once and for all.

281 Thus through what he’s achieved a conscious being becomes aware of the tension between acting and being, a tension that in earlier modes of consciousness had been the starting point of action rather than, as here, only the result. But in fact this tension was also at the bottom of things when consciousness first went into action as a self-containedly real individual, since a determinative original nature was presupposed as the inner principle of the action, and performing it sheerly for the sake of doing so was that nature’s [sole] substantive content.

282 –Yet sheer action is a self-conforming form to which the determinativeness of an original nature doesn’t conform. Here as elsewhere it’s a matter of indifference which of the two we call ‘concept’ and which ‘reality’: either way, we have an original nature present in the form of ‘something that’s being thought’ (in the manner of an inner principle) versus ‘the action in which this original nature is for the first time real’—or alternatively we have ‘an original nature that’s present as a form of being’ (individuality as such along with its achievement) versus ‘the act of original conceiving’ (conception as radically transitional, as a process of becoming). Experiencing in its every accomplishment this nonconformity between conceiving and reality, a nonconformity intrinsic to its essential nature, consciousness comes to know itself as it is in truth, and its vain conception of itself begins to dissipate.

283 Due to the fundamental contradictoriness of the manner of achievement that comprises the truth of individuality that deems itself to be self-containedly real, all facets of such individuality become in turn contradictory: once externalized by action as matter-of-factly existent, an achievement expressive of the substantive content of all

one's individuality leaves at liberty all the moments that action, as a negative unity, had held bound together—with these moments then turning out to have no bearing on each other in the element of ongoing existence. Concept and reality thus dissociate into purpose versus original nature: it's [M269] a matter of sheer coincidence that a purpose ends up really existing or that the inner principle ends up being made into a conscious purpose. Similarly, as a transition to actual reality and [what's envisioned in the] purpose, concept and reality dissociate: it's by sheer accident that a means will be chosen that's conducive to the end. And finally, when these inner moments do coincide (regardless of whether or not there's any inherent unity between them), an individual's action still basically has but a contingent bearing upon how things turn out in actuality: fortune is as likely to smile upon an ill-defined purpose and badly chosen means as it is to frown on them.

284 Now while this conflict between aspiring to do something and bringing it about, between purpose and means, and again between what's been brought together within [the mind] and what actually is—in short everything having to do with the contingency of its action—becomes in this way evident to consciousness in its achievements, nonetheless the unity and the necessity of its action are likewise evident as well. This aspect takes precedence over the other, and experiencing action's fortuitousness turns out to be an experience that itself occurs at random. Practical necessity consists in purpose unquestionably having a bearing on what's actual, and it's in this unity of purpose and actuality that the conceptual nature of action consists—action being undertaken because it is in and of itself indispensable to what's to become actual. Indeed contingency is evident in any achievement, in whatever has been actually brought about as contrasted with what was intended to be done or what's still in the works; and this experience, which it seems must be deemed the truth of the matter, contradicts this conception of active engagement. When, however, we look at what the substantive content of the experience amounts to once it has run its full course, we see that achievement is fleeting—albeit radically fleeting, its fleetingness being itself fleeting in actual fact, bound to and vanishing right along with the achieving. The negating is itself undone together with the positivity it negates.

285 This fleeting fleetingness lies within the conceptual purview of self-containedly real individuality, since that in the course of which a given achievement passes away (or, conversely, which passes away in it), supposedly giving the above experience its supremacy over the self-concept of such individuality, is objective reality—a moment [M270] that, in such consciousness per se, no longer of itself has any truth to it, consisting now simply in consciousness's oneness with action, “true achievement” being simply the unity of action and being—of wanting to do something and doing it.

286 –Such a consciousness thus looks upon any reality counter to its action-based certainty as being merely at its disposal: since it has involuted into a mode of self-

consciousness for which everything that contrasts with it has faded into insignificance, in its view there can no longer arise any opposition in the form of its self-orientedness versus actual reality. Rather does such opposition and negativity as comes to light in the act of achieving accordingly bear not only upon the purposive content of the achievement as well as that of consciousness, but upon actual reality as such—and therewith upon the opposition presented solely in and by actual reality, including the fleetingness of the achieving.

287 –Reflecting thus out of its transitory achieving into itself and affirming its own concept and certainty as “what is and endures” despite its experience of action’s fortuitousness, this manner of consciousness does in fact experience what it is conceiving—in which what’s real is but a moment, something existing merely for it rather than in and relative to *itself*. It experiences what’s real as an ephemeral moment, and so looks upon the latter just as it views being generally, whose universality is seamlessly one with that of action. This oneness [of being and acting, wanting to do something and doing it] is the true achievement—the *abiding concern*—which is asserted outright and experienced as enduring independently of the enterprise as fortuitously realized in any single phase (e.g., the circumstances, means, or actual outcome) of the action.

288 The abiding concern runs counter to these moments only insofar as they’re deemed to exist in isolation from it; but in essence, as an interfusing of reality and individual, it is their unity. In addition to being an act, and as such [an instance of] sheer action in general—hence too the act of a given individual as well as any action still part of him (as purpose vis-à-vis actual reality)—it’s also a transition from such and such determinacy to the very opposite, ultimately to an actual reality fully present to consciousness.

289 –Thus is the abiding concern expressive of a spiritual mode of being in which all such moments are sublated so far as they’re deemed to exist on their own (existing then only in the manner of universals), [M271] and in which consciousness’s certainty of itself exists as an objective entity: *a concern*, an object born of self-consciousness’s own being without ceasing to be a free and distinct object in its own right. For self-consciousness the ‘thing’ of sense-certainty and perception now derives its significance solely from self-consciousness itself; upon this rests the distinction between a thing and a concern. In the latter a dynamic that parallels the one seen in sense-certainty and perception runs its course.

290 In the abiding concern, then, as an objectified interfusion of individuality and objectivity itself, self-consciousness’s true self-concept has become evident to it—it having arrived at an awareness of its substance. Even so, at this juncture self-consciousness has only just arrived at this awareness, having then an immediate awareness of that substance, such being the specific way in which this spirit-suffused essence is here present, having not as yet blossomed into the substance it is in its true reality.

291 –In self-consciousness’s immediate awareness of this substance, the abiding concern has the form of a simple essence that, as does any universal, contains all its various moments within it, imparting itself to them while in turn remaining indifferent toward them in their specificity and abiding all by itself free of them; moreover, as the freely existent simple and abstract abiding concern that it is, it is deemed as something that’s [absolutely] of the essence. While the various moments of the original determinativeness involved here (i.e., *this* individual’s concern, his purposes, means, action, and reality) are for such consciousness single moments that, unlike the abiding concern, one can forgo or abandon, on the other hand they all have the abiding concern as their essence, if only because as their abstract universal it’s found within each of them severally and hence is “predicable” of them. The abiding concern itself isn’t yet the subject [that’s consciously sustaining this dynamic]; rather are the above moments construed as that subject, since they fit the mold of individuality, whereas the abiding concern is at first but a simple universal: the genus found in all these moments (its species) even as it exists independently of them.

292 A conscious being is said to be “straightforward” when he’s come around to the idealism expressed in the abiding concern; [M272] moreover in it he has something that—in the manner of a formalistic generality—is true. His sole abiding concern being the abiding concern itself, he moves along from one of its various moments or species to another and, failing to realize it in one of them, for that very reason succeeds in another, thus invariably getting the gratification that such a mentality conceives as its due. No matter how things go, he’s realized and achieved what’s to him the abiding concern since it, as the common genus of these moments, is predicable of them all.

293 Should he fail to realize a given objective, at least he’d “aspired” to it. In other words, he makes purpose as purpose—sheer busyness—his main business, and can then claim (and console himself accordingly) that at least *something* was always being done or attempted. And since a universal includes within it instances that are negative or transient, even the undoing of his achievement is his own doing. He lured others into undoing it, and takes satisfaction in the very fleetingness of its reality (just as brats who’ve done something to get their ears boxed delight in having brought it on themselves). –Or perhaps he never even tried to bring the abiding concern to fruition, and so hasn’t really done anything. Well then, he didn’t want to. To him, after all, the abiding concern consists in his resolve being at one with reality; however things actually are is the way he claims he wants them. –Or finally, suppose he gets wind of something of general interest to him that he had nothing to do with. As far as he’s concerned this affair is his business simply by his taking an interest in it, even though he played no part in bringing it about. Should fortune smile on him, he considers this due to something that he did and that he thus deserves. Should some world event occur which didn’t really involve him, he makes it his affair anyway, turning a cause to which he’s contributed mere passive interest into a partisan issue on which he stood pro or con and even personally championed or combated.

294 Clearly the “straightforwardness” of such a mentality, as well as the gratification he experiences all-round, actually derives from the fact that he just doesn’t get his head together regarding his abiding concern. For him what really matters consists in taking care of his own business—or equally well in accomplishing nothing at all, or in [M273] sheer action to no purpose, or even in actual reality untouched by action. He makes one referent after another the subject of this predicate, forgetting about each in turn. Whether in the form of something sheerly intended—or of something not even so much as wanted—the abiding concern has all the import of an amorphous purpose and a merely imagined unity of willing and doing. He consoles himself [with the conceit] that his designs came to naught because that’s what he wanted or even brought about, and he contents himself with having given others something to do. In this way he makes sheer doing, which is aptly called worthless due to its accomplishing nothing, be what really matters. Finally, should he find actual reality favorably disposed to him, then exactly that (not anything he did) becomes his abiding concern.

295 Yet the truth of such straightforwardness is that it isn’t as forthright as it looks. For it can’t be so scatterbrained as to let these disparate moments come apart like this—can’t avoid direct cognizance of their contrariety since they’re plainly interconnected. Action pure and simple is essentially the action of such and such individual, just as a given action is essentially something that’s actual—an undertaking of some sort. Conversely, actuality is in essence comprised of the mere action of the individual as well as of action at large; and while his mere action is part of action generally, it’s also part of actual reality at large. And while it seems that it’s just the undertaking itself as an abstract reality that matters to him, it’s also evident that it matters to him as involving action by him. Moreover it isn’t just action and effort that he’s serious about, but seeing one enterprise in particular through—namely his. And lastly, although he seems committed solely to his own enterprise and action, he’s once again involved in the overall enterprise at large—the abiding concern: actual reality enduring in its own right.

296 The abiding concern and its moments, while appearing here as [an amorphous unfolding] content, must also exist as forms discernible in consciousness. As its content they show up only fleetingly, with each making way for the other. Hence they have to be present as sublated in their very specificity, and as such be facets of consciousness per se. The abiding concern, although present in the manner of an inner principle, that is, with consciousness reflecting into itself, the supplanting of one moment of consciousness [M274] by another demonstrates that they’re not being set forth as existing unto themselves but solely in relation to something else in consciousness. Even while bringing one moment of this content into the light of day and making it present to others, consciousness is reflecting out of it and into itself, so that within it a counter-move is also in evidence, one that consciousness keeps to itself as *its* own business.

297 –It isn’t just that one such moment is being set forth while another is held within, but that consciousness is alternating between them since it has to substantiate the one

moment as well as the other both to itself and to others. Although the whole of it is a spontaneous interfusing of individuality and the universal, since this whole is present to consciousness only in the manner of a simple essence and hence an abstraction of the abiding concern, the moments of the whole become dissociated from it and each other as separate [concerns], and the whole ends up running its course and being disclosed only by a “now you see it, now you don’t” alternation of what’s presented openly and what kept to oneself. Since throughout this juggling consciousness keeps one moment to itself as the decisive moment in its reflection, retaining the other only in an external way (namely as present to others), what we have here is a game played by individuals who are deceiving themselves even as they deceive and are deceived by others.

298 So a given individual sets out to see something through, appearing thereby to have made it his business to do so: he acts, thus disclosing himself to others, and it seems to him that the way things are in actual reality is what matters. Others accordingly take his action to reflect an interest in the undertaking as such, in its being brought to fruition as an end in itself regardless of whether by him or by them. When they then either point out that they’ve already brought it to fruition, or else proffer assistance, he’s no longer dwelling upon what they thought it was: it’s *his* action and effort that interests him about this enterprise, and when it dawns on them that this is his actual concern, they realize that they’ve been misled. But in fact their rush to render assistance was itself nothing but a demonstration of their wanting to see and show what they can do, and had nothing to do with the enterprise per se—they were willing to mislead [M275] others in exactly the same way as they complain of having been misled.

299 –It being clear now that his own action and effort, the play of *his* powers, is what really matters, this consciousness seems to be promoting his affairs for his sake and nobody else’s, and to be concerned only about what he—not anybody else—does, thus leaving others to tend to their own business. But once again they’re mistaken: he has already moved beyond where they thought him to be. Rather than viewing the enterprise with which he’s involved as his exclusively, he sees it as one common to all. So he starts meddling in their undertakings and, even if he finds that he can’t take charge, shows that he’s an interested party at least to the extent of playing critic. If he bestows his stamp of approval and gives praise, it’s with the intention of lauding not only what they’ve accomplished, but also his own magnanimity and forbearance in not having questioned its status as an achievement, let alone critically dismissing it altogether. In showing an interest in their accomplishment he’s actually enjoying himself; and the same is true of works with which he finds fault, again because of the pleasure that his own action gives him.

300 –But those who find themselves (or claim to be) deceived by such meddling had every intention of deceiving in like manner. They pass off their actions and efforts as undertaken only for their sake, intended solely to take care of them and their affairs. Yet whenever they take action, in so doing stepping forth into the limelight, this directly contradicts any pretense of wanting to keep a low profile, away from the public eye and the participation of all; to actualize is to set forth what is one's own in the element that all have in common, through which it becomes, and is supposed to become, everyone's concern.

301 So when anyone alleges that he's concerned with some enterprise sheerly "for its own sake," he's deceiving both himself and others; in embarking upon an undertaking, a conscious being sooner discovers that others are drawn to it like flies to fresh-poured milk, all seeking a piece of the action; and they in turn discover that he's not concerned with the enterprise as an object, but rather as something that's *his*. Should [M276] he instead maintain that action per se—the use made of powers and capabilities, the expression of his individuality—is what really matters, then he'd yet again discover that everybody is summoned to action and considers himself invited in, and that, instead of being just "pure action" or "his own private and individual act," his undertaking is within the purview of others as well—is an abiding concern for them too. In both [individual action and action at large] what's happening is the same thing, and the only sense of there being anything different lies solely in what in either of them is taken for granted and deemed supposedly important.

302 –Consciousness experiences both of these aspects of the abiding concern as moments of equal importance, and thereby learns what the nature of that concern really is: that it doesn't consist in some mere undertaking that runs counter to action either at large or at the individual level, nor in action that is at odds with ongoing existence and that would be free of these moments (with it as genus, they as its species). Rather is the abiding concern an essence whose being consists in the action of the single individual and of all individuals, and whose action is directly evident to others—that is, is indeed a concern, and is such solely as the endeavor of each and all, an essence epitomizing the essential nature of all such entities: an essence consisting in spirit.

303 –Thus does consciousness come to see that none of these moments comprises a [sustainedly self-conscious] subject, but is sooner dissolved in the larger abiding concern. The moments of individuality that such consciousness thoughtlessly construed one after the other as [though a] subject coalesce into a simplex individuality that's as much a direct embodiment of the universal as it is such and such individual. In this way the abiding concern loses its predicative function as well as the determinateness of a lifeless abstract generality. It is instead a substance permeated by individuality: a subject in which individuality (as much in the form of this particular individual as of

all individuals) abides, and a universal that's matter-of-factly present simply in the action of each and all—an actual reality that this particular conscious being knows to be his own individual reality as well as that of all. Previously the pure abiding concern was what was characterized as categorical—being that is I, I that is being—albeit as embodied in a way of thinking that as yet differentiates itself from actual self-consciousness; but here actual self-consciousness's moments, whether referred to in terms of self-consciousness's content (purpose, action, and actuality) or form (existing for self and existing in relation to others), are [M277] established as being one with the simplex category itself—with it being then also all the substantive content that there is.



V.C.b. REASON AS LAWGIVER

304 Integral to the simplex being of any entity that exists as spirit is both consciousness pure and simple, and such and such [individual] self-conscious being. The original determinative nature of the individual has lost its positive relevance, namely as the self-contained element and purpose of his activity. That nature is but a superseded moment, and he a self that exists in the way that a 'self at large' does. Conversely, his formalistic 'abiding concern' is being fully fleshed out in his active, internally self-diversifying individuality, a diversity giving substantive content to that generic concern. The 'category,' as a universal comprised of pure consciousness, is self-inhering—yet is also *present to* itself, since the self that's integral to consciousness is a moment of it too. The category is a form of absolute being, since comprised in that manner of universality is the simplex *self-identity* of being itself.

305 What such an object is to consciousness thus has all the relevance of something that's genuinely true; it both is and is deemed to be true in the sense that it is in and of itself evident to and validated by [consciousness] itself—a concern that is absolute, one no longer burdened by any discrepancy between what's certain and what this certainty amounts to in truth, between universal and individual, purpose and the reality thereof, a concern the existential presence of which consists rather in self-consciousness's actual reality and action—a concern thus constitutive of an *ethically relevant substance*, the consciousness attentive to that substance an ethical awareness. Such consciousness regards its object as something true, since what's genuinely true unites self-consciousness and being as integrally unitary. What's true is thus deemed absolute since self-consciousness, being at home with itself here, no longer can or wants to go beyond its object—cannot do so, since this object is everything that is and that can be done, and doesn't want to, since this object is self or what the self wills. This is a *real* object existing inherently as an object in that the differentiation process of consciousness is at work within it, it being thus [conceptually] apportioned into the

specific laws integral to the absolute essence [of ethical substance]. These apportionments, rather than doing anything to obscure [ethical] conception, are the moments [M278]—namely ‘being,’ ‘pure consciousness,’ and ‘self’—abidingly integral to such conception: a *unity* that comprises the essence [or essential nexus] of these apportionments, and prevents these moments, amidst their distinctness, from any longer pursuing separate courses.

306 These laws or [conceptual] apportionments of ethical substance are unhesitatingly acknowledged. Their source and justification cannot be questioned, and there’s no point in pursuing alternatives, since other than this established entity existing in and relative to itself there is only self-consciousness. But self-consciousness is itself nothing other than this established entity as present to itself—being for that very reason what the latter consists of in truth, since self-consciousness comprises the self of such consciousness as well as its inner principle: sheerly being aware.

307 Realizing itself to be one of the moments—the presence to self—of this substance, self-consciousness accordingly gives expression to the law existentially embodied in it in terms of ‘sound reason’ having direct knowledge of what’s right and good. Having such knowledge, reason readily accepts their validity and declares forthwith: “This is right and good.” *This* indeed: what we have here are *specific* laws, an abiding concern that’s replete with content.

308 Whatever is given in so direct a manner has to be taken up and scrutinized accordingly. We need to see (just as we did with what sense-certainty straightforwardly says exists) how the being that this straightforward ethical sure-mindedness alleges to exist—these directly evident, matter-of-fact modes of ethical being—are constituted. Examples of a few such laws will show this. And since we’re taking them up in the form of the maxims of a sound reason that knows what it’s talking about, there’s no need for us to furnish whatever moment that it, regarding them as directly evident ethical laws, must itself validate.

309 “Everyone ought to tell the truth.” No sooner is this expressed unconditionally as a duty than the condition is added, “If one knows the truth.” So now the law reads: “Everyone ought to tell the truth according to what he knows and is convinced is true at the time.” Sound reason, this ethical awareness that has direct knowledge of what’s right and good, will explain that this condition was all along [M279] so closely bound up with the overarching maxim that it *meant* the law to include this stipulation. Yet in point of fact it thereby admits that in expressing its maxim it was already in direct violation of it; while it said, “Everyone ought to tell the truth,” it meant, “Everyone ought to tell the truth in accordance with what he knows and is convinced is true.” In other words it said something other than what it meant; and to say something other than what one means is to fail to tell the truth.

310 –In its improved version this untrue or inept expression is now reformulated as follows: “Everyone ought to tell the truth according to what he at that time knows and is convinced is true.” But with this, the universally necessary and inherently valid truth that this proposition was intended to convey is instead turned into something completely contingent. For telling the truth is then contingent upon my knowing it and being able to convince myself that I do—which tells us nothing more than that truth and falsehood should be spoken helter-skelter in accordance with what anyone happens to know, mean, or understand. The only thing universal about this contingent ethical content is the form of the proposition expressing it; as an ethical statement the proposition promises a content that’s necessary and universal—and so, by virtue of the contingent nature of its content, it contradicts itself.

311 –If, finally, the proposition were to be so emended that the contingency of one’s being acquainted with and convinced of its truth is removed, and it is moreover assumed that the truth “*ought* to be known,” we’d end up with a precept flatly contradicting the one with which we began. From the very first, sound reason was supposed to be sufficiently competent to express the truth; but now we’re being told that it “ought to know” the truth, an emendation indicative of its not knowing enough to say this outright. As for the content, it plays no part in the demand that one should know the truth, since this demand refers to one’s knowing generally: one is *supposed to know*—what’s demanded being then free of all specific content. Nonetheless there was mention of a specific content here, that is, of some manner of diversity within ethical substance. Yet this content, this directly evident ethical specificity, is just the sort of thing that has instead shown itself to be completely contingent—a content that, in being elevated to something universal and necessary so [M280] as to have this knowledge expressed as law, sooner pales into insignificance.

312 Another time-honored precept is “Love thy neighbor as thyself.” This is aimed at the individual in his dealings with other individuals, addressing a relationship of the person-to-person sort, one of sentiment. Efficacious love (since ineffectual love has no substantive being and is surely not what’s intended here) sets out to rid him of evil and do him some good. To this end one has to distinguish what in him is evil, what good is suited to counteract it, and in what his overall good consists. In other words I have to love him intelligently, unintelligent love being likely to do him harm, perhaps more so than hatred.

313 –But the most bounteous and important form of intelligent, substantive beneficence is judicious action on the part of the state at large, compared with which the action of the individual as such is altogether so paltry as to be hardly worth mentioning. Moreover the state’s power to act is so much greater than the individual’s that, were the latter intent upon actively opposing it—either by outright criminality or, out of love for another, by cheating the common weal out of its rightful due as well as his active participation in it—his action would be utterly futile and inevitably ruinous to him.

314 –The value of beneficence based upon sentiment reduces to that of utterly singular acts, acts of help in need, which are as circumstantial as they are short-lived. Chance determines not only the opportunity for them, but also whether they're in any sense genuine accomplishments instead of being instantly undone or even turned into something evil. Altruistic action, then, although alleged to be indispensable, is the sort of thing that *maybe* can occur in everyday life, and then again maybe not. If the opportunity perchance arises, maybe something gets accomplished, something good perhaps—or not. Hence this law has no more of an all-embracing content than the one we first considered, and doesn't, contrary to what an absolute ethical law should, express much of anything. In other words such "laws" never get beyond what "ought" to be. They've no effectual reality; they're not laws, but mere precepts. [M281]

315 But it's in fact clear from the nature of what's here the abiding concern that all claim to some universal and absolute ethical content has to be abandoned, since any attribution of specificity to this simple substance (it being essential that it be simple) is incongruous. Of itself a precept, simple and absolute, is expressive of ethical being in its immediacy. Any distinction that comes up in it is specific—and so comprises a content subordinate to the absolute universality of so simple a form of being. But since any *content* that would be absolute must on that account be abandoned, nothing remains except *formal* universality, which means no more than that it mustn't contradict itself. For universality absent content is formal; and the notion of so unqualified a content is tantamount to that of something distinct that isn't different—a content void of content.

316 And so all that this legislative mentality is left with is the sheer form of universality, indeed the tautological thinking of a consciousness that's adverse to any such content, a manner of knowing that's mindful not of anything that actually exists, any genuine content, but rather of an [utterly abstract] essence, its identicalness with itself.

317 Hence that which is ethically essential doesn't per se constitute a substantive content but is just a criterion for deciding whether or not a given content is capable of being a law—namely by not contradicting itself. Legislative reason has reduced itself to mere "probative" reason.



V.C.C. REASON THAT PUTS LAWS TO THE TEST

318 Any diversity in simple ethical substance presents that substance with contingencies such as we saw in connection with specific precepts: what happens to be known, what's the actual state of affairs, and how any action that's taken turns out. It fell to us to compare this simple mode of being with the specificity inconsistent with it, in the

course of which this simple substance turned out to consist of formalistic universality or pure consciousness that's free of any contrasting content and realizes that content involves specifics. While continuing on in the manner of an abiding concern, such universality functions otherwise in this now conscious form: it's no longer an [M282] unthinking inert genus but is focused upon the particular and validates its efficacy and truth.

319 –At first glance it seems that this consciousness is undertaking the same kind of testing that we did, and that nothing can come of its efforts beyond what's been achieved already, namely a comparing of universal and specific, once again disclosing their mutual incongruity. Yet here the relation of content to universal is different in that 'universal' has come to mean something else; it's now a formal universality applicable to any specifically defined content, since within it the content is regarded simply in relation to itself. When we were doing the testing, a universal substance stood solidly in contrast with the specifics, which unfolded in the form of contingencies evident to the consciousness imbued with that substance. Here one member of the comparison has vanished: what's matter-of-factly and validly substantial, something that's in and of itself right, is no longer the universal but rather a simplistic way of knowing, a thought-form that compares a given content solely with itself and looks to see whether it's tautological. Laws are no longer given, but tested. And for the consciousness that does the testing the laws are already given; it takes up their content just as it is without taking into consideration (contrary to what we did) the particularity and contingency attaching to its actual reality. Instead this consciousness adheres to the precept as precept, relating to it in just as simplistic a way as this precept serves as consciousness's criterion.

320 But for this reason such testing doesn't get very far; since the criterion is tautology and is thus content-indifferent, it accommodates any given content as readily as it does something contrary. –Suppose the question arises as to whether it ought to be a matter of law in and of itself that there be private property—in and of itself rather than because of its usefulness for other purposes, since the gist of what's ethical is here solely law's self-conformity, it being then based on its own nature rather than conditioned by something else. In and of itself private property isn't contradictory; it's an ad hoc specification of ownership, one set forth simply for the sake of self-consistency. Nor are nonownership, first-claim entitlement, or communal ownership self-contradictory any more so. That something belongs to nobody, or to the first who lays claim to it, or [M283] to everyone in common, each according to his need or in equal lots—all of this is simply a way of specifying, a formalized notion just like their contrary, private property.

321 –Of course if a thing that isn't owned is deemed a necessity, the object of a basic need, then it has to become the possession of some individual, and it would be incon-

sistent to make its continuing to be owner-free a matter of law. That a thing has no owner is by no means to be understood as a state of affairs that's sacrosanct; rather should things come into possession according to the need of the individual—not in order to be kept, but for direct immediate use. Yet to deal with exigencies in such an ad hoc fashion is inconsistent with just the sort of conscious being in question here. For such a being has to consider his need in overall context, take into consideration his entire existence, and secure the good for himself in a lasting way. The idea that a thing is to become at random the possession of the first self-conscious organism that happens to need it is thus inconsistent. Under a form of communism in which needs would be ongoingly and comprehensively provided for, everyone either would come to have as much as he needs—in which case any ensuing inequality would fly in the face of a consciousness whose core principle is the equality of individuals—or, in accordance with the same principle, would receive equal shares, in which case the shares would have no relation to need (this being, after all, what the concept of sharing is all about).

322 Yet if, thinking along these lines, the notion of there being no property seems inconsistent, this occurs only because it hasn't been left as a simple form of specification. The same applies to the notion of property when resolved into its moments. Thus a particular thing that's my property is deemed to be mine generally, securely, and lastingly, even though this runs counter to its nature, which consists in its being used and used up. Moreover, in being deemed mine, it's something that everyone else acknowledges to be such and excludes himself from. But in being thus acknowledged, I'm implicitly equal with everyone else, and am myself anything but exclusive. –Whatever I own is a thing—that is, an entity within the purview of others generally, existing wholly at large and unspecified in its relation sheerly [M284] to me: that I should own it is contradictory to its generic thinghood. That there be 'property' thus contradicts itself in all respects just as much as that there be 'no property at all'; each contains within it both of these tensive, contradictory moments, individuality and universality. And yet, when the one or the other is thought of without further elaboration, each of these specifications is as simple—that is, noncontradictory—as the other. Hence reason's legal criterion fits all cases equally well, and so in fact isn't a criterion at all. –It would be odd indeed if tautology, the principle of contradiction which in the context of theoretical truth functions only as a formal criterion (i.e., one indifferent to truth and untruth), were to turn out to be anything more than that in ascertaining practical truth.

323 Of the two moments under consideration, in which the essential nature of spirit had been as though an empty blank being filled in—the one setting forth directly evident specifics as integral to ethical substance, the other ascertaining whether these constitute laws—both have come to naught. What's to be concluded from this would thus appear to be that neither specific laws nor knowledge of them has any place. Yet

a substance such as this consists in consciousness of self as a manner of being whose essential nature is absolute, and hence cannot disclaim either the diversity that's integral to it or its knowledge of that diversity. That giving laws and putting them to the test have each proven futile when taken one by one in isolation is indicative of their being mere moments of ethical consciousness with no staying power of their own; and the dynamic in which they make their appearance does have significance as to form: that an ethical substance manifests itself as something that's consciously realized.

324 Inasmuch as both moments serve to focus consciousness more closely upon its abiding concern, they could be regarded as forms of an ethical "probity" which now (as generally occurs with formalistic processes) becomes preoccupied with the content of the good and the right as these *ought* to be and with putting such fixed truth to the test, thinking that in sound reason and mother wit it has discovered what empowers and validates precepts.

325 But of course absent such probity laws aren't deemed [M285] integrally essential to consciousness any more than is law-testing. Rather do these moments, each appearing straight off as a "reality unto itself," demonstrate on the one hand how actual laws are illicitly established and brought into being, and on the other how an equally illicit dispensation from them comes about. The law, as specifically defined, has a contingent content—which is here tantamount to saying that it's the law of some particular conscious being who has some arbitrary content in mind. Ad hoc law-giving such as this is a tyrannical outrage that makes caprice into law and reduces ethical uprightness to obedience to such caprice: obedience to laws that are merely laws and not conjointly precepts. So likewise with the second moment to the extent that it functions in isolation; such law-testing intimates modifying what can't be modified and is an intellectual outrage that rationalizes itself free of absolute laws, taking them to be arbitrary inventions alien to itself.

326 In both forms the orientation of these moments to ethical substance—this real essence consisting in spirit—is negative, which is to say that in them ethical substance isn't actually real. Yet such consciousness nonetheless embraces them in the form of its own immediacy, with ethical substance consisting as yet only in what the individual wills and knows: in the "ought" of a precept left unrealized and in familiarity with formalistic universality. Since both ways of going about things have nullified themselves, consciousness has found its way back into what's common to all, with these adverse orientations dissipating. Spirit's essential nature is an actual substance by virtue of these approaches being effectual not singly but only as superseded; and the unity in which they, as mere moments, then inhere is the self of a manner of conscious being who, established now within spirit's own essence, makes that essence actual, fully consummated, and self-conscious.

327 Hence for self-consciousness, spirit's own essential nature is above all else an inherent existential law. Such universality as probative reason had, which was formalistic, having no inherent bearing on existence, has been superseded. The essential nature of spirit is moreover an eternal law, one that, instead of being based on the will of a particular individual, is present to itself as what it inherently is: the pure unqualified will of all existing in the form of something directly evident. And rather than being a precept (that which merely ought to be), this will *is* and is *valid*: this law is the universal I, the category, which is a directly present actual reality, [M286] and the world it comprises is solely this reality. Inasmuch as the validity of this existential law is deemed unquestionable, a self-conscious being who heeds it isn't serving a master whose orders are arbitrary and in whom he recognizes nothing of himself. Rather are these laws inspired by his own absolute awareness, which embodies them directly within itself. He doesn't then also "believe" in them; for belief [or faith], while indeed contemplating [spirit's] essential nature, does so as though that essence were something alien. Due to the all-pervasiveness of its self, ethical self-consciousness is directly one with this essential nature, whereas faith begins with the individual conscious being and, although approaching ever more closely to such unity, never arrives at this its own essence in its full presence. –By contrast ethical consciousness has superseded itself as met with in any single individual; the mediation has been carried through; and only by having brought about this unity does it embody ethical substance's directly evident self-conscious being.

328 Self-conscious being's distinctness from this essence is thus completely transparent. The distinct elements integral to the essence itself aren't then random specifics; due to its oneness with self-consciousness (the latter being the sole possible source of any incongruity that could arise), they're instead modalities of a unity organized by being suffused with its life: spirits undivided in their self-clarity, flawless divine embodying forms that, although diverse, preserve the undefiled purity and harmonious integrity of their essence. Accordingly, self-consciousness's relation to them is likewise simple and clear: they are, and nothing more. This is what it's aware of concerning its relation [to them]. Thus does Sophocles' Antigone deem them as

the unwritten and unerring law of the gods,
not of now, not of yesterday, but alive forever,
and no one knows from whence it came.⁴

329 They *are*. If I probe into their origin and confine them to their source, then I've placed myself above them, for it is I who am now the universal, and they the

4. In his play, *Antigone*.

conditioned and limited. If they need to be legitimated by reference to my inner light, then I've already undermined their unshakable and inherent constancy, regarding them as something that may or may not be truly binding on me. Ethical [M287] sensibility consists precisely in holding firm to what's right and shunning anything that would disturb, undermine, or attempt to derive it from elsewhere.

330 –Suppose that something—a deposit, say—has been entrusted to me: it's someone else's property, and I recognize this simply because it is so, firmly maintaining this relation. If instead I keep it as my own, then according to the principle I use as test—tautology—there's no contradiction, since now I no longer consider it someone else's; and keeping something that I don't consider as someone else's is perfectly consistent. Changing one's point of view involves no contradiction; it's not the point of view as such, but the object and its content that's not supposed to contradict itself. Just as I can (and indeed do, when I give something away) change my mind about something being mine and regard it as someone else's without thereby contradicting myself, so can I just as readily proceed in the opposite direction.

331 –It isn't, then, my finding that something doesn't contradict itself that constitutes what's right; it's right because it's right. That something is someone else's property is all that matters. I've no business debating the issue, hunting for or conjuring sophisticated qualifications—or, for that matter, presuming to give laws or test them. Such mental exertions on my part serve merely to pervert this fundamental relationship, since in fact, if I'd like to, I could just as well have the very opposite be in conformity with my entirely indeterminate tautological sagacity, and make *it* the law. On the contrary, whether this determination or its opposite is the right one is decided by reference to it itself. Left to my own devices, I could make into law whichever I chose, or for that matter neither, and by initiating such tests I've already embarked on an unethical course. In taking what's right to be right in and of itself, I am within the ethical substance—it being then self-consciousness's own essence, even as self-consciousness is this substance's actual reality and presence, its self and its will. [M288]



VI

SPIRIT

1 Reason is spirit when the certainty of being all reality is raised to truth—when it is aware of itself as its world and its world as its self. The directly preceding dynamic delineated the course of spirit's emergence, in which the object of consciousness, the pure category, rose to the level of rational conception. –In observational reason this sheer unity of I and being, of presence-to-self and being-in-itself, is defined in terms of the latter, as a form of being, and reasoning consciousness goes about finding this oneness. But the truth of observation consists rather in superseding this instinctive, intuitive procedure of finding its nonconscious presence. The category intuited, the thing found, emerges in consciousness as the existence-for-self of an I that in the realm of objective being now knows itself as self. Yet the category thus defined, that of a presence-to-self that's utterly at odds with being-in-itself, is a similarly one-sided and self-sublating moment. –For that reason the category comes to be defined for consciousness as it is in its all-encompassing truth, as an entity existing both in and present to itself.

2 –This as yet abstract determination constitutive of an abiding concern is at first only a spiritual entity of sorts, and the consciousness attentive to it, in milling about through spirit's manifold content, attains only a formalistic knowledge of it. As individual, consciousness of this ilk is in fact still at variance with ethical substance, prescribing arbitrary laws or, deeming itself the seat of judgment, imagining that in its wisdom it's in possession of such laws as exist in and of themselves. –Considered with an eye to its substance, the abiding concern is a spirit-suffused essence existing self-relatedly in itself without as yet being conscious of itself as so existing. But such an entity existing self-relatedly in itself—while taking itself to be real as a conscious being, and putting itself forth as such—is spirit.

3 While its spirit-suffused essence was just characterized as ethical substance, spirit itself is constitutive of actual ethical reality. [M289] Spirit is the self of an actual conscious awareness that it confronts—or rather that is confronting itself in the form of an actual, objectively existent world, albeit one that has lost all sense of being extraneous to the self, even as the self (whether it be dependent or independent) has lost all sense of existing on its own apart from that world. As ethical substance and abiding essence, all-encompassing and self-concordant, spirit is the imperturbable, indissoluble ground and point of departure for the activity of everyone; and as the noetic inner principle of all self-conscious beings, it is their common purpose and goal.

4 –This substance is moreover a collective achievement engendering itself via the unifying and equalizing action of each and all, since it consists of the existence-for-self, the self, the action of each and all. As substance, spirit comprises an unwavering, equitable identity of self with self; but in the form of existence-for-self this substance is an entity in dissolution, a benevolent, self-sacrificial way of life within which each brings to fruition an achievement of his own, rending the existence they all have in common, and taking his portion of it for himself. Dissolving and individualizing this communal entity is the very impetus of the action and self of all—an impetus bestirring and ensouling this substance and the way of life in common thus engendered. Precisely in that this substance is existence dissolved into self, it isn't a moribund way of life but one that's vibrantly real.

5 Spirit is thus a mode of being that's self-sustaining, all-pervasive, and real. All the previous permutations of consciousness are abstractions from it, existing by virtue of its analyzing itself, differentiating its various moments while abiding with each in turn. The insularity of such moments presupposes and is sustained by spirit itself; that is, each exists solely within it, spirit being tantamount to existence itself. Viewed in isolation, they appear as though they existed on their own; but having pursued their separate courses only to return to it as their ground and essence showed that they're but ephemeral quantitative moments of it—this same essence being what moves them and dissolves them.

6 –These moments having reflected into it, spirit is by this point firmly established; we might briefly reconsider them in the present context. They were consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason. Spirit is basically consciousness (encompassing sense-certainty, perception, and understanding) when in analyzing itself it holds to the moment [M290] in which it is evident to itself as an objective, matter-of-fact reality, and abstracts from this that this reality is its own presence-to-self. When contrariwise it holds to the other moment of its analysis, in which its object *is* its presence-to-self, spirit is self-conscious. In being directly aware that it exists both in and present to itself, as a unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, spirit is consciousness in pos-

session of reason, a consciousness that (as ‘possessing’ suggests) has an object that’s rationally determined ‘in principle,’ bearing the full weight of a category but not as yet in consciousness’s own estimation. This is the manner of consciousness the examination of which has just now brought us to where we are. When such reason as spirit “possesses” is finally seen by it to *be* reason—reason that, as embodied in spirit, is both actual and comprises spirit’s world—then spirit is what it truly is: it *is* spirit, an actual ethical mode of existence.

7 Inasmuch as it is comprised in a guileless form of truth, an individual entity tantamount to an insular world, spirit is embodied in the ethical life of a whole people. Spirit has to go forth to an awareness that transcends what it is in this unmediated form, has to supersede edenic ethical life and, via a series of permutations, attain to self-knowledge. These differ from the permutations that preceded in that they’re forms of spirit realized, truly actualized—not embodiments merely of consciousness but of a world.



8 A vibrant ethical world is spirit in its pristine truth; so soon as spirit attains abstract knowledge of what it in essence is, ethical existence founders in the formalistic universality of legal right. Now internally divided, spirit objectifies one of its worlds—the cultural realm—in effect chiseling this out in hard reality, while depicting an alternate world in the element of thought—the world of faith—a realm of all that’s fundamental. But once spirit has a conceptual grasp of both these worlds, quitting the lost sense of self it has in them and delving into itself, they end up confounded and revolutionized by insight and its disseminator, enlightenment; the divided realm straddling the here and now and the realm beyond comes back [M291] within the purview of self-consciousness, which has then entered into the realm of morality, comprehending itself as what’s fundamental—an essence that’s an actual self. No longer locating its world and the conceptual basis of that world anywhere outside itself, self-consciousness lets all this fade away within it and, as conscience, is spirit certain of itself.

9 The ethical world, the world split into the here-and-now and the beyond, and the moral world-view are thus forms of spirit that, as they advance in their courses and recur upon themselves, act out the evolution of spirit’s simplex self existing for itself, their ultimate goal and outcome being spirit’s actual self-conscious emergence as spirit through and through.



VI.A. PRISTINE SPIRIT: THE ETHICAL WAY OF LIFE

10 Spirit in its simple truth is a form of conscious existence and dissevers the moments integral to it: taking action sunders spirit into substance and consciousness of that substance, and moreover disrupts both its substance and its consciousness. Ethical substance, as an all-encompassing essence and purpose, is at odds with what it is as an individually instantiated actuality. Endlessly intermediating this essence and actuality is self-consciousness, which is inherently the nexus of itself and ethical substance—with the essence becoming then present to itself in being united with the individuated actuality of a manner of self-consciousness that elevates the latter to the former (as the latter engages in ethically significant action), and that brings the former down to the latter (carrying out this purpose heretofore substantial only in thought). Self-consciousness brings about this unity of its self and ethical substance as its own achievement—and by the same stroke as an actual reality.

11 A simple ethical substance that has in part remained resistant to self-consciousness amidst the disruption of its conscious existence nonetheless in part exhibits within itself the nature of consciousness, differentiating itself internally as a world articulated into [the natural conceptual] apportionments of that substance. Ethical substance divides thus into a dichotomous ethical reality: into human law and divine law. Similarly, the self-consciousness in tension with this substance aligns, in keeping with its basic nature, with one or the other of these powers, and, as to the manner of its knowledge, ends up cognitively split: at once ignorant of and cognizant of what it is doing—being, in what it thus “knows,” self-deceived. In taking action self-consciousness accordingly experiences [M292] a contradiction ruinous to both of the powers into which ethical substance is divided, as well as a contradiction between what it knows of the ethical nature of its action and what’s ethical in and of itself—being then witness to its own undoing. Yet via this same dynamic ethical substance has in fact become *actual* self-consciousness; that is, the individual self has come into its own in and for itself—although as this occurs the ethical way of life has met its end.



VI.A.a. THE ETHICAL WORLD: HUMAN AND DIVINE LAW, MAN AND WOMAN

12 Spirit’s simple substance, consisting as it does of consciousness, is self-ramifying: just as consciousness of abstract sensuous being passes over into perception, so does immediate certainty of real ethical being turn into a form of perception; and just as, for sense-perception, simple being turns into a thing with many properties, so, for ethical perception, any given instance of action is an actuality involving multiple ethical relations. Whereas for sense-perception an unmanageable plethora of properties coalesces in one basic contrast, namely that between singular individuality and

universality, this takes place all the more for ethical perception, a clear-cut and substantive mode of awareness: the plurality of ethical moments all comes down to a duality consisting of a law of individuality and a law of universality. Each of these [conceptual] apportionments of ethical substance is nonetheless still an embodiment of spirit in its entirety. While in sense-perception things have no substance to them other than the two determinations ‘individuality’ and ‘universality,’ here the reciprocal opposition of the two aspects of ethical substance turns out to be merely superficial.

13 In the manner of being we’re considering here ‘individuality’ refers not to some single conscious being met with at random but rather to a [specific form of] self-consciousness at large: ethical substance in the definite form of something actual, consisting inviolably of spirit realized in a plurality of conscious beings, a spirit constitutive of a *community*. This is an entity of the sort we saw emerge as we delved into the practical formation of [M293] reason at large, having here come into its own in its truth as a consciousness-suffused ethical entity, an entity moreover within the purview of the consciousness that we now have as object. An entity such as this consists in spirit being present to itself (sustaining itself in the reflected image of its constituent individuals) and existing in and of itself (i.e., as a substance sustaining them within it). As an actual substance such spirit constitutes a *nation*; and as actually consciously existent, it consists in the *citizens* of a nation. This consciousness has what’s essential to it in the simple spirit [of the people]; and it has its certainty of self in the actual realm embodying that spirit—the entire nation—having its truth directly therein, hence not in something ineffectual but rather in a spirit that full well exists and makes its presence felt.

14 Spirit such as this, abiding integrally in the form of the actual self-conscious being of its constituent individuals, can be called ‘human law.’ In its all-encompassing form it is comprised in commonly acknowledged law and prevailing *custom*. And in individuated form it consists both in the actual self-certainty of each and every *individual* and in the assuredness of the simplex individual entity it forms as *governance*—the truth of which holds sway ‘openly in the light of day,’ an existent entity that, for the guilelessly sure-minded, assumes the form of a presence given free rein.

15 But confronting this, the power of the ethos and its manifest presence, there is another power: ‘divine law.’ For the political power of the ethos, as the engine of deliberate action, is beset by an antagonist in the very simplicity and straightforwardness characteristic of ethical substance. By virtue of this its actual all-pervasiveness, the power of the polis is a force inimical to individual existence-for-self; and by virtue of its basically being ‘an actual reality’ such as this, there is another [actual reality]—one other than it—right within the ‘inner essence’ of the ethos.

16 As already noted, each of these antagonistic ways in which ethical substance exists is a whole containing all the moments integral to that substance. Accordingly, while one aspect of it consists in what the community actually and deliberately does,

its other aspect has the form of an immediate or matter-of-fact substance. While this latter aspect is the inner conceptual principle of ethical existence (basically what makes it possible at all), it on the other hand also has self-consciousness as an equally integral moment. The aspect expressive of the ethical way of life in its elemental, immediate, or [M294] matter-of-fact being—consisting in direct awareness of self both as an existing entity and as a self that abides within another entity (namely a *natural* ethical community)—is the *family*. The family, as [instantiative of] a way of conceiving that is as yet unconscious and turned inward upon itself, is resistant to becoming self-consciously realized [in the public affairs of the ethos]; as the elemental constituent of the actual everyday life of the nation, the family is at odds with the nation itself; and as a manner of ethical being in its immediacy, the family is inimical to the ethical order formed and sustained by labors on behalf of the general welfare: the Penates stand opposed to the public spirit.

17 Although the ethical being of the family is definitely immediate insofar as it consists of the *natural* relation of its members—actually conjoining them directly and individually—the family isn't on that account an ethical entity, since what's ethical is inherently universal. Nonetheless this natural relation is essentially *spiritual*, and solely therein—as a spiritual entity—is it ethical.

18 –What this entity's distinctively ethical character consists in remains to be seen. To begin with, since what's of ethical relevance is inherently universal, the ethical connection between family members isn't one of sentiment—isn't a loving relationship. Now it might seem that the ethical bond would have to be located in the relation of the individual member to the family as a whole, as to his substance, so that what he does and actually is would have it alone as his purpose and purport. But the conscious aim of any action undertaken by such a whole on its own behalf is itself the individual family member. Acquiring and preserving power and wealth for the most part turn merely on need and appertain to desire; but even when pursuing some higher aim, they end up being merely intermediate to it. A higher aim of this sort, one directed at something genuinely universal—at the community—doesn't fall within the purview of the family itself. Rather is such an aim negatively disposed toward the family and consists in extricating the individual from it, subduing what he is by nature or personal inclination, and drawing him toward civic virtue, toward a life in and for the common weal.

19 –The positive purpose served distinctively by the family is directed at the individual family member as such. Now for this relationship to have ethical relevance, neither an individual who's taking action nor one who's being acted upon can appear to be involved in this incidentally—say by extending a helping hand or being done a favor. The content of ethical action has to be substantial, that is, whole [M295] and comprehensive; accordingly such action can only involve the individual in his entirety,

what he is all-inclusively. And one ought not to imagine that some service rendered the individual might further the whole of his well-being (for actually any such direct and matter-of-fact exertion affects him only in some particular)—nor that serving him via a series of educative tasks could really have as its objective to bring him forth as a whole and complete product (for what it actually accomplishes, aside from its purposely negative effect upon the family, is in scope quite limited)—nor even, finally, that coming to his rescue in time of need would in actual truth serve him in his totality (for of itself such assistance is entirely contingent, being occasioned by commonplace situations that, while they might occur, might just as well not).

20 –Thus any action that takes into account a blood relative's entire existence and has him for its object and substantive content—not as citizen (since a citizen as such doesn't belong to the family) nor as one destined to become a citizen and so cease being regarded as 'this single individual,' but rather the individual family member in sum and substance, having been divested of his sensuous, individual reality—is thus no longer concerned with the living but with the dead, with someone whose lengthy skein of episodic life experiences has been woven into one complete tapestry, and who has passed beyond life's vicissitudes into the quiescence of a simple summation. Since it's only as a citizen that he's ethically efficacious and substantial, to the extent that the individual belongs to the family and isn't a citizen he's but an ineffectual, marrowless shade.

21 Such a consummation as the individual per se attains is but a state of sheer being—namely being dead—the unmediated natural state of *having* been, thus hardly the action of a conscious entity. It's then the responsibility of some family member to see to it that this aspect of the deceased, his final state of being, his epitome, not be solely part of nature, continuing on as something nonrational, but be something *accomplished*, something to which consciousness can lay rightful claim. Or rather, since in truth the quietus and ethical universality of his self-conscious being isn't attributable to nature, the point of what the family undertakes is to dispel the specter of nature laying claim to such action as he undertook and to reestablish [M296] the truth of it.

22 –Nature's effect on the individual is an aspect of his coming to closure that turns out to be in store for any matter-of-fact being. Indeed something similar also occurs within the ethical community, and there has the community itself as purpose—laying down his life being the consummate act and highest service that the individual as such undertakes on the community's behalf. Yet insofar as he's essentially one lone individual, it's a matter of chance that his was a death directly linked to, and the result of, his labors on behalf of the common weal; and if so linked, his death is a natural negative process integral to the individual as a matter-of-fact being, one in which consciousness isn't in process of entering back into itself and becoming self-consciousness.

On the other hand, insofar as this matter-of-fact process is sublated [via the ethical community], culminating in a kind of presence-to-self [in the consciousness of others], death turns out to be that aspect of the nature-versus-self-consciousness dichotomy in which the presence-to-self thus attained is something quite other than the matter-of-fact being that started out the process. Because it is spirit in its im-mediate truth—with both of the aspects into which this spirit's consciousness splits being themselves in form unmediated, and with the individual crossing over into [death's] abstract negativity, which of itself affords no consolation or reconciliation—the ethical community must in essence embrace him by some efficacious action performed from without.

23 –Accordingly the individual's blood kin complement nature's abstractive process by bringing to bear the activity of consciousness; they interrupt the workings of nature and rescue their blood-relation from destruction—or better, since his disintegration or passage into sheer being is ineluctable, they take upon themselves the act of destroying his remains. In this way it comes to pass that even the one who's deceased, now reduced to common being [i.e., sheer matter bereft of consciousness], is restored to himself, to a presence-to-self of sorts—that a powerless and sheerly solitary individual attains to an individuality that all have in common. The deceased—his *being* released from his *doing*, the negative unity that's integral to him—is a vacant, solitary presence, a merely passive being wholly at the disposal of other entities, a being at the mercy of all primitive, unreasoning forms of individual existence as well as the forces of abstract material elements, both of which are now more powerful than is he: the former because they're alive, the latter because of their negative nature. The family protects him from the degrading effect of bestial cravings and feral creatures, replaces their activity with its own, and weds its kin to the bosom of the [M297] Earth (an elementary imperishable individual). In this way the family makes him a member of a community that prevails over and holds in check the forces of the sundry elements and lower life-forms that otherwise would have their way with him.

24 Performing this last duty thus fulfills the divine law, that is, the positive ethical service due the individual. Any other way of relating to him, any that doesn't keep within the confines of love but is ethical in character, pertains to human law and has a negative import, that of elevating him above the confines of the natural community to which he belongs as actual individual. Human justice already has for its content and power the actual substance of an ethos conscious of itself as such: the entire nation. –But divine justice and law derive theirs from a realm beyond the pale of the actual, one by no means impotent, having the power of something starkly and abstractly universal: an elementary *individuum*¹ such that, when anyone embodying the conscious

1. In Latin *individuum* means 'something indivisible' or, metonymically, 'something from which one is inseparable.' That this entity is 'elementary' should be taken in the sense that it is fundamental, as the proposition indicates.

actuality of the people severs himself from that [netherworldly] realm, it drags him back into it—into the sheer abstractness which is the foundation of his essence as well as that of the whole reality of the ethos. –How this power manifests itself among the people at large will become clearer as we proceed.



25 Now in the one law as in the other there are also variations and levels of development. For due to consciousness being an integral moment of both of these entities, there unfolds within each a diversity definitive of what drives, and in its distinctive way animates, that law. Examining such differentiations reveals how both of these entities coextensively comprehensive of the ethical world manifest themselves in practice and what manner of self-consciousness they entail, as well as how they interconnect and pass over into each other.

26 The community, the law prevailing in the upper world and having its day in the sun, has its effective vitality in governance, in which it exists as an individual entity. Governance is an actual spirit reflected into itself, the simplex self of the entire ethical substance. Indeed it's this simplex force that enables the community to branch out, imparting to each of its constituent parts a subsistence and existence-for-self of *its* own. Hereby spirit has a reality, an existential presence of its own, and the [M298] family is the elemental constituent of that reality. But spirit is also the power of the whole as such, a force that reintegrates these constituents into a negative unity, instilling in them a sense of their dependency and reminding them of the fact that they have a life of their own only within the whole. Accordingly the community may so organize itself as to systematically accommodate both personal independence and property as well as personal and material legal rights, while on the other hand apportioning the diverse ways of working for initially particular ends (gain and enjoyment) among private and independent associations.

27 –The spirit of association common to all such self-segregating organizations is their single-mindedness and their negative character. Lest they take root and become firmly established in their separateness—which would lead to the breakup of the whole and the dispersal of its spirit—governance must from time to time shock them to the core by resorting to war, thus throwing their orderly arrangements into utter confusion and violating their right to independence; as for individuals fully committed to such organizations—those who stand apart from the whole, striving only for inviolable self-orientedness and personal security—in the toils of strife thus imposed, they're given a real taste of their lord and master, death. By disrupting the form in which such organizations sustain themselves, spirit prevents the ethical order from degenerating into a merely natural condition, preserving and furthering in freedom and strength the manner of self that embodies its consciousness. This negative entity—the self—

proves to be the real might of the commonwealth and the power by which it preserves itself, its sway being thus validated and reinforced in this entity essential to both divine law and the nether realm.

28 The divine law governing the family has distinct elements of its own, the inter-relation of which forms the animating dynamic of its actual reality. Among the three relationships husband and wife, parents and children, brother and sister, it's initially in the relationship of husband and wife that one consciousness discerns itself directly in another and moreover discerns that this recognition is mutual. Being natural rather than ethical, such discernment is representational, a mere depiction [M299] of spirit rather than actual spirit itself. Just as representation or depiction has its actual reality in something other than it, so too with this relationship, which isn't fully realized within itself but in the offspring it engenders—itsself passing away in this changeover of generations that recurs time and again in the life of the nation.

29 –The mutual devotedness of husband and wife is thus mingled with natural attachment as well as sentiment, and their relationship isn't self-contained—as is also true of the second relationship, the mutual devotedness of parents and children. The devotion of parents to their children is affected by emotion, parents being aware that their reality is present in these others whom they see, without recompense, come into *their* own, carrying on as a different reality existing on its own. The devotion of children to parents, conversely, is emotionally affected by the fact that they come into being as who they are in themselves at the expense of another generation that passes away, and that they exist for themselves and attain their distinctive self-consciousness only by separating from their source—a separation in the process of which the source itself is spent.

30 The husband-wife and parent-child relationships keep within the transitory and dissimilar roles into which they're divided. Between brother and sister, however, an unmixed relationship holds. They're of the same blood, but in them this has attained a certain stability and repose. As such they don't covet one another, nor have they given to or received from one another what they are in their own right, they being instead autonomous individuals vis-à-vis each other. While having, in the sister, its highest presentiment of the nature of an ethical way of life, femininity does not, in her, come to consciously realize or actually embody what that nature is—the law of the family being an inherently inner nature, one that doesn't dwell in the daylight of conscious existence but remains an inner feeling and a divine concern remote from the actual realm. Femininity is bound to the Penates, seeing in them its overall substance as well as itself as individualized—this being a relationship involving the individual but not the natural relation of concupiscence. As daughter, a woman inevitably views the passing-away of her parents with natural emotion—and yet also with [M300] a certain equanimity since only at the expense of this relationship is she able to come into her own, which she thus hardly sees taking place in any positive sense via them.

31 –Now the roles of mother and wife involve individuality as something partly natural and pleasurable, partly negative and discernibly ephemeral, and for this reason partly contingent, these being interchangeable roles. In the ethical domain the capacities in which a woman functions aren't based upon this particular man, this particular child, but rather in *some* man, in having offspring—not upon sentiment but on something quite generic. The ethical character of a wife's role differs from that of a husband in that, even as she pursues her individual destiny and derives such pleasure as she does, she remains directly mindful of the overall picture and is a stranger to the individualistic aspect of desire. In the husband, by contrast, the universal and individual aspects diverge; and since he, as citizen, is self-consciously in possession of public power, not only does the right to indulge his desire accrue to him, but he also retains the freedom to forgo such. Accordingly, when the wife's relationship to the husband is mixed with individuality, its ethical character isn't pure—although to the extent that it is pure, individuality is beside the point, and the wife is deprived of the experiential moment of knowing herself as this particular self in the other.

32 –To a sister, by contrast, her brother is basically a dispassionate being like herself, and the recognition she receives from him *is* pure as well as uncomplicated by natural entanglements. The irrelevant and ethically contingent nature of individuality isn't at issue in this relationship. Rather is something of moment—the individual self—here in position to assert its right to recognize and be recognized, since here the self is involved in a balanced relation of consanguinity sans concupiscence. For a sister the loss of a brother is thus irreparable, and her duty toward him is of the highest order.

33 This relationship is moreover poised on the threshold at which the self-containedness of the family begins to unravel and turn outward. The brother embodies that aspect of the family in which its spirit assumes an individuality standing face-to-face with other such spiritual entities and makes the transition to a conscious concern with public matters. The brother leaves behind the guileless, rudimentary, and hence, properly speaking, negative [M301] ethical status of the family in order to bring forth and secure his family's self-consciously actual ethical reality.

34 The brother passes from the divine law, under whose aegis he'd thus far been living, into human law. The sister meanwhile becomes, or the wife remains, head of the household and warder of the divine law. In this way the sexes surmount their natural state and attain ethical significance as diverse elements apportioning between them the two distinct forms that ethical substance assumes. Each of these two generic life modes of the ethical world has its own distinctive form of individuality in a distinct natural form of self-consciousness, since ethical spirit is a direct union of substance and self-consciousness—a direct oneness that's thus at the same time matter-of-factly evident in the form of a natural diversity in keeping with the aspect [of individuality] involving reality and diversity. This is the same aspect we previously

encountered in a manner of individuality that, conceiving of the essential nature of spirit in terms of an 'original determinative nature,' regards itself as being self-containedly real. The haziness still evident in that experiential moment, with its fortuitous array of aptitudes and capabilities, is now gone, it all having been narrowed down to a contrast between the two sexes, with their natural roles taking on ethical significance.

35 The difference between the sexes and its ethical implications perdure even though ethical substance is unitary; and it's precisely the stirrings of this difference that keep bringing that unity into being. The husband is sent forth by the familial spirit into the community, finding there his self-conscious identity; and just as via him the family attains its public substantiality and standing, so conversely the community has in the family the formative rudiment of its actual reality, and has in the divine law its strength and confirmation. Neither exists in and of itself alone. Via the dynamism animating it, the human law emerges from the divine, and is even then returning to that from whence it came—just as the law of the upper world emerges from the chthonic, the conscious from the unconscious, and mediation from immediacy. By contrast the power of the nether world has its actual reality above ground, becoming, in and through conscious existence, an actively engaged presence.



36 [M302] All-pervasively essential to the ethos are thus its substance as embodied in the consciousness of the public at large and its substance as embodied in individualized conscious existence. While these have their generic reality in the nation and the family respectively, they also have a distinctive natural identity and are actively individualized in husband and wife. In this, the substantive content of the ethical world, we see attained the ends at which the preceding, insubstantial embodiments of consciousness had been aiming. What reason apprehended merely as an object has here turned out to be self-conscious, while what was implicit within self-consciousness is here present as genuinely actual.

37 –What observational reason took to be something found already present, something in which the self had no hand, is here an ethos found to be already there, albeit a reality that's at the same time the act and achievement of the one finding it. –Here the individual seeking pleasure in the enjoyment of his individuality finds this in the family, while the necessity in which his pleasure-seeking meets its end is his own self-conscious existence as citizen of his nation: his self-consciousness consists in his realizing that the law of the heart is the law of *all* hearts, that to be conscious of self is to recognize the order common to everyone—consists in virtue that enjoys the fruits of its sacrifice and accomplishes what it sets out to do, making the ethical way of life actually present and finding gratification in public service. –Finally, the consciousness

mindful of its abiding concern achieves satisfaction in a real substance that, in a positive way, contains and maintains the abstract moments of what had been but an empty category. This substance has an authentic content in the powers of the ethical order, a content replacing the insubstantial precepts that “sound reason” would sagely divulge—hence a substantive, inherently definitive standard for testing not the laws but what is done.

38 The whole is formed of all its parts in stable equilibrium, with each part having an indigenous spirit that seeks satisfaction not beyond but rather within itself by being itself in equilibrium with the whole. Now of course the only way that this equilibrium can have any life to it is for some manner of inequality to emerge within it and then be justly restored to equality. Justice, however, is neither something beyond and foreign to actual reality nor on the other hand a reality unworthy of the name, one characterized by reciprocal [M303] malice, treachery, ingratitude, and so on, administering the law with such thoughtless arbitrariness as to be conceptually incoherent as well as feckless in what it does and doesn’t do. Rather does justice in the form of human right bring the imbalanced self-orientedness of independent-minded classes and individuals back into the common weal, thus constituting the just governance of the nation: the body politic’s own individuality as present to itself and the distinctive self-conscious will of all.

39 –Yet the same justice that, in getting the upper hand over the individual, brings the commonwealth back into equilibrium is also embodied in the singular spirit of the individual who suffered injustice, and isn’t broken up into the one who suffered the wrong and some entity over and above him. He is himself a chthonic force, and it is *his* fury that wreaks vengeance, since his individuality, his blood, lives on in the patriarchal house; what he in sum and substance is, is there enduringly real. In the ethical realm the only wrong that can be done the individual is for something to “just happen” to him. The power that perpetrates injustice of that sort against the conscious individual, in effect making him sheerly into a thing, is nature—not the doing of the community at large, but the abstract pervasiveness of sheer being; and in righting the wrong thus suffered, the individual turns not against the community (for it isn’t at its hands that he suffered) but against this sheerly abstract manner of existence. As we saw, the consciousness of the individual’s blood kin rights this wrong in such a way that a mere happening is turned instead into a kind of achievement, so that the final being of the deceased, his demise, becomes as it were deliberate and in that sense welcome.

40 In this way the ethical realm is sustained without blemish, a world untainted by internal dissension. Moreover its dynamic effects an orderly transition from each of its motive powers to the other, so that each preserves and brings forth the other. We of course see that it’s split into two fundamental components actualized in two ways—

but whenever these conflict, each sooner confirms the other; and wherever they come into direct contact as actualized, their intermediating element consists in their each directly pervading the other. Through the individuality of the male, one of these extremes, the self-conscious spirit oriented to the common good, [M304] is tied to the other extreme, an unconscious spirit, as to its motive force and element.

41 –Divine law, by contrast, is individualized—that is, the individual’s unconscious spirit has its actual presence—in woman, through whom as intermediary this spirit emerges from a nonactual state to become an actual reality and rise from the unknowing and unknown into the conscious realm. The conjoining of husband and wife actively intermediates the whole and is the element which, even while bifurcated into extremes (namely divine law and human law), brings these into direct union, converting the two initial syllogisms into one and the same syllogism, taking their opposite dynamics—the man’s descent from the realm of the actual (human law organized in accordance with its independent constituents) to that of the nonactual (facing mortal danger and proving himself by going to his death) and the ascent of the woman (the law of the nether world) into a conscious presence and actual existence in the light of day—and conjoining them into one.



VI.A.b. ETHICAL ACTION: KNOWLEDGE HUMAN AND DIVINE, GUILT AND DESTINY

42 The tension integral to this realm is so constituted that self-consciousness has yet to emerge in its own right in the form of singular individuality; to one of the sides here in contention, individuality matters solely as befits the common will, to the other simply as befits the family bloodline: [either way] the individual counts as something not yet actually real, a bare “shadow” [of an individual]. –No action has been taken yet, even though it’s in its act that the effectual self consists. An act disrupts the stable order and workings of the ethical world. What appears orderly and harmonious in the two fundamental components of this world, each of which validates and completes the other, is turned by such an act into an escalating antagonism in which each demonstrates not the validity but the nullity of itself and the other—is turned into a negative dynamism, one timelessly necessitated, a terrible Destiny swallowing up law, both human as well as divine, within its abyssal simplicity [M305] along with both of the modes of self-consciousness in which these powers exist: a process that, as we’ll see, passes into the sheer and utter self-orientedness of individualistic self-consciousness.

43 While this dynamic has the ethical realm as the ground from which it originates and upon which it proceeds, what effectuates it is self-consciousness. A self-conscious being mindful of his ethos is focused purely and simply upon what’s indispensable to that ethos: duty. Such self-consciousness, having disclaimed prescribing and testing

laws, isn't arbitrary, let alone conflicted or indecisive in determining what to do; rather does it regard the substantive essence of ethical life as straightforward, unwavering, and entirely free of contradiction. –Thus here we see neither a sorry spectacle of passion colliding with duty, nor a comical spectacle of duty colliding with duty. There's no collision the content of which would effectively have passion colliding with duty, since [on the one hand] to be passionate in the performance of duty can itself be portrayed as a duty, while [on the other] any consciousness that withdraws into itself outside the straightforwardly substantial way of life integral to duteousness turns duty (as we've already seen) into a formalistic universal accommodating one content as readily as another. As for a collision of duties being comical: such a collision would disclose the contradictoriness of an absolute [commitment] that is utterly at odds with another—with each so-called absolute or duty being right then and there null and void.

44 –Ethical-minded consciousness, by contrast, knows what it has to do and is decisive in its allegiance, be it to divine law or human law. The straightforward manner of its decisiveness is intrinsic to its very being, and so also has to it the tenor of something that's natural, as we've seen—it being nature, not accidents of circumstance or choice, that assigns one sex to one law, the other to the other law—or conversely it's via the two sexes that the two ethical powers come to be actualized as they are and have the individual presence that they do.

45 Now since ethical-mindedness consists notably in this straightforward decisiveness regarding the two laws, so that for such a consciousness one and only one law is fundamental—and since on the other hand it's in the self of each such consciousness that the ethical powers [M306] are real—these powers bespeak mutual exclusiveness and antagonism; and while this is fully evident to self-consciousness, it's only latently so in the ethical realm. Due to its being decisively committed to just one of the two powers, ethical consciousness consists basically in *character*: that both powers are equally essential isn't evident to it, their antagonism appearing then simply as the ill-starred collision between duty and a reality bereft of law. To the extent that it's self-conscious, ethical consciousness is caught up in this clash, and as such promptly sets out to subdue by force or guile any reality at odds with the law to which it adheres. Seeing right solely on one side, wrong on the other, the consciousness adhering to divine law views the other as sheer arbitrarily imposed human brutality; the one adhering to human law sees in the other the stubbornness and intractability of self-impacted existence-for-self. The decrees of governance, after all, convey their intent publicly in the light of day, whereas the will of the other law bespeaks a netherworldly import locked within, the existence of which appears as the will of a solitary individual and, in contradicting human law, as something outrageous.

46 In this way there arises within consciousness a tension between the known and the unknown comparable to that between the conscious and the unconscious in ethical

substance; and so the unrestricted right of ethical-minded self-consciousness comes into conflict with the divine right that's essential to the ethos. For self-consciousness as a form of consciousness, actual objective reality is as such something essential. Ethical self-consciousness, however, in keeping with its substance, is a unity of itself and this essential objective reality—which runs counter to it; and because ethical self-consciousness is abidingly mindful of its substance, this object running counter to it has lost all sense of being all by itself essential.

47 –Just as those horizons of experience within which consciousness's object consists merely in some manner of 'thing' have long since receded, so also have those in which consciousness fixates upon something outside it and construes that single moment as essential. Against such one-sidedness actual reality has a power of its own: it stands in league with truth as against that manner of consciousness, and proceeds to show the latter what the truth actually [M307] is.

48 –But from the chalice of absolute substance ethical consciousness has quaffed oblivion, forgetting all the one-sided ways of self-oriented existence with its narrow objectives and eccentric ways of conceiving, and in this Stygian water has thus by the same stroke drowned all that's properly essential to objective reality along with everything that points to its having any sort of independent status. So by rights it perfectly befits such a mentality that, when conducting itself in accordance with the ethical law, it find nothing actualized other than the fulfillment of this very law, and that its action manifest nothing save doing what's ethical.

49 –Being at once absolutely essential and efficacious, ethical action cannot abide any perversion of its inherent content. Were it just absolutely essential yet powerless, it could find itself turned awry by individuality. But ethically minded individuality, in abandoning one-sided self-orientedness, has renounced all such perversity. Conversely sheer power alone, were it still one-sidedly self-oriented, would end up deviating from what's ethically of the essence. Due to this unity of essence and power, individuality is the pure form of the substance comprising the ethical content; and action is what effects the transition from thought to actual reality (action consisting here merely in the dynamic of a shadowy opposition the moments of which have no special content and character to distinguish them one from the other). Hence, by [seemingly] inviolable right, it befits such ethical-mindedness that an act on its part—the very embodiment of its actual reality—be in no wise other than as known by it.

50 Nevertheless the ethos has split itself into two laws, while its consciousness, undivided in its commitment to "the" law, ends up consigned to but one. Just as this single-minded consciousness insists that by inviolable right what's ethically of the essence has been disclosed to it exactly as it is in itself, so does the ethos by rights insist on being what it is in reality, namely dualized. Moreover this, the right inherent in what's ethically essential, rather than standing opposite self-consciousness as though

existing somewhere outside it, is self-consciousness's own essence. In this alone does the ethos have such presence and power as it does, and its conflicted character is self-consciousness's doing. For self-consciousness, precisely in regarding itself as self and taking in hand to act, rouses itself from its simple straightforwardness and brings about on its own a division within the ethos. By this act it relinquishes ethical definitiveness, the single-minded certainty of its embodying [M308] the straight truth, rending itself asunder—into itself as agent vis-à-vis a reality négative of it. By such an act it thus incurs guilt. For this is its own action, and it is in action that its ownmost being consists; moreover guilt portends transgression: in its ethical single-mindedness consciousness has allied itself with the one law, broken with the other, and by its own deed violated the latter.

51 –Now guilt isn't some casual, ambiguous affair in which a deed as actually performed in the light of day might or might not be the self's own act, as though something extraneous and incidental could be linked with it to exculpatory effect. Rather is action itself divisive, an assertion of self as against an alien external reality; that there even is such a reality is inherent in, and due to, action. Guiltlessness is thus but inaction, a state of being not so much like that of a child as that of a stone.

52 –As for its content, ethical action has transgression as an integral moment because it doesn't resolve the natural assignment of the sexes to two laws, remaining instead unswervingly oriented to "the" law in keeping with what's directly natural to it; moreover as an act, it turns its one-sidedness into guilt by embracing only one side of the ethos and conducting itself negatively toward—that is, violating—the other.

53 –How transgression and guilt, action and endeavor, play out in ethical life at large will be discussed in more detail later. This much is readily clear: it isn't "this single individual" who acts and is guilty, since as *this* self he's a shadowy unreality. In other words, he's but a common self, and individuality constitutes sheerly the formal impetus of whatever is done, while the substantive content of ethical being is comprised in the laws and customs, and (for the individual specifically) in the laws and customs relevant to his station. The ethical-minded individual exemplifies ethical substance existing in the manner of a genus that, via its specificity, is in fact turning into a species—but doing so while continuing on as a universal, a genus. Within a people, self-consciousness descends from the universal only into *communal* particulars, not into those of singular individuality, which in self-conscious action establishes an *exclusive* self and concomitantly a reality négative of it. [M309] The endeavors of a people's self-consciousness serve rather to lay the foundation of a secure trust in the entire ethos, untainted by anything alien, neither by fear nor hostility.

54 In taking action, ethical self-consciousness, whether it had committed to divine or to human law, comes to experience the fully developed nature of effectual action. Whichever law it takes to be self-evident is by its very nature linked with the opposing

law. The ethos is the unity of the two, but self-consciousness's act has carried out only the one at the expense of the other. But with the one law by nature bound to the other, fulfilling the one rouses the other: whichever was violated is now hostile and demands revenge for the act perpetrated against it. Only one side of the overall decision to act is evident to the agent; but a decision is inherently negative, confronting the decider—who's supposedly in the know—with something other than what he'd resolved to do, something altogether different.

55 –This other side foreign to his way of knowing is something that actual reality keeps hidden, not showing it as it is in and of itself to consciousness—to the son who strikes down the one giving insult (his father) and who takes to wife a queen (his mother). For this ethically self-conscious individual there thus lies in wait a power that shuns the light, bursting forth only once he has undertaken the deed, catching him in the act. The deed that was done undoes the difference between the knowing self and the reality besetting him. The one who acts can disclaim neither the transgression nor his guilt: what he does sets the unmoved into motion and brings out into the open what until then lay secreted in sheer possibility, hence binding unconscious to conscious, what isn't to what is. Thus, in truth such as this, to act is to venture into the sunlight—wherein conscious is bound to unconscious, self bound to what's alien—as a sundered entity whose other aspect, as consciousness comes to experience, is indeed its own, albeit in the form of a power that it has violated and roused to hostility.

56 It may well be that for the acting consciousness the ethical right that lay in ambush, rather than being present in proper guise, is at hand only implicitly, in the guilt one feels within once one has decided and acted. But ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt [M310] clearer, if, having prior knowledge of the law and power it opposes, deeming them to be coercive and unjust—to be ethically arbitrary—it knowingly, as did Antigone, commits the crime. The performance of such a deed reverses the perspective of ethical consciousness; performing it is itself a declaration that what's ethical must be actual: that this end be made actual is the purpose of the action. To act ethically is to assert in no uncertain terms that what's actual and what's ethically substantial are one and the same—that what's actually real is integral to rather than accidental to the ethos—admitting of no right that isn't a true right. Because this is the way things actually are, and on account of what it has itself done, ethical consciousness is obliged to acknowledge its antagonist as being integral to its own reality—must acknowledge its guilt:

Because of what we suffer, we acknowledge that we have erred.²

2. Sophocles, *Antigone*.

57 What this acknowledgment expresses is that the rift between ethical purpose and reality has been closed, marking a return to a sensibility whose apprehension of the ethical is that nothing matters save what's right. But this has the agent so much as surrendering his personal character as well as the reality of his very self—having thus met his downfall. Although his being consists in adhering to his ethical law as to his very substance, as he acknowledges his antagonist the law to which he adheres ceases in his eyes to be of such substance, becoming instead something unreal rather than real, a mere matter of opinion. While it's true that this substance comes to light within individuality as the latter's pathos (individuality being what actually lives out this substance and in so doing outlives it), this same substance is also a pathos that's part and parcel of the individual agent's character. Ethical individuality is directly and inherently one with this, the agent's sum and substance, having existence solely therein, and is unable to survive the downfall that this ethical power suffers at the hands of the one antagonistic to it.

58 But thereby ethical individuality is assured that in the pathos it endures at the hands of the power it antagonized, it suffers no more harm than it inflicts. The reciprocal dynamic of the ethical powers attains (as does that of the individual entities animating and actuating them) its true end only to the extent that both sides experience the same demise. For there's nothing about either power that makes it a more essential moment of ethical substance than [M311] the other. With both alike essential, and with each abiding without regard for the other, such being as they possess has no self; they do indeed exist as entities unto themselves—albeit ones so at variance as to contradict the integrity of the self, ensuring their illegitimacy and inevitable downfall. —So too with character, which, in keeping with its pathos or substance, adheres to but one of these powers, dissociating, in accordance with what it knows of the one or the other, into cognizance attended by ignorance. And since each itself elicits this tension—by its act even turning ignorance into something it achieved—each invites the guilt that consumes it. Any victory of one power and character, and defeat of the other, would thus be only a partial win or loss, an incomplete achievement in a ceaseless advance toward mutual equilibrium. Only in the equal subjection of both sides is unqualified right achieved, with ethical substance rising up in the form of an all-powerful and evenhanded fate, a négative power that consumes both.



59 Taking into account what these two powers specifically involve and how they're individuated provides us a picture of how the conflict between them is structured. In form, ethical reality and self-consciousness are in contention with brute nature and the vicissitudes it occasions—with nature asserting its right against self-consciousness since the latter consists strictly in authentic spirit, abiding solely in unmediated oneness with its own substance. As for its content, this conflict presents itself as a rift between divine and human law.

60 –A certain youth leaves behind the carefree way of life he had in the family and rises to individual prominence in the community. But it's soon evident that he's still subject to nature's influence—the very thing from which he meant to emancipate himself—owing to the fortuitous circumstance that he's one of two brothers who've with equal right come forth to take control of the community (the fact that one was born before the other being but a natural disparity of no significance to them upon engaging in the affairs of the ethos). Governance, on the other hand, as the simple soul or self of the people's spirit, can scarcely abide the dualization of its own individuality—even as nature encroaches via this plurality of contenders, a contingency counter to the ethical necessity of unitary governance. The two brothers thus come into contention and end up destroyed by their equal right to political power—both being equally [M312] in the wrong.

61 –From the perspective of human law, the one who was out of power was the perpetrator of a crime in assaulting the community at whose head the other stood, whereas the one who had the good sense to seize upon the other only in isolation from the community, driving the latter off while thus vulnerable, was in the right—having attacked only an individual as such, not the community, not the crux of human right. While the community, attacked and defended thus by vain individuality, manages to survive, the two brothers meet their end at each other's hands; for individuals who, to advance themselves, are prepared to imperil the whole community have thrust themselves out from it and are as good as dead. But while the community will honor the one whom it found on its side, governance (the now reestablished simplicity of the community's self) will punish the one who at its walls had as much as vowed to lay waste to it, denying him the last honor. He who undertook to assault consciousness's highest embodiment of spirit, that of the community, must be stripped of honor in the very sum and substance of his being, his dignity as a departed spirit.

62 But all that the body politic has managed to do in so casually knocking off the bare tip of its pyramid and prevailing over the family, the rebellious principle of individuality, is to embroil itself in a struggle with divine law, its self-conscious spirit with the unconscious. For the divine law is a power indispensable to the body politic's self-conscious spirit, and doesn't end up destroyed by the latter—just outraged by it. Yet against the mighty law having its day in the sun, all that the latter power has to help do its bidding is a bloodless shade. As the law of things faint and dim, the unconscious spirit, prevailing not upon the earth but only in the nether realm, yields at first to the law and force holding sway in the realm of day. –But having deprived the inner realm of *its* power and honor, the actual order has undermined its essence. The strength of the public spirit is rooted in the nether world: only when the communal substance is oblivious and mute—only in the waters of forgetfulness—does the certainty of a people sure of itself and self-affirming validate the oath binding all into one.

63 –With this the full realization of the public spirit [M313] turns into the very opposite, experiencing its supreme right as the most egregious of wrongs, its triumph as its downfall. The dead brother whose right to burial was violated knows full well where to find the instruments of his revenge, ones as real and effective as the power that did him wrong. These powers are other communities—dogs or birds having defiled their altars with the remains of the deceased. He, left lying exposed on the ground in the actual realm above rather than having been raised to a commonality beyond the pale of conscious existence by being duly interred within the earth, is now afforded an actual, self-conscious universality as the force implementing the divine law. Roused to animosity, these other communities destroy the one that dishonored and violated familial piety, the very source of its strength.

64 As thus portrayed, the necessity bestirring human and divine law is brought to light by individuals in whom what they all have in common appears as pathos; and what this dynamic does is manifest in their individual action, giving what's being necessitated the appearance of contingency. But individuality and action are actually constitutive of the principle of singularity, which in its pure universalized form had been hallowed as the inner divine law. An integral moment of the visible community, the divine law isn't efficacious only as the power of the nether realm nor, in its actual presence, as an external force: its presence and dynamic is no less visible amidst the people at large. What, taken in this form, had been depicted simply as pathos played out on an individual scale looks quite different, while the crime and resultant destruction of the community assume a form in keeping with the way they really occur.

65 –Thus in its public presence (the community), human law—having masculinity as its primary means of enactment, and governance as its practical application—exists, functions, and sustains itself at the expense of the separateness of the Penates, the independent matriarchal family units it dissolves within its own fluid continuity. But even so, the family is human law's primary elemental constituent, and individual consciousness is the basis upon which it is publicly [M314] implemented. And since the community is able to sustain itself only by disrupting familial felicity and dissolving self-consciousness into the common weal, it turns femininity as such—suppressed by it and yet indispensable to it—into an enemy within. The female, the eternal irony of the community, conspires to divert governance from a public to a private aim, transform public business into the dealings of some particular individual, and turn public property into a possession and ornament of the family. She ridicules the somber wisdom of the elders (deadened, as they are, to personal individuality, to pleasure and enjoyment as well as to any real activity—thinking and caring only about public affairs), making it an object of wanton derision for callow youths, something to scorn, as they do with such enthusiasm. She asserts that the strength of youth is above all what counts—exalting her son as lord of the one who bore him, lauding the brother in

whom the sister finds a man who's her peer, and extolling the youth through whom her daughter is delivered from dependency and attains the satisfaction and dignity of womanhood.

66 –The community, though, can sustain itself only by suppressing this individualistic spirit; yet because the latter is crucial to it, the community, in adopting a suppressive policy, is actually regenerating this spirit—and indeed as a principle hostile toward it. But this individualistic principle, in deviating from communal aims, would be plainly miscreant and of no account, not to mention incapable of accomplishing anything, if the community itself didn't acknowledge that in the strength of its youth (despite their immature masculinity being still caught up in individualistic concerns) lies the strength of the whole. That's because such a community comprises a nation—is itself a form of individuality and basically exists in its own right only inasmuch as other such individual entities exist in relation to it, inasmuch as it isolates itself from them and knows enough to keep itself independent of them. Internally suppressive of the solitary existence of its individual constituents yet outwardly autonomous in its activities, the negative aspect of the community has in individuality the very weapons it needs.

67 –War is the spirit and form in which the fundamental moment of ethos-based substance—its existing as an entity unto itself in complete independence from all other existing entities—is actualized and confirmed. War lets [M315] the various clusters of ownership and personal autonomy, as well as individual personhood itself, get a real taste of the force of negation; on the other hand in war there emerges precisely the negative agency that is the preserver of the whole ethos: the valiant youth who rouses the passions of the womenfolk, this pent-up principle of destruction, strides forth thus as something of inestimable value. Natural strength and what looks like a roll of the dice are what's now decisive for the existence of the ethos and its spiritual exigencies; and since its very existence now depends upon strength and fortune, the demise of the ethos is a foregone conclusion. –Whereas before only the Penates meet their downfall in the spirit of a nation, here the living spirits of entire nations, by virtue of their individuality, meet theirs in an all-encompassing commonwealth whose monofarm commonality is spiritless and lifeless, its sole claim to vitality being the individual in his singularity. Thus does spirit's ethos-based modality vanish, with a new one arising in its place.

68 The collapse of the ethical substance and its transition into another embodiment are assured, then, by the fact that ethos-minded consciousness is oriented to law in an essentially im-mediate way. At this level of functioning—immediacy—it is implicit that in ethical action *nature* enters in at every turn. What she in her reality makes manifest is but the contradictoriness and seed of destruction lurking within the very unanimity and balance of the ethical spirit, for all its beauty and poise. Such im-

mediacy paradoxically entails both the placid obliviousness met with in nature and the self-conscious, disquieting quiescence of spirit. Because of its rootedness in nature, this ethos-oriented nation is first and foremost a form of individuality defined—and hence confined—by nature, finding itself sublated within another form of individuality. The determinate character of an ethos, in being established as a matter-of-fact presence, is confined to set limits; moreover, as an altogether negative mode of being, it passes away along with the self characteristic of this manner of individuality; the life of this spirit and the substantive self-consciousness of all who lived in this way are then lost. With this substantive reality no longer abiding in these individuals as a living spirit, there now emerges in them a manner of individuality that is comprehensive in form only, [M316] the simple solidarity of their bygone individuality having burst apart into myriad points.



VI.A.C. LEGAL STATUS

69 The generic unity into which the vibrant and guileless unity of individuality and ethical substance reverts is a commonality that has no spirit, having ceased to be the unselfconscious substance of its constituent individuals—a commonality in which individuals are now reckoned, in keeping with their individualistic self-orientedness, as selves and substantive entities existing on their own. The cohesiveness of the ethical community having atomized into an innumerable plurality of individuals, all that there is to this now defunct spirit is a manner of equality in which each counts the same as the others—namely as a ‘person.’ What in the ethical world was called the hidden ‘divine law’ has in fact emerged from its inner recesses into the realm of actual reality. In the inner realm the individual was reckoned, and indeed was, actual solely as constituent of his extended family’s bloodline. As a solitary being he was but a selfless departed spirit, yet now the individual has emerged from this nonactual manner of being. But since ethical substance is spirit only in pristine form, the individual has no recourse but to return to such certainty as he has in himself; while he exemplifies the positive universality of that substance, his actual reality is that of a pervasively negative self. –We saw the ethical world’s two powers and their respective embodiments end up engulfed in a monolithic necessity, an abyssal destiny. The compelling force of this world is a self-reflecting substance in its simplicity; but the unrestricted entity that’s here reflecting into itself, precisely this necessity, this abyssal destiny, is none other than the I of self-consciousness.

70 The I is thus henceforth deemed an entity existing in and for itself. Its being recognized *is* its substantive being—an abstract form of universality in that its content is such and such obdurate self, not a self that’s dissolved in the ethical substance.

71 Thus personal identity has here ventured beyond a substantively ethical way of life, consisting now in consciousness having actually validated independence. Previously an ineffectual idea of independence—such as is had by resigning from the actual realm—was forthcoming in the form of Stoical [M317] self-consciousness. And just as that form of self-consciousness emerged from the master-slave relationship, that is, from self-consciousness as present in its immediacy, so here personal identity has emerged from a spirit that directly embodies a general will that both dominates all and is the obedient servant of all. What appeared in Stoicism as an inner principle existing only in abstraction now constitutes an actual world—it being none other than Stoicism that consciously fashions the principle [of that world], that is, legal status, autonomy absent spirit, into the abstract formality that it is. Via its flight from the actual this mentality achieved autonomy in thought alone, abiding entirely by itself in that it doesn't link its concerns with anything that actually exists but, giving up on such, invests its whole being solely in the unitariness of pure thought. Accordingly a person's legal right has nothing to do with enriching or empowering the existence of the individual *per se*, nor with invigorating the public spirit, but instead has to do with the sheer unit constitutive of the individual's abstract reality, the solitary atom typifying self-consciousness.

72 Now just as such effectual realization as Stoicism achieved was exhibited in a sheerly abstract form of autonomy, this latest mode of autonomy repeats the process. Stoicism paves the way to a mode of consciousness caught up in a skeptical muddle, a nattering negativism meandering formlessly from one fortuitously encountered state of affairs and way of thinking to another, deconstructing and reconstructing them all in its sheer and utter autonomy—an out-and-out contradictory consciousness at once autonomous and anything but autonomous. What comes of the personal independence that legal right affords is much the same: pandemic confusion and dissolution on all sides. For what's here deemed indispensable is self-consciousness present as a sheer solitary cipher, a 'person.' In contrast to this vacuous generality, ethical substance still retains the form of something substantively realized and laden with content—a content now left wholly at loose ends, since the spirit that once held it in check, keeping it integrated within its unity, is no longer present.

73 –To exist as a 'person'—a cipher—is thus in reality to exist altogether at random, scurrying busily about to no lasting effect. Hence as with Skepticism, formalistic legal right, in keeping with its own conception as being devoid of any [M318] distinctive content, finds a manifold sustaining medium in possessions, and inscribes on them (again as did Skepticism) the abstract universal called 'property.' While Skepticism dismisses as a sham anything real that's specified as property and ascribes to it only negative value, in the context of legal right it has positive worth. Its negative value consists in its pointing to a self that exists in the way that thought does, as something inherently universal, whereas its positive value consists in its being "mine" in a categorical sense,

something of recognized and actual worth. Both add up to the same thing, an abstract universal: what actual substantive content the ‘mine’ involves and what exactly it specifies (whether this consists in some external possession or even inner wealth—or poverty—of spirit and character) is neither contained in this empty form nor concerns it in any way. Rather does such content fall within the purview of a power quite distinct from the formal universal, one of a more personal sort, one of happenstance and whim. The consciousness embodying legal right, in the very process of proving its actual worth, accordingly experiences both the loss of its reality and its outright insubstantiality, and here finds that calling an individual a “person” is to use an expression of contempt.

74 The unrestrained power of the content here in play is established in such a way as to be dispensed over the sheer multitude of personal atoms at the same time that it, by the very nature of its preemptory character, congeals into something monolithic, a single point [of personhood] that’s as alien to them as it is devoid of spirit. This is a purely individualistic reality just like the callous personalities of the multitude, yet contrasts with their vacuous individuality in that it also embodies for them the meaning of this entire content—and thereby what is for them the real gist [of their existence]. Moreover, unlike their allegedly unqualified—yet of itself insubstantial—reality, this is an all-pervasive power and an unqualifiedly actual reality. This [point of convergence, this] master of the world, thus takes himself to be a person utterly unto himself who also epitomizes all existence within himself, a person who knows of no higher spirit. He is a person—albeit the solitary person confronting all the rest. They comprise the validating entirety of this one person, since the single individual as such is truly what he is only amidst the generic multitude of individuals—whereas separated from the multitude, the solitary self is in fact a self without actual reality, without power.

75 –Moreover he, this all-embracing personality, is mindful of the import of what’s poised in opposition [M319] to him—which, once let loose by its own negative potency, is a veritable chaos of sentient agents who, like unfettered elemental forces running amok, go on an orgiastic rampage of reciprocal destruction. Their effete self-consciousness is tantamount to a stadium of the powerless as well as the arena upon which their tumult plays out. The master of the world, realizing that he, among all the powers that be, is the quintessential one, is a colossal self-consciousness who knows that effectively he’s a god; and yet, since he is a self in but form and thus incapable of keeping any of these powers in check, his endeavors and ways of indulging himself involve a no less colossal excess.

76 In directing ruinous violence against the selves of the subjects who confront him, the master of the world knows full well what he is: a power all-pervasive in the actual realm. For his power isn’t based upon a solidarity of spirit within which the multitude

of persons might recognize their own self-consciousness; they sooner exist as persons unto themselves, all continuity with others being ruled out by the utter intransigency with which they maintain their atomic existence, so that they exist in a merely negative relation both to one another and to him, he being their nexus, their continuity. As such he comprises the quintessence and substantive content of their formalistic identity—albeit a content alien to them, and an essence inimical to them—a content and essence sooner obviating the very thing they deem essential to them: their existing for themselves devoid of substantive content; and even in sustaining the continuity of their personhood, he destroys it. In that such substantive content as is validated in it is alien to it, and that what the master of the world, as the actual reality of the multitude of persons, validates in them is himself, legal personhood sooner experiences its lack of substance. Although going on a destructive rampage in this arena of the insubstantial does give it a conscious sense of its sovereign omnipotence, such a self is naught but devastation, is thus quite beside itself, and would as soon trash its very awareness of being a self.

77 This, then, is the way in which a self-consciousness that's real and actual as an unbounded entity is constituted. As for the consciousness that ends up driven from this state of affairs back into itself, it is left to ponder its status as a nonentity. Previously we saw the stoical independence of pure thought pass through Skepticism and find in the Unhappy Consciousness its truth—or such truth as was then pertinent [M320] to its existing in and for itself. If there this knowledge appeared merely as the one-sided perspective of a consciousness such as that, here the real truth implicit in that perspective comes to light. This truth consists in the fact that the allegedly comprehensive worth of a self-conscious being is a reality estranged from him. No sooner is such worth the all-encompassing reality of the self than this reality turns out to be the exact opposite: the loss of the self's very essence. The actual reality of the self, which was missing in the ethical world, has been secured by falling back upon the individual person; what there cohered as a kind of unanimity now emerges as something more evolved, albeit self-estranged.



VI.B. SELF-ESTRANGED SPIRIT: CULTURE

78 Ethical substance kept such conflict as it encountered confined within its simple consciousness and kept its consciousness in direct union with its essential nature. Thus for the consciousness directly oriented to it, and whose ethos it is, this essential nature has the simple definiteness of 'the way things are.' A mentality such as this doesn't think of itself in terms of 'this self to the exclusion of others,' nor does substance of this sort give any indication of some other way of existing that has been excluded from its

awareness, one with which it could identify only by becoming estranged from its present self, and doing so on its own from within.

79 –However, the mind of the one whose self stands totally apart has as its conscious content a contrasting reality just as hardened as his, and here the world is virtually so externalistic as to be a form of unselfconscious being. This world nonetheless embodies a spirit-suffused mode of existence, is in itself an interfusing of matter-of-fact being and individuality: individuality's own self-consciously achieved presence—albeit a reality that's as alien to self-consciousness as it is directly present, having a distinct existence of its own in which self-consciousness doesn't recognize itself. Although embodied in the externalistic ways and libertarian content of legal right, the external reality epitomized in the master of the world of abstract right doesn't consist merely in some naturally occurring state of affairs that the self just happens to be confronted with; it's the self's own creation (albeit a negative rather than positive one).

80 –This world comes to exist as it does by self-consciousness having externalized and divested itself [M321] of its own essential nature, which would appear, amidst the havoc that's rife throughout the world of legal right, to have been brought upon it by the extraordinary violence of its unrestrained constituent elements. Left to their own devices these are utterly devastating and are their own undoing; yet what's effecting the dissolution, this world's negative soul, is none other than the self: this world's subject, its action and ongoing emergence. The action and emergence whereby such a substance becomes actual entails, however, personal alienation, since the immediate self (i.e., absent such alienation and taken as it is in and of itself) is lacking in substance, being sooner the plaything of the above raging elements. The substance of this manner of self consists thus in its very act of externalization, which is indeed substantial, consisting in spiritual powers organizing themselves into a world and sustaining themselves thereby.

81 Substance is in this way spirit, a self-conscious unity of self and essence—yet also betokens entities alien to one another. While such spirit consists in consciousness of an actual objective reality existing independently in its own right, in contrast to this consciousness there stands the above unity of self and essence—a form of pure consciousness vis-à-vis actuality-oriented consciousness. On the one hand actuality-oriented self-consciousness, in externalizing itself, ventures into the real world, even as the latter concomitantly returns within its purview; but on the other hand this same reality, person as well as objectivity, is therewith superseded, existing then clearly in the way that universals do. This—reality's estranged form—is comprised in pure consciousness, that is, exists in the way that an essence does. Present reality has its opposite directly in its “beyond,” which consists both in what it is thinking and what is being thought about—just as the beyond has *its* opposite directly in the here-and-now, which comprises the beyond's actual albeit estranged reality.

82 Hence this manner of spirit isn't fashioning merely a single world but rather one that's dualized, set apart from, and in tension with itself. The world of a spirit immersed in its ethos is its own present reality, with both of its constitutive powers existing thus within that unity; and howsoever these come to differ, they abide in equilibrium with the whole. Nothing is there suggestive of some form of unselfconscious being; even the spirit of the departed is present in the bloodline of kinfolk, in the self that the family comprises, while the power of governance at large embodies the will, the very self of the people. –But here we have what's present referring merely to an objective reality whose consciousness abides somewhere beyond it; each individual moment in essence receives its present and hence [M322] actual reality from a moment other than it, and to the very extent that it is actual, its essential nature is other than its actual reality. Here nothing has an indwelling spirit grounded within it; everything exists outside itself in an alien spirit. The equilibrium of the whole isn't based on a unity that, having reattained inner tranquility, remains at one with itself, but rather on the estrangement integral to this kind of opposition. The whole, like each individual moment, is thus a self-estranged reality—breaking up into a realm in which self-consciousness is actually real as well as its own object, and into a realm of pure consciousness which, abiding beyond the first, isn't really present, existing instead in faith.

83 –Now just as the ethical world—once having divided into divine and human law as well as into their respective embodying forms, and once ethical-minded consciousness has fractured into knowledge and obliviousness—makes its way back into that wherein its destiny lies, into the self as the power to negate the strife attendant to such divisions, so also will the two realms of self-estranged spirit make their way back within the self. But whereas yon self [that animated the ethical world] was accepted just as it was initially—that is, as individual person—the self present in self-estranged spirit, recoiling into itself from its externalized existence, will turn into a self that is oriented to the universal, a consciousness grappling with matters conceptual.

84 –And thus it is that the two worlds of self-estranged spirit, whose experiential moments all maintain some manner of fixed actuality and enduring existence devoid of spirit, end up dissolved within *pure insight*. As self comprehending itself, pure insight brings the cultivation process to completion. It apprehends nothing but, and everything as, self—turning everything into concepts, annihilating every vestige of objectivity and transforming every aspect of being *in* itself into being *for* self. Directed at faith as against a realm of essential being lying somewhere off in the beyond, pure insight becomes *enlightenment*. Enlightenment perfects alienation both in this realm in which spirit is self-estranged and in the consciousness seeking escape through meditation upon a self-concordant tranquility. It throws spirit's household in yonder realm into disarray by introducing into it the instrumentalities of this world, a world in which spirit has an undeniable stake since its conscious existence is likewise invested therein.

85 –In this negative undertaking pure insight, in the very act of realizing its self, brings into being a manner of object peculiarly its own, comprising at once an unknowable Supreme Being and sheer *utility*. [M323] Since in this way the actual world loses everything of substance and no longer contains anything that exists in its own right, both realms, that of faith and that of the mundanely real, are overthrown. And this revolution brings into being a form of *absolute* [or *total*] freedom, a moment in which heretofore alienated spirit, having come completely full-circle, abandons this realm of cultivation and passes over into the domain of moral consciousness.



VI.B.1. THE WORLD OF SELF-ESTRANGED SPIRIT

86 This spirit's world breaks up into a dual world: the first is actual reality, the world in which spirit is estranged, and the other is the world that spirit, elevating itself above the first, fashions in the rarified atmosphere of pure consciousness. The latter world, having been wrought in head-on opposition to such estrangement, isn't free from it but sooner only an alternate form of estrangement, which consists precisely in having consciousness in two different worlds while straddling them both. What we're looking at here, then, isn't a self-conscious awareness of 'an absolute divine being as it is in and present to itself,' isn't religion, but rather faith, inasmuch as faith consists in flight from the actual world and so doesn't exist in and *present to itself*. This flight from the realm of the present is thus integrally twofold: while pure consciousness is the element into which spirit elevates itself, this isn't just the element of faith—but also that of conception. Thus do faith and conception enter upon the scene concomitantly, and the former comes under scrutiny only in tension with the latter.



VI.B.1.a. *Culture and Its Realm of Actuality*

87 The spirit animating this world is embodied in a manner of spiritual being that's suffused by self-consciousness—self-consciousness that's directly present to itself as this individual being that exists for itself and knows that it's confronted with an actual reality that's essential to it. Both the existence of this world and the actuality of such self-consciousness are based, however, upon a dynamic in which self-consciousness abnegates its personal [M324] existence, in this way bringing into being a world of its own making, while relating to it as to something alien, something it now has to get under its control.

88 –Yet it's precisely by abandoning its existence-for-self that it brings that reality into being, and in the process gains control of the world thus directly confronting it.

Differently put: a self-conscious being such as this amounts to something and has actual reality only insofar as he alienates himself. By so doing he establishes himself as something universal [or public]; and in this, his universality, his status and actual reality are comprised. His equality with everyone else is accordingly not such equality as was had in legal right—that is, doesn't consist in the immediate recognition and status accorded a self-conscious being simply because he is. Rather is his status established via the alienative process by means of which he has accommodated himself to the universal. The spiritually impoverished universality of right accommodates each and every naturally occurring nuance of character and way of life, giving them all its stamp of approval. But the universality that carries weight here is one that has undergone real development and in that way is truly actual.

89 It's thus through *acculturation* that the individual counts for something and has actual reality here. His true original nature and substance are now comprised in this spirit that's estranging his natural being. This process of abnegation [that leads him out of his natural self] is thus as much a purpose as it is something already present; it's also a means, the transition of a thought-sustained substance into actual reality, and on the other hand a form of resolute individuality in transition to something of essential import. This manner of individuality *cultivates* itself into what it inherently is, and only then and thereby exists in its own right and has an actual presence: the extent of its cultivation is the measure of its reality and power. Although the self knows itself to be actual here as 'this self,' its actual reality consists in the sublation of its natural self; the specifics of its original nature reduce to an insignificant quantitative distinction (greater or lesser force of will, say). But the purpose and substantive import of a *self* pertain solely to a substance that is itself universal, and that can exist only in the way that a universal does. To have the particularity of one's nature become one's purpose and import is unfeasible and unrealistic—a specious effort laughably undertaken to no avail, contradictorily ascribing to the particular the actual reality that consists directly in the universal.

90 –Were individuality [M325] erroneously reduced to the particulars of nature and character, then in the real world we wouldn't encounter any individuality and character at all but instead individuals whose existence is interchangeably the same. Putative individuality such as this is just individuality that's "intended" to exist, something that—in this world where only those who are self-abnegating and hence exist in the manner of universals attain actual reality—has no staying power. An "intended" individuality counts for just what it is: a "sort of" individuality. 'Sort' isn't quite the same as *espèce*: "the most appalling of epithets, for it connotes mediocrity and expresses the highest degree of contempt."³ But the commonplace expressions 'a sort of' or 'good in

3. Diderot, *Rameau's Nephew*.

its kind' adds to this connotation an air of straightforwardness, as though one didn't really mean anything all that bad—or that it hadn't actually occurred to one as yet what it means to be a something "of sorts" as opposed to something cultivated and real.

91 As regards the single individual, what appears as his cultivation turns out to be a pivotal moment in the emergence of culture's very substance: the direct transition from a universality existing in thought to one existing in actual reality—a manner of universality comprising culture's simplex soul, via which what's contained latently within gets recognized and is actually there. Thus the dynamic of self-cultivating individuality is directly one with culture's own emergence as a universal and objective mode of existence—is the genesis of an actual world.

92 –But this world, although brought into being by individuality, initially strikes self-consciousness as being alien, and as having the form of a reality fixedly in place. Convinced nonetheless that herein lies its substance, self-consciousness sets out to get a handle on this world, managing to do so through acculturation, which from this perspective makes it appear that self-consciousness is, to the extent that the energy of its original character and talents allows, accommodating that reality. What here appears as a power wielded by the individual, one that would subjugate and undermine this substance, is the same power that makes the latter the actual reality that it is. For such an individual's power consists in his conforming to this substance—abnegating his self and thereby establishing himself as an objectively existent substantive being. His own reality and cultivation are thus what makes this substance itself real. [M326]

93 Only as sublated does this self see itself as real. Hence it doesn't regard itself as unifying self and object in its consciousness, but instead construes this object as involving its negation. With the self functioning as its soul, this world's substance is then so thoroughly resolved into its moments that one contrary animates the other—with each in turn via *its* estrangement sustaining, even as *it* is being sustained by, the other. And yet each moment has a definitive character, an uncontestable value of its own as well as a set reality vis-à-vis the other. –Thought has a way of fixating the difference between such moments in the broadest of generalities—positing "good" and "bad," say, as out-and-out contraries that abhor, and could in no wise turn out to be the same as, each other. But this [thought-concocted manner of] fixed being has a soul of its own, forthwith passing over into what's opposite; actual existence sooner involves the reversal of each such definitive characteristic into its contrary; and the substantive nature of such a whole is comprised and sustained only in this manner of estrangement.

94 –Now to be considered is how these moments move and come alive in reality—with estrangement becoming estranged from itself, enabling the whole to reintegrate conceptually.

95 First we need to consider this simplex substance itself with regard to the organization of its moments just as they directly, matter-of-factly, and as yet soullessly present themselves. Just as nature sets itself forth in universal elements—namely air, a form of being that is permanent, altogether pervasive, and transparent; water, a form of being that's ever being offered up; fire, their animating unity, ever dissolving their oppositeness even as the simplicity of each bifurcates within it; and lastly earth, the tight nexus of this articulation as well as the subject of these forms of being and their dynamic, their point of departure and return—so likewise does the inner essence or simplex spirit of actual self-conscious reality set itself forth as a world articulated into generic yet spiritually animated apportionments. The first of these is an inherently all-embracing, self-conformative spiritual mode of existence; the second is a self-oriented, progressively self-discordant way of existing that offers up and abandons itself; and the third exists self-consciously as a subject, and has a potency akin to fire directly within it. In the first of these [conceptual] apportionments a spiritual subject is aware of itself as existing self-inheringly. In the second this subject develops self-orientedly by [M327] sacrificing the universal. Spirit itself, however, is the self-inhering and self-oriented being of a totality that splits apart into an enduring and a self-sacrificing substance even while reintegrating these within it: as much a blazing flame consuming them as it is their ongoing embodiment. –We see that these two interacting modes of existence are somewhat akin to the community and the family in the ethos-based world, but without the homebred spirit they had there; while to that spirit fate is something alien, here by contrast self-consciousness is, and knows itself to be, the actual force driving them.

96 Now to be considered is both the way in which these components are first set forth within pure consciousness, namely in the form of the *thoughts* that they in themselves are, and also the way in which they're set forth in reality-oriented consciousness, namely as objectively existent entities.

97 –In the form it has in pure consciousness (that of simplicity) the first of these components—as the self-consistent, straightforwardly evident and immutable essence of all conscious being—is the good: an independent spiritual power, something inherent beside which the stirrings of self-oriented consciousness are merely peripheral. The second component is by contrast a passive mode of spiritual being, one that's universal inasmuch as it places itself at the disposal of individuals, letting them derive from it an awareness of their singularity—a mode of being that comes to naught, the bad. This tendency toward the dissolution of spiritual being is of itself unrelenting; whereas the initial form of such being is the foundation, point of departure, and end result of individuals who exist therein sheerly in common, the second by contrast relates to otherness self-sacrificially—yet for that very reason on the other hand involves both the persistent return of individuals to themselves as individual and their relentless self-orientedness.

98 Nonetheless the simple notions ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are directly self-estranged: they’re real, and in reality-oriented consciousness both moments are seen to exist *objectively*. The one entity is state power, the other wealth.

99 –State power is a simple substantive entity as well as a public achievement: a comprehensive abiding concern in which individuals find what’s vital to them given voice and have their singular individuality focused strictly on what they have in common. It is moreover an accomplishment and simple end-product in which any trace of its having [M328] been wrought by them individually vanishes, an accomplishment that endures as the bedrock and sustaining principle of all their actions. This, the simple ethereal substance of their lives, in thus defining for them a stable self-identity, exists matter-of-factly, hence solely in relation to what’s other than it. Thus is it implicitly its own direct opposite: wealth.

100 –Even though passive or nothing in and of itself, wealth is in its own right an all-pervasive spiritual form of being: the steadily accumulating result of the exertion and action of all even as it is dispersed for the enjoyment of all. Although in enjoyment individuality does become oriented to itself as a solitary being, enjoyment itself is the result of the action of all in common, just as wealth is for its part engendering the common effort and enjoyment of all. Simply put, anything actual has a spiritual import—that of being directly universal. While no doubt at any given moment each individual supposes he’s acting in his own interest (since herein he’s awakening to his being “out for himself” and so doesn’t think of this as anything spiritual), even on superficial inspection it’s clear that in his enjoyment each is contributing to the enjoyment of all, that in his labors he’s working for all as much as for himself, and all working for him. His self-orientedness is thus inherently universal, and “self-interest” but a notion incapable of making what it has in mind—namely to do something that wouldn’t be to the benefit of everyone—actual.

101 In these two spiritual powers, then, self-consciousness apprehends its substance, content, and purpose, discerning in them its dual nature: in the one power what it is latently in itself, in the other what it is in existing for itself. As spirit, however, self-consciousness is at the same time a unity that’s negative of the permanence of such powers as well as of the split between individual and universal, reality at large and self. Power and wealth are thus present to the individual as objects, entities from which he deems himself to be free, and between which he could choose as he likes, or even choose neither. As a pure conscious being who exists at liberty, he confronts any given entity as something existing only for him. What’s of the essence as such is thus contained in him.

102 –To him in his pure consciousness the integral moments of substance aren’t state power and wealth but rather the ideas of the good and the bad. Yet [M329] self-consciousness goes further, interconnecting its pure consciousness to its actuality-oriented consciousness—relating what it thinks to some entity that objectively exists;

essentially it is judging. –As for the two aspects of the actuality here at issue, which of them is good and which bad is already evident based on their ultimate ends as defined at the outset: the power of the state is good, wealth is bad. Yet an initial judgment of this sort, which has the one aspect defined simply as something existing in itself or as positive, the other simply as something existing for itself and so as negative, can hardly be regarded as befitting spirit. As spiritual entities, however, each pervades both moments, with neither of them being then exhaustively defined at the outset; and since the self-consciousness relating itself to them exists in and for itself, it has to relate to each of the two in its own twofold way, in the course of which their nature, that of being self-alienated predications, will become explicit.

103 For self-consciousness the object in which it locates its self is now “good” as well as existing in *its* own right, and the object in which it locates its opposite is “bad”—the good consisting in objective reality’s being concordant with self-conscious existence, the bad in its being nonconcordant. Moreover what’s good or bad for self-consciousness is good or bad inherently, since self-consciousness is, after all, that wherein these two moments (the being that anything has in itself and the being it has relative to self-consciousness) are the same. Self-consciousness is the real spirit animating these objectively existent entities, and as it judges them it has proof of its power to *make* them be what they are inherently. Their criterion and their truth lies not in their being either consistent or inconsistent directly in themselves (in what they are abstractly in themselves or in relation to themselves), but rather in what they are in the way that spirit relates to them: their being or not being consonant with it. As spirit interrelates them they—having originally been set forth as objects but now having each become, via self-consciousness, an entity unto itself—reflect into themselves conjointly, thereby assuming actual spiritual existence and exhibiting what *their* spirit consists in. Yet just as their initial or directly evident character is different from that which they have as spirit interrelates them, so will the third—their own distinctive spirit—be different from the second. The second, their existence unto themselves as brought about by [M330] spirit interrelating them, is perforce already issuing into something other than what it was in its unmediated state, since spirit’s intermediation sets that unmediated character in motion, turning it into something else.

104 A conscious being existing in and for himself does thus find in state power something that’s quite simply essential to him and his overall sustainment (what he is in himself), but not his individuality as such (what he is for himself), sooner finding that action by him as individual is obviated and that he’s reduced to obedient compliance. In face of such power the individual reflects into himself; to him this entity is repressive, something bad, since instead of being compatible with his individuality it’s patently *incompatible*. Wealth, by contrast, is something good; it enhances the enjoyment of all, is at their disposal, and provides each and all a conscious sense of having a self of one’s own. In principle, wealth is beneficence for all; and if it sometimes withholds

anything, failing to accommodate one or another need, this is but an accident in no way diminishing its all-pervasively necessary function, which consists in its being dispensed among all individuals and serving as a thousand-handed provider.

105 These two judgments give the notions ‘good’ and ‘bad’ a meaning quite the reverse of what they had for us. –Thus far self-consciousness, in accordance with its having existence-for-self as sole standard, has been relating to its objects only incompletely. But a conscious being is also a living being who exists unto himself, and he has to make this aspect of his essential nature a standard [of judgment] as well, since only thus is spiritual discernment brought to completion. In accordance with this aspect, state power conveys to him something vital; it comprises statutory law—state power’s very substance in its simplicity—as well as governance and the directives that regulate the everyday workings of public action, animating and sustaining this substance and all individuals concerned. In state power the individual thus finds something fundamental and indispensable to him articulated, structured, and actuated. When taking pleasure in his wealth, by contrast, rather than experiencing the expansiveness of his nature he gets but a passing sense of self, along with such enjoyment as is had in existing singularly for himself and in a way incompatible with what he essentially is. Thus do the concepts ‘good’ and ‘bad’ here acquire [M331] an import contrary to what they had before.

106 Both modes of judgment find something “compatible” and something “incompatible”: the first such consciousness finds state power incompatible with it and the enjoyment of wealth compatible, while the second by contrast finds the former compatible with it, the latter not. In evidence here are dichotomous findings of compatibility and incompatibility that relate both of these real entities as opposites. –We need to form a judgment about these divergent modes of judgment themselves, to which end we need to employ the standard set up by each. A way of relating that such consciousness finds compatible with it is accordingly ‘good,’ while one found not to be so is ‘bad’; and the two ways of relating are themselves henceforth to be borne in mind as being diverse forms of conscious being. Consciousness itself thus qualifies as something dichotomous, being either good or bad by the way it varyingly disposes itself rather than by having as principle either what it is self-orientedly or what it is in itself, since both moments are equally essential to it. While the twofold discriminating we’ve been examining makes these principles out to be separate, and so consists in sheerly abstract ways of doing so, a consciousness that’s realistic includes both principles, and the difference between them falls entirely within its own essential nature—in the way it itself is oriented to the real.

107 Such an orientation is tensive, relating to power and wealth on the one hand as to something with which it is consonant, on the other as to something with which it isn’t. –A consciousness finding that it relates consonantly with these is “noble.” In

public power it sees something it deems akin to it, something of its own simple nature activated, something on behalf of which it's prepared to serve in a spirit of genuine obedience and inner respect. Similarly, in wealth it sees something bringing to its attention another aspect of importance to it: its self-orientedness—which is why in relation to itself it regards wealth as essential too and recognizes the latter, from which it receives such gratification, as a benefactor to whom it holds itself obliged.

108 The consciousness of the other orientation, being insistently incompatible with either of these entities [power or wealth], [M332] is by contrast “base.” It accordingly looks upon sovereign power as a fetter and as suppressive of existence for self, and so detests the sovereign, obeys only two-facedly, and is ever primed for revolt. As for wealth, even though affording it self-oriented enjoyment, this consciousness regards wealth to be simply incompatible with its abiding nature, serving only to remind it of its solitariness and the fleetingness of such enjoyment—which it loves yet despises, deeming such to be ephemeral, inherently insignificant—any ties it has to the rich having disappeared.

109 So far these orientations give voice to a judgment specifying what both essentials [state power and wealth] are as objects of consciousness, not as yet what they are in and present to themselves. To discriminate in this way is to put forward a reflection that (as is first evident only to us) on the one hand sets forth the specific character of the one as well as the other—and hence cancels out both alike without as yet setting forth any reflection they undergo as present to consciousness itself. On the other hand, these simply are in fact unmediated, having neither become such nor in themselves attained to self-consciousness. That to which they're present isn't yet what animates them: they're predicates that aren't yet themselves subject. Due to this rift, the very integrity of spiritual discrimination dis-integrates too, with its two modes of consciousness laboring under a one-sided way of defining. Now just as the initial, mutual irrelevance of such estrangement's two aspects—the one inhering in pure consciousness, namely the specific notions good and bad, the other the matter-of-fact presence these have as state power and wealth—culminated in both being interrelated in such judging, so does this externalistic way of relating have [need] to attain to inner unity, thought interconnect with actual reality, and the spirit of both forms of discrimination become evident. This takes place when discerning gives way to syllogizing, an intermediary process that brings to light the mean common to both sides of such discernment as well as what's therein necessitated.

110 Thus in the course of such judging, the noble consciousness finds itself face-to-face with state power without as yet regarding the latter as a form of self but just as a substance they have in common—albeit one that it realizes is indispensable to it, is its purpose and substantive content. Oriented so positively to this power, it takes a negative view of [M333] its own purposes, its private agenda and affairs, and lets them drop

by the wayside. –Nobility consists in the heroism of service, in civic virtue that sacrifices individualistic being for the sake of the public weal, and by so doing brings it into existence—in a manner of person who voluntarily renounces property and pleasure, takes action on behalf of the standing authority, and thus is actually real.

111 Via this abnegative process the public realm is integrated with matter-of-fact existence at large even as this matter-of-factly existent conscious being is cultivating himself via his abnegation into someone of substantive importance. Although that from which, in serving, he alienates himself is his existence-immersed consciousness, this self-alienated being is inherently *his own*; cultivation thus affords him self-respect as well as respect from others. –As for state power, which was at first only the idea of a public weal, something present only in principle, it becomes, via this same process, an actually existing public order, an actual power. It is such only in being accorded actual obedience, only via self-consciousness judging state power to be vital and sacrificing itself freely on its behalf. This form of action, integrating being and self, brings about a dualized reality: a manner of self that is genuinely actual and a form of state power that's accepted as genuinely real.

112 However, this dual reality brought about through such alienation doesn't yet include self-consciousness's realizing that it is itself the power of the state. All that's validated so far is state power's law, its inherent principle—a power that still has no distinctive will of its own, since the self-conscious being rendering service to bring it to life has abnegated only his matter-of-fact being, not his pure self: he's sacrificed only his factual existence, not what he has to offer from within. –A self-conscious being such as this is seen as conforming to what he essentially is by nature, and he's recognized on account of what he in himself is. In him all others see their essence in action, but not such existence as they have for themselves; they see something they're pondering, something that exists sheerly in their minds brought to fruition, but not their own individuality. He thus carries real weight in their thoughts, and appreciates the honor he receives. He is a proud vassal who acts on behalf of state power inasmuch as it has no will of its own yet is nonetheless of the essence. He values himself solely in the honor of serving, solely in fundamentally advancing the general public's view—not in the approbation of individuality, having done [M334] nothing to promote *its* self-oriented ways. What he has to say, were this to have any bearing upon the will of state power in its own behalf (no such will having yet formed), would consist of counsel imparted on behalf of what's best for all.

113 Thus state power hasn't yet formed a will vis-à-vis the counsel it receives, and is scarcely able to decide between different opinions as to what's best for the common good. It isn't yet governance, and so isn't truly as yet state power. –Self-orientedness, a manner of will that hasn't yet been sacrificed as will, is the inwardly focused spirit of the various estates, a spirit that stands apart and, for all its fine talk about the common

good, keeps its own counsel regarding what's best specifically for it, being inclined to offer lip service about what's best for all as surrogate for actually doing anything on their behalf. The sacrifice of one's existence in public service is indeed complete if it culminates in death. But when one survives continual mortal peril, what one is left with is a resolute existence, and so also a singular self-interestedness that renders counsel in behalf of the common good ambiguous and suspect, and that vis-à-vis state power in fact keeps its opinion to itself—keeping what it wills private. The agenda of one such as this is accordingly still at odds with state power and qualifies as a form of ignoble consciousness ever on the verge of rebellion.

114 The contradiction that consciousness has here to resolve takes the form of a self-orientedness incompatible with the comprehensiveness of state power, and at the same time an abnegation of existence that matter-of-factly culminates in death rather than returning to conscious existence—that has consciousness, rather than surviving and abiding in and for itself, merely passing over into something irreconcilably contrary to it. Hence the only sacrifice appropriate for a self-oriented being is one in which he not only offers himself up as completely as in death, but also sustains himself in this abnegation, thus becoming in actual reality what he potentially is: himself united in identity with what's antithetic to him. By the very fact that such a spirit, focused inwardly upon itself in separation—a self as self—ventures forth and alienates itself thus, state power comes into possession of a self of its own. Without such alienation, nobility—its [M335] acts of honor and insightful counsel—would remain equivocal, maintaining a standoffish reserve that bespeaks separate intentions and a will all its own.



115 Estrangement such as this, however, takes place in *speech* alone, which here steps forth in its uniquely significant role. In the ethical world, in the form of law and command, and then in the world of self-estranged reality (initially in the form of counsel), speech has as content something essential of which it is but the form; here, however, it takes as content the very form that it itself constitutes, and matters substantively as speech—this manner of utterance having the power to accomplish something that needs be done. For speech is pure self *present* as self; in speech the singular individuality existentially present to itself in self-consciousness enters as such into the realm of existence at large so as to be present to others. Otherwise the I—this sheer, pure I—isn't really there. In externalization of every other kind the I immerses itself in the actual realm, and does so in a guise from which it can withdraw, reflecting into itself from any action it undertakes and physiognomic expression it employs, leaving so inarticulate a means of presenting itself (which invariably conveys too much and too little) soullessly behind. But speech captures the I in its purity; speech alone articulates it, expresses the I itself. This, the existential presence of the I, is as such a form of ob-

jectivity having the true nature of the I within it. The I is *this* I—yet even thus is universal. Even as a given I is appearing, it is externalizing itself and evanescent, and in this way it stays within the universality integral to it. An I that expresses itself is heard—is a kind of contagion by which it becomes directly one with those to whom it's present, existing then as a consciousness of self [experienced] in common. –No sooner is the I heard than its presence is attenuated; this, the being that it has in others, has receded into *itself*. And precisely this is the I's presence as a self-conscious now, one that doesn't exist by staying where it is and does exist by so vanishing. Hence it's in the evanescent itself that the I has its staying power; this is its own knowledge of itself, and it knows itself to be a self that has issued forth into another self—that has been heard and is universal.



116 Spirit comes to have the reality it has here because the extremes whose unity it comprises have both alike the unmediated determinateness of actual entities existing in their own right. Their unity [M336] accordingly disintegrates into intractable factions each of which is regarded by the other as an objective reality exclusive of it. Thus what unites them emerges in the form of an intermediary that's exclusive of and distinct from their separated reality, one that has an objective actuality distinct from them and that's present to both—matter-of-factly present. Spiritual substance as such enters into existence only in coming to have constituent factions that are sufficiently self-conscious—such that even as they come to realize that this emerging pure self is a reality to be accepted forthwith, they realize that it is this solely via self-alienative mediation. Through what they self-consciously realize, these factious moments are refined into a self-cognizant category—to such a degree as to exist as integral moments of spirit; through the pure self that thus emerges spirit enters into actual existence as [intercommunicating and interacting] intelligence.

117 –Spirit is then functioning as an intermediary that presupposes such extremes and is engendered by their presence, yet is also a spiritual whole that bursts onto the scene between them, takes them to task and, only by so touching each, integrates them in accord with its own principle. –That both extremes are already inherently sublated and destabilized is what brings about their unification; this is the dynamic that integrates them, interchanges their set roles, and indeed consolidates both within each extreme itself. This intermediation thus turns what's conceptually integral to both extremes into what they actually are, making what each is in itself into its spirit.

118 Both extremes, state power and the noble consciousness, are dis-integrated by the latter: state power into an abstract common weal that's to be obediently heeded and [on the other hand] into a self-oriented will that, of itself, is as yet hardly suited to such obedience; and nobility into such obedience as befits an existence that's being uplifted

into a manner of being inherently possessed of self-respect and honor and [on the other hand] into a form of sheer self-orientedness that hasn't yet been superseded, a will still holding something back. The moments into which both sides [of this power and status dynamic] are here being refined—and by the same stroke tidied up as turns of phrase in public discourse—are the abstract universal alleged to be 'what's *best for all*' and [another that's alleged to be] a '*pure self*' which, in serving, forswears preoccupation with sundry peripheral matters. Conceptually both are the same since unvarnished selfhood is precisely that in which this abstract common weal consists, thus establishing their unity [in such matters] as their [M337] common mean.

119 –But at first this manner of self is real only in the one extreme, the [noble/self-oriented] consciousness, whereas what such a self is in implicit principle is actual only in the other extreme, in state power. What the [noble] consciousness lacks is for state power to be conferred upon it not just honorifically but in actual reality. And what state power lacks is its being obeyed not just as something alleged to be best for all but as will per se, above all that *it* be the self that decides what's best. The unity being here conceived—in which state power still stands as a concept, one to which the [noble] consciousness has been refined—becomes an actual unity in the course of an intermediary dynamic in which speech is the simplex presence serving as mean. –But even so, there still aren't two functional selves present here to serve as participants in such a process, since state power is only just beginning to come alive as a self; whatever might be said at this point is thus hardly reflective of a spirit that knows and expresses itself fully.

120 The noble consciousness, as the extreme that does exist as a self, makes its appearance as the one to utter the words by which both sides of the relation are embodied as animate wholes. –And thus does the heroism of quiet service turn into the "heroism" of flattery. This articulate reflection on the part of the one who serves institutes a spiritually self-dissolutive common ground, reflecting into itself not only its own extreme but that of the public dominion as well, and turning the latter, which at first exists only in principle, into a self-oriented and singularly individual self-conscious entity. The spirit thus empowered becomes sovereign monarch. He's sovereign in that the parlance of flattery is elevating state power into a refined form of omnipotence; the thrust of so doing, of having this manner of existence refined as a creation of speech into a form of spirit, is to forge a pure unalloyed self-identity. And he is monarch in that the parlance of flattery likewise elevates singular individuality to its acme; what the noble consciousness abnegates in keeping with its side of this simplex spiritual unity is the pure implicit entity integral to its thinking: the very I that is its own.

121 –More specifically, by giving the monarch a special name all his own, flattery elevates this otherwise mere would-be individuality into one that's existentially present

in pure form. For it is only by virtue of having a name that this individual's distinctness from all others, rather than being merely intended, is made real by all. In having a name the individual is acknowledged [M338] as a pure singular individuality no longer just in his own eyes, but in everyone else's. Hence through his name the monarch ends up utterly separated from everyone else, exclusive and alone: an atom that can impart nothing of its essence and that has no peer. His name reflects him into himself, into the manner of reality that such sweeping power implicitly entails; through his name this power is monarchical. Conversely he, this single individual, knows that these other singular individuals are integral to this all-pervasive power—that the nobles not only stand ready to serve state power but ring his throne like a diadem, never ceasing to tell the one who sits upon it what he is.

122 In this way the praise-filled speech of the nobles embodies a spirit that unites the above extremes within state-power itself: it reflects abstract power into itself and infuses this power with the impetus of the other extreme, that of willing and deciding for oneself and therein existing as a self-conscious being. In other words this single, actual, self-conscious being comes to the certain realization that he is the power of the state. This power is the focal point of the self in whom the multitude of atomic selves, in abnegating *their* inner certainty, have coalesced.

123 –Yet since the spirit peculiar to state power (its actual reality and its sustenance) thus consists in the actions of the nobility-minded and the ideas they proffer, it is a self-alienated form of autonomy. What noble consciousness, the extreme characterized by self-orientedness, acquires in return for having relinquished a theoretical public weal is an actual public weal: the power of the state has been transferred to it. State dominion becomes genuinely effectual once it's in the hands of the nobility, ceasing, via the latter's self-orientedness, to be the effete entity it appeared to be as an extreme abiding abstractly unto itself.

124 –Considered by itself, state power's having reflected into itself—having become spirit—means nothing other than that it has been integrated into self-conscious existence as one of the latter's moments, existing now only as sublated. The kind of entity that state power then constitutes is one whose animating spirit consists in its being offered up and handed over to others—existing as wealth. While in principle forever turning into wealth, [M339] state power continues to be an actual reality vis-à-vis wealth—albeit one whose conceptual dynamic transforms the very service and respect that give rise to it into the opposite, a relinquishment of power. Thus the distinctive self who came to embody state power's will via the abasement of the noble consciousness becomes for his part a self-abnegating embodiment of the common weal, an utterly singular and adventitious being at the disposal of every stronger will; all that remains of his generally acknowledged and inalienable autonomy is an empty title.

125 So whereas the noble consciousness characterized itself as relating to public power in a quid-pro-quo fashion, the truth of the matter is that in the service it renders

it remains self-oriented and, in the very act of relinquishing its personhood, actually disrupts and undermines the very substance of the populace at large. Its spirit is embodied in a relation of flagrant inequality: while retaining a will of its own in matters of honor, it on the other hand relinquishes this will, in part by becoming estranged from its inner essence and turning into something totally unlike itself, and in part by subordinating to itself the substance of the general populace, turning *it* into something totally unlike *itself*. With this, clearly, the distinction it adjudged itself to have vis-à-vis the mentality referred to as ‘base’ has disappeared along with the latter itself—which has achieved *its* purpose of making public power subservient to self-orientedness.

126 Augmented thus by public power, self-consciousness exists as a form of all-round beneficence, that is to say wealth, which is in turn itself an object of interest to consciousness. For wealth, even though deemed something commonplace that’s subordinate to self-consciousness, hasn’t via its initial sublation been fully reintegrated into the self. As yet the self doesn’t have itself as self for its object but instead this sublated commonplace being. Such an object having only just now come into existence, consciousness relates to it straightforwardly, there being as yet no indication of its incompatibility with consciousness. It’s in this newly emergent insubstantial commonplace that the noble consciousness comes into its own [M340] as a self-oriented being—thus according it recognition while being beholden to it as benefactor.

127 The impetus of self-orientedness is immanent within wealth from the start. Wealth isn’t the selfless common weal of state power, nor does it consist in spirit’s unselfconscious inorganic nature; rather is it a potency that, via the will intrinsic to it, resists any will that’s intent upon usurping it for enjoyment. Yet since wealth has but the form of a substantive entity, this one-sided self-orientedness—which isn’t anything in itself (its “inherent being” having sooner been nullified)—has the individual who’s enjoying himself reverting insubstantially into himself. Thus wealth is itself in need of something to give it life; and this involves a reflective process in which it doesn’t just consist in existence *for* self but in being something *in itself* as well—involves its nullified essence turning into a substantive entity, thereby affording it an immanent spirit of its own. –Since the form of this dynamic was analyzed previously [in paragraph 100], it will be sufficient here to delineate its content.

128 At this point the noble consciousness doesn’t relate to its object as to anything of essential substance. Rather does it consider existence-for-self to be itself alien; it encounters its self as such in estranged form, in the fixed role of an objective reality that’s beholden to another established being that exists for itself. Its object is existence-for-self—its own existence; but in its being objectified in this way, directly within its existence-for-self there is also an alien reality that exists for *its* own self—that has a will of *its* own—meaning that the noble consciousness sees its self as subject to the power of an alien will upon whom its being granted the status of a self depends.

129 Self-consciousness is capable of abstracting from any particular facet of itself, thus retaining, in any obligation that such a facet may involve, its reputation and intrinsic worth as an entity existing for itself. Here, however, it sees itself from a perspective in which its pure ownmost reality—its I—is outside it, belonging to someone else. It views its personhood as such to be contingent upon that of someone else, on the vicissitudes of the instant, on sheer whim, on the most random of circumstances. –In the realm of legal right whatever is subject to the sway of objective reality appears as something materially fortuitous from which [M341] one can abstract, a power of this sort having no effect upon the self per se, which on the contrary continues to be recognized. But here the self sees that whatever certainty one has of oneself is as such insubstantial in the highest degree—that purely of itself, to be a person is to be a total nonperson. The spirit of its gratitude is accordingly tinged with the most deep-seated feelings of abjectness and of indignation. The pure I, seeing itself outside of and severed from itself, here finds that all continuity and community with others, everything affirmed as law, as the good, as right, has gone to rack and ruin. All equality has dissolved; for everywhere rampant is the sheerest disparity, the utter insignificance of what's absolutely vital, the heteronomy of autonomy itself. The pure I has itself come wholly undone.

130 Thus even if it does manage to retrieve from wealth an object-like presence-to-self and to sublimate the object-like character thereof, this manner of conscious existence—consistent with its own perspective as well as that of the previous [abstract, self-alienative] reflection—isn't just incomplete but manifestly dissatisfied with itself. Since in this reflective process what the self comes away with is its self reduced to an object, a direct contradiction within the pure I as such is established. Yet, as self, consciousness forthwith surmounts the contradiction—being so perfectly elastic that it in turn nullifies the self's being thus nullified, rejects the self's being abjectly present to itself as something alien, and manages, while aghast at this way of “acquiring” a self, to be present to itself in the act of acquisition after all.

131 Since this mentality's relation [to wealth] is thus attended with such total conflict-
edness, within its own spirit the distinction integral to this relation—that of being defined as noble versus base—drops out of account, both turning out to be the same.

132 –The spirit of beneficent wealth can, however, be further distinguished from that of its beneficiary, and this merits special attention. This spirit consisted in self-orientedness that has no set nature of its own, a mode of being to be dispensed [among each and all]. But in being thus imparted it becomes something in itself. Having fulfilled its function of offering itself up, it supersedes singular individuality—sheerly self-oriented enjoyment—and, as a form of sublated singular individuality, turns into something common to all, a mode of being that's then indispensable.

133 –What the spirit of wealth imparts, what it gives to others, is self-orientedness. But rather than availing itself to all in the manner of a selfless entity of nature, [M342] impartially dispensing itself as one of life's necessities, it does so as a self-conscious entity that stays oriented to *itself*. Unlike the inorganic potency of [nature's] elements, whose influence any consciousness affected by them knows to be inherently transitory, the spirit of wealth is a power over self that knows itself to be both independent and able to do as it pleases—and also knows that its doing so is at the expense of somebody else's self.

134 –So although wealth shares its client's degradation, instead of indignation we now find arrogance. For while it, like its client, knows the fortuitous thinglikeness of existence-for-self, on the other hand it itself is this fortuitousness to which personal existence is subjected. In its arrogance it imagines that for the price of a meal it has gained possession of a personal identity alien to its own and has thereby managed to subjugate that person's innermost being.

135 –Oblivious to the pent-up indignation of the other, it doesn't see that all inhibitions are being cast aside. Wealth fails to take note of this radical sense of being torn out of one's place, this mentality for whom (since the parity among beings existing for themselves has turned into stark disparity) all equality, all cohesiveness is in tatters—a mentality accordingly prepared to tear to shreds the image and authority of this “benefactor” first and foremost. Wealth is thus poised on the brink of the innermost abyss, a bottomless pit in which every foothold and everything of substance has vanished. And all it sees in this abyss is a commonplace thing, the plaything of its own moods, the chance effect of its own whim. It is a mentality that dwells on the utterly trivial, is superficiality abandoned by the last vestige of spirit.

136 Just as self-consciousness found its tongue vis-à-vis state power (spirit having stepped forth to actively intermediate these extremes), so also does it—or rather its indignation—find *its* tongue vis-à-vis wealth. The language whereby this self-conscious indignation makes wealth aware of how essential wealth is and in so doing gets control of it is once again that of flattery, albeit flattery of an ignoble sort. For what such indignation is thus affirming as essential, it knows to be at the disposal of everybody, not something that's inherently essential. Yet as already noted, the parlance of flattery is that of an as yet one-sided spirit; for the moments that are in fact integral to it consist of a 'self' that has been refined via the cultivating influence of service into one that does clearly exist, and a state power [that as yet only exists] in 'implicit principle.' But the pure conception in which this simple self and this implicit principle—the pure I and [M343] this pure essence or thought are the same, that is, the *unity* spanning the two sides of the interaction—is *not* what the mentality engaging in such speech has in mind: to it the object is still something inhering in *itself* in opposition to the self, an object that *isn't* at the same time its own self as such.

137 –Sarcasm is the perfect vehicle to convey, and the spirit that truly epitomizes, this entire cultured world. This manner of self-consciousness, so given to finding fault with its own fault-finding, is wholly at one with itself in its utter conflictedness: pure self-consciousness in the act of pure self-mediation. It consists in such equality as comes of an identity-judgment in which one and the same person is as much subject as predicate. An identity-judgment such as this is, however, also unlimited, totally splitting personhood in two, with subject and predicate, absent the requisite unity, simply existing as indifferent matters of fact that are unconcerned with each other—to such an extent that each is what empowers its own personhood. Such presence-to-self has its self-orientedness for its object, as something that's utterly other than it and yet at the same time directly the same as it—is itself as other—not as though this other had a different substantive content but rather a content consisting in the same self that it has, albeit one present in a form completely contrary to it: a presence that's wholly *its* own and that has no regard for it. –Here, then, we have the spirit of a real world, that of culture, a spirit aware of its being present as it truly and cohesively is.

138 This spirit consists in the total, indeed all-pervasive, inversion and estranging of reality and thought: pure culture. What's experienced in this world is that neither the allegedly real entities 'power and wealth,' nor the notions 'good and bad' peculiar to them, nor the consciousness of good and bad met with in nobility and baseness holds true: these moments all turn into one another, each being its own contrary.

139 –Public power, the substance of which consists in its being duly animated by the principle of individuality, is only nominally the recipient of a self of its own, and, in-sofar as it is "real" power, is sooner an impotent, self-sacrificial [M344] sort of thing. Nonetheless this entity selflessly at the disposal of all, this self become thing, finds its way back to itself—is existence for self that's present to itself, spirit's manner of existence. –The ideas integral to such entities, the ideas of the good and the bad, are likewise reversed in the process: what's deemed good is bad, what's deemed bad is good. –Similarly the mentalities respectively characteristic of each of these moments and deemed to be noble or base are instead the reverse of what these determinations are supposed to entail: the consciousness of nobility turns out to be base and disreputable even as depravity emerges as nobly embodying self-consciousness's most cultivated form of freedom. –And from a formal perspective as well, everything is outwardly the reverse of what it takes itself to be; and again what it takes itself to be isn't what it is in truth but rather something other than what it wants to be: self-orientedness is self-dereliction, and self-alienation self-preservation.

140 –What's happening here, then, is that all moments are exacting upon one another a common justice: each is alienating itself internally even as it's insinuating itself in its opposite, and by the same stroke turning that opposite into the opposite of *itself*. But it's in just such a unity of entirely separate extremes that true spirit consists; indeed it

is precisely via the free-wheeling reality of such identity-less extremes that spirit, as their intermediary, comes into existence. This spirit's presence is that of a comprehensive articulateness and cutting judgment before which these moments supposedly existing as entities in their own right and as the actual constituents of the whole are one and all dissolved—and which also plays this self-dissolutive game with itself. Thus really the sole concern of such judging and speaking is to overwhelm everything in this the real world with its candidness and indomitable spirit. In this way every part of this world ends up getting its spirit expressed, being subjected to spirited discussion and identified for what it is. –An unsophisticatedly ingenuous mind takes each of the above moments [good, noble, etc.] to be enduringly substantive—while in its uncultured thoughtlessness failing to notice that even then it is likewise doing just the opposite. But a conflicted consciousness is fully alert to such inversions, indeed such out-and-out perversions; what matters to it is the conceptual dimension of things, bringing together thoughts that for the naïve mind [M345] lie far apart, and doing so in language full of spirited wit.

141 The content of what this spirit says from within and about itself amounts to a perversion of all concepts and realities, a ubiquitous humbug perpetrated against self and others—its shamelessness in voicing this humbuggery being for that very reason its greatest truth. Its discourse is like the mad creation of the musician “who compiled and intermingled thirty arias (Italian, French, tragic, comic, all the various genres), one moment sounding the pits of hell with a deep bass, the next rising high into the air with contracted throat and piping falsetto, stormy and becalmed, imperious and mocking by turns.”⁴ To the staid mentality which straightforwardly sets the melody of the good and true in monophonic tones (i.e., in a single voice range), such discourse seems “an effusion of cleverness and folly, a medley of finesse and vulgarity, of ideas as often wrong as they are right, of an utterly perverse sensibility and consummate shamelessness, commingled with total sincerity and truth. A consciousness given to such can't resist trying out all these tones, running up and down the entire gamut of emotions from the highest admiration and enthusiasm to the deepest contempt and disdain. Blending its admiration and enthusiasm with a touch of the ridiculous, it ends up denaturing them both”—even as its contempt and disdain turn out to have (by virtue of their candor) a reconciliatory and (by virtue of their unnerving trenchancy) irresistible countercurrent that conveys spirit to itself.

142 When we compare the discourse of a mentality that thinks of truth and goodness in simple terms with the discourse of this consciousness whose perplexed state is transparently evident to it, we see that vis-à-vis the lucid and self-conscious eloquence of the cultivated spirit the former is reduced to monosyllables, there being nothing that

4. In this paragraph both quotations are from Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew*.

the former can tell it that it hasn't noticed and commented on already. Were the former to venture beyond monosyllables it would end up saying what the other says, while also foolishly imagining that it's saying something new and different. Its choice epithets—"outrageous!" "vulgar!"—already display such folly since the cultured spirit directs these at itself. When in speaking its mind the cultured spirit perverts everything univocal (since whatever is self-same, a sheer abstraction, [M346] is itself actually the reverse), and when the straightforward mentality's only recourse is to take what's good and noble, what retains integrity when uttered, under its protection and insist that the latter's value isn't lost simply by being bound up or mixed in with what's bad (since, as all nature's wisdom attests, this is the inherent and necessary condition of what's good and noble), then in its well-meaning effort to combat such perversity this mentality ends up merely trivializing the substantive content of what spirit has to say, thoughtlessly supposing that by construing the opposite of the noble and good as their inherently necessary conditions it has said anything more than that what's called 'noble' and 'good' is in essence quite the reverse, or that what's called 'bad' is in fact excellent.

143 Were the naïve consciousness to substitute for this artless notion an actual instance of excellence (supplying some fictional example or an anecdote based on fact) so as to show it to be present in more than empty phrase, this would fly in the face of the all-pervasive factual reality of the entire real world's perversity in action, wherein anything of the sort matters only as something wholly unique—an *espèce*. And to say that goodness and nobility exist only in anecdote, be it based on fact or fiction, is the most caustic thing that can be said about them. –Were the naïve consciousness to end up insisting that this entire perverted world be dissolved, this cannot require the individual to keep his distance from it, since even a Diogenes in his tub is affected by the world—and in any event to make such a demand on the individual, namely that he look out for himself as individual, is precisely what's reckoned to be bad. Even when the demand to so distance oneself is directed at individuality collectively, this can't mean that reason should abandon the spiritually cultivated consciousness it has so arduously attained, let the articulated wealth of its experiential moments sink back into the one-dimensionality of natural feeling, and revert to the savage surroundings of brutish consciousness (referred to by some as the state of nature and innocence). Rather, the demand for some such dissolution can [M347] be addressed only to the spirit of culture itself, that it might emerge from its intellectual disarray and press on to a still higher level of awareness.

144 But in fact spirit has in principle accomplished that much already. This consciousness's self-conscious and articulate conflictedness is its way of laughing at existence, at the chaos of it all, itself included, its laughter being the still audible last reverberation of the entire muddle. In this, the self-conscious vanity of everything

actual and of every definite concept, the real world is doubly reflected into itself: on the one hand into such and such particular self's consciousness, and on the other into consciousness's pure universality—that is, into thought. From the one perspective spirit, having returned to itself, directs its gaze toward the actual world, still having this as its purpose and immediate content; but from the other its gaze is directed partly in upon itself alone while being negatively disposed toward the world, and partly away from this world toward heaven, with the realm beyond as its object.

145 From the former perspective, the reversion to self, the “vanity of all things” is the self's own vanity: it itself is vain. It is self existing for self, a self that knows not only how to judge and comment on everything, but also how to articulate with consummate wit the “solid facts” of reality as well as the “fixed norms” established by judgment in all their contradictoriness, a contradictoriness integral to their truth. This self knows that, when viewed with respect to form, everything is alien to itself, that what the self is for itself is unrelated to what it inherently is (i.e., what it has in mind to do and its purpose are both unrelated to truth), and that what it is in relation to what's other is in turn unrelated to both (i.e., what it overtly alleges to be doing is unrelated to what it actually means to do as well as to its real concern and intent). Hence this self knows exactly how to articulate each of these moments in its contrariness to the others, indeed the perversity of them all. No matter how they may define themselves, it knows better than they what each amounts to. Being knowledgeable regarding the disjoint and discordant elements that matters of substance unite within them, but not regarding what their unity constitutes, this self knows very well how to pass judgment on anything substantive—yet has lost the capacity to comprehend it.

146 –Such vanity, needing the vanity of all things in order to derive from them an awareness of self, is thus itself what engenders this vanity, and is the soul [M348] that bears it along. Power and wealth being the loftiest purposes toward which it strives, this self knows that only through resignation and sacrifice can it aspire to anything comprehensive, attain possession thereof, and in so doing achieve public standing (power and wealth being, after all, the commonly recognized forces in the actual realm). But such status is itself vain. Precisely in becoming master of power and wealth, the self realizes that these aren't substantive entities in their own right—that on the contrary it is itself the power animating them, they as such being vain.

147 –That in possessing them it's actually outside and beyond them: this is what such a self demonstrates in its clever formulations, which thereby become not only its pre-eminent interest but the truth of the whole as well. In such language *this* self—a pure self bound by no mode of determinacy whether actual or ideational—comes to realize that it has spiritual, truly comprehensive merit. It *is* the self-disruptive nature of all relationships, and is conscious of being what disrupts them. But only when moved to self-conscious indignation does the self know its own conflictedness; and no sooner

does it know this than it has risen above such. In vanity of this sort all substantive content becomes negative, no longer capable of being grasped in positive terms. The only positive object is the pure I itself, and implicit in this conflict-ridden consciousness is the pure self-identity of a self-consciousness that has found its way back to itself.



VI.B.1.b. *Faith and Pure Insight*

148 The spirit of self-estrangement has its existent presence in the cultured world; but inasmuch as this entire realm has become estranged from itself, beyond it there lies a nonactual world of pure consciousness, that is, of thinking. This other world has pure thought as its substantive content and exists within the unrestricted element of thinking. Yet since thought for the time being itself comprises the element in which that world exists, consciousness “just has” these thoughts without as yet thinking them through or realizing that they’re indeed thoughts; they’re present to it merely in the form of representations. For even in stepping out of actual reality into pure consciousness, it is itself still basically caught up in the sphere and specifics of the actual. That the self-identity of pure consciousness is implicitly comprised in the conflicted consciousness is at first evident to us, [M349] not to it itself. It thus progresses merely in ad hoc fashion, isn’t yet internally mature, and is still limited from within by a counterprinciple that it hasn’t yet mastered via any sort of mediation. Hence it doesn’t deem the manner of being it’s pondering as one that exists sheerly in the form of something ‘abstractly immanent’ but rather in the form of some matter-of-fact commonplace, something real that has simply been elevated into this other element without losing the determinateness that an actual reality has when *not* engendered by thought.

149 –It is important to distinguish what’s thus ‘abstractly immanent’ from the essence integral to Stoic consciousness—to which all that matters is thought’s *form* as such (any content being then something extraneous that’s imported from actual reality). To the consciousness here under scrutiny thought’s form *isn’t* what matters. –Also to be distinguished from it is the inherent principle of the “virtuous” consciousness, which regards what’s essential as indeed standing in a relation to actual reality—even as being the essence of the real—albeit one that’s just not realized yet: an inherent principle abiding beyond actual reality but nonetheless deemed real by such consciousness. –As for the inherently right and good advanced by law-giving reason and the manner of “all-inclusiveness” proposed by the law-testing mentality, these don’t have the definiteness of anything actually real.

150 –Thus while per se falling within the cultural world as one aspect of alienation, pure thought, having as criterion of abstract good and bad gone through the whole process of judgmental assessment, has been enriched by the other moment, actual

reality, and thereby provided with a substantive content. But the reality of the form of being it's mulling over is only that of pure, not realistic consciousness. Although indeed raised into the element of thought, that entity still isn't deemed by this consciousness as consisting of thought but as existing beyond consciousness's reality proper—it being a flight from actual reality.

151 The way in which religion (for obviously that's what we're talking about) makes its appearance here, namely as this cultured world's *faith*, isn't the way in which it's present in and to itself. We've already seen religion appear in other guises such as the Unhappy Consciousness, a form in which the very dynamic of consciousness lacks substance. Religion also appeared [M350] in connection with ethical substance as belief in the nether world, although mindfulness of the spirit of the departed isn't really faith (the affirmation of a substantive being beyond the actual realm in the element of pure consciousness) in that it abides directly within the present, its element being the family. –But here religion is partly comprised in pure awareness of the ethical substance from which it has emerged, and partly in a pure consciousness estranged from its reality-based consciousness, an entity estranged from its actual presence. So while in fact no longer consisting in some conscious process void of substance, religion is still determinedly antagonistic to actual reality—in any event to this particular reality—and especially to that of self-consciousness, being then in essence just a belief.

152 This pure consciousness of a manner of being that's absolute is an estranged form of awareness. We need to take a closer look at what specifically this consciousness is other than, and consider it simply in the context of that other. What pure consciousness appears to have contrasting with it initially is but the world of actual reality; yet in view of its being in flight from and determinedly opposed to that world, it harbors that world within it—meaning that in essence this pure consciousness is estranged from itself internally, with faith constituting but one of its aspects.

153 –The other aspect of it has thus already emerged for us too: pure consciousness so reflects out of the cultural world that the latter's substance and the modes into which that substance is articulated have shown themselves for what they are in themselves: spirit-suffused entities, wholly restive processes, modes of determinacy that supersede themselves right in their very opposite. Their essence—simplex consciousness—is thus a simplex form of total differentiation in which nothing different is directly there. Hence this is a manner of presence-to-self existing not as such and such individual self but rather as an internally all-pervasive self—a turbulent dynamism invasive and pervasive of the inert nature of any given matter at hand. Accordingly, present within such consciousness is a certainty that knows itself first-hand as the truth, knows pure thought as a manner of conceiving that's unrestricted in its power to negate, annulling everything alleged to exist objectively over against it and turning the latter into consciousness's own being.

154 –This pure consciousness is moreover [M351] simple, precisely in that what it has distinguished isn't distinct from it. In this form of simple reflection into self, pure consciousness is a constituent element of faith, one in which spirit has hold of something certain, something positive that's omnipresent, a self-immanence that contrasts starkly with such presence-to-self as self-consciousness has. –Having recoiled into itself out of an insubstantial and merely self-dissolutive world, spirit truly, indivisibly consists both in the 'unbridled dynamism and negativity' whereby it comes to light and in the 'inward contentment and positive serenity' that one has in this self-inhering all-pervasiveness. But with both moments being wholly under the influence of estrangement, they pursue separate paths as what is now a dualized consciousness. The former is *pure insight*, a concerted intellectual process within self-consciousness that finds itself face-to-face with and at odds with the consciousness oriented to faith's (in form objectivistic or representational) positivity. Pure insight's distinctive object is solely the pure I. By contrast the simple believing consciousness oriented to this manner of positivity, this serene self-identity, has as object inner being as such.

155 –Thus at first pure insight has no inherent content since it consists in a negative presence-to-self, whereas faith does have such a content but lacks insight. So while pure insight never deviates from self-consciousness, faith does have a substantive content in the element of pure self-consciousness, albeit one that consists in thinking rather than conceptualization, in pure consciousness rather than pure self-consciousness. Hence faith is indeed a pure consciousness of a form of 'essential being,' namely the simple inner, and so is a form of thinking, the decisive component of faith's nature—something commonly overlooked.

156 –That this 'essential being' is directly present within faith is due to its being faith's object, that is, a sheer thought. Yet to whatever extent such thinking enters into consciousness, or pure consciousness enters into self-consciousness, what's directly present in it is still indicative of an objective being that lies beyond the consciousness of the self. Because the pure thinking of faith (for all its directness and simplicity) sustains this consideration in consciousness, the 'essential being' it contemplates devolves from a thought into a representational projection, turning into a "supersensuous world," something in essence *other* than *self*-consciousness. [M352]

157 –In pure insight, by contrast, the transition of sheer thinking into conscious existence has the opposite effect: objectivity is indicative of a content that is sheerly negative, self-sublative, and that ends up turning back into the self. In other words the only object that the self really has is itself, or the object is true only so far as it has the form of self.



158 Just as faith and pure insight are conjointly integral to the element of pure consciousness, so also are they conjointly in recoil from the actual world of culture. Thus they present three different aspects: what each is in and present to itself outside any other relation, what each is in relation to the actual world existing over against pure consciousness, and what, within pure consciousness, each is in relation to the other.

159 Of these aspects, the believing consciousness's existence in and present to itself is its absolute object, the content and specific character of which has already been disclosed: in keeping with faith's way of conceiving, this object is none other than the real world raised into the universality of pure consciousness. The way that the real world is structured is accordingly also definitive of how the world of faith is organized—except that in pure consciousness the latter world's components don't in their restiveness become estranged but are entities existing in and relative to themselves, spirits that have receded into and keep to themselves. –It's thus evident only to us that faith and pure insight undergo a transitional process in which they become estranged from the set determinedness in which they're at variance, and that this occurs of necessity. So far as faith is concerned, the difference between them is a static disparity, any movement between them a bygone event.

160 To make brief mention of faith and pure insight in keeping with the outward character of their form: Whereas in the cultural world it was state power, the good, that was most noteworthy, here it's instead a divine being that is absolute: spirit existing in and relative to itself insofar as it constitutes a simple eternal substance. But in the process of actualizing this substance's conceptual nature—its being spirit—it turns into a being that's relative to others; its self-identity becomes an *actual* being that is absolute, one that “offers itself up,” becoming a self, albeit one that's transitory. Hence the third moment, the reversion of this estranged self and humbled substance to [M353] its initial simplicity, being in this way at last envisioned as spirit.

161 Thus restored to themselves from the flux of the actual world by thought, the distinct modes of this divine being exist as immutable, eternal spirits whose existence consists in contemplating the unity that they constitute. Remote from self-consciousness, they impinge upon it nonetheless. Were this being to remain unmoved in its initial form, that of a simple substance, it would be alien to self-consciousness. But implicit in the externalization of this substance—and thereupon its spirit—is another moment, that of actual reality, whereby the believing self-consciousness is made a participant in or indeed an integral part of the real world.

162 In accordance with this second relationship the believing consciousness, as noted, has its actual reality in the real world of culture, and itself makes up [part of] that world's spirit and presence; but it also turns against and undertakes to undermine this its actual reality as though *it* were the vanity of vanities. This process doesn't consist in just indulging in witticisms concerning the perversity of mundane reality; for a be-

believing consciousness, being simple and straightforward, counts wit, in still having mundane reality as its target, among the vanities. Rather does it pit the serene realm of its own thinking against that reality as to a spiritless presence that's accordingly to be outright overcome.

163 –Surmounting sensuous knowledge and action with dutiful service and praise, the believing consciousness manages to elicit a sense of unity with this divine being that exists in and present to itself—albeit a unity that isn't actually witnessed, in that such service just keeps on eliciting without fully attaining its goal in the present. While as a form of comprehensive self-consciousness the religious community does achieve such unity, for the self-conscious individual this realm envisioned in pure thought must needs remain somewhere beyond the reality he inhabits—or, when at the cost of its eternal being this realm is relocated within actual reality, it ends up as an ill-understood sensuous reality. Yet one such sensuously actual realm is and remains indifferent to another; and with this the realm beyond has the added feature of remoteness in space and time. But within the believing consciousness what's being conceived of here—spirit's reality as present [M354] to itself—remains something inner that, even though it is all and effectuates all, doesn't itself emerge into view.



164 In pure insight, however, all that's real is what's conceptual; and the above third aspect of faith, its being an object of pure insight, is the very relationship in which it appears here. –In like manner pure insight is itself to be considered as it is in and relative to itself, then in its relation to the actual world (to the extent that it, consisting in nothing but consciousness, still has a positive presence there), and lastly in its relation to faith.

165 We've seen what pure insight is in and for itself: whereas faith is a pure consciousness serenely aware of spirit as the divine being, pure insight is *self*-consciously aware of spirit—hence knows such being not as an entity of that sort but as self and self alone. Accordingly pure insight sets out to sublimate and conceptualize everything that's other than and independent of self-consciousness, whether existing actually or in principle. Pure insight doesn't just consist in self-conscious reason being certain that it is all truth; it *knows* that it is.

166 As it first emerges, however, what pure insight is conceiving hasn't yet actually been realized. Thus its conscious activity appears as yet random and ad hoc, and what it deems indispensable to be done appears as an aim it has yet to actualize. Such consciousness starts out intending to make pure insight universal—conceptualizing everything actual and forming it into a way of conceiving common to all self-conscious beings. Its intention is “pure” in that it has pure insight for its content; and the insight itself is “pure” in that its sole content is entirely conceptual, having nothing contrary

to it in the form of some object nor anything else to impede it internally. Both aspects are directly integral to such unrestricted conceiving: that everything objective be significant solely as a form of presence-to-self, of self-conscious existence, and that this presence-to-self have universal relevance, with pure insight becoming the possession of all self-conscious beings.

167 –Culture has accomplished this second aspect of its intention once objectified spirit's differentiae—the ways in which its world is sorted and stereotyped, as well as such differences as come to light in the form of original determinative natures—have all come to naught. Genius, [M355] talent, and the whole lot of special capabilities are part and parcel of the actual world insofar as it still has a dimension to it comprising a feral realm of would-be intelligent beings who, amidst reciprocally perpetrated violence and upheaval, battle and betray one another over the sort of things that matter in a world such as that.

168 –Needless to say, in pure insight's world there's little room for any who'd distinguish themselves as ingenuous types. And individuality is neither satisfied with some would-be "abiding concern" nor has it any special content and agenda all its own; rather is it valued solely as comprehensively rounded out, as cultivated. "Distinction" reduces to a matter of greater or lesser energy—a quantitative, hence negligible difference. This last form of disparity has fallen by the wayside in that consciousness's utter conflictedness has turned this sort of difference into one that's altogether qualitative. What the I here deems to be other than it is nothing but the I itself. In this sweeping assessment, all the one-sidedness and idiosyncrasy attaching to its original presence-to-self is nullified. The self knows that it itself, as pure self, is its object; that both of these aspects are totally identical is what constitutes pure insight's element.

169 –Pure insight is thus simplex in nature, is in no wise internally at variance with itself, and is a comprehensive achievement belonging to all in common. In each and every object within this simplex spiritual substance, self-consciousness goes about engendering and sustaining awareness of this its individuality, of its own action—even as, in so doing, its individuality is self-concordant and all-inclusive. Thus is pure insight a form of spirit calling out to each and every conscious being: "Be manifestly for yourselves what you are latently within yourselves—be reasonable."



VI.B.2. ENLIGHTENMENT

170 The distinctive object on which pure insight focuses its conceptual energies is faith, the form of pure consciousness standing in contrast with it in the element common to both. But pure insight also bears a relation to the actual world, since, like faith, it consists in a recoil from that world into pure consciousness. How pure insight en-

gages the ignoble intentions and perverse “insights” of this mundane realm is what needs to be looked at first. [M356]

171 We’ve already made mention of the mentality constitutive of one aspect of this relation, namely pure insight and intention, a consciousness standing impassively in opposition to what ended up as an internally self-dissolving and self-regenerating tumult. But as we saw, this dispassionate consciousness really has no special insight concerning the world of culture. Rather does culture itself have the most soul-wrenching feelings and truest insights regarding itself, the felt sense that everything solidified is dissolving, that in every moment of its present existence it’s being broken on the wheel and having all its bones shattered; indeed culture gives voice to this feeling and is brilliantly critical of every aspect of its condition. Thus pure insight is for its part hardly in a position to do or proffer anything of substance here, and so is reduced to the role of providing a formal and accurate “synopsis” of the cultural world’s ingenious insights and clever discourse. Yet since cultivated discourse is capricious (every critique being a mere flash of frivolity no sooner delivered than forgotten) and coheres as a whole only in the eyes of a third party, pure insight can make its mark simply by bringing all these random brush-strokes together in one all-encompassing picture, thus making its insight everybody’s.

172 By this one simple means pure insight will resolve the world’s pandemic confusion, it having become evident that the modes into which this reality is articulated, conceptually defined, and individuated aren’t what’s essential to it, that its substance and mainstay is a spirit that exists to judge and dispute, one whose interest is to have some substantive content for all this sophisticated tongue-wagging—if only to keep it all going both as a whole and as variously articulated. While having its say, pure insight still thinks of its self-consciousness as “this particular individual who’s out for himself”—although the vacuousness of a content such as this is at the same time reflected in the vacuousness of the very self that knows all this to be idle. So when the impassive consciousness taking in all this brilliant babble about such vacuity assembles the most telling and trenchant of these formulations, the soul still sustaining the whole enterprise—the witty critic’s vanity—comes to naught right along with the rest of existent reality’s vacuity. Such a montage shows to most minds a superior and to all minds at least a more diversified wit than their own, and demonstrates that such judgmental [M357] one-upmanship is something universally encountered and now everywhere old-hat. With this the sole surviving interest therein is extinguished, and these individual flashes of “seeing into things” end up dissolving into the insight common to all.

173 As yet, however, knowledge concerned with the divine being still holds its established place as superior to vain and vacuous knowledge, and the distinctive efficacy of pure insight emerges only insofar as it enters the lists in opposition to faith.



VI.B.2.a. Enlightenment's Struggle with Superstition

174 The modes of negatively oriented consciousness here at variance (on the one hand Skepticism, on the other theoretical and practical idealism) are subordinate forms of pure insight and its dissemination as enlightenment; this is so because pure insight is born of substance, knows consciousness's pure self to be absolute, and is a match for any 'pure consciousness of the absolute essence of all reality.' Since faith and insight, notwithstanding their both alike consisting in pure consciousness, are in form antithetical—with the 'divine being' envisioned by faith being present to it in a form of thought rather than conceptualization (hence as something altogether contrary to self-consciousness), and with pure insight taking the essence of the real to be comprised in the self—each regards the other as the one thing utterly negative of it. As they confront each other, all substantive content falls to faith since, in the tranquil element of its way of thinking, each moment thereof wins an enduring place. But while pure insight initially has no content, and is sooner the utter disappearance of such, by negatively counteracting what it regards as its negative complement it will establish its reality and provide itself with a substantive content after all.

175 What pure insight knows of faith is that faith is something antithetic to it—to reason and truth. While looking upon faith as basically a web of superstition, prejudice, and error, pure insight furthermore takes the mentality espousing such a content to be organized into a veritable dominion of error: a realm in which false insight is on the one hand endemic within the common ruck of conscious beings (straightforward, ingenuous, and inwardly unreflective), yet on the other hand also stands separate from such ingenuousness, [M358] having an internally self-reflective or self-conscious moment, a form of persistently self-oriented insight and evil intent operating behind the scenes to deceive the unreflective consciousness. The common mass is victimized by the treachery of a priesthood that, even while jealously pursuing among other selfish ends its futile goal of remaining sole keeper of all insight, enters into collusion with despotism. Despotism in turn, as an artificial, conceptually vapid union of the real and the ideal realm (a singularly inconsistent entity), places itself above the paltry discernment of the multitude and the bad intentions of the priests even while uniting the two within itself. Although contemptuous of both, it derives from the people's stupidity and muddleheadedness (thanks to an insidious priesthood) the advantage of unchallenged hegemony and the wherewithal to fulfill its passions and whims—even while itself embodying the same dullness of vision, the same superstition and error.

176 Enlightenment doesn't engage all three fronts presented by the enemy indiscriminately; for since it essentially consists in pure insight, something in and of itself universal, it actually interrelates with the other extreme by focusing on what they have in common and how they're alike. The front posed by the manner of individuality that sets itself apart from the common unsophisticated consciousness presents enlighten-

ment with an antagonist it can't directly engage. Hence the immediate object of enlightenment's action isn't the will of the insidious priesthood and the oppressive despot, but the irresolute insight of those who haven't set themselves apart in self-orientedness—the conceptual capacity of rational self-consciousness that's present in the masses but isn't as yet manifesting its presence as conception. By delivering this honest form of insight with its unsophisticated ways from prejudice and error, pure insight wrests from the clutches of bad intent such reality and deceptive power as it has: a realm whose foundation and raw material is the conceptually undeveloped consciousness of the general mass—the self-orientedness of bad intent being in the main based substantively on guileless consciousness.

177 The relation between pure insight and the unsophisticated consciousness of an absolute divine being is now two sided: pure insight being implicitly the same as the latter consciousness, [M359] even while the latter, in the simple element of its musings, gives free rein to this absolute entity and *its* attributes, concedes their existence, and simply lets them pass unquestioned, and to that extent objectively validated, as that in which it itself inheres—albeit while disavowing its being present to itself therein. Inasmuch as the faith of the unsophisticated consciousness is for pure insight (via the first side of their relation) implicitly a form of pure self-consciousness needing only to become present to itself as pure self-consciousness, in the unsophisticated consciousness's own conceiving pure insight has the element within which to realize itself in place of false insight.

178 On this side of the relation where pure insight and the unsophisticated consciousness are basically the same, and where the contact of the former with the latter occurs in and through one and the same element, they're in direct communication and the give-and-take between them proceeds in smooth-flowing fashion. Whatever divisive wedges may otherwise be driven into it, there's an innate simplicity to conscious being in which everything gets worked through to a resolution, done with and forgotten, taken in stride—leaving it fully receptive to matters conceptual.

179 –The communication of pure insight is thus comparable to a gentle diffusion, to the wafting of a fragrance through the unresisting atmosphere. The infection is pervasive, giving no advance warning that it's inimical to the insouciant element into which it is insinuating itself—there being then no way to resist it. Only when it has already spread is the infection evident to the consciousness that unawares placed itself at risk. For indeed that of which this consciousness was the recipient is the simple nature common to both—albeit one that is moreover simplex in the manner of a self-reflective negativity that by its nature evolves into something self-conflicted and so induces consciousness to recall its previous condition. –Such negativity is what conceiving consists in: simplex knowing, which knows itself as well as its opposite, but as an opposite sublated within it.

180 –Thus by the time that consciousness becomes aware of it, pure insight has already spread—any struggle against it being symptomatic of the infection having occurred. Resistance is too late, and remedial efforts merely aggravate the disease, since by then pure insight has taken hold in the vital marrow of spiritual life—in consciousness itself, in its pure conceiving, its pure essential nature—there being then no force remaining to prevail against it. Ensconced now within consciousness's very being, the infection can abide having its localized eruptions [M360] contained, its surface symptoms suppressed.

181 –The situation is then most advantageous to pure insight, since it isn't expending its energy uselessly or failing to live up to what it in essence is—which it would do were it to break out in mere symptoms challenging the thought-content integral to faith, and in isolated eruptions challenging the coherence of faith's outward actuality. An invisible and unobserved spirit now, pure insight steals through every fiber of the vital parts, soon gaining complete control of all the viscera and members of the unsuspecting idol, until "one fine morning it gives its 'comrade' a little nudge and—crash! smash!—the idol lies shattered on the ground":⁵ one fine morning that isn't bloody by noon provided that the infection has permeated every organ of spiritual life. By then all that's left of the bygone ways of spirit's previous form is what memory somehow preserves from the history of things past—the new serpent of wisdom, raised high for idolization, having painlessly sloughed off its withered skin.

182 But spirit's quietly entwining itself thus in the simplex inner fabric of its substance, keeping what it's doing covert, is only one aspect of pure insight's realization. Its dissemination isn't just an affair in which like goes hand in hand with like, any more than its actualization merely involves its unopposed furtherance. No less crucial to the action of a negative mode of being such as this is an escalating process of sorting things out—having to take deliberate action in the realm of concrete public affairs to promote such matters as are of moment to it, making its presence felt by sounding the alarm and vehemently struggling against any opposition it faces.

183 So we need to see just how this pure insight with pure intent goes about negatively engaging the opposition it encounters. In conducting itself thus—since its conceptualizing is all that's essential, and nothing outside it matters—such pure insight with such pure intent cannot but be its own negative complement. Thus does it, as insight, turn into the negation of pure insight, becoming untrue and irrational—while, as intent, it turns into the negation of pure intent, a tainted purpose and a sham.

184 Pure insight gets caught up in this contradiction because it [M361] takes up the fight meaning to do battle against something other than it. But it doesn't get past just

5. Diderot, *Rameau's Nephew*, again.

meaning to do so because, being in essence a form of absolute negativity, it has this otherness integrally within it. A way of conceiving that's as all-pervasive as this is categorical, its knowing and its object being one and the same. Thus what pure insight declares to be other than it—an error or lie—can't be anything other than pure insight itself: all that's there for it to condemn is what it itself is. What isn't rational has no truth: what isn't grasped conceptually doesn't exist. So when reason makes mention of something "other" than it, it's in fact referring only to itself; in doing so it doesn't go outside itself.

185 –To grapple with an antagonist in this way gives concomitant indication of how pure insight gets actualized, namely via the progressive unfolding and reintegration of its moments. In part the process involves a bifurcation in which the insight doing the conceiving sets itself in contrast to itself as an object; and so long as it remains in this phase, it is self-estranged. As insight that is pure, it's devoid of all content; the process of its realization hinges upon its becoming its own substantive content—there being nothing else that can do this since its self-consciousness is categorical. Yet since this self-conscious being that's present in its antagonist is at first known by it only as a substantive content and not yet as itself, it doesn't recognize itself therein. Thus the point of carrying this process through to completion is that the content which pure insight initially took to be objective ends up being recognized by it as its own. In this way, instead of reinstating either the errors it combats or merely its initial conception, it will issue in a manner of insight that recognizes what's radically negative of it as constituting its own reality, as its very self—insight recognizing itself conceptually.

186 –The nature of enlightenment's struggle with such errors—battling with itself in battling them, and decrying what it itself asserts—is, as we now see, what it and its struggle inherently involve. But what this first phase of the struggle objectifies for faith is that enlightenment, in adopting this negative course, is contaminating its self-consistent purity. Faith accordingly experiences enlightenment as falsehood, irrationality, and malice aforethought, even as enlightenment views faith as error and prejudice. –As to its content, enlightenment [M362] is initially a vacant form of insight to which the content peculiar to it appears other than it; it encounters this in the guise of something not yet its own, existing altogether independently of it—in faith.

187 So while initially apprehending its object largely as a form of pure insight, enlightenment doesn't recognize itself therein, and declares it to be error-ridden. In insight as such, consciousness so apprehends its object that to it the object becomes an entity of consciousness: an object suffused by consciousness, one in which consciousness sustains itself, remains with and present to itself—and in functioning then as the object's motive force, so much as engenders that object. On precisely this point what enlightenment says about faith—that what faith construes as a divine being that's absolute is an entity of its own consciousness, its own thought, something generated

by consciousness itself—is correct. Enlightenment accordingly declares faith to be an erroneous and fictive version of what enlightenment itself is.

188 –In so doing, enlightenment, intent upon teaching faith the new wisdom, fails to tell it anything new; for faith likewise takes its object to be a pure entity of consciousness, one in which it, rather than supposing itself to be forsaken and undone, places its trust—meaning that it finds itself therein as this particular conscious or rather self-conscious being. –The certainty-of-self of one whom I trust is to me tantamount to my own; I’m recognizing in him my own existence for myself and moreover that he recognizes the gist and point of what I’m thus doing. Faith, however, is a form of trust in that its consciousness relates to its object directly and so also intuitively that it’s one with, integral to, that object. Furthermore, when the object before me is one in which I recognize myself, I’m actually present to myself in that object as a self-consciousness that’s other than me—here meaning as a self-consciousness that has become estranged from its particular individuality (its natural and contingent aspect) yet continues to consist both in self-consciousness and, precisely thus, in a form of consciousness as indispensable as that of pure insight. Insight’s conceptual cohesiveness doesn’t just involve consciousness recognizing itself in the object into which it peers—its being present right there in the object without having to quit this entity of thought just to get back to itself—but moreover involves its awareness of being [M363] an intermediating agent: as itself actively engendering the object, the unity of self and object thus being evident to it in its very thinking.

189 –This is exactly the kind of consciousness that faith consists in as well—with obedience and action comprising a necessary moment in achieving “a certainty of abiding within this being that is absolute.” While there’s of course no indication that this being is itself brought into existence by anything faith does, fundamentally the being envisioned by faith isn’t an abstract entity lying beyond the purview of the believing consciousness but rather a communal spirit, the unity of an abstract entity and self-consciousness. That this being become the spirit of the community makes what the community does an indispensable moment of their relation; this spirit is that entity only by consciousness making it so—or rather *isn’t* that entity unless consciousness brings it about. For crucial as it is that this be made to be, substantively such action isn’t the sole ground but only one moment of the relation. This being exists both in *and* present to itself.

190 From the perspective of its counterpart, pure insight conceives of itself as other than its object because its negative orientation is what’s defining that object. From that other perspective pure insight is then also declaring that faith’s divine being is alien to self-consciousness—*isn’t* the latter’s very essence but rather a changeling that’s been foisted upon it. Yet in this, enlightenment is being utterly absurd. Faith hears in it a voice that doesn’t know what it’s talking about and that has no idea what’s at issue when

it carries on about a treacherous clergy and mass delusion. Enlightenment talks about such things as though the believing consciousness were having something totally other than and alien to it conjured up through the hocus-pocus of priests and palmed off on it as a divine being—while on the other hand saying that this is an entity created by consciousness, one that it believes in, trusts in, and strives to win the favor of, beholding in *it* its pure essence no less than its singular and collective individuality, and that it is through its own action that it brings about this union of itself and its divine being. In one and the same breath enlightenment declares that what it claims to be alien to the believing consciousness is the latter's ownmost essence.

191 –So what entitles [M364] enlightenment to speak of deception and delusion here? In forthwith asserting the exact opposite of what it maintains concerning faith, it reveals itself to the latter instead as a conscious falsehood. How could delusion and deception turn up where a consciousness abiding in its truth has firsthand certainty of self, where consciousness possesses in its object its very self, where it finds itself as much as brings itself forth? There's no longer so much as a verbal distinction here. When the sweeping question has been raised as to whether it's permissible to deceive a people,⁶ the answer would in fact have to be that this question is ill-conceived, since it's impossible to delude a people in such matters. No doubt brass is now and again sold as gold, counterfeit currency tendered in place of genuine, a battle lost put over on some as a battle won, and all manner of lies about sensuous things and particular events made credible for a time. But when it comes to knowledge of an entity in which consciousness has direct certainty-of-self, the idea of there being some manner of deception is totally off the mark.



192 Moving on, let's see how, in the distinct moments of its consciousness, faith experiences enlightenment—this perspective having been touched upon only generally in the preceding. These moments are as follows: pure thinking or (as object) an absolute divine being abiding in and relative to itself; then how such thinking relates cognitively to that being, the basis of its faith; and lastly how it relates to that being in its action, in the service it renders. Just as pure insight altogether failed to recognize itself in faith and denied having any part therein, so will it, as these moments are played out, behave in a similarly wrongheaded way.

193 Pure insight takes a dim view of the absolute divine being envisioned by the believing consciousness. This being consists in pure thinking—in pure thinking that's set

6. A question proposed for a prize essay contest at the Academy of Science in Berlin by Frederick the Great in 1778.

forth as an object in thought itself: thinking affirmed as an entity. In a believing consciousness the self-inhering being of such thinking moreover takes on, for the consciousness here existentially present to itself, the form—just the bare form—of an objective entity, with such being existing then in the specific form of something set forth representationally.

194 –Yet to pure insight, a pure consciousness whose perspective is that of a self that’s matter-of-factly present to itself, this “other” appears as something negatively complementary to [M365] self-conscious being. An other such as this could still be regarded as consisting in the pure self-inherency of thought—or for that matter as a being of sense-certainty. Yet while this “other” is at once present to the self and, as a self that has an object, an actual conscious being, pure insight construes this distinctive object as such to be an ordinary matter-of-fact thing of sense-certainty. Pure insight’s object appears to it here in the guise of something that faith sets forth in representation. It condemns this representation and, in so doing, condemns its own object. But in thinking of faith’s object in the way that it thinks of its own, it already does faith an injustice. Carrying on in this vein, pure insight says of faith that its absolute divine being is a hunk of stone, a block of wood having eyes that can’t see, or some bread dough transformed by people from something grown in the soil into something else sent back to it—or in whatever other ways faith might anthropomorphize, objectify, and represent that being to itself.

195 What enlightenment, which professes to be pure [in thought and intention], is doing here is reducing the eternal life and holy spirit of those focused on the spiritual to some matter-of-fact ephemeral thing and muddying them with a perspective that would properly seem bootless—that of sense-certainty, which has no place at all in the believer’s worship—and thereby engaging in downright calumny. What faith reveres it by no means looks upon as stone or wood or dough, nor any other time-bound sensuous thing. And should it occur to enlightenment to assert that faith’s object is nonetheless a sensuous thing “as well,” or even that this is what its object is inherently and in truth, faith, quite aware of this other thing that its object is “as well” yet regards as extraneous to its worship, isn’t in the least concerned with things like stones as they are in themselves, but solely with this divine being of pure thought as this being is in itself.

196 Faith’s second moment involves its relating, as a *knowing* consciousness, to that divine being. That being is manifest to faith firsthand in its thinking; but faith’s pure consciousness to that very extent intermediates certainty and truth—a connection undergirding faith. Even so, as enlightenment sees it, faith is based upon one’s happening to have knowledge of certain contingent events. But the foundation of faith’s knowledge is a manner of communing that *knows*, and is something whose truth consists totally of [M366] spirit—which in abstract pure consciousness (thinking as such) is

sheerly this absolute divine being, yet, when self-conscious, consists in knowing oneself. Pure insight assumes that this way of communing with what one thus knows, this simple self-knowing spirit, is nonetheless a form of *unselfconscious* being. –Pure insight is of course itself a form of pure intermediative thinking, of thought mediating itself by means of itself: pure knowing. But inasmuch as it is pure insight—pure knowing that doesn't yet know itself, that doesn't yet realize that it itself consists of a pure intermediative process such as this—it takes the latter (as it does everything else that it itself is) to be something other than it.

197 –So as it goes about working things through, pure insight fleshes out this moment that, while indispensable to it, it construes as belonging to faith and as being in *its* specifics extraneous to it—as a sort of knowledge contingent upon vulgar accounts of actual events. In so doing, it as much as accuses religious belief of basing *its* certainty on a few fragments of historical testimony that as such hardly provide the degree of certainty about an event that newspaper reports do. Moreover it charges that faith's certitude rests on the chance survival of such testimony—on its having been, for one thing, recorded on paper, and, for another, competently and honestly transcribed from one piece of paper to the next, and ultimately on the meaning of these long-dead words and letters being interpreted correctly. Yet in fact it never even occurs to faith to tie its certainty to any such evidence or eventuality. In its sure-minded way it relates to its indubitable object straightforwardly, knows that object purely—doesn't mix letters of the alphabet, pieces of paper, and copyists in with its awareness of the absolute divine being, doesn't resort to any such intermediary. Rather is this awareness the self-mediating ground of faith's knowledge: spirit is its own best witness, as much within the inner being of individual consciousness as through its all-pervasive presence among the community of the faithful. Were faith to look beyond itself to history in order to establish, or at least corroborate, its substantive content, seeking the kind of confirmation that enlightenment talks about, and earnestly believe and act as though doing so [M367] were crucial, then it would already have been corrupted by enlightenment; and any effort it expends in thus trying to justify and fortify itself is just that much evidence of its contamination.

198 Still to be considered is the third aspect, the believing consciousness's way of relating to the absolute divine being actively. Such action entails sublating the individual's particularity, the natural bent of his self-orientedness, affording him the certainty, commensurate with his action, of partaking in pure self-consciousness, that is, seeing himself as an individual conscious being at one with the divine being. Since in action of this sort expediency and purpose are two different things, with pure insight being as negatively disposed toward such action as it is in denial concerning its own nature in its other experiential moments, it cannot but show that it fails to understand expediency as it applies insight to intention, attunes purpose and means, and thus appears

as other than, or as the very opposite of, insight. As for purpose, pure insight can scarcely make something base its aim—pleasure and possessions, say—without proving itself to be the epitome of *impure* intention, since when pure intention is anything other than that, it is impure intention.

199 Thus with respect to expediency, we see that enlightenment finds the individual believer foolish when, aspiring to the loftier state of mind of one who's not fettered to natural pleasure and enjoyment, he goes so far as to actually deny himself pleasure and enjoyment, demonstrating in deed that his contempt for such isn't feigned but genuine. Enlightenment likewise finds the individual foolish if, to break out of his set ways as property holder and consummate individualist (to the exclusion of everyone else), he divests himself of part of his property, showing that he isn't someone grievously isolated—is above being reduced to such by natural necessity, above being so totally insulated from others by his self-orientedness as to deny their solidarity with him. Pure insight finds both of these courses of action pointless and wrongheaded. Seeing no point to renouncing pleasure and giving away property in order to show that one isn't fettered to pleasure and [M368] possession, presumably it will then on the other hand declare that anyone who in order to eat, seizes upon the expedient of actually consuming something, is a fool. Pure insight also finds it wrongheaded to deny oneself a meal—to give away butter and eggs without getting money, or give away money without getting butter and eggs, or simply to give such things away gratis; it declares that to have a meal or possess things of this sort is an end in itself, thereby showing itself to be in fact a grossly impure form of intention, one for which pleasure and possessions are all that matter.

200 –While pure insight, in the guise of pure intention, goes on in turn to assert the need to rise above natural existence and the greedy pursuit of means, it finds simply foolish and wrong that one's rising above these be demonstrated in actual deed. In other words this manner of pure intention is actually perpetrating a fraud, pretending to and insisting upon an inner high-mindedness while claiming such high-mindedness—when taken seriously, put into practice, and thus demonstrably genuine—to be superfluous, foolish, even wrong. In this way such insight belies itself both as pure insight by disavowing action directly oriented to its end, and as pure intention by disavowing any intention to emancipate itself from self-centered ends.

201 This is how enlightenment presents itself in faith's experience. Enlightenment looks as bad as it does because, by the very way it relates to what's other than it, it casts itself in the role of a negative reality—in other words shows itself to be the opposite of itself. Yet pure insight and intent has to adopt such an attitude, since this is how it gets actualized, appearing initially as a negative reality. Perhaps as a positive reality it's more favorably constituted. Let's see if that's so.

202 –Once all prejudice and superstition have been banished, the question arises, What next? What's the truth that enlightenment has disseminated in their stead? In uprooting error it has already given expression to a positive content, for enlightenment's very self-estrangement is in equal measure its positive reality. Enlightenment, given the specifics it unearths in what for faith is wholly spiritual, makes these out to consist of wood, stone, and so on, of individual actual things. By presuming to construe *all* specificity—including such substance and content as faith has—[M369] as being in this way finite, as the stuff of human nature and imagination, it takes faith's absolute divine being to be a kind of vacuum to which no specifics, no predicates, could be attributed. Any such attribution would be downright reprehensible, precisely the sort of thing that spawned the monsters of superstition. –Now of course reason, pure insight, being well aware of what's negatively complementary to it and having this for its substantive content, isn't itself vacuous but abounding, if only with matters particular and limited; its preventing the likes of such from being identified with or attributed to an absolute divine being epitomizes its insightful way of life, which is quite adept at keeping itself and its abundant array of finite matters in their place while treating such an absolute entity with dignity.

203 Vis-à-vis this vacuous entity is the second moment of enlightenment's positive truth: the individuality that's integral to conscious being and indeed to all being, but which has been altogether excluded from this being that's absolute, existing as it does in and relative to itself. Consciousness, the reality of which consists first and foremost in sensuous certainty and opinion, here returns from its far-reaching experiential journey and once again consists in knowledge of what's sheerly, negatively complementary to it—knowledge of sensuous things, matter-of-fact entities that have no regard for the existence consciousness has in relation to itself.

204 –But here consciousness isn't what it is in its guileless natural form, but rather what it has become. Initially susceptible to all the entanglements into which it is plunged in the course of its development, now, thanks to pure insight, it has been led back to its nascent form, experiencing this rather as a result. Its foundation now securely based upon its insight into the nothingness of all other modes of consciousness, and hence of everything beyond sense-certainty, this certainty is no longer opinion but absolute truth. While the nothingness of everything that goes beyond sense-certainty is of course but a negative proof of it, such truth doesn't admit of any other proof since sense-certainty's positive truth consists precisely in the *unmediated* presence-to-self that the conceptual process itself has as object, and indeed in the form of otherness. Every conscious being is entirely certain that it exists, that there are other actual things besides it, and that in [M370] just naturally existing it, like those things, exists in and of itself, that is to say, absolutely.

205 The third moment of enlightenment's truth, finally, involves the relationship of individual entities to this entity that is absolute, interrelating the first two moments. Enlightenment's insight, as pure insight into what's the same as it or in no way constrains it, is also such that it transcends what's not like it, transcends finite reality, extending beyond itself—as something that is itself a form of sheer otherness.

206 –What such insight has beyond finite otherness is the void, to which it accordingly relates sensuous reality. When specified as to content, both of these correlates don't come into play, since the one is a void, and only via the other, sensuous reality, is any content available. But when it comes to specifying the form of their relation, in which the self-inhering correlate does play a role, this can be fashioned however one pleases, since a form such as this is negatively complementary to itself inherently, and hence is antithetic to itself—is being as well as nothing, what it is in itself as well as the opposite of itself: to relate the actual to something self-inhering that exists beyond the actual does as much to negate it as to affirm it. What's finitely actual can accordingly be construed in whatever way is useful at the time. The sensuous then becomes positively related to the absolute as to something self-inhering—and with that, sensuous actuality is itself self-inhering: being made, fostered, and cultivated by the absolute. On the other hand it also relates to this absolute as the opposite thereof—as a nonentity—and thus related, instead of inhering in itself, it's sheerly relative to what's other than it. Whereas in the previous permutation of consciousness the concepts integral to the opposition were specified in terms of 'good' and 'bad,' here by contrast they become for pure insight the sheer abstractions 'being that inheres in itself' and 'being that's relative to something other than it.'



207 Both perspectives, however, the positive as well as the negative interconnection of the finite to what's self-inhering, are in fact equally necessary, and so everything is no less something in its own right than it is relative to what's other than it. Everything is *useful*. Everything is at the disposal of others, lets itself be used by them, and exists for them—only to rear up on its hind legs, so to speak, fight shy of others, exist for itself, and use others in turn. For a human being, as [M371] a thing that's aware of this interrelation, his nature and place in all this becomes readily apparent. –Taken just as he is as a natural conscious entity unto himself, man is "good"; as a solitary being he's self-sufficient, and everything other than him is at his disposal. And indeed since for him as a self-conscious animal the moments here in play are all-encompassing in their implication, *everything* exists for his pleasure and diversion; and even as he came forth from the hand of God, he walks the face of the earth as though it were a garden planted specially for him. He must also have picked from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, giving him possession of something useful that distinguishes him from all other beings. For his innately good nature just happens to be also constituted in

such a way that it's harmed by excessive enjoyment—or rather, his unique nature is itself so constituted that it has a beyond of its own within it: it can overreach itself and destroy itself.

208 –Against this he finds reason a useful means of duly restraining excess, or rather of preserving him when he goes to such excess, this being the power of consciousness. The gratification of a conscious, inherently universal entity is, in keeping with its variability and endurance, perforce itself all-inclusive rather than specific. The function of moderation is thus to prevent any break either in the variety or the continuity of gratification, which is as much as to say that moderation's role is to serve excess. –Just as in the eyes of man everything is useful, so also is he; and it's his function to make himself a socially useful and usefully versatile member of the herd. To the same extent that he's looking out for himself he has to put himself at the disposal of others, and to the extent that he does so he's looking out for himself: one hand washes the other. In whatever situation he finds himself, that's right where he belongs; he uses others and gets used in turn.

209 While different things are useful to each other in different ways, integral to them all by their very nature is this utilitarian reciprocity that relates them to what here reigns absolute, doing so both positively, whereby each exists in and for itself, and negatively, whereby each exists for others. Hence one's relation to the absolute divine being (one's religion) is, of all the various modes of usefulness, the most useful of all; for this nexus is the quintessence of utility, what sustains all things (the being [M372] they have in and of themselves) and what undoes all things (the being they have for others).

210 Needless to say, faith considers this positive conclusion that enlightenment arrives at to be as outrageous as the latter's negative attitude toward it. To faith, this "insight" into the absolute divine being—seeing in it nothing but a being unrelated to anything else, an abyssal *être suprême*—this outlook purporting that everything, taken just as it is, is something in its own right, is good, and finally that the relation between the individual conscious being and that being, religion itself, is given exhaustive expression in the concept 'utility,' is utterly abhorrent. Enlightenment's patented "wisdom" inevitably strikes faith as flatly jejune, and self-confessedly so at that; for it consists in knowing not a whit about the supreme being or, what comes to the same, in possessing only the platitudinous truism that such an entity is "naught but a being unrelated to anything else"—whereas in fact it knows only of finite things, knows these alone to be true, and deems this knowledge of them as true to be the highest knowledge there is.

211 Vis-à-vis enlightenment, faith, however, possesses a divine right, that of a halcyon self-consistency or of pure thinking, and feels thoroughly wronged by the former: enlightenment distorts it in all its pivotal moments, turning these into something other

than what they are in it. But vis-à-vis faith, such right and truth as enlightenment possesses is merely human: the “wrong” it commits lies in its lodging a claim of *inconsistency* [against faith], as well as in its inverting and revising [what faith affirms]—a right inherent in the very nature of self-consciousness when confronting such simplistic modes of being or thinking. Yet since what it’s in possession of here is a right inherent in self-consciousness, enlightenment doesn’t turn out simply to be “likewise” in the right—with these two equal spiritual rights being then left at loggerheads, and with neither of them capable of satisfying the other. Rather is the claim asserted by enlightenment unqualified, since self-consciousness is a *conceptual* negativity, one that isn’t just minding its own business but actively encroaching upon its counterpart. And faith—itself a form of consciousness—will scarcely be able to deny enlightenment its just claim.

212 Enlightenment doesn’t, after all, confront the believing consciousness with principles all its own but rather [M373] with those that are intrinsic to faith’s consciousness. Enlightenment simply brings together the thoughts that faith thinks in desultory fashion, merely reminding it, when it’s pursuing one way of looking at things, of the other ways that are also part and parcel of it yet which, when focusing upon any one, faith keeps forgetting. In so doing enlightenment proves that it, as opposed to the believing consciousness, is pure insight, seeing in each given moment the whole picture, accordingly providing for each the relevant countermoment, and in unsettling each by way of the other, forcing into the open the negative—the conceptual—nature of both ways of thinking. This is why enlightenment appears to faith as a distortion and a lie; for in thus pointing out that there is something else that faith’s own moments involve, enlightenment seems to be making of them something downright different from what they are individually on their own. Yet this other aspect is equally critical, and in truth is present in the believing consciousness itself, although this just doesn’t enter into its thinking, being instead somewhere in the back of its mind, as something that’s neither foreign to it nor something it can disown.

213 Yet while reminding faith of the countermoment of each of its disjoint moments, enlightenment is every bit as unenlightened about itself as is faith. Enlightenment is sheerly negative in its attitude toward faith insofar as it is pure: it excludes its content from itself and takes this content [i.e., faith] to be the negative complement of itself [i.e., enlightenment]. Hence it neither recognizes anything of itself therein, in faith’s content, nor, consequently, does it bring these two ways of thinking—the one it introduces and the one against which it does so—together.

214 –Not recognizing that what it condemns in faith is directly part and parcel of its own thinking, it is itself caught up in the conflict between these moments, at every turn acknowledging only the one at odds with faith, while splitting away from the other just as does faith. Hence while enlightenment does nothing to bring to light the

unity of the two—that they’re integrally one, that is, conceptual—nonetheless their conceptual nature emerges before it all on *its* own, or is simply there for it to find. For the realization of pure insight, whose very nature is to conceptualize, inherently involves its first becoming in its own eyes altogether other than itself, then denying itself, and then—the tensiveness of conception being absolute—coming forth from that otherness to itself, to its being itself conceptual. [M374] –Enlightenment is nothing but a process of this sort, indeed an as yet unconscious activity of pure conceiving that encounters *itself* in the manner of an object; while construing this to be something other than it, it doesn’t also grasp the nature of its own conceiving—which is to say that what’s splitting completely apart here is something that’s [in itself] nondifferentiated. Against faith, insight, inasmuch as it acts as a cohesive power that traverses and interrelates the moments lying separate in faith’s consciousness, so interconnects them that their contradictoriness becomes conspicuous. While in this matter the force of what insight argues counter to faith is undeniably legitimate, what insight actually accomplishes thereby consists simply in the believing consciousness, by virtue of its being itself a form of conceiving, coming on its own to acknowledge the counterview with which insight confronts it. Hence insight retains legitimacy vis-à-vis the believing consciousness by validating in the latter what’s necessary to and implicit within it.

215 At the outset enlightenment claims the conceptual moment to be consciousness’s doing, asserting against faith that its absolute divine being is an entity of faith’s own consciousness fashioned as a self, something fabricated by consciousness. To the consciousness of the believer his absolute divine being, while taken by him to be an entity in itself, isn’t one that would abide in him as an alien thing, with no one knowing how or whence it came. Rather does his trust consist in his finding himself—as this particular, personal conscious being—within this absolute being, while his obedience and service consist in his bringing it forth as *his* absolute being by his own act. All that enlightenment is really doing here is reminding faith of this whenever the latter baldly asserts that the inherent nature of this being lies beyond anything consciousness does.

216 –Although it does correct the one-sidedness of faith—by bringing to mind, vis-à-vis the being about which alone faith is at this point thinking, the contrasting moment, faith’s action—enlightenment itself fails to bring both moments together, leaving such action isolated as a sheer moment, and asserts that the self-inhering being conceived by faith is a mere fabrication of consciousness. But action in isolation from or at odds with this self-inhering being is randomly adrift; and faith’s action, as something merely representational, produces nothing but fictions—that is, representations, which as such don’t inhere in themselves; and this is just how enlightenment looks upon the substantive content of [M375] faith. –On the other hand pure insight also says exactly the reverse. Emphasizing the moment of otherness integral to conceiving, pure insight declares faith’s divine being to be something that’s of no concern to consciousness, something that’s beyond, alien to, and unfathomed by it. And this much is

true of faith, since even while placing its trust in that divine being and finding reassurance therein, it on the other hand finds the latter's ways inscrutable and its being unattainable.

217 Further, enlightenment makes a legitimate claim against the believing consciousness (which the latter itself concedes) in looking upon the object that this consciousness venerates as a piece of stone or wood, or some such finite, anthropomorphized particular. For since faith is a consciousness divided, having at once a realm beyond actual reality and a plain here-and-now apart from the realm beyond, it does in fact have present within it a perspective on sensuous things whereby they do matter in and of themselves; but it's unable to bring these two ideas concerning what exists in and of itself (on the one hand a pure divine being, on the other common sensuous things) together. Even in its pure consciousness it's affected by the latter perspective: since the believing consciousness lacks the concept that would integrate the differentiae of its realm beyond the senses, they comprise a series of independent modes of embodiment, and their movement is something that "just happens," which is to say that they exist only in representation and bear within them the stamp of sensuous being. –On its side enlightenment likewise isolates actual reality as matter-of-fact being that's been abandoned by spirit, taking determinacy to be intransigently finite, as though not itself a moment of the spiritual dynamic of being—neither an outright nullity nor something existing in and of itself but rather something ephemeral.

218 Clearly the same applies to the ground of knowledge. The believing consciousness admits to being a contingency-bound way of knowing since it does involve itself with contingent matters, and even the absolute divine being is representationally present to it in the form of a commonplace reality; hence it's a manner of certainty that isn't integrally true, a consciousness that confesses its insignificance, falling far short of self-confirming [M376] and self-authenticating spirit. This moment is what faith forgets in its spiritually unmediated knowledge of that being. –On the other hand enlightenment, while reminding faith of this, dwells solely upon knowledge of the contingent and in turn forgets the other aspect, having in mind only a mediation effected via an alien third term rather than one in which something directly present is itself the third term intermediating the other aspect with it itself.

219 Finally, enlightenment's view of what faith does in relinquishing enjoyment and possessions is that this is improper and ill suited to its purpose. Improper in that the believing consciousness itself (concurring with enlightenment in this matter) acknowledges that part of actual reality includes owning, maintaining, and enjoying property. Its behavior in holding on to property is then all the more stubbornly insular, its pursuit of pleasure all the more venally self-abandoned, when its religious act of "offering up" property and pleasure alights in a realm beyond the actual present and buys it privilege there. Due to the sheer incongruity of it, this way of rendering service

(“sacrificing” natural urges and gratifications) has in fact nothing genuine about it: here keeping and sacrificing go hand in hand, the latter being merely symbolic, performed in but token measure and as in fact merely representative of a real sacrifice.

220 As for its suitability to its purpose, discarding *a* possession or forgoing *a* pleasure is, in enlightenment’s view, ill-suited to knowing and proving that one isn’t in thrall to pleasure and possessions. The believing consciousness itself understands such action, whole and entire, to be fully comprehensive: it doesn’t think that only the absolute divine being’s action (taken as object) is all-comprehensive, but also that individual consciousness should be proving itself free of *its* sensuous nature wholly and comprehensively. Relinquishing a single possession or denying oneself a single pleasure, however, is hardly an all-comprehensive act; moreover, since in such an act the fundamental incongruity of purpose (which is all-pervasive in action) and performance (what in particular is done) would inevitably be obvious to consciousness, this turns out to be an act of no interest to consciousness, hence one it actually [M377] deems too naïve even to qualify as action—fasting, say, so as to prove oneself free from the pleasures of the table, or removing, as did Origen, other pleasures from the body’s reach so as to prove them disposed of altogether. Such doings of themselves show that they’re externalistic and ad hoc. Desire, by contrast, is rooted deeply within and is all-pervasive; its ardor abates neither with the disappearance of a given instrument in its service nor via any particular act of abstention.

221 But on this point enlightenment for its part severs the inward and nonactual from what’s actual, just as previously it had clung to the externality of thinghood against the inwardness of faith’s intuition and devotion. It puts emphasis on the intention, on the thought, thus obviating the need to actually achieve emancipation from natural purposes—such inwardness being on the contrary itself a formal component brought to fulfillment in and through the natural drives, whose justification consists precisely in their being internal (to existence at large, to nature).

222 Enlightenment, then, has an irresistible impact on faith in that the latter finds in its own consciousness the moments that the former champions. The effect of this power, on closer view, is that enlightenment’s attitude toward faith would appear to tear asunder the beautiful simplicity of faith’s trust and unhesitating certainty, pollute its spiritual consciousness with the base concerns of sensuous matters, and destroy—by the prideful act of using one’s intelligence, exercising one’s will, and seeking fulfillment—the sense of calm and security faith has in its submissiveness. What enlightenment is actually doing instead is overseeing the elimination of a thoughtless, or rather nonconceptual, dichotomy present within faith itself. The consciousness of the believer weighs and measures by a double standard, sees with two sets of eyes, hears with two pairs of ears, speaks with two voices, dualizes its every representation—without reconciling all this ambiguity. Or one might say that faith abides in two

perceptual modes, that of a slumbering consciousness living in a realm of purely non-conceptual thoughts and that of a waking consciousness living purely in sensuous reality, maintaining in each the kind of household appropriate to it. In illuminating [M378] yon heavenly world with sensuous depictions, enlightenment disclosed in it a finiteness that faith cannot deny, since, being self-conscious, faith comprises the unity to which both modes of representation belong and in which they don't separate; for they're part and parcel of the same indivisible, unitary self into which faith has passed.

223 The substantive content of its own element having hereby been lost, faith lapses into a kind of woolgathering—that of a spirit turned in upon itself. It has been expelled from its own kingdom—or rather has had its realm plundered by the waking consciousness, which has wrested unto itself every parcel and expanse thereof, returning these fragments back to Earth and vindicating her claim to them as her property. Faith is by no means satisfied with this, since via such an illumination individualistic concerns are everywhere ascendant, so that what's now claiming to be spirit is a reality that's sheerly insubstantial and a finitude that spirit has forsaken. Since faith is now without content and cannot remain in this void, or rather since in going beyond the finite (the only content there is) it finds only the void, it exists as sheer yearning—its truth an empty beyond for which no suitable content can be found anymore, everything having been put to other use.

224 –Hereby faith has actually turned into the same thing as enlightenment, namely an awareness of the connection between finite entities existing in themselves and an absolute entity that is predicateless, unknown, and unknowable—except that the one is enlightenment satisfied, the other enlightenment unsatisfied. Whether 'enlightenment satisfied' can sustain that state remains to be seen; lying in ambush is the yearning of the melancholy spirit that mourns the loss of *its* spiritual world. 'Enlightenment unsatisfied' is of itself blemished by a yearning—as seen in its transparently clear object, the vacuous absolute entity it entertains; as also seen in its active progress, moving past its solitary existence toward a beyond devoid of any substantive content; and as seen in its coming up with an object that does have substantive content—yet has no self: utility. Enlightenment will see to it that this blemish is removed. And a closer look at the positive result that it deems as truth will disclose that in principle this blemish is as good as removed already. [M379]



VI.B.2.b. *The Truth of Enlightenment*

225 Spirit's no longer internally discriminative woolgathering is thus turned inward upon itself beyond the purview of the consciousness that has by contrast become clear to itself. –The initial moment of this clarity is defined, both necessarily and condition-

ally, by the fact that *pure* insight (insight that's *inherently* conceptual) actualizes itself by positing a form of *otherness* or specificity *within* itself. Pure insight is in this way negative—negating something conceptual [namely part of itself, positing this as *nonself*]*—a negation that is accordingly pure, with such otherness being then constitutive of a 'pure thing': an entity that is absolute in that it admits of no further specification. Since this 'pure thing' is more accurately characterized as an 'absolute concept,' pure insight is here distinguishing differentiae that amount to nothing beyond that—abstractions, 'pure concepts' that are no longer self-supporting but are sustained and differentiable solely via this [conceptual] dynamic entirely integral to itself. In thus distinguishing what isn't distinct, this absolute form of conceptualization is making itself its own object and projecting itself as a mode of being in contrast to its own conceptual dynamic. Being of this sort is missing a [real and objective] correlate that would sustain the separate existence of these abstractions or differentiae, and so ends up as pure thought projected as a pure thing.*

226 –This has spirit engaged in exactly the same absent-minded woolgathering into which faith lapsed upon losing sight of the content it had distinguished; moreover it exemplifies the above progression in pure self-consciousness that makes of this manner of being an utterly alien Beyond. For since it moves along in pure concepts, in variations of itself that aren't distinct, this pure self-consciousness does in fact lapse into such absent-mindedness, into sheer feeling [namely that of its being in touch with this reified "otherness"] or this "pure thinghood." But due to its being here still estranged, this self-alienated way of conceiving doesn't discern that both sides of the relation (the dynamic of self-consciousness and the absolute being it envisions) are in essence identical—that in fact one and the same essential nature is their substance and what sustains them. Since such conceiving doesn't discern their oneness, this absolute being matters to it solely in the form of an objectively existent beyond—while the consciousness distinguishing them in this way, being itself [M380] finite, ends up having 'this entity that's actually intrinsic to it' outside it.

227 Enlightenment comes into conflict with itself over this manner of absolute entity (much as previously it had been in conflict with faith) and divides into two camps. One of them manages to score a victory of sorts simply by itself splitting into two camps, thereby showing that it is in possession of the principle it combats and has thus superseded the one-sidedness it previously evinced. The interest previously common to both camps now falls entirely within this one, which then leaves the other behind since the [absolute being vs. self-consciousness] opposition it's concerned with is now internal to it. Moreover, by the same stroke this opposition has been elevated into the victorious element [namely its own self-consciousness] wherein it is now manifest in refined form. Hence the seemingly unfortunate disagreement arising within this one camp instead turns out to be a boon for it.

228 Of itself a mode of being that is pure has no variants within it, and so comes by such only when two modes of it present themselves to consciousness or when consciousness is of two minds regarding one of them. A pure, absolute mode of being exists solely in pure thinking—or rather is pure thinking itself, existing thus altogether beyond the finite, beyond self-consciousness, and as a mode of being that’s sheerly negative. But in this mode all that it amounts to is just *being*, self-consciousness’s negative complement. As self-consciousness’s negative counterpart, it concomitantly bears a connection to self-consciousness—is the “external being” integrally related to the self-consciousness in which such distinctions and specifications come to light, sustaining the variants present in self-consciousness (what gets tasted, seen, etc.); the relation of the two is here one of sense-certainty and perception.

229 Starting out from this sensuous being into which the negative beyond perforce passes while being abstracted from the specific ways consciousness has of relating to such, all that’s left for this consciousness’s woolgathering and interior processing is ‘pure materiality.’ It’s important to bear in mind here that pure materiality is merely what’s left over when we abstract from seeing, feeling, tasting, and so forth—in other words isn’t itself something seen, tasted, felt, and so on. It isn’t materiality that one sees, feels, tastes, but some color, a stone, saltiness, and so forth; materiality is instead a pure abstraction, and hence sheerly an entity of thought: [M381] pure thought that’s itself present in the manner of an absolute—something internally undifferentiated, indeterminate and predicateless.

230 One of enlightenment’s two camps christens what it started out with—the above predicateless absolute existing in thought beyond actuality-oriented consciousness—‘the absolute divine being.’ The other camp [the one that internalized the above opposition] calls its predicateless absolute ‘materiality.’ Were these differentiated into ‘nature’ in the latter instance and ‘spirit’ or ‘God’ in the former, then the nature envisioned in the one camp’s woolgathering would lack nature’s abundant burgeoning vitality, while the spirit or God envisioned in the other would lack self-discerning consciousness. In concept they’re, as we’ve seen, basically the same, differing not in anything that really matters but sheerly in the starting point of their respective lines of development and in the particular point at which each gets bogged down in the course of its thinking. These drawbacks aside, the two camps would concur, and would recognize that what the one alleges to be an abomination and the other plain foolishness are identical.

231 –For the one camp deems the absolute divine being to exist in its pure thinking, that is, as directly present to pure consciousness, as the negative “beyond” of consciousness oriented to the finite. Were this camp merely to reflect that this, its simple straightforward thinking, is itself nothing other than a form of pure being, and that what consciousness deems as its negative counterpart also bears a relation to it—that

in a negative judgment the ‘is’ (the copula) also serves to keep the two separated terms together—then the relation that this by-definition-externally-existent beyond has to consciousness would be evident, as also would the latter’s sameness with what’s termed ‘pure materiality.’ The missing moment—what’s *present*—would then be secured.

232 –Enlightenment’s other camp starts out with sensuous being and then, abstracting from the sensuous nexus of tasting, seeing, and so on, turns sensuous being into a pure form of self-inherency—absolute materiality—something neither felt nor tasted. In this way sensuous being has turned into something predicatelessly simple, an entity of pure consciousness: pure conception matter-of-factly existing in, or pure thought abiding within, itself. In its mentations this manner of insight fails to follow through with the contrasting step of proceeding from existence that’s sheerly matter-of-fact to thought as itself a form of sheer matter-of-fact existence, that is, [M382] from the purely positive to the purely negative. For while anything positive is as such pure solely via some manner of negation, anything purely negative is internally self-conformative by virtue of its purity, and precisely therein constitutes a form of positivity.

233 –In other words neither camp has arrived at the concept central to Cartesian metaphysics: that being and thought are integrally the same. Neither has arrived at the thought that *being*, pure being, isn’t something concretely actual but a sheer abstraction, and conversely that pure *thought*, that in which one’s self-identity, one’s essence, consists, is at once self-consciousness’s own negative complement and hence a form of being, as well as something immediately simplex, again nothing other than a form of being: thinking is [a form of] thinghood, thinghood is [integral to] thinking.

234 The essence here in question is at first internally dualized in that it appertains to these two ways of contemplating it; it perforce has this difference integrally within it. On the other hand it’s precisely in it that the two ways of contemplating it merge into one; for the abstract moments (pure being and *its* negative complement) by which these views distinguish themselves are even then coalescing in the object of both views. The manner of universal envisioned by both in common consists in the abstractive process integral to a pure inward vibrancy—that of pure thought thinking itself. A simplex axial dynamic such as this inevitably comes apart since only by distinguishing its moments does it get anywhere. The process of distinguishing them leaves behind whatever remains unmoved as sheer being’s empty shell, no longer having any actual thought, anything alive, within it since the process itself is all the substantive content that there is. But in so placing itself outside this unity, this process issues in a turnover of moments—namely ‘being that inheres in itself,’ ‘being that’s relative to other being,’ and ‘being that relates to itself’—that doesn’t cycle back into itself, issuing in such reality as is the object of pure insight’s practical consciousness: utility.

235 As bad as utility may look to faith, or to sentimentalism, or indeed to the abstract mentality which, calling itself “speculation,” is fixated on the “self-inhering,” it’s

nonetheless in utility that pure insight completes its realization and becomes its own object, an object it now no longer repudiates and doesn't deem to be vacuous or something sheerly beyond it. For pure insight, [M383] as we saw, is matter-of-factly existent conception itself: pure self-same personhood diversifying itself in so internal a manner that each of its permutations is itself purely conceptual—instantly nonheterogeneous: pure simplex self-consciousness that's seamlessly one and that is present to itself to the very extent that it is self-inhering. The self-inherency of such self-consciousness is thus hardly a mode of being that lasts; it abruptly ceases, amidst its variations, to be much of anything. Being such as this, bereft of staying power instead of inhering within itself, is in essence at the disposal of what's *other* than it—the latter being a power that [utterly] absorbs it. But this second moment at odds with the first (its self-inherency) vanishes just as abruptly as the first; in being merely relative to something else, it sooner exemplifies evanescence itself, and is established as having turned back into itself, as being that is self-related. But simplex self-relatedness such as this, in being self-same, is just another form of being as such, hence in its turn something relative to what's other than it.

236 –Pure insight's nature is such that as its moments unfold, that is, as it objectifies itself, it gives expression to that which is useful. While a useful entity is something that subsists in its own right, is some sort of thing, self-inherency of this kind is at the same time but a sheer moment. Anything useful is thus undoubtedly relative to something other than it, yet is only as relative to that other as it is something in itself—these opposing moments having turned back into a seamless unity, a self-related mode of being. Yet even while conceptually expressive of pure insight, something useful does this in representational fashion, functioning as pure insight's "object" rather than as integrally conceptual per se: "being of use" consists simply in the restless turnover of these moments, one of which does involve a return to self of sorts, albeit solely in the form of self-relatedness, an abstract moment set apart all by itself in contrast with the others. Something useful isn't of itself a negative entity that in one and the same respect has these moments within itself all at the same time, undivided in their very contrariety—in the manner of a thought, as in pure insight. This moment, self-relatedness, is indeed integral to an entity of use, but not in such a way that it obtrudes upon the other moments (what's self-inhering and what's other-related) so as to be constitutive of a *self*.

237 –Thus in what's useful pure insight has for its object its own conceptual nature in *its* pure moments. Such insight has an inkling of [M384] this "metaphysics" without as yet having a real grasp of it, having not yet arrived at the unity of being and conception itself. Because what's useful still takes the form of an object for it, pure insight still has a world out there—of course no longer one existing in and of itself, but one that it differentiates from itself nonetheless. Yet since the above contraries have diverged to

their conceptual apex, the next step is for them to collapse into each other while enlightenment garners the fruits of its endeavor.

238 Viewed in the context of this whole experiential sphere, the manner of object arrived at in the world of reality-oriented culture was epitomized in a form of self-conscious vanity—a self-oriented way of existing that still has that world’s conundrums as its content, and that still consists in ad hoc conceptualizing, not yet comprehensively self-related conception. Having now come full circle back into itself, conception is embodied in pure insight: pure consciousness as pure *self*, a form of negativity, just as faith is pure consciousness consisting in pure *thought*, a form of positivity. In this self, faith has the moment needed to complete it—although due to its being undone as it is thus made whole, it’s only in pure insight that we now see both moments integrally together: in the form of a divine being that is absolute, existing purely in thought (i.e., via negation), as well as in the form of materiality, which exists matter-of-factly (i.e., positively).

239 –This totality still lacks the reality that self-conscious existence has, that of the above vain consciousness—the world from which thought emerged so as to come into its own. In utility this lack is remedied inasmuch as pure insight has there attained to positive objectivity, being then an actual, internally satisfied consciousness. Objectivity of this sort now constitutes its world, and this has turned out to be the truth of the entire preceding sphere, the ideal world as well as the real. The first of these worlds of spirit is the vast realm of its self-diffusing presence and individualized certainty of self, much as nature diffuses her life among an endless variety of forms while having no existent genus. The second of these worlds does contain a genus, and is the realm of the self-inhering, truth that’s opposed to certainty of the above sort. But the third, the realm of utility, is comprised of truth that moreover consists in certainty of self.

240 –Faith’s realm of [M385] truth lacks the principle of actual reality, of self-certainty as realized in the particular individual. But the actual reality, the self-certainty, embodied in the particular individual lacks self-inherency. In the object of pure insight these two worlds are united. What’s useful is constitutive of an object insofar as self-consciousness sees right through that object, and insofar as individual self-certainty finds gratification (the realization of *its* existence-for-itself) in it. Self-consciousness does “see into” its object in this fashion, and this insight captures the true nature thereof, namely that of being something seen through, something that exists for an entity other than itself. Such insight is then itself a genuine knowing, and self-consciousness is accordingly in firsthand possession of an all-encompassing self-certainty, having its “pure consciousness” involved in a relationship that thus unites not just its individual material presence and actuality but truth as well. Both worlds are reconciled, with heaven transplanted to the earth below.



VI.B.3. TOTAL FREEDOM AND TERROR

241 Consciousness found that its conceptual principle is present in utility, albeit as yet largely in the manner of an object—utility being as yet something toward which it aims but doesn't have directly in its possession. Usefulness is still the predicate of an object—isn't subject per se (consciousness's sole and immediate reality). This is exactly what became evident above: existence-for-self hasn't yet proven to be the substance of the other two moments, whereby anything of use would forthwith be nothing but an extension of consciousness's self and hence in its possession. –Consciousness's reappropriation of the form of objectivity as met with in utility is, however, already a virtual *fait accompli*, and this internal upheaval ushers in something genuinely revolutionary in the actual realm at large, the emergence of a new permutation of conscious being: total freedom.

242 Save in empty semblance, there's in fact no longer anything that's objectively present to keep self-consciousness from such possession. For while the standing and status of the established constituents in the organized world of mundane reality and faith have altogether lapsed into this simplex [M386] form of specification as into their substantive ground and spirit, on the other hand it no longer has anything to it that can be called its own. Rather does it consist in sheer metaphysics, pure conceiving, the manner of knowing integral to self-consciousness.

243 –With respect to what something useful consists of in and of itself as an object, consciousness recognizes that whatever being such an entity has in itself is substantially relative to something other than it; and because what it is in itself is devoid of self, it is in truth a passive modality at the disposal of any other entity possessed of a self. Consciousness's object is present to it in this abstract form, that of pure self-inherency, because consciousness here consists in a pure “seeing into” *differentiae* that exist in the pure form of concepts.

244 –But the self-related being to which such other-related being reverts, namely the self, isn't a self in its own right and at variance with the I, a self integral to what's here referred to as [pure insight's] ‘object’—since in pure insight consciousness isn't [embodied in] some singular self that's confronted with an object having a self of *its* own, but rather consists in pure conception, self gazing into self, in seeing itself as totally self-replicated. The certainty that this manner of consciousness has of itself is that of an all-encompassing subject; and its perspicacious way of conceiving essentially epitomizes all that's actually real. Thus whereas previously utility had merely consisted in a turnover of moments that didn't come back full circle into its own unity and was accordingly still present to knowing in the way that an object is, this is no longer so; for the knowing is now itself what the dynamic of these abstract moments consists in: a self that's universal—encompassing itself as well as the object—and, due to its being thus all-encompassing, a process that of itself reintegrates into a unity.

245 With this, spirit exists totally at liberty, as a manner of self-consciousness fully aware that its certainty of self is the quintessence of all the spiritual modalities of the real as well as of the supersensible world—or conversely, that what’s essential and real is what consciousness knows of itself. –It is abidingly aware of its pure personhood, and therein (all reality being that of spirit) of all spiritual reality; to it the world is simply what it wills—a will that is universal. And to be sure, this isn’t some airy notion of will such as is found in silent assent or consent via representative; this is an authentic general will, the will of every single individual as such. For will is inherently a consciousness of personhood, that is, of each [individual]; and it is [M387] meant to be a real and actual will as [embodied in] the *self*-conscious being of each and every person, so that each always acts in concert with all, and what appears as action on the part of the whole is the direct and conscious action on the part of each.

246 This, the undivided substance of total freedom, places itself on the throne of the world, there being no other power whatsoever capable of resisting it. For since in truth consciousness alone is the element in which these diverse spiritual entities or powers have their substance, the entire system that they comprise, which was organized and sustained by being divided up into fittingly apportioned components, collapses so soon as individual consciousness realizes that this object [utility] has no substantive essence other than self-conscious being itself, that its object is simply and solely conceptual.

247 –What had turned conception into a matter-of-factly existent object in the first place was self-consciousness’s own differentiation into these separately sustained apportionments; but as this object turns out to consist in [pure] conceiving, there’s no longer anything enduringly subsistent within it: negativity has permeated all its moments. Such conceiving enters upon the existential realm as each individual conscious being rises up out of the sphere that had been his lot, no longer finding his living essence and his life’s achievement in any such specialized apportionment, but instead comprehends his self as consisting in the *conceiving* of a will, comprehends all the masses [of humanity] as entities part and parcel of that will—and hence also comprehends that only in labors oriented to the whole is he able to actualize himself. Amidst such totally unrestrained freedom, then, all the classes, the spiritual entities into which the whole is articulated, are undone; the individual conscious being whose place was within some such station, having to exert his will and fulfill himself there, has surmounted these his confines: what he aims at is the all-encompassing purpose, what he professes is the law to which all are to adhere, what he undertakes is the task that all undertake in common.

248 Here, in the context of the usefulness predicated of all real being, the object and the way it was divided up have lost relevance. Consciousness doesn’t initiate this process in the object as in an alien entity from which it only afterwards has returned

to itself; rather does it regard its object to be conscious being itself. The contrast between consciousness and object consists then sheerly in the difference between individual and universal forms of conscious being—although individual consciousness forthwith thinks of itself as merely *seeming* to contrast with the latter, since it is a consciousness and will oriented to the universal. Above the corpse of the autonomy formerly attributed [M388] either to reality-based being or to faith-based being, such reality as there is “beyond” consciousness’s own now hovers like a thin pall of gas—the final exhalation of a vacuous *être suprême*.

249 Once the distinct spirit-suffused apportionments and the relatively limited life of individuals have thus been dissolved along with spirit’s actual world and its world of faith, all that’s left is the internal dynamic of self-consciousness at large as present in the form of the general public interacting with personal consciousness: a general will turning in upon itself and becoming a *single* will, one to which public law and endeavor stand opposed. Yet this [concomitantly] *single* consciousness is also directly cognizant of itself as what constitutes the general will—is well aware that its object consists in laws that it itself promulgates and undertakings that it itself brings to fruition. Engaging in action and re-creating the objective realm, it accordingly doesn’t concern itself with minutiae but strictly with laws and acts of state.

250 In so doing consciousness is interacting with itself in a dynamic that leaves at liberty nothing having the character of an independent object running counter to it. Consequently it can’t accomplish anything positive, anything publicly efficacious either in what it says or actually does, either in establishing laws and public institutions that befit consciously pursued freedom or in deliberate actions and measures that promote it.

251 –Were freedom to avail itself of consciousness [as encountered in ordinary independent individuals], what could be accomplished would consist in freedom objectifying itself as an all-inclusive substance and a sustained mode of existence. Otherness such as that would embody the diversity integral to freedom, which would accordingly sort itself out into stalwartly dedicated assemblies and separate power blocs, on the one hand comprising the deliberative bodies of separate legislative, judicial, and executive powers, while on the other consisting of such “realities”⁷ as emerged in the actual cultivated world. And as the details of the overall effort were to come under closer review, the division of labor would be broken down further into more specialized sta-

7. Namely what’s deemed to be ‘good or bad,’ and ‘noble or base’ in the *judgment* of state power, wealth, and unsophisticated consciousness; what results from the *speech* of the nobility’s duplicitous ‘heroism of flattery’ and the conflicted consciousness’s idiosyncratically spirited ‘sarcastic wit’; and what the *cultivated* consciousness’s fitfully self-conscious embrace of either ‘faith’ or ‘pure insight and enlightenment’ ultimately amounts to.

tions in life. Public freedom that would in this way have diversified into its constituent elements and thereby made itself into a factually existent substance would thus function independently of any single individual and have the multitude [M389] distributed among its diverse constituent elements.

252 –Yet what a person does and is would then end up limited to a single branch of the whole, to a limited kind of acting and existing. As set forth in the element of matter-of-fact being, the very meaning of personhood would end up narrowly specified, ceasing to be a truly all-comprehensive form of self-consciousness. In this matter self-consciousness isn't going to let itself be tricked about its role in actual reality, either by the idea that in being thus assigned a set place it's merely submitting to "self-imposed" laws, or by the notion that it's being "represented" in legislative and other public undertakings—won't let itself be cheated out of the reality it has when it itself does the legislating and itself performs the tasks of general (as opposed to merely ad hoc) import. For wherever the self is merely "represented" and figuratively present, it isn't actually present; where a proxy stands in for it, it itself isn't there.

253 The self-consciousness of the single individual no more identifies with the sweeping achievements of total freedom as something matter-of-factly substantial than it does with the particular actions and specific measures taken in implementing what such freedom wills to be done. The public will, in order to get things done, has [thus instead] to be individualized in a single entity with one single self-conscious being at its head, since only in a self—a single self—is a *general* will such as this an actual will. But thereby all other individuals are excluded from the totality of the action and have but a limited role in it—meaning that whatever action they do take wouldn't be the act of a self-conscious being who's in fact doing so for all. –Thus is such all-pervasive freedom incapable of bringing to fruition *any* positive deed or accomplishment; all that's left to it is negative action; it is but a frenzy of eradication.

254 Yet the reality nonpareil, the one most inimical to this all-pervasive freedom, or rather the one object it has yet to face, is the freedom and singular individuality of actual self-consciousness itself. For all-pervasiveness such as this, which is hardly amenable to becoming an organically integrated reality and aims at continuing on its course uninterrupted, is at the same time internally self-disruptive because it is in flux, consisting as it does wholly in consciousness.

255 –And indeed owing to its characteristic abstractness such freedom splits into extremes that are equally abstract: a simplistic, inflexible, [M390] cold public realm vis-à-vis the dissociated, uncompromising, obdurate obstinacy and self-centered atomism of actual self-conscious beings. Once such wholesale freedom has finished destroying the very organization of the real and is now sustaining itself for its own sake, just *that* is its sole object—an object no longer having any content (any possessions, presence, or extension beyond itself) other than the knowledge it has of itself—as pure

self, totally free, absolutely singular. All that can be comprehended of an object such as this is that its existent presence is utterly abstract.

256 –The relation of these extremes—each being totally inseparable from its self-orientedness and hence quite incapable of contributing anything whereby the two of them might establish some common bond—is thus one of pure, wholly unmediative negation; and indeed it negates the individual as an existing being within the general public. Accordingly, the sole act and accomplishment of this all-pervasive freedom is centered upon *death*, a death having no inner dimension to it, and nothing fulfilling, since what’s negated in it is an unfulfilled atom, a self that’s absolutely free. To die thus is to suffer the coldest and starkest of deaths, one having no more significance than chopping up a head of cabbage or downing a gulp of water.

257 In this one stark syllable the wisdom of such a regime is epitomized—its general will’s understanding of how it is to be “implemented.” Here government itself is but a self-immuring atom—is such individuality as a general will can have. Consisting as it does in a willing and implementing that emanates from a single point, the government at once wills and brings into being some sort of order and way of conducting business. In so doing it excludes other individuals from these initiatives even as it constitutes a particular will of its own, thereby running counter to the general will. It’s thus hardly in a position to present itself as anything but a faction. Whatever faction wins out is what gets called “the government.” And because a faction is exactly what such a government is, the inevitability of its demise is at once evident: the very fact that it does govern makes it, conversely, factious and culpable.

258 –So when the general will insists that the governing faction’s actual doings constitute a crime perpetrated against the general will, against this charge the governing faction has nothing specific or overt with which to demonstrate the culpability of the will opposing it. For standing in contrast to it, as to an actual implementation of the general will, there’s nothing but [M391] sheer *unactualized* will—mere intent. Just falling under suspicion then takes the place of, or has the same import and effect as, being actually guilty of something. And the official reaction to this—to the governing faction’s having such reality as is latent in the simple inwardness of intention—is to cold-bloodedly annihilate that faction’s matter-of-factly existent self, whose mere being is all it has left to be deprived of.

259 In this its consummate accomplishment, total freedom is objectified and self-consciousness gains experience of what it is. In itself it’s just such an abstract form of self-consciousness, one that destroys within it all that’s not in conformance with it and anything that sustains nonconformity. This is how it is present to itself objectively: in mortal terror it beholds its own negative essence.

260 –Now of course a self-consciousness that's totally free finds this, its actual reality, to be altogether different from what it had conceived itself to be, namely a general will consisting only in the positive nature of personhood, and a personhood having in that will an awareness of self in a positive sense, as preserved therein. On the contrary, this manner of self-consciousness, which as a form of pure insight keeps the positive and negative modalities of its nature (the predicateless absolute in the form of pure thought and of pure materiality) utterly separate, is here faced with a complete crossover from the one to the other that takes place right within its own actual being. –The general will, as a form of totally positive, actually existing self-consciousness, by virtue of its being a self-conscious reality elevated to the level of pure thought or abstract materiality, turns into a negative mode of being and proves itself to be likewise the bane of the thinking self—of this being that is self-conscious.

261 This absolute form of freedom, consisting in the sheer self-conformity of a general will, has negation—and hence all manner of diversity—implicitly within it, and proceeds to develop that diversity into something actually diverse. For in a self-conformative general will this sheer negativity has a sustaining element or substance within which its constituent moments realize themselves—has the material it can put to use to its specific ends. And insofar as this substance has proven to be the negative complement of individual consciousness, [the much-needed work of] organizing spirited assemblies resumes, with the multitude of individual conscious beings duly apportioned among them. Having felt the fear of their absolute master, [M392] death, these individuals are disposed once again to abide negation and diversity, to be regulated by such assemblies, and to return to their separate and specialized tasks—but therein to their actual substantive reality.



262 Out of this tumult spirit would be flung back to its starting point, the world of ethical custom and the world actualized via cultivation, which would then have merely been refreshed and rejuvenated, fear of the lord once again having a grip on men's souls. Spirit would have to tread this wheel of necessity all over again, and repeat it unto perpetuity, if the result were simply the complete interfusing of self-consciousness and substance: an interfusion in which self-consciousness, having experienced as inimical the negative power of its own all-encompassing nature, would wish to know and encounter itself only as something collective and not as a particular individual, and so would be prepared to put up with the objective reality of a collective spirit exclusive of self-consciousness as particular individual.

263 –But under the sway of total freedom there was no mutual interaction between [on the one hand] a consciousness either immersed in the manifold details of present

existence or settled upon definite objectives and ways of thinking, and [on the other hand] a world regarded as existing beyond all of that either in reality or in thought. Instead a world consisting sheerly in a form of consciousness (as a general will) and *self*-consciousness both together withdrew from any such extensive involvement in present existence or so complicated a set of aims and assessments into a simplex self.

264 –In interacting with this manner of entity, consciousness thus achieves its pre-eminent and ultimate level of cultivation and sees its pure, its naïve reality forthwith vanish without a trace. In the cultured world *per se* consciousness never gets to the point of seeing its negation or estrangement in so purely abstract a form; rather is its negation laden with honor or wealth gained in lieu of the self from which it's alienated; or with the level of intellectual articulateness and insight achieved by the conflict-ridden consciousness; or with the heaven envisioned by the believer; or with the utility embraced by the Enlightenment. All these ways of defining the self are lost amidst the disasters that befall the self in total freedom; its negation consists in meaningless death, in sheer terror before a negativity devoid of any [M393] positive affirmation or anything at all fulfilling.

265 –Yet at the same time, the reality of this manner of negation isn't something alien; it's not like the all-encompassing necessity that lies just beyond, and is inevitably ruinous to, the ethical world; nor is it like the sheer fortuitousness of whether a given individual happens to be well off, or how the well-off happen to be disposed toward him. Rather is such negation embodied in a general will so consummately abstract that it contains nothing positive and hence can't provide anything in return for the sacrifice it exacts. Yet for that very reason this will is unmediatedly one with self-consciousness, that is, is sheerly positive because it's so sheerly negative—with meaningless death, the self's negation sans fulfillment, being turned in inner principle into something that's out-and-out positive. For a conscious being, its oneness with this general will, its insistence upon knowing itself as this specific point within that will, turns out to be the complete opposite experientially.

266 –What vanishes for it in this experience is just such abstract existence, the immediate being of an insubstantial point. And this—this immediacy that has vanished—is the general will itself, is what consciousness now knows itself to be insofar as what it is in its immediacy has been sublated, insofar as it is a pure knowing or pure willing.

267 –Hereby consciousness knows this will to be part and parcel of itself and itself to be something fundamental; but it doesn't think of itself as some directly evident matter-of-fact entity—not as, say, some revolutionary government or as anarchy striving to instigate anarchy, nor as the center of such and such faction or one deadset against it. Rather does the general will consist purely in consciousness's knowing and willing, and it's in this pure knowing and willing that consciousness embodies a will *common* to all.

268 –The self doesn’t lose its identity in this manner of will, since in sheerly knowing and willing there’s rather more of a self than in some atomic point of consciousness. Conscious existence then consists in pure knowing interacting with itself. With pure knowing as essence, there is a will common to all—albeit an essence consisting merely in pure knowing. Self-consciousness is then the sheer knowledge of what really matters in the form of pure knowing. Moreover as embodied in an individual self, self-consciousness consists solely in the form of a subject: the form integral to action that’s real, form that’s known by the self as form. By the same token objective reality—matter-of-fact being—is, for self-consciousness, form utterly devoid of self, it being [M394] that which isn’t really known, whereas self-conscious knowing knows that what’s indispensable is the knowing.

269 Total freedom has brought the tension between the general and individual wills into balance. Self-estranged spirit, driven to the peak of its tensiveness, reduces this opposition (while still as yet drawing a distinction between pure willing and the one doing the pure willing) to a transparent form and therein finds itself. –Much as the world of mundane reality passes over into a realm of faith and insight, so does total freedom make the transition from its self-destructive reality into another realm of self-conscious spirit—one in which freedom in a similarly non-matter-of-fact form is deemed true, and in which the thought of this truth comforts spirit so far as it thinks and continues on thinking, and so far as it knows this being contained within self-consciousness as a complete and perfected form of being. –A new embodiment has emerged: *moral* spirit.



VI.C. SPIRIT CERTAIN OF ITSELF: MORALITY

270 The ethical world showed that within it the spirit of the departed, [exemplified in] the single individual self, is its destiny and its truth; yet a “person by right” such as this has his substantive realization outside that world. The dynamic of the world of culture and faith supersedes this abstract form of personhood, and via total estrangement, the ultimate abstraction, the substance of spirit’s self becomes first a general will and then finally the self’s own possession. Here at last knowing appears to have become wholly adequate to its truth, since its truth is comprised in knowledge itself, with all opposition between the two sides of their relation having vanished—and not just as is evident to us, not just implicitly, but for such self-consciousness itself. Self-consciousness has itself mastered the tension inherent in consciousness. While based upon the contrast between certainty of self and certainty of some object, consciousness now has self-certainty itself—what it knows—as object, even as self-certainty as such

no longer aims at any agenda of *its* own, being thus no longer comprised in [pre-defined] specifics but sheerly in knowing. [M395]

271 To self-consciousness its knowing is then substance itself, a substance that's directly evident to it as well as thoroughly mediated in seamless unity. Although, like ethical consciousness, it straightforwardly knows and does its duty, adhering to duty as to its very nature, unlike ethical consciousness it isn't comprised in 'character,' the straightforwardness of which limits spirit to adhering to only one ethical perspective—having an aspect in which it fails to know. Like the self-cultivating and the believing consciousness, this manner of self-consciousness is thoroughly mediative, essentially consisting in the self's process of superseding the abstractness of existence in its unmediated form and turning itself into something all-comprehensive; but it does so neither via sheer estrangement from and conflictedness concerning its self and reality, nor by fleeing from them. Rather is it directly present to itself in its substance, since this substance consists in what it knows, the pure intuitive certainty it has of itself. And precisely this direct presence comprising self-consciousness's own reality is all that's real; for what's thus directly present is tantamount to being itself, and, in having been refined by a process of total negation, is itself pure, consisting altogether in being; it is being through and through.

272 Here then, what's absolutely of the essence isn't exhaustively specified as a simple entity of thought; rather is it all that's actually real, and this reality is comprised solely in knowing. That of which consciousness is oblivious would have no significance to it, and wouldn't be a force to be reckoned with; all objectivity, the whole world, has withdrawn into consciousness's knowing will. In knowing itself to be free, such consciousness is free absolutely; and precisely this knowledge of its freedom comprises its substance and purpose and sole content.



VI.C.a. THE MORAL WORLD-VIEW

273 Self-consciousness knows duty as something absolutely essential: it is bound solely by duty, the substance of its own pure consciousness, incapable of assuming the form of anything alien to it. But closed in thus upon itself, moral self-consciousness isn't yet established as a consciousness [of anything objective] and isn't viewed as such. The object here is [M396] direct knowing, and in being thus permeated sheerly by the self, isn't per se an object. –Yet in its conceptualizing (being essentially mediative and negative) moral self-consciousness does bear a connection to otherness and does constitute a form of consciousness—although such otherness has utterly no moral significance for it, since its sole compelling purpose and object is duty. Because such consciousness is so perfectly closed in upon itself, its attitude toward oth-

erness is perfectly disengaged and indifferent, with existence at large—left wholly at liberty by self-consciousness—accordingly relating solely to *itself*. And the freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer becomes this negatively complementary object of its consciousness. This latter object accordingly constitutes a complete world unto itself with an individuality of its own, an autonomous whole with laws appropriate to it, following an independent course and actualizing itself freely: the realm of nature at large, whose laws and workings are intrinsic to it, a realm of being that's as unconcerned with moral self-consciousness as moral self-consciousness is with it.

274 With the matter thus defined, a moral outlook on the world begins to take shape, interconnecting moral existence in and of itself and natural being in and of *itself*. This connection is based as much upon the utter indifference and characteristic independence of nature vis-à-vis moral purposes and activity as it is upon an awareness of the singular essentialness of duty and [morally] the complete nonautonomy and nonessentialness of nature.

275 –To view the world in moral terms involves teasing out such moments as are ensconced in this nexus of starkly conflicting presuppositions.

276 At its outset, then, the existence of moral consciousness is simply taken for granted. It deems duty to be all-important, itself as actual and active, its obligation fulfilled by what it actually is and does. Yet also within the purview of moral consciousness is nature's presumed freedom: experience tells it that nature doesn't much care about consciousness being provided a sense of unity between its reality and hers, and hence that perhaps she'll let things turn out well for it—then again maybe not. After all, while an amoral consciousness might [M397] quite by accident accomplish what *it* would, a moral consciousness might very well see that there is cause for action, but not that by taking action it will be fortunate enough to get the job done or be happy with what it brought about. Hence moral consciousness has grounds for complaint regarding this incongruity between itself and existence at large, as well as the unfairness of its being thereby limited to possessing its object only in the form of pure duty, while being denied the sure prospect of ever seeing this its object—and itself—actualized.

277 Moral consciousness can't forswear such happiness and leave this moment out of what it has set as its inviolable aim. Crucial to the purpose articulated in the expression 'pure duty' is the inclusion of individual self-consciousness: individual conviction and the knowledge thereof were all along to be a moment unquestionably part and parcel of morality. Integral to the objective realization of moral purpose, duty fulfilled, is this moment in which individual self-consciousness witnesses its own realization—a form of gratification that, while by no means directly implicit in the concept of morality when regarded as a disposition to act, is implicit in the concept of morality's actualization. –Yet with this, such gratification is implicit even in morality regarded as a disposition, since to be so disposed doesn't involve *remaining* disposed as against

taking action, but *to act*—to become a reality. Articulated as a whole with attention to its moments, moral purpose is thus viewed as entailing that both the fulfillment of duty (consisting in morally pure action no less than the realization of individuality) and nature (the side of their relation on which individuality and abstractly conceived purpose are at odds) be at one with it.

278 –Although the two sides are inevitably experienced as disharmonious since nature is independent, it is duty alone that matters, and nature, as opposed to duty, has nothing to do with the moral self. Implicit within this whole harmony-driven purpose is actual reality itself: purpose is at one and the same time the *thought* of an actual reality. The harmony of morality and nature, or of morality and happiness (nature coming into consideration only so far as consciousness does experience nature's oneness with it), is thought to exist necessarily—in other words is postulated. For to insist upon anything in this way is as much as to say that something is thought to exist that isn't yet [M398] actual: a necessity that isn't conceptual as such but allegedly existent—even while essentially consisting of an interrelation established via conception.

279 –What it's here insisted upon that there actually be isn't, then, some figment of casual mentation, but something implicit in moral conception itself, the true content of which is a unity of pure consciousness and conscious existence as individual. It's incumbent upon the individual consciousness that this unity be present to it as an actual reality—happiness being the substantive content of its aim, existence as such the form. What's required to be there, this unity of pure consciousness with individual conscious existence, isn't then something just wished for; nor, regarded as one's aim, is it something the attainment of which is still uncertain; rather is it insisted upon by reason, being forthwith considered a certainty and therewith presupposed.

280 Now, this initial experience and postulate isn't the only one; there's a whole round of postulates looming here. For nature isn't just a totally independent external mode of being within which consciousness would have to realize its purpose in a sheerly objective manner. By its own intrinsic nature it's evident to consciousness that this other independent reality exists right within it; that is, consciousness is itself contingent and natural. This nature that moral consciousness considers its own consists in sensuality, which in the form of will—as drives and inclinations—has a specific essential nature or specialized purposes of *its* own which contrast with pure will and pure purpose.

281 –This tension notwithstanding, pure consciousness deems the connection of sensuality to it, the out-and-out oneness of this nature with it, to be pivotal. Consciousness's pure thought and sensuality both implicitly inhere in one conscious being; and pure thought is precisely the consciousness within which and to which this sheer oneness exists and is evident—although, as consciousness, what's also evident to it is the tension between itself and its drives. In the conflict between reason and sensuality, what matters to reason is that this conflict be resolved, resulting in the unity of the

two—not their original unity (their existing in one individual) but rather a unity issuing from the known opposition of the two. Only in a unity of the latter sort is morality real, namely by virtue of its including the opposition whereby the self is morally conscious—is for the first time actual and in fact [M399] a self as well as a self that’s all-comprehensive [i.e., inclusive of both]: it’s in this tensive unity that the mediation we’ve seen to be indispensable to morality is acted out.

282 –Since of the two moments of this opposition sensuality is plainly other than, or the negative complement of, morality whereas pure mindfulness of duty is morality’s very essence, nothing of which can be dispensed with, it would appear that whatever unity is achieved can come about only by annulling sensuality. But since sensuality is itself a moment of the actualization process—the moment having to do with reality—such unity as will have to suffice for now is of the sort evoked in the proposition that “sensuality must conform to morality.”

283 –This manner of unity is likewise a form of postulated being. It doesn’t exist; for what does exist is moral consciousness—or the conflict between sensuality and pure consciousness. Nevertheless this unity isn’t just implicit, as with the first postulate, in which nature in her independence makes up one side of the relation, with any harmony between it and moral consciousness being then extraneous to the latter. Rather is nature here immanent within consciousness itself, morality as such being concerned with a harmony proper to the acting self: consciousness itself has to bring about this harmony and keep on making moral progress.

284 –But then morality’s consummation would have to be put off *ad infinitum* since, were it ever actually brought about, moral consciousness would be rendered null and void. For morality in the form of moral *consciousness* exists solely as embodied in a negatively oriented being whose pure duty-mindedness deems sensuality as having only negative significance, that of being out of keeping with duty. But when in harmony, morality as consciousness, as what it actually is, vanishes—just as in moral consciousness, in its being what it actually is, its harmoniousness vanishes.

285 –Hence the full realization of morality isn’t something to be actually attained but something to be thought of strictly as a task—one that quite simply *remains* a task. Yet its substantive content is even then to be thought of as one that positively must *not* remain a task, but *be*. Thus one could think of this manner of awareness as completely vitiated once its goal is attained—or on the other hand not. How exactly one is to view the matter is hard to tell as it fades thus into the dark recesses of infinity [M400]—into which, conveniently enough, the attainment of the goal is thrust. One is forced to conclude that a more specific portrayal of it isn’t supposed to be of interest, and in any event not pursued since doing so leads to out-and-out contradictions: to a task that’s supposed to remain undone and yet get accomplished, and to a morality that’s no longer to be consciously experienced, no longer be actual. Yet to consider morality’s

consummation as entailing a contradiction would compromise the inviolability of its character and make what's unqualifiedly obligatory seem unrealizable.

286 The first postulate was concerned with morality and objective nature being in harmony: an ultimate aim of the world at large; the second with morality and the sensuous will being in harmony: an ultimate aim of self-conscious existence as such. Hence the first harmony was postulated in the form of something implicitly existent, the second in the form of a manner of being that's evident to oneself. But what binds these two telic ideational extremes together—intermediating them—is the dynamic of efficacious action itself. Thus far these extremes are harmonies the moments of which haven't yet become objectively evident in this their abstract distinctness; this takes place in the actual realm, where the sides thus interrelated make their appearance in consciousness proper, with each as the other's "other." Whereas previously these concomitantly emergent postulates each entailed sheerly separate harmonies—one implicit, the other evident to oneself—now each has become an implicitly inherent harmony as well as one that's evident to oneself.

287 In taking action moral consciousness, as the simple knowing and willing of pure duty, engages an object that starkly contrasts with that simplicity, involving itself in the actual reality of a complex case and thereby having on its hands a morally complex situation. In content such situations basically give rise to manifold moral laws, as also, in keeping with the form [of the two relationships], to contrary modes of moral efficacy: a manner of consciousness that is morally knowledgeable and a form of consciousness that isn't.

288 –As for the several duties, moral consciousness initially deems only *pure* duty as valid—a *multiplicity* of duties being as such deemed by it as concerned with specifics and hence not sacrosanct. Yet by conceiving of action as also involving a complex actual situation and hence a nexus of moral considerations, these must of necessity be [M401] regarded as morally relevant in and of themselves. And further, since they could be such only in a moral consciousness, they are so only in a consciousness *other* than the one that deems pure duty alone as in and of itself pure and sacred.

289 Thus it is that another form of moral awareness comes to be postulated, a consciousness that sanctifies the many duties as duties, knowing and insisting that these are obligatory. Whereas the one view maintains that pure duty has nothing to do with specific content, and that duty is sheerly a matter of indifference vis-à-vis such, the other by contrast is basically action oriented and perforce involved with substantive specifics; and since the latter regards specific duties to be valid as duties, it considers such content to be every bit as indispensable as the form whereby any duty is a duty. So in the latter consciousness universal and particular exist plainly as one, its concept being then the same as the one that would have morality and happiness in harmony. For the contrast between them is also indicative of there being a hiatus between

self-consistent moral consciousness and an actual reality that, consisting in matter-of-fact being in all its complexity, flatly conflicts with the simple essence of duty.

290 –Yet whereas the first postulate merely alleges that a harmony exists *between* morality and nature at large, because the latter (the moment consisting in matter-of-fact being) is therein the negative complement of self-consciousness, on the other hand this now *implicit* harmony is affirmed as existing essentially as [within the purview of] consciousness. For what thus matter-of-factly exists now has the form of duty's substantive content: the specificity integral to a specific duty. What's thus implicit is a unity of specifics which, as simplex entities, are entities of thought and so exist only in some conscious being.

291 –This conscious being is henceforth the world's lord and master, harmonizing morality and happiness while sanctifying duties in their multiplicity. This is as much as to say that a conscious being attentive to *pure* duty is incapable of directly deeming any given *specific* duty as sacrosanct. But since the *necessity* for taking some specific dutiful action then likewise lies outside the purview of the consciousness of pure duty and within that of this other form of moral consciousness, the latter accordingly comes to be regarded as mediator between specific and pure duty as well as the foundational source of specific duties.

292 But a conscious being who actually takes action does so as this particular self, a full-fledged individual; he's oriented [M402] to the actual as such and has it as his purpose, since he wants to bring something about. Duty thus falls altogether outside his purview [as a moral agent] and within that of a being other than him: the consciousness that's both attentive to, and the holy lawgiver of, pure duty. The one who acts, precisely in doing so, directly acknowledges something besides pure duty, which is then the substantive content of another consciousness in whom it is sacrosanct, it being only indirectly sacrosanct for the one taking action.

293 It having thus been established that the validation of duty as in and of itself sacred falls outside its purview, actuality-oriented consciousness is fundamentally an incomplete form of moral consciousness, comprising but one aspect thereof. Regarding what it knows, it accordingly thinks of itself as a being whose knowledge and motivation are imperfect and contingency ridden, just as, regarding its volition, its purposes are tainted with sensuality. On account of its unworthiness it can't regard happiness as necessarily its due, but rather as sheerly gratuitous, something it can at best hope for as a gift of grace.

294 But even if incomplete in its actual reality, in its pure willing and knowing it still regards duty as what's of the essence; thus insofar as its will stands in stark contrast with reality, moral consciousness is in principle (i.e., in its thinking) complete after all. But this is exactly how the supreme being is thought of—and likewise postulated

beyond actual reality. This, then, is the kind of thinking in which morally imperfect knowing and willing are deemed perfect, and in which, taking imperfection as a most serious matter, happiness is distributed in keeping with worthiness, namely according to what an imperfect consciousness deserves.

295 With this the moral outlook on the world is fully rounded out, since both of its components—pure duty and actual reality—are so integrally united in moral self-consciousness's conception that, instead of each being set forth as inhering in and relating to itself, each is set forth as a moment of, or as sublated by, the other. This becomes evident to consciousness in the culminating phase of the moral world-view, where it consigns duty to an entity other than it, setting the latter forth at once as something idealized in imagination and as not holding true in and of itself—it being more likely that something nonmoral counts instead as perfectly complete. In like manner this mentality puts itself forth as one whose [M403] actual reality, which doesn't conform to duty, has been superseded and as such, that is, in keeping with the way it represents the supreme being, no longer contradicts morality.

296 But for this moralistic mentality itself, its moral world-view offers no suggestion of consciousness doing anything to develop and objectify a moral conception of its own; paying no mind to the above conflicts either of form or content (the particulars of which it doesn't bother to interconnect and compare), in the course of its development it just shuffles along without integrating its moments conceptually. For all that it knows is the "pure essence" of what's moral, an object known so far as this is a duty, so far as this is the abstract object of its pure consciousness as a "pure knowing," a knowing of itself. What it's doing is just thinking, not comprehending.

297 –Hence the object of such a mentality's actual consciousness isn't yet transparent to it; it's not altogether conceptually engaged—this being the only way to grasp heterogeneity as such (consciousness's absolute counterpart) as integral to it itself. Indeed, it deems its own reality as well as that of all objectivity to be insubstantial—yet the manner of freedom it ends up with is such freedom as one has in sheer thinking, while nature concomitantly emerges over against it as equally independent. Since on this view both (the independence of being at large and what that being amounts to as enclosed within consciousness) exist *within* consciousness, its object is then something that exists only while being thought. Ultimately the content that it thus envisions is affirmed as something the very being of which is representational; and this union of being and thought bespeaks what such an entity in fact amounts to: something imaginary.

298 When we consider that the moral world-view's objective mode is nothing but the concept that moral self-consciousness has of itself and proceeds to objectify, attentiveness to the form of this world-view's origination turns up yet another feature of the way it presents itself.

299 –The initial point of departure is actual moral self-consciousness, namely that there is such a thing. For this way of conceiving commits consciousness to the view that the entire realm of actual reality matters at all only insofar as this reality is commensurate with duty, and establishes that what really matters [M404] is knowing that's in direct unity with the actual self. This unity is thus itself actual: it exists as an actual morally conscious being. And it's as a morally conscious being that it now represents its own content to itself in the manner of an object, namely as the world's "ultimate purpose," as the harmony of morality and all actual reality. But since it represents this unity as existing in the way that an object does, and isn't yet the kind of conceiving that holds sway over objects as such, it thinks of this unity as a negative complement of self-conscious existence, abiding outside it, "beyond" its own reality, and yet also as something that matter-of-factly exists—albeit only in thought.

300 Since this consciousness is self-consciously aware of being "other" than the object, what it is left with is the *disharmony* of duty-mindedness and reality, indeed its own reality. Its subsequent proposition thus reads: "There is no *actual* self-consciousness that's morally complete." And since anything moral exists at all only so far as it *is* complete—and since duty is purely, untaintedly self-inhering and morality nothing but conformance to this manner of purity—this second proposition thus basically means: "There is no such thing as moral reality."

301 Yet, thirdly, in that it's comprised in a unitary self, moral self-consciousness implicitly embodies a unity of duty and reality, a unity that accordingly becomes its object—as morality that's complete, albeit *beyond* self-consciousness's actual reality, a beyond that nonetheless ought to be actual.

302 In this goal, this synthetic unity of the first two propositions, both self-conscious reality and duty are set forth merely as sublated moments. For even though they are defined as essentially independent of one another, neither exists in isolation, each being no longer independent of but superseded by the other within this unity, turning thus into a manner of object that in content has each holding good for the other, and in form has them changing roles with each other, albeit doing so merely as set forth in representation.

303 –In other words something that's not actually moral, because it nonetheless consists in pure thought and has been exalted above what moral self-consciousness consists of in reality, is portrayed as moral after all and taken to be fully legitimated. Hereby the first thesis, that there is such a thing as moral self-consciousness, is reinstated, albeit as combined [M405] with the second, namely that nothing of the sort exists, that there is such a thing as actual moral self-consciousness but only in imaginative representation. In other words this moralistic consciousness lets another consciousness validate that there is such—though of course there isn't.



VI.C.b. MISREPRESENTATION

304 In the moral world-view we see consciousness itself on the one hand engendering its object [namely morality] with consciousness. We see that consciousness neither encounters the object as something alien nor comes to view it as something that isn't conscious, but at every turn endeavors to lay a foundation upon which to establish the objective being of morality. Realizing that it is itself the agent engendering this mode of being, it knows the object to be part and parcel of itself. Hence it might seem that here it attains peace of mind and satisfaction, which it can find only when it no longer has need to go beyond its object since the object no longer extends beyond it. –On the other hand this same consciousness also locates its object outside it, as something beyond it—hence existing in and for *itself* yet nonetheless set forth in such a way as not to exist independently of, but rather at the disposal of and by means of, self-consciousness.

305 The moral world-view thus in fact consists in nothing other than perfecting this fundamental contradiction that underlies the diverse aspects integral to it: it is (to borrow a Kantian phrase here, where it fits) a “whole nest” of thoughtless contradictions. The way in which this manner of consciousness operates as it thus plays itself out is to fixate upon one of morality's moments and immediately shift from there to another moment while undermining [the moral relevance of] the first—then, once the second is established, it in turn shifts away from that moment as well, making the opposite into what's morally of the essence. At the same time it's aware that it is contradicting itself and *misrepresenting* what's morally essential, shifting from one moment relevant to this very essence to one directly contrary thereto. –Because any given moment has no reality for it, the moment it affirms as genuinely real is one that's just the opposite—that is, in order to assert that the one moment is what's “implicitly” essential, it asserts that a contrary moment is what's “in principle inherently” essential. Hereby it's as much as acknowledging that in fact it isn't serious about any of this. –A closer [M406] look into the moments of this vertiginous dynamic is warranted.

306 Let's leave uncontested for now the presupposition that there is such a thing as actual moral consciousness (an assumption made summarily and without reference to anything that precedes it) and turn instead to the first postulate mentioned above, concerning the harmony of morality and nature. This harmony is supposed to be implicit, not present to actual consciousness, not really there; present reality sooner exemplifies only the contradiction between the two. That morality is now within reach is assumed, while actual reality is construed as being out of harmony with morality. But an actual moral consciousness actually engages in action; it's just in this that its moral reality consists. Yet in the very process of taking action the above stance shifts; for moral action is nothing if not the actualization of an inner moral purpose, nothing if not the bringing forth of a reality defined by that purpose: the harmony of reality and moral

purpose itself. Moreover, what its action accomplishes is present to consciousness—is the presence of this unity of actual reality and purpose; and since in action carried through to completion consciousness does actually realize itself as the individual that it is—seeing actual existence reintegrated with it, this being what is here its pleasure—the reality of the moral purpose also entails the very form of reality referred to as enjoyment and happiness.

307 –Action thus in fact directly accomplishes what had been put forth in such a way as not to take place, supposedly existing only as postulated, as being something *beyond* [moral consciousness's reach]. Hence by its own deed this mentality as much as says that it doesn't take its postulating seriously, since the whole point of engaging in moral action is to *make present* something that supposedly doesn't exist in the realm of the present. And when a harmony is postulated in order that moral action be taken—with what's supposed to *become* actual thereby having to be “in principle actual” lest this be *unattainable*—the link between action and postulate is so fashioned that for there to be some point to taking the action, that is, in order that purpose and reality be in harmony, this harmony is set forth as nonactual, as abiding “somewhere beyond.” [M407]

308 So whenever it does proceed to act, consciousness isn't taking the incommensurability of purpose and reality at all seriously, but on the contrary is apparently in earnest about action itself. Yet since a moral action is in fact only the act of a single conscious being, it's itself merely singular and whatever it accomplishes contingent. But a purpose prompted by reason—one that's universal, that's all-encompassing—spans nothing short of the entire world: an ultimate aim extending far beyond the compass of any single act and hence projected above and beyond any actual measure taken. Since what's supposed to be brought about is what's best of all for everyone, nothing good will get done.

309 –Yet in fact the [alleged] “futility” of any moral action actually taken and the “reality” attributed solely to the holistic purpose misrepresent morality in all its aspects in turn. Moral action isn't contingent and limited, since it has pure duty as its very essence: pure duty comprises its sole and entire purpose; whatever its limitations in content, in actualizing this purpose it fulfills the whole and entire purpose. Or, were reality to be once again equated with nature—hence as having laws of her own and as being contrary to pure duty, so that dutifulness can't have *its* law realized in her—then, so long as duty as such is what's of the essence, the full realization of pure duty as comprised in the entire purpose isn't at issue; duty's realization doesn't aim at “pure duty” but something contrary to it: actual reality. To assert, on the other hand, that what's essential in morality has nothing to do with actual reality is to misrepresent the matter yet again; for by the very concept of moral action pure duty is fundamentally embodied in actively engaged consciousness. So, by all means action should be taken; what's unequivocally a duty ought to resonate throughout all nature, and moral law become nature's law.

310 Were a “highest good” like the above allowed to pass for what’s essential, then moral consciousness wouldn’t be serious about morality at all. For in this “highest good” nature has no law save that of morality. Moral action itself then falls by the wayside, since there can be such action only on the presupposition of there being some negative state of affairs that’s to be sublated. –But if nature is in conformance with moral law, [M408] taking action would violate the law by sublating the way things are. –Presupposing that such a state of affairs is essential to morality turns it into one in which moral action is superfluous and doesn’t even take place. The postulate concerning the harmony of morality and actual reality, predicated on a conception of moral action as oriented to bringing the two into agreement, is from this perspective accordingly expressed thus: “Since moral action is without any qualification morality’s purpose, the purpose of moral action is, without qualification, that it not take place at all.”

311 If we assemble the moments through which this mentality shuffles in its moralistic musings, we see that each is in turn annulled in its counterpart. While its initial stance is that morality and reality aren’t in harmony, it isn’t serious about this, since, when it takes action, such a harmony is made actually present to it. –But then it doesn’t take moral action seriously either, moral action being after all something merely individual, whereas it has no less lofty a moral purpose than the “highest good.” –But this in turn misrepresents the matter, since hereby all action and all morality would go by the wayside.

312 –In other words, this moralistic mentality isn’t really at all serious about moral action; its utmost wish—what it wishes absolutely—is for the highest good to be a fait accompli and engaging in moral action superfluous.

313 In its checkered course this mentality must repeatedly evade such a conclusion and by turns mischaracterize its nullification of moral action. Morality is on this view implicit; for morality to play any role, the ultimate purpose of the world can’t have already been carried out. Rather does moral awareness have to be manifest to itself and come up with some aspect of nature that conflicts with it. Yet its being fully enacted has to take place wholly within it. –And this leads to the second postulate, the one concerning its harmony with the aspect of nature that’s directly present within it: sensuality. Moral self-consciousness proposes that its purpose be pure, that it be independent of urges and inclinations, intending thereby to have the aims of sensuality extinguished within it. –But it goes on to misrepresent in turn this proposed sublimation of its sensuous nature. It proceeds to act toward the actualization of its purpose—while its self-conscious sensuality, [M409] which was purported to have been nullified thus, turns out to be precisely what intermediates its pure consciousness and reality—sensuality being an instrument or organ (also referred to as a drive or inclination) with which it actualizes itself. Hence it isn’t serious about nullifying inclinations and drives, since precisely in them self-consciousness actualizes itself. But then, it’s not even that

they're supposed to be suppressed, just 'be conformative to reason'—which indeed they are, since moral action is nothing but moral consciousness that, embodied thus as a drive, does actualize itself—as a directly present harmony of drive and morality. Yet in fact a drive isn't just an idle mode of embodiment that could have within it this ulterior spring of action [namely morality], and be driven by it. For since sensuality is a part of nature, having nature's laws and springs of action integral to it, morality can't seriously be construed as the motivating spring of the [sensuous] drives or as a vector of the inclinations. For inasmuch as these [drives and inclinations] have a set determinacy and a substantive content of their own, any mode of consciousness with which they were supposed to conform would sooner conform to them—a conformity that moral self-consciousness abhors. The harmony of morality and nature exists then only "in principle" and in the manner of a postulate. –So now, the harmony just proposed between morality and sensuality as present in moral action is being shifted elsewhere—abiding somewhere beyond consciousness at a nebulous distance where nothing can anymore be clearly distinguished, let alone comprehended, since trying, as we just did, to get a grasp on this unity proves to be futile.

314 –In this "morality in principle," moral consciousness altogether gives up on itself. Morality in principle is its moral consummation, in which the struggle between morality and sensuality has ceased, the latter having conformed to morality in a way that defies comprehension. –Such a consummation thus misrepresents the matter yet again, since in it morality—attentive solely to this "pure purpose" as opposed to all other aims—would instead actually be giving up on itself. Morality would then consist as much in the "active pursuit" of this "pure purpose" as it does in "rising above" sensuality, consciously intermixing morality with the very sensuality it opposes [M410] and struggles against. That this manner of moral "fulfillment" isn't to be taken in earnest is readily admitted by this mentality itself, having relocated it in infinity—as much as maintaining that such will never come about.

315 What moral consciousness of this sort is thus validating is instead only a midway state of suspended completion, one that's nonetheless supposed to be at least a "progression toward" completeness. But it can't be that either, since to so progress in morality would sooner be to advance toward its undoing. The goal toward which such progress would be aiming is the manner of nullity alluded to above, namely the nullification of morality and moral awareness itself—not to mention that the term for coming ever closer to nullity is 'regression.' Moreover, to make any moral progress at all presupposes, as would moral regression, that there are quantitative distinctions within morality, even though none such are relevant to it. In morality, as a mode of conscious existence for which an ethical purpose is obligatory pure and simple, variation of any sort, let alone anything so superficial as quantitative variation, is given not a moment's thought—there being only one virtuousness, only one pure duty, only one morality.

316 Since what it's thus serious about isn't moral perfection but rather some intermediate state—in other words, as just considered, a form of amorality—we end up coming, by another way, back around to the substantive content of the first postulate. That's to say, it isn't at all obvious how happiness could be demanded for this manner of moral consciousness on the basis of its worthiness. Aware, as it is, of its imperfection, it can hardly ask for happiness as something it in fact deserves, something of which it's worthy, but can only long for happiness as for something graciously bestowed: happiness as such—happiness in itself for its own sake, something happenstance and gratuitous—not something to be expected on positively assured grounds. And it's precisely in this that amorality discloses what it is: its concern isn't with morality but with happiness in itself for its own sake, quite apart from morality.

317 By means of this second aspect of the moral world-view the other assertion, concerning the first aspect in which morality and happiness were presumed to be disharmonious, is sublated as well. It's attested to as a matter of experience that in this life one who's moral [M411] often fares poorly while for one who's immoral things often go quite well. But the intermediateness of an incomplete morality (a state that has proven characteristic of it) shows that this perception and would-be "experience" is but a misconstrual of the matter. For since such morality is incomplete—meaning that it isn't in fact morality—what can its experience that it fares badly amount to? It having at the same time turned out that happiness in itself—and for its own sake—is all that matters, the judgment that the immoral man thrives was evidently not meant to imply that an injustice was taking place here. Since such morality is anything but fully consummated, [the very idea of] characterizing any individual as 'immoral' is vitiated, being supportable only on arbitrary grounds. Thus the sense and purport of an experiential judgment of this sort can only be that some people ought not per se to have happiness within their reach—which is envy masquerading as morality. Actually, the reason why we think others ought to receive what we call good fortune is our comradery with them, which freely grants and wishes for them (and ourselves in the bargain) this favor, this stroke of luck.

318 Such morality as there is in this manner of moral consciousness is thus incomplete—which is just what's now being postulated, even though it's crucial to morality that it be pure and complete. Morality that's incomplete is on that account impure—is immorality. Hence morality per se must reside in some manner of being other than consciousness as consciousness actually is—in a holy moral lawgiver. Consciousness's moral incompleteness (the reason for all this postulating) is first and foremost an indication that morality, inasmuch as it's posited in consciousness as something actual, bears a relation to some sort of *other*, a being that exists outside itself, thus introducing into morality itself an element of otherness or difference that gives rise to sundry moral commandments. Yet this same moral self-consciousness also holds these

many obligations to be of no relevance, since it is concerned solely with the one pure duty, while these, insofar as they're oriented to specifics, have no truth for moral self-consciousness. –Hence only in some other being could they have any truth, being sacred (which for moral self-consciousness they're not) only via a holy lawgiver.

319 –But this is itself yet another misrepresentation [M412] of the matter; for moral self-consciousness, from its own standpoint, isn't relative to anything else—duty being only what such self-consciousness itself *knows* to be obligatory. It knows only pure duty to be obligatory. What isn't sacred to it isn't inherently sacred. And what isn't sacred can't be made sacred by some holy being. Moreover, moral consciousness isn't at all in earnest in allowing something to be “sanctified” by some other conscious being, since what it deems sacred is simply and solely what's sacred to it in and through it itself. –Nor is moral consciousness any more serious about this other entity being holy because in the latter something is supposed to attain an essential being that in the estimation of moral consciousness it doesn't inherently have.

320 Thus, were a ‘holy being’ postulated so that in him duty might be legitimated as a plurality of specific duties rather than as pure duty, this would once again require some “adjusting”—with this other being considered holy solely insofar as in him only pure duty has validity. And indeed it's only in some such other being—not in moral awareness—that pure duty does in fact have validity. –Although it might seem that in a morally conscious being pure morality is all that matters, this has to be established on a different footing since such a being is also a *natural* conscious being. In a being of that sort morality is affected and conditioned by sensuality, and so doesn't abide self-relatedly in itself but as contingent upon free will—while, as *pure* will, morality exists in consciousness as contingent upon what that consciousness knows, existing then self-relatedly in itself in some other being.

321 So it's in this holy being that pure morality is made complete, since in him morality isn't connected to nature and sensuality. Yet such reality as pure duty has consists solely in its being actualized in the natural and sensual realm. In deeming a strictly negative orientation to nature and sensuality to be an indispensable moment of morality, moral awareness attributes its imperfectness to the fact that in it morality has a positive relation to nature and sensuality. By contrast a purely moral being isn't negatively oriented thus, since he stands aloof from the struggle with nature and sensuality. So all that's actually still available to moral consciousness is the positive relation, the one just now [M413] assessed as imperfect, as immoral. On the other hand a “pure morality” wholly detached from, and hence lacking any positive connection to, the actual realm would be so abstractly out of touch and unreal that in it the very concept of morality—entailing thoughtful attention to pure duty as well as willing and acting accordingly—would be utterly vitiated. This oh-so-purely moral being is thus yet another misrepresentation of the matter, and is to be abandoned.

322 The contradictory moments through which this manner of synthetic moral imagining shuffles along in this [notion of a] purely moral being “come close to,” without actually, being integrated in thought; it allows these conflicting moral “also’s” to just follow one after the other, with each opposing view ever being replaced by another one—so much so that consciousness has to give up on its moralistic world-view and withdraw from all this back into itself.

323 Moral consciousness comes to realize that its morality is imperfect because it is affected by a sensuality and nature that are at odds with it. This casts a pall over morality per se, while also giving rise to a cluster of duties that perplexes moral consciousness in concrete cases calling for action, since each such eventuality is the concretion of many moral interconnections (just as an object of perception is basically a thing of many properties). Moreover since any specific moral obligation is purposeful, morality has a substantive content comprising part of its purpose, and hence *isn’t* pure. –Thus does it have its reality in a being other than itself. Yet that it does have this reality means just this: it exists here *in and present to itself*—is present to itself in that it is the morality of a conscious being, and in itself in that it exists and is actually real.

324 –In the first, incomplete form of moral consciousness discussed above, morality hasn’t been fully implemented. It’s then something implicit, in the sense of an entity existing in thought; for, while associated with nature and sensuality (with the actual reality of being and consciousness as its content), the relevance of nature and sensuality to morality is nil. –In the second mode of moral consciousness morality is present in complete form and not as some unrealized notion. But such completeness as it has consists precisely in its having actual reality in a particular consciousness as well as in independent actuality or existence at large, [M414] in being replete with this content rather than being vacuous—meaning that morality is consummated in having precisely what was just now determined to be irrelevant to morality be instead affirmed as present in and integral to it. Morality is supposed to have validity sheerly as a non-actual, purely abstract entity of thought—and yet in this way have no validity at all; its truth should consist in its being at odds with, not to mention wholly free from and devoid of, actual reality—and then again be something actually real.

325 Any attempt at reconciling the scattered contradictions endemic to the moralistic view of the world collapses from within because the distinction upon which that view is based—a distinction having to be thought of and affirmed as necessary yet at the same time as irrelevant—is no longer even verbally sustainable. What ends up set forth as at variance with itself—as both a nullity and a bona fide reality—is one and the same thing: present existence and actual reality. And what’s supposed absolutely to exist—albeit only beyond actual being and consciousness, while existing sheerly in the mind and, beyond that, as nothing at all—is pure duty and the knowledge that this alone is

morally of the essence. The consciousness making this nugatory distinction, declaring what's actual to be null and yet real, morality to be something truly of the essence as well as of no significance, expressly conjoins ideas that it previously kept separate. In so doing it's as much as admitting that it's not serious when it has the moments 'self' and 'implicitness' defined and set apart thus—that what it claims to exist strictly outside awareness it keeps confined inside self-consciousness's self, and takes what it claims to exist entirely in thought, that is, as being sheerly and utterly implicit, to be for that very reason something that has no truth.

326 –It thus occurs to consciousness that to separate these moments from each other is to distort them, and that to persist in this would be hypocrisy. But as a self-conscious being that's "morally pure," it flees in horror from any such incongruity between its self-portrayal and what it in essence is—from this untruth that testifies to the truth of what it regards as untrue—and takes refuge in itself. It's then a "pure conscience," despising any such [M415] moralistic representation of the world, abiding inside itself as a simple self-certain spirit, acting straightforwardly and conscientiously without the intermediating influence of such representations, and having in this straightforwardness its truth.

327 –Yet if this world of [moralistic] dissemblance is but moral self-awareness's development as its moments (and concomitantly its reality) unfold, what it manages to become—by thus reverting back into itself in keeping with its essence—is just that [namely a world of dissembling]: and all that it comes to realize in its self-reversion is that its truth is pretended. And it would have to keep on pretending that this is the truth of moral self-awareness since, in expressing and presenting an objective portrayal of itself, it would *know* that this is all just an act. Then it would indeed be hypocritical, and its disdain for such dissembling would be the prime manifestation of that hypocrisy.



VI.C.c. CONSCIENCE; THE BEAUTIFUL SOUL: EVIL AND ITS FORGIVENESS

328 The antinomy inherent in the moral world-view, namely that there is and isn't such a thing as moral consciousness—or that what validates duty is something beyond consciousness even though duty can be validated only within consciousness—ended up being synthesized in a representation in which amoral consciousness was to be counted as moral, its casual knowledge and volition accepted as carrying full moral weight, and happiness allotted it through grace. And rather than accepting responsibility for this self-contradictory representation, moral self-consciousness shifted it onto an entity other than itself.

329 –For self-consciousness to project outside itself what it's compelled to deem necessary to it involves, however, a contradiction in form as serious as was the antinomy's contradiction in content. But what appears contradictory here, and has moral self-consciousness going around deconstructing and reconstructing its world-view, is inherently the exact same thing: pure duty as a pure knowing that's nothing other than consciousness's self, which in turn is nothing other than consciousness's being and [M416] reality—just as what's supposed to be “beyond” reality-oriented consciousness consists in nothing other than pure thinking and hence in fact in self. As is thus evident to us, self-consciousness is here inherently self-reintegrative, and knows that this kind of being, in which reality-orientedness is comprised of both lucid knowledge and clear obligation, is integral to it itself. As such it regards itself as having full validity in its very contingency—knows that its individuality consists directly in pure knowledge and action, in being truly actual and harmonious.

330 This manner of self, that of *conscience*, spirit certain of its directly embodying a form of truth and being that is absolute, constitutes a third form of self, one that emerged before us from the third of spirit's worlds. –Comparing it briefly with the two preceding worlds, the totality or reality exhibiting the truth of the ethical world is the self of a ‘person,’ whose existent presence consists in being recognized. Just as personhood is a substantively vacuous form of self, so is its manner of existence an abstract reality. While a person does have status, indeed just as he is, such a self is like a point at rest directly within the element constitutive of its being. A self such as that is in no wise separate from its generic element, and neither of the two is astir in relation to, or has any bearing upon, the other; the universal isn't distinctively individuated in it, and no more provides the self a substantive content than does such a self find fulfillment on its own. –The second manner of self is that of a cultural world come to be what it is in truth, spirit restored to itself amidst discord, [culminating in] total freedom. In this self the above initial, direct unity of individuality and universality comes apart; the universal, which nonetheless remains a purely spiritual mode of being—namely one that's recognized as willed and known by all in common—is then an object and content part and parcel of the self, and is the self's actual reality at large. Yet a universal of this sort hasn't the form of anything that exists independently of the self; in this manner of self the universal comes to nothing fulfilling—to no positive content, no world.

331 –Moralistic self-consciousness actually leaves its universality at liberty to develop a nature of its own, while also keeping that universality internalized within it in sublated form. But this is but a game of make-believe in which these two fixed determinants [the real but morally ineffectual individual and the nonactual but indispensable universal] keep having their roles switched. Only as conscience does moral self-awareness have within its self-certainty a substantive content for what had until then

been mere empty duty (just like vacuous right and a vacuous general will); [M417] and because this self-certainty is moreover directly evident, it is itself an existent presence.

332 Having arrived at this, the truth of itself, moral self-awareness leaves behind, or rather supersedes, the internal disjunction that gave rise to its dissembling—the disjunction between what exists merely in implicit principle and the self, between pure duty as sheer aim and actual reality as nature and sensuality at odds with that aim. Self-consciousness such as this, having thus returned to itself, is a manner of concrete moral spirit that refuses to employ the vacuous standard provided by a mentality focused on pure duty, a standard that would be inimical to reality-oriented consciousness; rather have both of these moments, pure duty as well as the nature at odds with it, been superseded. Now directly at one with itself, spirit is a self-actualizing moral entity and morality is directly and concretely embodied in action.

333 A situation involving moral action presents itself: for the consciousness aware of it this constitutes an objective actual reality. As conscience, consciousness grasps the situation in a straightforward concrete manner, and the situation exists only as conscience knows it to exist. Although knowledge is adventitious to whatever extent it's derived from something extraneous to the object, self-certain spirit such as this no longer consists in adventitious knowledge, nor in internally concocted thoughts that could be out of touch with the actual reality at hand. On the contrary, since the disjunction between 'what in implicit principle is' and the self has been sublated, the situation at issue is directly present in the certainty of sense-knowledge just as it *inherently* is, and is inherently so *only* as present in such knowledge.

334 –Action as actualization thus comprises the pure form integral to volition: the sheer conversion of actual reality as a matter-of-fact state of affairs into something actual that was *done*—the conversion of a mere object-oriented mode of knowing into one in which the reality known has been brought about by consciousness. Just as sense-certainty is taken up, or rather converted, directly into a spiritual mode of self-inherency, so also is the conversion here under way simple and unmediated, a transition effected via pure conception without alteration in content, a content determined by whatever interest is taken in it by the consciousness that knows it.

335 –Nor does conscience sort out the particulars of a given case in accordance with diverse obligations. It doesn't function as a positive [M418] generic medium, in which miscellaneous duties would each secure a stable substantiality of its own, so that either moral action couldn't be taken at all (since every concrete situation involves some sort of conflict and, as a moral situation, a conflict of duties, so that in pursuing a definite course of action one whole facet, that is, one of the duties, would always end up being violated)—or else, when action *is* taken, one of the conflicting duties actually would be violated. Rather is conscience a negative unity, an inviolable self that undercuts

any such diversity of “moral substances”; it’s simple duty-bound action, which, instead of fulfilling this or that obligation, knows and does what’s concretely right. Thus only with the advent of conscience is there a form of moral action that actually does something, conscience being that into which the heretofore ineffectual consciousness of morality has passed.

336 –Now a discriminating mind might analyze an act’s concrete context according to its various properties (here various moral relationships) and either declare each to be valid without reservation—which they have to be if they’re obligatory—or proceed to compare them and put them to the test. In the simple moral action integral to conscience duties interpenetrate so completely that all such fuss with details is curtailed forthwith: in the unwavering certitude of conscience no probative scrutiny of duty takes place at all.

337 Nor is there in conscience any of the vacillating uncertainty typical of a mentality that at first locates so-called pure morality outside itself in some other, holy being while deeming itself to be unholy—only to then relocate moral purity within itself and the integration of sensual and moral existence within that other being.

338 Conscience disclaims all the shifting stances assumed by the moral world-view when it renounces the mind-set that holds duty and reality to be contradictory. According to that mentality I act morally when I’m mindful of fulfilling naught save pure duty—which amounts to saying when I don’t act at all. When I do take action, however, I’ve something other than pure duty in mind, namely an already present actual state [M419] of affairs as well as one that I wish to bring about; I’ve a definite purpose and fulfill a specific duty, scarcely the “pure” duty that was supposed to be the sole focus of attention. –Thus conscience contrasts with yon moralistic mentality in realizing that, when the latter declares pure duty to be the gist of its action, this sheer purpose is a misrepresentation of the matter at hand. For the fact of the matter is that “pure” duty is an empty abstraction existing sheerly in thought; moreover duty’s reality and substantive content is comprised solely in a specific reality, one integral to consciousness itself—not consciousness in the form of some thought-concoction but rather as [the conscious being of] a particular individual. –Conscience has its truth evident to it in its direct certainty of itself. This concrete firsthand certainty of self is indispensable; when this certainty is viewed in keeping with the contrast integral to consciousness, the content of moral action is embodied directly in the agent’s own individuality, and the form of such action is self sheerly in process—as *knowing*, being personally *convinced*.

339 Taking into more precise account the unity of moral action and the significance of the moments involved, whereas moralistic consciousness thought of itself sheerly as an implicit principle or “essence,” consciousness as conscience has a grasp of its presence-to-itself, a grasp of its self. The contradiction besetting the moral world-view

has resolved itself: its underlying distinction proves to be none, and coalesces in a form of pure negativity—which is exactly what the self is: a simplex self consisting in pure knowing as well as in knowledge of itself as this single conscious being. Hence it's this self that constitutes morality's essence (which heretofore was vacuous), since it is an actual entity that no longer portends to have a nature alien to and (having laws of its own) independent of that essence. A self such as this—as the negative complement of anything distinct from morality's pure essence—comprises a substantive content, and indeed one that's valid both in itself and as present to itself.

340 Further, this manner of self, as a pure knowing that's identical with itself, is in any instance all-inclusive: this very knowledge, as the self's own knowledge—this conviction—*is* duty. Duty is no longer an abstract generality over against the self, but is instead known to have no validity when separate [M420] from the self; and so now it is the law that exists for the sake of the self, not the self that exists for the sake of the law. But the significance of law and duty doesn't on that account consist solely in their being a form of self-related presence-to-self, but also in their being law and duty inherently in themselves; for such knowledge, on account of its self-identicalness, *is* exactly what law and duty are in themselves. And in consciousness this manner of inherency is even divergent from the above direct oneness with consciousness's self-related presence-to-self; functioning then tangentially to consciousness, such inherency constitutes a form of matter-of-fact being, being that's related to what's other than it.

341 –Duty, having so much as left the self behind, is at this juncture known to be but a moment [of a broader dynamic]; it has declined in status from 'absolute essence' to a manner of being that *isn't* self—one that doesn't consist in self-relatedness and is then related to what's other than it. But for just that reason this relation to otherness remains a pivotal moment since the self, as a conscious being, itself embodies this tension between self-relatedness and other-relatedness—so that now duty, directly and inherently real, no longer consists sheerly in some pure awareness in the abstract.

342 This other-related being thus comprises a substance unto itself that's distinct from the self. Conscience hasn't given up on pure duty, on this abstract inherency; rather is it a crucial moment that, as something universal, is interrelated with all others. Conscience is the communal element of self-conscious beings, and this element is the substance in which an act has ongoing and actual relevance, the moment in which one comes to be recognized by others. Moralistic self-awareness has no such recognitional moment in which this pure consciousness is actually there, and so doesn't really do or accomplish anything. It either looks upon its inherent being as an abstract, unreal entity or deems matter-of-fact being to be a reality that isn't spiritual. The matter-of-fact reality of conscience, however, is a reality that exists as a self: an existent presence that's self-aware, the elementary spiritual component of the recognition process.

343 –To act is then merely to translate the self’s individual substantive content into the objective element in which it is public and is there to be recognized; and the fact that this content is recognized is precisely what makes that action real. To take such action is to be recognized and in that way real because the reality that’s thereby made present is directly linked to conviction, to knowing—knowledge of self-consciousness’s aim being directly formative of a [M421] matrix within which to be existentially present, to be recognized at large. For the crux of such action—that it is obligatory—consists in conscience’s being *convinced* of this; conviction is precisely what [morality] is in itself: a form of self-consciousness that’s inherently communal, that’s recognized and herewith actual. Accordingly, what’s done out of dutiful conviction forthwith has permanence and presence. There’s no point to carrying on about good intentions coming to naught, or the good man faring ill; what’s known to be a duty is carried through and actualized because precisely in duty-boundedness there’s something common to all self-conscious beings, something recognized to be such and hence a matter of fact. But taken by itself in separation from the substantive content comprised in the self, duty exists for somebody else, something seen right through, something that’s basically just a meaningless bother.

344 Looking back to the point at which spiritual reality first came into play, the prevailing notion was that the expression of individuality in and for itself was all that mattered. But the mode of embodiment directly expressive of this conception was that of a “straightforward” consciousness preoccupied with some abstract “concern.” What this abiding concern consisted of there was a predicate; but in conscience it is for the first time a subject, one in which consciousness’s moments are all in place, and for which these moments—basic substantiality, an outward presence, and an essential nature consisting in thought—are all part and parcel of such self-certainty. Broadly speaking, in the ethical realm the abiding concern consists in having substantive status, in the cultural realm in having an outward existential presence, in the moral realm in possessing the essentially self-knowing nature of thought; and in conscience the abiding concern consists in a subject who knows that these moments are integral to it. Whereas a straightforward consciousness is ever grasping after some vacuous enterprise, conscience succeeds in fulfilling its abiding concern, providing such fullness on its own. Conscience has such power because it knows the moments of consciousness to be just that, and, as their negative essence, holds sway over them.

345 Conscience—viewed in the context of the specifics of such conflict as arises when action is taken, and of its awareness of their nature—initially comports itself as a knower oriented to the actual reality of a situation [M422] warranting action. Insofar as comprehensiveness is an integral moment of this manner of knowing, informed conscientious action requires that the case in point be grasped circumspectly, with scrupulous attention accordingly paid to the relevant circumstances. Yet also within the purview of such knowing (it being mindful that this holistic approach is an inte-

gral moment here) is the realization that its grasp of the circumstances isn't comprehensive and to that extent isn't conscientious. Whereas a truly comprehensive and pure knowing relation would involve a connection to something presenting no opposition (a relation to itself), action on the other hand, due to the opposition it by nature entails, is bound up with consciousness's negative complement, the actual realm existing matter-of-factly unto *itself*.

346 –This reality counter to the simplicity of pure consciousness, this radical other, this intrinsically complex being, comprises an utter plethora of endlessly ramifying circumstances extending backward through all kinds of causal conditions, sideways into all sorts of circumambient complications, and forward into all manner of consequences. Aware of this predicament and its relation thereto, the conscientious consciousness knows that when it acts in a given situation its familiarity with the details falls short of the comprehensiveness ostensibly demanded of it—that it is idle to pretend to be conscientiously weighing all circumstances. On the other hand there's here no total lack of attentiveness to and consideration of all circumstances—but only as a moment of concern solely to others; and what this consciousness knows thus incompletely, being what *it* knows, it deems sufficiently complete.

347 Such consciousness deals with the universal aspect of what's morally essential (that which pure consciousness determines the substantive content here to be) in much the same way: When embarking upon action, conscience focuses on the many facets of the situation. As the situation ramifies, so does the relation of pure consciousness to it, the sheer complexity of the situation giving rise to a multiplicity of duties. Conscience knows that it has to choose and decide among these, since in their specificity, their substantive content, none of them—unlike pure duty—is absolute. But here the reality of this abstract concept has become synonymous with a self-conscious I: as conscience, self-certain spirit abides within itself, and the manner of universality that makes it real—its duty—is inherent in its [M423] sheer conviction concerning duty.

348 –As such, this sheer conviction is as vacuous as pure duty in the sense that nothing within it, no specific content, is per se obligatory. Yet something is supposed to be done, and the individual has to determine what; and self-certain spirit, this spirit in whom what's inherently a duty has become synonymous with the self-conscious I, knows that just such a purposive content is available in the firsthand certainty it has of itself. The certainty providing this purposive content is embodied in natural consciousness: in urges and inclinations. –Conscience admits of no such content as being absolutely binding for it since it is a negativity that isn't at all relative to anything determinate. It determines from within itself. However, the ambit of the self in which determinacy of this sort obtains is what's referred to as sensuality, which is such content as the self has at its disposal deriving directly from its self-certainty.

349 –Everything that came to light in spirit's earlier embodiments (as the good or the bad, law and right) consisted in something other than direct certainty of self—existing in the manner of a universal that's then relative to something else—or viewed otherwise, in some object that, while serving to mediate consciousness with itself, comes between consciousness and its own truth and, rather than consisting in consciousness's own direct presence, cuts consciousness off from itself.

350 –But for conscience certainty of self is sheer firsthand truth; and this truth consists in conscience's direct self-certainty represented as a purposive content—basically the whim of the individual and the wanton ways of his unreflective natural being.

351 At the same time this capricious content passes for the very core of morality—that is, as what's obligatory—since pure duty (as was already made evident when laws were put to the test) is perfectly indifferent to all content and accommodates any given it. In the present context duty additionally has the distinctive form of a self-oriented presence-to-self. This is the form characteristic of individualistic conviction, which consists in nothing save awareness of the vacuity of pure duty, hence that duty is but a moment, its substance but a predicate having its subject in the individual—whose whim in turn provides this form with a substantive content, he being quite able to attach all manner of content onto the form while tacking his “conscientiousness” onto that content.

352 –Say an individual manages in some particular way to improve himself financially, it being no less a duty [M424] that each should take care of himself and his family than that he look for opportunities to be useful to his fellows and do good for those in need. The individual is confident that this is a duty because the import of it is embosomed right within his certainty of self—and in the present case he perceives himself as fulfilling that duty. Others might regard this particular way of going about things as an imposture; while they're attending to other aspects of the concrete situation, he's focusing on this one facet, he being aware that advancing oneself financially is a clear-cut obligation. Actually, what others call outrageous and unjust is what fulfills his duty to assert his independence vis-à-vis others. What they call dastardly fulfills his duty to preserve his own life and thereby the possibility of his being useful to his fellows, whereas what they might characterize as mettlesome is more likely to violate his obligations to both.

353 –Yet a dastard is scarcely so inept as not to realize that preserving his own life and thus the possibility of being useful to others are duties, so inept as not to be convinced of the dutifulness of his action—as not to realize that dutifulness consists in just such “knowledgeableness”; otherwise he'd find himself in the awkward position of being immoral. Since morality lies in the realization that a duty has been fulfilled, there will scarcely be less conviction attending an act called dastardly than one called mettlesome. The abstract idea termed ‘duty’ readily befits this or that content; hence what-

ever this mentality does, it knows as a duty; and since it knows this—and inasmuch as being convinced of any such duty is dutifulness itself—this mentality is recognized by others accordingly, its action thereby gaining acceptance and having a place in the realm of the actual.

354 In face of such license, which inserts any content it pleases into the generic passive medium of pure duty and knowledge, there's no point to maintaining that some other content should be put there instead. For whatever the content, it bears the "blemish" of specificity, the specific determinacy from which pure knowing is free, being as capable of disdaining it as of embracing it. Each such content stands, by virtue of its specificity, on an equal footing with every other, even when it appears to have precisely the character of one in which the particular would be superseded. Since in actual situations duty as a [M425] matter of course fragments into conflicting elements, with individual and collective claims thus at odds, the duty that has the universal itself as its content may seem to be the one directly embodying the nature of pure duty, with form and content thereby coming into complete conformity. Thus for instance acting on behalf of what's best for all would be preferable to acting on behalf of what's best for the individual.

355 –Yet this duty aimed at the common good is in any case already in place and in force—namely as substantially existing in and of itself in right and law—and it is this independently of the knowledge and conviction as well as the immediate interest of any single individual, an interest whose form is precisely that counter to which morality fundamentally aims. As for the purposive content of the individual's interest, that too is specific insofar as what's best for all is at odds with what's best for the individual—the law of the individual being one from which conscience accordingly knows itself to be completely free, and with regard to which it grants itself plenary authority to add or subtract, ignore or comply.

356 –Then again, the distinction between one's obligation to the individual and to the common good is hardly, given the overall nature of the opposition, a firm one. On the contrary, what an individual does for himself works to the advantage of the common good as well. It isn't just that the more he has taken care of himself the greater are the opportunities he has of being of service to others; rather does his actual reality consist solely in his existing and living in association with others: the essential import of his individual enjoyment consists in his sharing what's his with other individuals and helping them enjoy life too. In fulfilling his obligation to the individual, that is, to himself, he's also fulfilling his obligation to the common good. Any weighing and comparing of obligations that might enter in here would proceed along the lines of calculating how a given action might benefit the common good. But that would have morality fall prey to the inevitable arbitrariness of such discrimination—whereas it's in the very nature of conscience that it cut short such calculating and weighing, and without resorting to such rationales make a decision on its own.

357 So this is how, when it engages in action, conscience manages to cohere as self-inhering and evident-to-itself, in a unity of pure thought and individuality, and is [M426] a self-certain spirit whose truth abides within it integrally—in its very self, in what it itself knows and therein knows to be obligatory. Self-certain spirit sustains itself thus precisely by the fact that what's positive in moral action—the substantive content as well as the form and knowledge of what's obligatory—is part and parcel of the self, of the self's certainty, whereas that which would pose an inherency of *its* own counter to the self isn't deemed true but rather of relevance only as sublated, as a mere moment. Thus knowledge concerned with generalities doesn't matter at all but rather familiarity with the circumstances. Conscience puts such purposive content into duty—as what's universally, inherently obligatory—which it derives from its individual nature, this being what it has available to it from within itself. This becomes the duty it carries out by way of the generic medium in which it exists, thereby superseding vacuous pure duty, turning the latter into a mere moment; this content voids the vacuity of pure duty, that is, is a duty that gets fulfilled. But furthermore conscience is free of any and every content; it absolves itself of every specific duty that's supposed to carry the force of law. Empowered by self-certainty, it has all the majesty of absolute autarchy: the power to bind and to loose. –Accordingly, self-determination such as this is forthwith absolutely duty-bound; what obliges is knowledge itself. This simplex form of selfhood is what morality in itself is; for in itself morality is sheer self-identity—which in moral consciousness is inherent.

358 Sheerly to know what's thus obligatory is to exist directly in relation to otherness; for this knowing, as pure self-identity, is itself something directly evident, a matter-of-fact being. Being of this sort exists moreover sheerly in common—is everyone's selfhood—which is to say that an action taken is recognized and thus real. Such being constitutes the element in and through which conscience stands as an equal in direct connection with all self-conscious beings, a connection the significance of which isn't embodied in some impersonal law but in conscience's very self.

359 Nevertheless, by the very fact that the “right thing” conscience does is also evident to others, an inconsistency appears to enter into it. In any obligation that conscience fulfills there is a definite purposive content, which is factually [instantiative of] consciousness's self and, concomitantly, its knowledge of itself, [wherein it has] its self-consistency. However, once brought to bear in the broader medium of being at large, [M427] this self-consistency is no longer [possessed of] knowledge of the above sort, is no longer the kind of discretion that so readily undoes the different things it entertains. On the contrary, a difference brought about in the existential realm is a difference that lasts; and an action, in being definite, is quite unlike the element formed of everyone's self-consciousness—hence isn't necessarily recognized there for what it is. Both parties, the acting conscience and the public consciousness that recognizes conscientious action as obligatory, are equally free of the specific character of the ac-

tion taken. Due to their being thus free, their relation in the common medium connecting them is sooner one of complete *in*consistency, for which reason a consciousness confronted with such an action finds itself wholly uncertain regarding the self-certain spirit who takes action.

360 –Taking action, this self-certain spirit puts something specific forth as an existent matter of fact. Others seize upon this *de facto* being as his true reality, of which they're certain, while he has expressed what he takes to be obligatory. He, however, is free from any specific obligation, is ever one step removed from where others suppose him actually to be; as far as he's concerned the medium they have in common, that of being at large, as well as anything obligatory in and of itself, are both but moments [of the larger reality of the matter]. Thus whatever stance he assumes before others he shifts out of in due course—or even right away. After all, such a spirit doesn't deem his actual reality to consist in some objectified duty and set role, but rather in the fulsome certainty he has in himself.

361 Others accordingly don't know whether from a moral standpoint such a conscience is good or evil—or rather, not only do they have no way of knowing this, they'd sooner have to deem it evil. For just as his conscience is free from duty's specificity and from any obligation that's matter-of-factly inherent, so too are theirs. Whatever his conscientious stance before them, they themselves know how to switch this around, it being something expressive only of someone else's self, not theirs. It's not enough that they know themselves to be unbound by such; they have to quash the idea that they are so bound, judging it null and explaining it away for the sake of sustaining their selves.

362 But conscientious action doesn't consist merely in some such matter-of-factly specific duty that was forsaken by a self that's pure. Whatever is to carry the force of and be recognized as a duty is such only via the knowledge and conviction that it is obligatory, [M428] by the self's knowing itself in acting accordingly. When an act is no longer the act of a knowing and convinced self, it ceases to be that in which alone the nature of a conscientious act consists. Absent such cognizance the act would present us with some commonplace occurrence, and would appear as just a way of gratifying appetite and desire. What there, in such gratification, is something that ought to be is here indispensable solely by its becoming known to be individuality in the act of expressing itself; and to be thus known entails both what's being recognized and what as such ought to be matter-of-factly present.

363 It is *as a self* that the self enters into existence: self-certain spirit exists as such in being *present* to others. The self's extemporaneous action isn't what is morally relevant and effectual; nor is what's being recognized anything fixedly definite, anything that exists inherently “in principle,” but solely the self-knowing self as such. The sustaining element is self-conscious existence at large, an element in which whatever comes into

play can scarcely consist of some action's mere effect, which here has no staying power and achieves no abiding presence; rather is it only self-conscious existence that is recognized and attains actual reality.

364 Thus do we again see speech serving as spirit's existent presence. Speech is self-consciousness made present to others—directly present as self-consciousness and as this particular embodiment of self-conscious being at large. Speech is self in the act of separating itself from itself, becoming, as pure I = I, its own object—abiding in objective form as this particular self even as it is merging directly with other selves as part of *their* self-consciousness. Even as a self is coming to understand itself, it is coming to be understood by others; and such understanding is that self's matter-of-fact presence become self.

365 The content with which speech has here become laden is no longer the manner of self—distorted, distorting, conflicted—met with in the world of culture; here instead is a spirit that has found its way back to itself, is certain of itself and of a truth it possesses within itself, and that is recognizing and being recognized as knowledge possessed of conscience. The spirit of an ethos gives voice to law, to simple authoritative command, and to a kind of grieving tantamount to tears shed over necessity. Moralistic consciousness, by contrast, is still mute, still closed up within its inner being where the self as yet has no such existent presence—self and existent presence being thus far only externally interrelated. Speech [M429] comes to the fore merely as intermediating autonomous and recognized self-consciousness; and the self thus made present is universal directly within itself—is complex—and in this complexity is a manner of simplex being consisting in its being recognized.

366 –When conscience speaks, the substantive content of what it says is the self as an entity that knows itself. This is all that its language conveys, and in being thus communicated lies the true reality of a deed and the worth of an action. Consciousness voices its conviction; it's solely in this conviction that any action taken is a duty; action counts as a duty solely by such conviction being communicated. For self-consciousness at large stands free of any mere specific matter-of-fact action: action as matter-of-factly present isn't what matters to it, only the conviction that the action is obligatory does, and this is made actual in speech.

367 –In this context, to see an action through in reality doesn't mean that its substantive content is being translated from a purposive or self-oriented form into the form of an abstract reality, but rather that this is being translated from a form of firsthand self-certainty that knows its own knowing (its being evident to itself) as decisive, into a form of assuredness: consciousness's being convinced of a certain duty and knowing from within itself that this duty is a matter of conscience. What such assuredness thus assures is that consciousness is convinced that its conviction is the essence [of its action].

368 Now as to whether this assuredness that it's acting out of dutiful conviction is true, whether what it's doing actually is its duty, these are questions, or scruples, that mean nothing when addressed to conscience. By asking whether such assuredness has any truth to it, one in effect presupposes that inner intention might be at variance with professed intention, that the volition of the individual self is capable of functioning apart from duty, apart from the will of pure consciousness oriented to the universal—in which case duty would be reduced to mere words and individual volition actually turn out to be the true motive of the action. –But the difference between consciousness mindful of what all have in common and individual self is exactly what has been sublated; and as sublated, it is conscience. What a self-certain spirit directly knows is tantamount to law and duty. The intention of such a self, precisely because this is what the self-certain self intends, is what's right; all that's required is that it realize this and state its conviction that what it thus knows and wills is what's right.

369 –To give voice to such [M430] assurance is all by itself to sublimate the form of the self's specialness, and in so doing to recognize the necessary commonality of the self. By calling itself 'conscience' it identifies itself as pure self-knowledge and pure abstract volition: in other words as 'a knowing and willing' that's oriented to what all have in common, that recognizes others and is on a par with them, that recognizes them to be likewise a pure knowing and willing—and is itself thus acknowledged by them. In the volition of a self-certain self, in this knowledge that here the self is the essential entity, lies the gist of what's right. Thus when someone says that he's acting from conscience—it being his knowing and willing self—he speaks truly. But it's essential that he openly say so, since a conscientious self has also to be a self committed to all in common. This manner of self isn't to be found in the content of action, since owing to its specificity the content is per se a matter of indifference; rather does universality lie in the action's form: *that* is what needs to be established as actual. The form is the self, actual as such in speech, expressing itself as the truth, and precisely thereby acknowledging all selves while being acknowledged by them in turn.



370 Raised thus in its majesty above any specifically defined law and any content that duty might have, conscience puts whatever content it pleases into its knowing and willing. It is morally inspired, knowing the inner voice of its direct knowledge to be divine. And since it's likewise possessed of direct knowledge of the realm of matter-of-fact existence, it embodies a godlike creativity brought to life within its very act of conceiving. As such it's a kind of divine service conducted within, for its action consists in contemplating this its own divinity.

371 This divine service held in solitude is also by nature communal, with this pure inward knowing and hearkening to self culminating in an epiphany. Its objective

presence is comprised in its vision of itself—an objective element expressive of what it knows and wills as a communal being. By expressing itself thus, such a self gains popular acceptance and such action turns into something of a feat. Although what it's doing is realized and sustained by self-consciousness at large, it's what conscience is expressing that [M431] establishes such self-certitude as pure self—hence a self common to all. Others acknowledge such action so as to hear out this account in which the self is expressed and recognized as the divine being. The spirit and substance of the bond between this and other selves consists, then, in their mutual assurances concerning their conscientiousness, good intentions, the delight they take in their mutually reflected purity, and their basking in the glory of knowing and expressing, cherishing and fostering such excellence.

372 –Now to the extent that this manner of conscience still distinguishes its abstract mentations from its self-conscious existence, its life in God is but a latent one. While God is no doubt directly present to such a conscience's heart and spirit—that is, to its self—what's manifest here (namely what it's actually aware of together with the mediative process of such consciousness) is to it something other than the hidden inner and direct presence of the divine being. –Only as conscience is perfected is the disparity between its abstract and its self-conscious being superseded. Conscience then knows that *abstract* consciousness constitutes just such a self, a self-certain presence-to-self—knows that in the very directness of the self's relation to this latently inherent being (which, when posited outside the self, constitutes an abstract entity obscured from the self) the disparity is nullified. For a relation is mediative only when the terms related aren't one and the same but reciprocally other, and when they're united only in and through a third term. By contrast a direct relation is tantamount in fact to oneness. Once consciousness has surmounted its thoughtless propensity to regard distinctions that don't differentiate as differentiative nonetheless, it realizes that the divine being's presence directly within it constitutes a unity between that being and its self, that its self is thus a living embodiment of that inherent being, and that this its knowledge is what religion is—a form of knowledge that, in contemplation or in attention to present matters, embodies what such a community has to say about its spirit.

373 Here, then, we see a manner of self-consciousness that, having withdrawn into its innermost recesses, has all externality as such dissolving into an intuition of $I = I$ in which all that essentially exists is the I . It lapses into sheer self-conceiving, having been impelled to the apex of self-consciousness's extremes, so that indeed the moments here [M432] distinguished, whereby it is [focused on something] real—that is, is still consciousness—consist solely of these rarified extremes. This isn't just evident to us but to it as well: what to it exists 'inherently in itself' and what to it is 'existentially present' have become airy abstractions that for this very consciousness have neither support nor substance, while everything that up to now consciousness deemed sub-

stantive has receded into these same abstractions. –Refined to such purity, consciousness is embodied in its most impoverished form, and even this impoverishment comprising its sole possession is fleeting. The absolute certainty in which moral substance has dissipated itself is a sheer and utter untruth that collapses from within, it being a form of *self*-consciousness so radical as to undermine consciousness.

374 Pondered from within such a self-absorbed state, what matter-of-factly existent substance consists of for consciousness is *knowing*—its own knowing. As consciousness, knowing is dissevered into itself and a contrasting object that it takes to be a substantive entity. But the object we’re dealing with here is completely transparent; this transparency is its very self, and its consciousness is but a knowing of itself. All life and all that’s essential to spirit has reverted into the self—and has even lost its distinctness from the I. The moments of conscious existence are then abstractions in the extreme; none of them hold their own but sooner get lost in, and give rise to, other abstractions. This to and fro it has with itself is tantamount to that seen in the Unhappy Consciousness, although for the present mentality this takes place right within consciousness itself and in full awareness that this involves reason’s conceptual activity, whereas the Unhappy Consciousness is conceptual only latently. Thus does this resounding self-certainty find that it’s as though its consciousness were changing into sounds that instantly fade into the distance, with its presence-to-self turning into an objectivity of sorts, albeit one in which this fabricated world is this same consciousness’s own report—one to which it just as readily hearkens and whose echo returns to it alone.

375 –A reverberation of this sort gives no indication that such consciousness exists in and present to itself here, since to it the being thus objectified isn’t anything that exists in *itself*, but is just consciousness itself. Nor does such consciousness succeed in having any more of an existent presence, since what’s thus “objectified” comes no closer to being *nonself* (the negative complement of an actual self) than it does to being something actually real. It lacks the strength to externalize itself, the vigor to make itself into a thing and bear the burden of being. It lives in dread that, by taking action and engaging present reality, it might defile the splendor of its inner nature. And in order to [M433] preserve the purity of its heart it flees from contact with the real, stubbornly persisting in its narcissistic effeteness, unable to renounce this self honed to the epitome of abstraction so as to give itself some manner of substance—that is, to transform its thought into being and give itself over to what’s totally different from it. Thus is it made aware of its own emptiness by the vacuous object it engenders. What it does is pine away—over the loss it suffers in turning itself into an insubstantial object. And once having fallen back upon its own inner resources after recovering from its loss, it finds itself forlorn. In moments as transparently pure as these this melancholy beautiful soul languishes away, dissipating like a wisp of smoke in the air.



376 Yet to be considered is the significance of conscience other than as this placid confluence of marrowless beings living out their etherealized life—conscience regarded with respect to its actual reality, what its dynamic brings to light, and how it engages in action. The objective moment integral to such awareness was defined above in terms of conscious existence at large. –As embodied in the particular self, this knowing that knows itself is distinct from other selves; the spoken exchange in which all are reciprocally recognized as acting conscientiously, this collective parity, disintegrates into the discord typical of individualistic existence-for-self, so that each such consciousness is no less abruptly reflected back into itself apart from what it has in common with all. This inevitably puts one individual at odds with another as well as with what all have in common, a relationship and dynamic meriting closer scrutiny. –Differently put, such commonality and duty is evocative of the complete opposite: a manner of individuality that peremptorily exempts itself from any such commonality, regarding pure duty as but a commonplace that has become superficial and externalistic—something thus merely verbal and mattering only as of relevance to others.

377 –Conscience, at first only negatively oriented toward duty as embodied in such and such specific obligation here and now, knows itself to be free of such; but since it fills in its otherwise vacuous duty with a specific content drawn from its own inner resources, it is positively aware that it, as this particular self, is producing that content. Conscience's pure self, [M434] a noetic *tabula rasa*, is contentless and nonspecific, any purposive content that conscience provides the self being derived from conscience's self as this specific self, itself as natural individual. Although in averring the conscientiousness of its conduct it certainly has its pure self in mind, nonetheless in the purpose—the real import—of its action it is attentive to itself as this particular individual and to the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is to others, that is, to the tension between what all have in common—duty—and the being that conscience has as reflected out of that commonality.

378 While the opposition into which actively engaged conscience thus enters makes itself felt within it internally, such opposition is also outwardly indicative of a disparity in the element of existence at large, the disparity of conscience's particular individuality vis-à-vis other individuals. Individualistic conscience is distinctive in that its two constitutive moments, the self and what's inherently obligatory, are valued in it unequally, and indeed with a manner of definitiveness in accordance with which conscience's self-certainty is deemed to be indispensable—as opposed to what's inherently obligatory, what's common to all, which is regarded as a mere moment [of the overall dynamic]. This inner definitiveness is thus at odds with the element in which it is existentially present, consciousness at large, which by contrast deems what all have in common, namely duty, to be indispensable, while deeming the individual who's out for himself in opposition to that commonality merely as a moment that has been superseded. Duty-bound consciousness deems the individualistic mentality to be evil,

since the latter's inner being is inconsistent with the common weal—and moreover, when the latter openly declares its action to be self-consistent, dutiful, and conscientious, deems it to be hypocritical.

379 The dynamic of the latter opposition starts out by restoring formal consistency between what this manner of evil consists of internally and what it expressly declares: it has to be brought out into the open that it *is* evil and its presence thus made to resemble what it in essence is, such hypocrisy having to be unmasked. Hypocrisy doesn't recover from its state of internal inconsistency and become self-consistent merely (as is often alleged) in its demonstrating a regard for duty and virtue by assuming their guise and using this to mask itself from its own cognizance as well as from any deemed alien—as though in being [M435] attentive to its antithesis it were implicitly self-consistent and harmonious. Hypocrisy, after all, is reflected away from any such spoken acknowledgment in the very measure that it's reflected in upon itself; and in utilizing what duty and virtue inherently are merely as a way of presenting itself to others, hypocrisy sooner holds them in contempt and demonstrates their lack of substance to all. For whatever lends itself to use as a tool for fashioning external appearances shows itself to be a thing having no real weight of its own.

380 Consistency of conscience is achieved neither through an evil consciousness's one-sided, stubborn insistence in having its way nor through the judgmentalism of [a conscience oriented to] the common weal. When an evil consciousness disavows what dutiful consciousness takes it to be—maintaining that what the latter declares to be iniquitous, something entirely inconsistent with the common weal, is on the contrary action consistent with conscience and the law within—then, despite its unilateral assurance of such consistency, the fact that it's inconsistent with the other persists, since the latter doesn't give credence or recognition to this. Or rather, due to the futility of one-sided adherence to the one extreme, an evil consciousness would, in doing so, be admitting that it is indeed evil, therein directly undermining itself without either being hypocritical or having unmasked itself as such. In asserting that it acts in accordance with its own inner law and conscience as opposed to what's acknowledged by all in common, it does in fact admit to being evil. For if this law and conscience weren't just the law of its own private individuality and whim, then instead of being inward and idiosyncratic they *would* be recognized by all in common. Hence whoever says that he's doing to others in accord with his own law and conscience is in fact saying that he's doing them wrong. Real conscience doesn't persist in a knowing and willing set against the common weal; rather is the common weal the element in which it has its existent presence and verbally testifies to its regarding its action as obligatory.

381 Nor does dogged judgmentalism on the part of the consciousness oriented to the common weal fare any better at unmasking and dispelling hypocrisy. When it inveighs against hypocrisy as bad, base, and so on, it appeals in such judgment to its own law

just as does the evil consciousness. For the one law turns up in contention with the other and thereby as a [M436] particular law. The one has no advantage over, and sooner legitimates, the other—such zeal accomplishing the exact opposite of what it intends, showing that what it calls true duty, and means to have recognized as what's common to all, isn't in fact so recognized, thereby conceding to the other an equal right to exist on *its* own terms.

382 But moral judgment likewise has another side to it, one leading to a resolution of the present deadlock. –Consciousness concerned with what's obligatory for all doesn't relate to evil consciousness in the way that one oriented to and engaging in action does (the latter being by far the more practical-minded); instead it counters evil consciousness as does a consciousness not caught up in the conflict that action involves, namely between individuality and the duty common to all. It keeps within the universality of thought, takes a receptive approach, and makes its first act simply to pass judgment. –Now in proceeding, as just said, to pass judgment it puts itself in contact with, and to that extent on a par with, the other consciousness, thereby coming to see something of itself in the other. For by conducting itself in this receptive—passive—manner, the consciousness thus mindful of duty contradicts itself as a willing of duty that is absolute, duty that's strictly self-determining. Little wonder that such a mentality has managed to preserve its purity, since it doesn't do anything. It epitomizes the hypocrisy inherent in wanting judgment to be taken for an actual deed, and in giving proof of its righteousness by spouting lofty sentiments instead of taking action. Thus is this consciousness altogether like the one rebuked for confining duty to lip service.

383 –In both alike actual reality is at variance with what's said: in the one, due to the selfish aim of the action taken, in the other, due to a failure to act at all even though the need for action is implicit in the very assertion of its being obligatory—since obligation without action has no point to it at all.

384 Judging is nonetheless also to be regarded as a positive action of thought, and as having a positive content; in light of this, the contradictoriness present in the receptive consciousness and the latter's similarity with the first become all the more complete. –The consciousness taking action asserts that some specific act on its part is obligatory, and this much [M437] at least the judgmental consciousness can't readily dismiss, since obligation *per se* is a contentless form accommodating any content. In other words a concrete act, being internally diverse by virtue of its multifacetedness, has an aspect common to all, namely what's considered obligatory, as well as an aspect that's personal, the portion and interest of the individual.

385 –Now a judgmental consciousness doesn't rest content with addressing the aspect concerned with obligation and the acting consciousness's knowledge thereof—that, given its situation and status in actual reality, such and such is its duty. Instead it proceeds to latch onto the other aspect, relegating any [allegedly obligatory] action to the

realm of the inner, asserting that such an act derives from some intention and selfish motive at variance with the act itself. Just as any action can be looked at from the perspective of its dutifulness, so likewise can it be viewed from the other perspective, that of particularity, since as engaged in action this is the actual reality of the individual. –Such judging thus removes the action from the arena of external being and reflects it into the domain of the inner, that is, into the form of personal particularity. Should the action in question elicit praise, then such judgment knows the action's inner motive to be "glory-seeking." If the individual's action is altogether in keeping with and not over-reaching his station—and is such that through his action, rather than having his station simply assigned him, he makes its larger aims his own and thereby shows himself capable of a higher station—then such judgment knows the action's inner motive to be "ambition," and so on. Should the agent in the overall course of his actions succeed in seeing something of himself objectified, or to attain a measure of self-esteem and hence joy in his everyday life, the judgmental consciousness knows this to be inwardly a striving for personal happiness, if only in the form of inner moral vanity, delight in one's own excellence, and hopeful anticipation of happiness yet to come.

386 –No action can elude such criticism since duty for duty's sake, a purpose this pure, isn't anything actual; the reality of a purpose is in the action of the individual, with particularity being thereby an integral aspect of action. No man is a hero to his valet—not because the former isn't a hero but because the latter is a valet, with whom the former has dealings not as a hero [M438] but as one who eats, drinks, gets dressed, and is routinely taken up with the minutiae pertinent to personal needs and fancies. Hence for judgmentalism there's no manner of action the particular individualistic aspect of which it couldn't contrast with the act's broader implications and so play moral valet to the agent.

387 The judgmental mentality is thus itself ignoble in so dissecting any given action, emphasizing and belaboring its inner inconsistency with itself. Moreover it is hypocritical since it alleges that such judgmentalism isn't just evil of a different stripe but on the contrary a legitimate way of thinking about any such action—fobbing itself off, amidst its fecklessness and vanity, as principled sagacity superior to any of the deeds it berates, and seeking to have words not backed up with deeds be reckoned as a most estimable sort of reality.

388 –Having thus put itself on a par with the agent it criticizes, the judgmental mentality comes to be recognized by the latter as being the same as he. The latter finds not only that he's perceived as alien to and unlike the former, but that the former's makeup is indeed much like his own. Intuiting and giving expression to this similarity, he admits as much to the other, anticipating that, having thus in fact put himself on an equal footing, the other will respond in kind, give expression to their equality, and embark upon a mutually recognized presence. His admission isn't humiliating or self-abasing,

nor does he disparage himself vis-à-vis the other, since what's being expressed isn't one sided, doesn't establish his inequality with the other. Rather is it only because of his intuiting the other's equality with him that he so speaks, expressing by his own admission what they have in common, and being moved to do so because speech is the presence of spirit as the self's own direct presence. Accordingly he expects the other to do his part in contributing to that presence.

389 But the evil one's admission, "This I am," doesn't elicit a confession in kind. This wasn't what the judge had in mind; far from it! Rebuffing any such common bond, his is a hard heart that keeps [M439] to itself and disavows continuity with the other. The tables are now turned. The one who made the acknowledgment sees himself rejected and the other to be in the wrong—for refusing to make his inner self vocally present and for pitting the beauty of his soul against this evil one, responding to the latter's acknowledgment with the stiff-necked persistency and silence characteristic of one keeping to himself and not about to be disparaged in face of anyone else.

390 –Here the indignation of the self-certain spirit [who confessed] reaches its peak; for he, while beholding himself as a simplex knowing of self in another, and indeed while discerning even by the other's countenance that he isn't something insubstantial (as met with in wealth)—isn't some thing but on the contrary is thought itself, knowledge itself, that's dead set against him. This other instantiative of the absolute fluid continuity of pure knowing is refusing to commune with him, a spirit who, having already renounced his insular existence for himself, had committed himself to sublating his particularity and thereby affirming his continuity, his commonality, with that other. But still the other clings to an uncommunicative presence-to-self, attributing the same to the confessing consciousness even though the latter has already renounced all that. By failing to recognize that in its absolute self-certainty spirit is master over every act as well as actual reality, and can repudiate and undo them, the other shows himself to be a consciousness that, in [thus effectively] renouncing spirit, is being forsaken by it. Nor does he realize that when he refuses to let a stated repudiation count as genuine—while he himself has certainty of spirit not via any actual deed but via his inner self and the presence it has in the judgment he utters—he's contradicting himself. Thus is he the one impeding the other's turning back from his deed to spiritual presence and equality, and by such obstinacy is himself the source of the inequality that still remains.

391 Now insofar as this self-certain spirit, this "beautiful soul," hasn't the mettle to part with its self-absorbed self-knowledge, it can't achieve equality with the consciousness it has rebuffed, hence [M440] can't attain an intuitive sense of its being itself one with—present in—that other; the only equality achieved, that of spiritless existence, is sheerly negative. This beautiful soul, bereft of reality and caught up in the contradiction between its "pure self" and the pressing need to get out of itself and turn into

something real—unable to get beyond this stubbornly contrarian unmediatedness (it being all there is to mediate and reconcile this opposition intensified to sheerest abstraction, rarified existence, and vacuous nullity)—this beautiful soul, aware of the contradictoriness of its unreconciled immediacy, ends up degenerating into, and wasting away in, a kind of [moralistic] derangement. While in this way it does manage to take leave of its impacted presence-to-self, it achieves but a spiritless unity, that of sheer being.

392 A true adequation—one that is self-conscious and made objectively present—is, as befits the pressing need for such, already implicit in the above: a hard heart breaks and rises to commonality in just such stirrings as found voice in the confessing consciousness. When spirit's wounds heal, they leave no lasting scars; the deed isn't permanently locked in but is taken back by spirit into itself, and its individualistic aspect (whether present in intention or in expressly narrow-minded negativity) dissipates forthwith. The actualizing self—the form integral to the action of spirit—is but one moment of the process as a whole, just as is the manner of knowing that via judgment defines and rigidly differentiates the individualistic and communal aspects of action. An evil self that was drawn into openly confessing by its seeing itself in the other thereby affirms its self-abnegation, its being a mere moment [of a more expansive self realized via this its self-externalization]. The judgmental consciousness has to see it break with the one-sided, singularly self-oriented existence it hasn't admitted to, just as the confessing consciousness has to see the other break with the one-sided judgmentalism to which it hasn't admitted. The former thus demonstrates spirit's power over its actual reality, just as the latter demonstrates spirit's power to overcome its set way of conceiving.

393 But when the judgmental consciousness renounces its divisive way of thinking and the self-oriented intransigence with which it clings to such thinking, this occurs because it's in fact seeing itself in the other. The confessing consciousness, in rejecting what [M441] he in actual reality is and turning himself into this particular being who's been sublated, demonstrates that he's in fact universal; in returning from his reality outside such universality into himself as he is in essence, he enables the consciousness focused upon the universal to recognize itself in that same essence. The forgiveness that the former extends to the latter is based on the latter's renouncing itself, its ineffectual "evil" way of going about things, which its other action, its effectual act of confessing, has met in kind. Also entailed in such forgiveness is the judgmental consciousness recognizing as good this action that, as stereotyped by its way of thinking, had come to be called 'evil'—that is, in letting go of this distinction imposed by its set way of thinking and its self-serving judgmental tendencies, just as the confessing consciousness lets go of the self-oriented determinedness of its action. The reconciliatory word is spirit made actually present, contemplating its own pure knowledge of self as

universal essence in its complete opposite—in the pure knowing of self as an individual being existing entirely within itself: a reciprocal recognition comprising absolute spirit.

394 Absolute spirit comes into being only in this experiential culmination wherein its pure self-knowledge is both in opposition to, and in reciprocal interaction with, itself. Well aware that its ‘pure knowing’ is but an abstract mode of being, this spirit is one of perspicacious dutifulness entirely at odds with the manner of knower who, as a totally individualistic self, knows himself as what’s essential. It’s this nonindividualistic knowledge that comprises the sheer continuity of all in common, the realization that the manner of individuality that knows itself to be what’s essential is inherently vain, is evil. Evil, however, stands utterly apart, knowing itself to be complete in its sheer singularity—while knowing commonality as something unreal, something of concern merely to others. Both sides are refined to such clarity that there’s no longer anything present within them that isn’t self—that isn’t conscious being. Here dutifulness abides within the staid character of consciousness’s self-knowledge, just as evil, in its self-involutedness, has a purpose of its own and an actual reality of its own that it expresses in an idiom all its own—the import of which is the substance of its singular persistency, a substance that “in its own way” guarantees spirit’s inner certainty.

395 –Both of these self-certain spirits have no purpose other than their pure self, and no reality and existence other than this same pure self. But they’re still disparate; and this disparity, having been established in the element of pure conceiving, is absolute. And it’s absolute [M442] not only for us, but also for the ways of conceiving here at odds. For even though reciprocally specific, these ways of conceiving are also inherently universal—hence filling out the entire compass of the self, a self having no substantive content save that of which it’s specifically certain, which neither extends beyond nor is more limited than it. For the one mode of definiteness (the one altogether oriented to the universal) consists in pure self-knowledge just as does the other (the one that stands individualistically apart); and indeed neither consists in anything but pure self-knowledge. Both modes of definiteness are thus forms of pure noetic conception, whose definiteness itself consists in direct knowing—which is to say that what interrelates and contrasts them is the I. Thus while they’re utterly antithetical to each other, what has here come face-to-face with itself and become matter-of-factly present is something wholly internal: comprised in these two modes of definiteness is a pure knowing that via this their opposition is affirmed as *consciousness*.

396 –But this still isn’t *self-consciousness*. Such is had only as this tensive dynamism of opposites unfolds. For their opposition is of itself a nondiscrete continuity and equality, an I = I; and each on its own behalf, precisely by contradicting its pure universality—by resisting equality with the other from whom it’s still disposed to distance itself—sublates itself from within. Via such self-abnegation this knowing that’s

divided in the manner of its presence comes back to the unity integral to a self; this [reintegrated] knowing is the actual I: a universal knowing from within one's own self—of oneself in one's absolute counterpart, an I who, because of the undefiled integrity of its separate inwardness, is itself completely universal. –The reconciliatory Yes! within which both I's abandon their confrontational way of life is the presence of an I that has expanded into a duality, an I that, amidst its complete externalization and vis-à-vis its complete opposite, retains its identity and self-certainty. This is the deity resplendent amidst those who know themselves as pure knowing. [M443]



VII

RELIGION

1 Amid the preceding experiential permutations—broadly distinguished as consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—religion emerged as well, basically as an awareness of a manner of being that is absolute, albeit absolute solely from the standpoint of the consciousness aware of it and not as it is in and present to itself, which is to say, not as the *self-conscious* being of the spirit that emerged in these forms.

2 Consciousness, insofar as it consists in understanding, is already an awareness of the supersensible, the inner aspect of objective existence. But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever one might call it, is bereft of self—is but a primitive universal still far from being spirit that knows itself as spirit. Then there was self-consciousness, which culminated in the anguish of a spirit that, as embodied in the Unhappy Consciousness, wrestled with itself in an unsuccessful attempt just to re-attain an objective presence. Such unity as an individual self-conscious being of that sort attains with its ‘immutable essence’ remains thus elusively beyond it. The way in which reason is directly present (reason having, as we saw, emerged from the anguish of self-consciousness) and the ways in which it then distinctively embodied itself have nothing religious about them since the manner of self-consciousness integral to them knows or seeks itself in what’s directly present.

3 In the ethical world, by contrast, we did encounter a form of religion, namely the religion of the netherworld: belief in the fearsome, unfathomable night of fate (pure negativity in the form of universality) and in the Eumenides unleashed in wake of the departed spirit (pure negativity in the form of individuality). So while the form of absolute being embodied in the latter [consisting of pure negativity] does exist as a

“self” and is “present”—there being no other way for a self to exist—what the individual self ends up as is ‘such and such individual shade,’ with the universality comprised in fate being separate from it. Although a shade is indeed a shade, a sublated ‘this,’ and in that sense a self existing [abstractly] as does a universal, [M444] the negative import of this sublation still hasn’t been turned into anything positive, and the self thus sublated still gives direct indication of being particular and insubstantial. As for fate, devoid of a self, it remains an unfathomed night in which nothing is ever distinctively discerned nor clarity of self-knowledge attained.

4 This belief in the nullity implicit in necessity and in the netherworld turns into belief in heaven because the self’s ending up as one of the departed has to be reconciled with the self’s being something universal—what the self amounts to in its universality having yet to be threshed out and thus made clear. But as we saw, the realm of faith unfolds its substantive content nonconceptually—solely in the element of thought—and so ends up doomed to a fate of its own making: the religion of enlightenment. In the latter the understanding’s supersensible beyond is reestablished, albeit in such a way that self-consciousness rests content with the here-and-now and knows this supersensible vacant beyond as something that isn’t to be thought of—or feared—either as a self or as a [divine] power to be reckoned with.

5 Lastly, in the religion of morality, a form of being that’s absolute is reestablished as a positive content, albeit as a content compounded with the negativity of enlightenment. A content of this sort is a form of being that turns back into the self and stays enclosed within it, and moreover is a content differentiated into components no sooner set forth than negated. But this contradictory moral dynamic is destined to founder in a manner of self that realizes that it itself is the destiny of everything real and essential.

6 In religion self-knowing spirit is comprised directly in its own pure self-consciousness. The modes of embodiment previously considered—pristine, self-estranged, and self-certain spirit—together comprise spirit in its conscious existence, functioning face-to-face with its world without recognizing itself therein. But in conscience it comes to terms both with itself and with its objective world at large, as well as with its way of representing and its set ways of conceiving [self and world]—and so now consists in a form of self-consciousness at home with itself. In conscience, where it’s put forth as an object, spirit regards itself as having the import of something comprehensive, encompassing everything essential and all that’s real—but without existing in the form of anything independently actual or of any aspect of nature that appears autonomous. [M445] Spirit is of course embodied—has the form of *being*—in that it is an object of its consciousness. Yet since in religion this being is defined as consisting essentially in self-consciousness, its embodiment is completely transparent to it, and such reality as it has is confined to and sublated within it—just as when we say “all reality,” which is reality at large in the form of thought.

7 Since the specific character of what spirit is actually conscious of in religion doesn't thus have the form of something independently other than it, what it has matter-of-factly present to it is at variance with its self-conscious existence, and its actual reality falls outside religion. Although there is of course one spirit common to both, its consciousness doesn't encompass both at once; and so religion appears as one part of its presence, action and striving—its other part being the life it has in the real world. Now that we realize that spirit in its world and spirit conscious of itself as spirit (spirit in religion) are [in concept ultimately] one and the same, religion's consummation hinges upon these becoming identical with one another—not by religion simply embracing such reality as spirit has, but conversely by spirit becoming real as self-conscious spirit and as the object of its consciousness.

8 –Insofar as spirit *represents* itself to itself in religion, it is indeed a form of consciousness; and such reality as that religion encompasses is what's embodied and arrayed in its representation. But actual reality isn't given its full due as thus set forth, reality being no mere raiment but a freestanding matter-of-fact presence. And since, conversely, such reality as is set forth in a representation is insufficiently complete, it is embodied in a way destined to fall short of making present what it's supposed to, namely spirit conscious of itself. An embodiment of spirit expressive of spirit per se would itself have to *be* nothing other than spirit; and spirit would have to appear—that is, actually exist—therein as it is in its very essence. Only thus, counterintuitive as it may seem, could the demand be met that the object of spirit's consciousness also have the form of an independent actuality: indeed only spirit that's objectively evident to itself as absolute spirit is as much present to itself as an actual independently existent reality as it is abidingly conscious of itself therein. [M446]

9 Since to begin with, spirit's self-conscious existence (religion) and its actual conscious existence (spirit in its world, its matter-of-fact presence) turn out to be distinct, the latter epitomizes the whole of spirit insofar as its moments run separate courses and present themselves each on its own. These moments are, again, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit—namely spirit as it directly is, without as yet being aware of itself as spirit. Comprised in the integrated totality of these moments is the overall gamut of spirit's worldly existence, with spirit as such comprehending the permutations [of its experience] thus far within these generic modes of specification, the moments just mentioned. Religion presupposes that these moments have run their entire course, and is their simplex totality, their absolute self.

10 –Further, in relation to religion the course of these experiential moments isn't to be imagined as occurring in time. Only spirit as an integral whole exists in time, with the permutations embodying it in its entirety appearing as such sequentially; for only the whole has actual reality and hence the form of something clearly independent vis-

à-vis what's other than it, a form expressed temporally. The moments of the whole (consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit), as moments [integral to that whole], have no existence apart from one other.

11 –Thirdly, just as spirit came to be distinct from its moments, so is each moment's own separate mode of specification to be distinguished from the moments themselves. As we saw, each moment underwent in its course further internal differentiation and was variously embodied, as for instance in consciousness, where sense-certainty and perception proved to be distinct from each other. These facets of the whole pursue separate paths in time and belong to particular wholes. –By undergoing such specification spirit descends from its universality to individuality. What's undergoing specification or mediation is consciousness, self-consciousness, and so on. Yet it's individuality that embodies these moments. Hence these exhibit spirit in its individuality—its actuality—and undergo differentiation in time, albeit in such a way that each successive moment retains within it the one that preceded it.

12 Thus while spirit is consummated in religion in such a way that its individual moments (consciousness, [M447] self-consciousness, reason, and spirit) return and have returned to what's fundamental to each, together they round out the existential reality of integrally whole spirit, which exists solely as the differentiative and reintegrative dynamic of these aspects of itself. The overall emergence of religion is encompassed in the dynamic of these generic moments. Yet since each of these attributes presents itself not just as defined in this broader context but as each exists in and relative to itself, it pursues its own course as a whole unto itself—whereby not only has religion at large emerged, but the course pursued to completion by each individual aspect also encapsulates a specific characteristic of religion itself. Spirit integrally whole, the spirit of religion, in turn consists in a movement away from spirit existing in its immediacy toward arriving at *knowledge* of what it thus is in itself—that is, in that immediacy—toward achieving complete correspondence between the embodying form in which it appears to its consciousness and its essential nature, seeing itself as it is.

13 –In the course of this emergence, then, spirit itself exists in specific embodiments constitutive of distinct phases of the overall progression; accordingly each specific religion has in turn a mode of spirit oriented to actual reality in a specific way. So while consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit are part and parcel of self-knowing spirit generically, the specific embodiments of self-knowing spirit are specific forms [of spirit] that evolved in consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit severally. Drawing upon these ways of embodying each of spirit's moments, a specific embodiment of religion selects as its reality-oriented spirit whichever of these embodiments befits it. The unitary specificity integral to religion permeates all facets of its actual existence and impresses on them this common stamp.

14 In this way the embodiments that have emerged thus far now order themselves differently than when they appeared serially, regarding which a few essentials should be noted before we proceed. In the sequence we've considered, each of these moments, as it deepened internally, formed itself into a whole commensurate with its own proper principle; and discernment was what was thus deepening—the spirit within which they, having of themselves no power of sustainment, had [M448] their substance. But by then this substance is fully emergent; comprised in it is the very depth of spirit's certainty of itself, a substance that precludes any single principle from isolating itself and turning into a whole unto itself. This same substance, by assembling and integrating all these moments within itself, furthers the accumulated wealth of the reality-oriented spirit that is also integral to it, a spirit whose particular moments receive in common and take unto themselves a specificity like that of the whole. This, the self-certain spirit and dynamic of discernment, is their true reality and is what each of them individually consists of in itself and has present to it.

15 –Up to this point, then, the unitary series gave indication, in the form of nodes, of retrograde phases in its advance, yet from each such retrogression in turn continued on its single course. But now this sequence is, as it were, broken up at these nodes, with these generic experiential moments diverging into several lines of advance which, bound into one, at the same time assemble in symmetric alignment so that these variants, which are each internally embodied in its own distinctive way, all alike coincide.

16 –How to understand the way in which the common paths of experience set forth here are coordinated becomes clear in the course of the whole presentation (it being thus superfluous to note that these variants are essentially to be grasped solely as moments of a developmental process, not as parts [of a static whole]). In reality-oriented spirit these are attributes of spirit's substance, whereas in religion they're but the predications of a subject. Nonetheless implicitly, as is evident to us, all these forms are contained within spirit both at large and in each variant; but whatever actual reality spirit has depends wholly upon which mode of specificity is present to it in its consciousness—in which of them it gives expression to its self, or in which of these modes of embodiment it knows its essential nature.

17 The distinction made between reality-oriented spirit and spirit that knows itself as spirit, between spirit as consciousness and as self-consciousness, is superseded in spirit that knows itself in a manner commensurate with its truth—its conscious and self-conscious existence being therein made identical. But inasmuch as religion at this point exists only in its immediate presence, the difference between the two hasn't yet resolved itself into spirit. All that's been established is religion's way of conceiving, in which the essence that's being conceived of consists in a mode of self-consciousness that takes itself to be all truth [M449] and therein to contain all that's real.

18 –What such self-consciousness, as a form of conscious being, has for its object is itself. Knowing itself initially in a direct way, spirit thus takes itself to be spirit in the form of something directly present, and the specific character of the embodiment in which it appears to itself is that of being. Of course being of this sort is laden not with sensation or sundry forms of matter or any other one-sided moments, purposes, and specifics, but with spirit—and comes to know itself as all that's true and real. Such a consummation isn't commensurate with the way it's embodied: spirit as essence hardly equates with spirit having conscious existence. Spirit is first realized as absolute spirit when the way it exists in its self-certainty is also evident to it in its truth—when the extremes into which it separates as a mode of conscious being are present to each other in spirit's own manner of embodiment. Any configuration that spirit assumes as object of its consciousness in substance remains imbued with spirit's certainty, a content obviating the possibility that the object might sink into sheer objectivity (the form of something totally devoid of self-consciousness).

19 –Spirit's direct oneness with itself is fundamental—is the pure consciousness within which conscious existence takes divergent paths. Enclosed in this way within its own pure self-conscious being, spirit—while by no means existing in religion as the creator of nature at large—does produce in its course the forms in which it is itself embodied, the forms of spirit that together comprise the whole spectrum of its manifestation. And it's this very dynamic that, by way of these individual facets or partial actualizations, brings into being its complete actuality.

20 Such actuality as religion's emergence initially entails is the conceiving of religion itself: religion as a directly evident and hence *natural* religion. In religion of this sort spirit, as its own object, knows itself in some natural or immediate mode of embodiment. The second form of reality that perforce emerges in religion is that of spirit knowing itself as embodied in a sublated natural state—an embodiment of the self. Thus is it a religion of *artistry*, spirit's embodiment raised to the form of the self via the productive activity of consciousness, which hereby beholds its own doing, its very self, in its object. Ultimately a third form of reality supersedes the one-sidedness [M450] of the first two—with the self being directly present just as what's directly present is self. In the first of these, spirit exists basically in the form of consciousness, and in the second in the form of self-consciousness, but in the third it exists in the form of their unity, embodied as it is in and present to itself; and in being thus set forth as it is in and for itself, it is religion made *manifest*.

21 –While spirit does here attain its true embodiment, this very embodiment and representation is itself an as yet unsurmounted aspect of spirit from which it has to cross over into conception in order that the form of objectivity be wholly resolved within it, spirit being inclusive even of its own opposite. And with this, spirit has

grasped its own conceptual nature as heretofore grasped only by us; and its embodying form, the elemental component of its matter-of-fact presence—which consists of conception—is itself spirit.



VII.A. NATURAL RELIGION

22 Spirit that knows spirit is consciousness of its self, and is evident to itself in the form of objectivity: it exists and is moreover a presence-to-self. It is present to itself, having a self-conscious aspect, indeed one that contrasts with the conscious aspect in which it relates to itself in the manner of an object. This tensive contrast is within the purview of its consciousness and is accordingly specific to the mode of embodiment in which it appears to itself and knows itself. This is the sole concern in this examination of religion, since spirit's unshapen essence—its pure conceiving—has already made its presence felt. Yet the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness of this sort at the same time falls within the purview of the latter. The way in which religion is embodied doesn't involve spirit's existing in the manner of a natural entity abiding independently of thought or as thought abiding independently of existence; rather does it consist in existence sustained in thinking as well as thought that is evident to itself as matter-of-factly existing.

23 —One religion distinguishes itself from another in keeping with the specific way in which spirit knows itself to be embodied—although it should also be noted that an exposition of what spirit knows of itself in this single specific way hardly exhausts the entire scope of an [M451] actual religion. The series of diverse religions to be brought to light here merely presents in turn the various facets of one single religion, and this applies to each individual religion. Moreover the modes of representation that seem to place one religion at variance with another are in fact to be found in each of them. Yet this diversity has also to be regarded as a diversity part and parcel of religion. For whenever spirit finds itself beset with an incongruity between its conscious and its self-conscious existence, its dynamic aims precisely at negating this overarching difference and imparting the embodiment that's the object of its consciousness with the form of self-consciousness.

24 —That the moment 'self' is among the modes of embodiment within the purview of consciousness, and that God is represented as a self-conscious being, hardly suffices to sublimate this incongruity. A representational self isn't an *actual* self. In order for the self to be truly integral to a given mode of embodiment, not only does the self (as with every other way of further specifying that embodiment) have to find its place therein through the action of self-consciousness, but the experientially less advanced specifi-

cation has to be shown to be superseded by and comprehended in the more advanced. For anything represented ceases to be merely representational and alien to the self's knowledge only once the self has itself brought it into being and so looks upon the way that the object has been specified as its own doing, as its own presence therein.

25 –Via this activity a less advanced way of specifying [spirit's embodiment] lapses into insignificance, action being a négative process carried out at the expense of something else. Insofar as such a specification still shows up, it has been reduced to something nonessential; when on the other hand it's still predominant despite the more advanced specification being present too, the one has a place, but no self, vis-à-vis the other. Thus while the various representations within any single religion do indeed exhibit the entire dynamic of that religion's forms, the character of each religion is determined by a particular unity of consciousness and self-consciousness—namely by self-consciousness having inwardly grasped the specific character of the consciousness it has as object, and, by its own doing, taken that character wholly unto itself as the one it knows to be, in contrast to all others, essential.

26 –The truth of belief in a specific mode of religious spirit is shown in [consciousness's] actual spirit being constituted in the same way as the embodiment in which it beholds itself in religion (the way the deity becomes incarnate in oriental religion, for example, has no truth, since that religion's actual spirit is without such a reconciliation). –There's no point here in turning from the totality of specific forms and going back to them individually to show in which embodying form and particular religion [452] within this totality the rest are contained. A more advanced form re-subjected to one less advanced is deprived of whatever significance it has for self-conscious spirit, belonging then only superficially to that spirit and way of representing things. The more advanced form exists in its own distinctive ambit of meaning, and is to be examined there where it is the principle of that particular religion and is sustained by that religion's actual spirit.



VII.A.a. THE DIVINE LIGHT

27 Spirit, as a mode of being that is self-conscious—or as a manner of self-conscious being that is all truth and knows all reality as constitutive of itself—consists at first (in contrast to such reality as is provided it in the stirrings of its consciousness) sheerly in its act of conceiving. And this conceiving, in contrast to the day of its unfolding consciousness, is the night of spirit's essential nature, the creative mystery of its birth in contrast with the presence its moments have once independently embodied. Immanent within this mystery is its revelation. For being existentially present is necessitated by spirit's own conceiving, which, because it is spirit knowing itself, has as an integral

moment of its nature its existing consciously and setting itself forth objectively. –This presence is pure I, which, in being thus externalized in the manner of a common object, has self-certainty part and parcel of it—such an object being an interfusing of all thinking and all actual reality.

28 In its initial, immediate diversification self-knowing absolute spirit is embodied in a manner befitting direct consciousness, i.e. sense-certainty. It looks upon itself in the form of being—not the spiritless being characteristic of sense-certainty, replete with random sensuous specifics, but rather [M453] spirit-suffused being. It likewise includes the form of being that emerged in immediate self-consciousness: in the form of the Master confronting the manner of self-conscious spirit that shrinks away from its object. Suffused with the conceptual activity of spirit, such being thus embodies spirit's simple self-relatedness—embodies something that has no embodiment. By virtue of its way of specifying itself, permutation of this sort takes the form of pure divine light: ever-dawning, all-encompassing and all-suffusing, sustaining itself within its own formless substantiality. Its integral otherness is an equally simple negativity: darkness. The stirrings whereby this luminous being emanates, its creations in the unre-sisting element of its otherness, are themselves gushes of light: comprised within their simplicity is its coming-into-being as present to itself and also its return from any such existent presence—streams of fire consuming whatever embodiment it has. While the variety that this being engenders proliferates within the substance of all that thus exists, and is embodied in nature's manifold forms, amidst them the simplicity essential to its thinking undergoes inconsistent and incomprehensible fluctuations, immeasurably expanding their scope and dissolving the magnificently enhanced beauty of nature in this substance's own sublimity.

29 The content that this sheer existing unfolds—or in other words, what it perceives—consists then in a manner of instantiation that has no essence, instantiation in a substance that just keeps dawning without ever setting so as to become a subject and, by becoming a self, consolidate its differentiae. Its modes of specification are mere attributes that, instead of attaining self-sufficiency, remain mere names of the many-named One. The One is clad in the manifold forces of existence and permutations of actuality, decked out in finery that conveys no self. These are but will-less messengers of its might, witnesses to its glory, and voices raised in its praise.

30 But frenzied life such as this is perforce destined for self-oriented existence and the sustainment of its otherwise ephemeral embodiments. The immediate being in which such life stands in contrast with its conscious existence is itself the negative potency that resolves its differentiae. What such life then in truth comprises is a self; and it's thus in the form of self that spirit comes to know itself. The pure light disperses its simplicity into an infinity of forms [M454] and presents itself as an offering to self-oriented being—that the individual may incorporate into his substance a way of sustaining his existence.



VII.A.b. PLANT AND ANIMAL

31 Once self-conscious spirit has emerged from the above amorphous state of being and come into its own, having altogether raised what it was in its immediacy into a self, it proceeds to resolve what it was in its simplicity into manifold forms of self-orientedness—constituting a religion of animated perception within which spirit splits up into a plethora of weaker and stronger, richer and poorer spirits. While at first composed of peacefully abiding spiritual atoms, this pantheism evolves from within into a conflictive dynamic. The innocence characteristic of ‘flower religion,’ a merely selfless representation of self, gives way to the serious business of warring life, to the transgressive character of ‘animal religion,’ as the placidity and effeteness of contemplative individuality passes into destructive self-orientedness.

32 –It’s to no avail that the things with which perception is concerned have been relieved of their deadening abstractness and elevated to entities of spirit-oriented perception. Due to the definitive and negative character of this realm of spirits, it has death as an integral component—overwhelming anything innocently insouciant and turning a scattered assortment of peaceful plant-cultivators into something malignant, a dynamism in which the very animosity born of their self-orientedness wipes them all out. The actual self-consciousness of this scattered spirit consists of a host of isolated, antipathetic folk-spirits that, hating each other, fight to the death and, being nothing but animalistic spirits whose brutish way of life keeps them apart and oblivious of their commonality, come to think of specific forms of that animality as their very essence.

33 But amidst all this animosity, the definitiveness characteristic of such purely negative existence-for-self is obliterated as well, and, as its way of conceiving progresses, spirit takes on another embodying form. Sublated existence-for-self is the form that an object has as produced by a self—or rather is self as product, self as self-effacing—that is, self turning into thing. The laboring self, because its action isn’t merely negative but also [M455] steady-handed and positive, retains the upper hand over these sheerly destructive animal spirits. Thus henceforth spirit’s consciousness is a dynamism functioning above and beyond immediate being-in-itself as well as abstract existence-for-self. What’s self-inhering, having been reduced to something defined by contrast, is no longer a form appropriate to what consists totally of spirit, being instead something actual that spirit’s consciousness encounters as a commonplace presence existing over against it and proceeds to sublate—doing this not so as to exist simply for itself but to produce a representation of spirit, a presence-to-self set forth in the form of an object. Nevertheless, to produce in this way isn’t yet production in the fullest sense, being instead an activity that’s conditioned—that gives form to something already there.



VII.A.c. THE ARTIFICER

34 So then, here spirit appears as artificer, and its action, by which it brings itself forth as object even though it hasn't yet grasped the thinking that underlies what it's doing, is an instinctive kind of labor like that of bees building their honeycomb.

35 In this initial form, owing to its immediacy, such labor is an abstract form of understanding, and so isn't inherently imbued with spirit. Crystal-shaped pyramids and obelisks, simple combinations of straight lines and flat surfaces, symmetrical components bearing no trace of the incommensurability of the curvilinear: these are the works of this craftsman of rigid form. With its intelligibility this stark, what such form portends isn't anything intrinsic to it itself; it isn't a spirit-ensouled self. Works of this sort thus receive spirit into them merely in the form of an extrinsic spirit (one of the departed who've left behind any living involvement with actual reality, haunting these life-bereft crystals as one of the dead), or else they relate to spirit externally, as to something that's itself there externally and not as spirit (relating to it as the light of the orient, which casts its meaning on them).

36 The rift from which the spirit here at work proceeds, [M456] namely that between some being-in-itself that becomes the stuff upon which it works and the presence-to-self comprising self-consciousness's side of the relation, is objectively evident to it in its work. All its subsequent efforts perforce aim at superseding this separation between soul and body, at embodying and adorning the one from within, and ensouling the other. As the two are brought closer together, each side, spirit as set forth in representation and spirit as enveloping shell, retains its specific character vis-à-vis the other—this tension between individuality and universality being integral to spirit's unity with itself. As the work in its various aspects comes closer to what it's meant to be, by the same stroke it approximates more closely to the self-consciousness working on it, thus enabling the latter to come to know itself in this work as it is in and for itself. But all this is at first merely the abstract aspect of spirit's activity, the content of which isn't yet known to be spirit itself but rather spirit as present in the work produced, which is a thing. The master craftsman himself, spirit integrally whole, hasn't yet appeared, but is still a being whose essence is concealed within, one that's present in its entirety only as split up into an active self-consciousness and the object it has wrought.

37 Hence the artificer undertakes to fashion the surrounding habitat, the outer reality that he'd thus far constructed in keeping with the understanding's abstract form, into a more animate form. To this end he employs plant life, which, no longer considered holy as it was in the effete pantheism of earlier times, he—deeming himself as a

being who exists unto himself—instead regards as something at his disposal, something to be reduced to mere externality and ornamentation. But rather than using it unaltered, this craftsman of self-conscious form puts an end to the transitoriness natural to plant life as it immediately exists, while bringing its organic forms nearer to the more exacting and universal form of thought. Organic form, which, left to its own devices, proliferates into all manner of exotica, when subordinated for its part to the form of thought, in turn dignifies flat, straight-line configurations like the above with a more enlivened [and enlivening] curvilinearity—an intermingling that will become the root of free-formed architecture.

38 This habitation, the aspect comprising spirit's overall environment, [M457] the part of nature that's not organically part of spirit, now also includes an embodiment of individuality that brings spirit—which heretofore was cut off (being either closed up inside or left outside) from having any matter-of-fact presence—closer to actual reality, thereby making the work more akin to active self-consciousness. The craftsman starts out by seizing upon the form of existence-for-self as such, namely animality. He proves that he's no longer directly aware of himself in animal life by constituting in his own person a productive force, and by realizing that in existing for himself his work is his own—whereby animal form is at the same time superseded, and hieroglyphs come to signify something else: thought. Thus the craftsman is no longer using the animal form exclusively and entirely, but intermingling it with an embodiment of thought, with something human.

39 –Still, the work lacks an embodiment and presence whereby the self exists as self. As yet it fails to give any indication from within itself of having an inner meaning enclosed within it. What's wanting here is speech, the element wherein the full measure of this meaning is itself present. Thus even when it's wholly purified of animality and bears the form of self-consciousness alone, such a work is still a mute embodiment in need of the rays of the dawning sun to animate it with sound—which, when produced by this light, is mere resonance and not speech, showing only an outer self, not the inner.

40 In contrast to the external self thus embodied, there is another mode of embodiment that makes clear that it does have an inner essence within it. In reverting to what it essentially is, nature here reduces its living, self-individuating—and in its stirrings bewildering—manifold to an insignificant shell that covers over the inner. And this inner is as yet a kind of darkness without subtlety, something unanimated—black unwrought stone.

41 Both ways of portraying incorporate some manner of inwardness as well as an outer presence—these being moments integral to spirit. And both portrayals involve both moments alike in a relation of contraries, with the self functioning at once as inner and as outer. These need to be unified. The soul of a statue formed in human

likeness still doesn't come forth from within, still isn't speech—a presence that's inherently inner. And what lies within this multiform presence is still lacking in tonality, still internally [M458] indistinguishable and separated from the outer aspect containing all its variations. The artisan accordingly unifies both moments by mixing natural and self-conscious embodiments, and these ambiguous entities which are a riddle to themselves—consciousness wrestling with the unconscious, simple inner paired with multiform outer, obscurity of thought juxtaposed with clarity of expression—break out into an oracular language that's as difficult to understand as it is deep.

42 In artistic achievement of this sort the instinctual (as opposed to self-conscious) labors producing works that aren't themselves conscious have run their course. For in such endeavor the master artisan's activity, which is formative of self-consciousness, meets with an equally self-conscious, self-expressive inner. With this he has worked himself up to where his consciousness divides, where spirit encounters spirit. In this unity of self-conscious spirit with itself, insofar as it's aware of being the embodiment and object of its own consciousness, any intermixture of nature's unconscious structures with itself is hereby purged. These monsters in physical form, word, and deed dissolve into an embodying form animated by spirit, whose outer is turning inward and whose inner is turning outward, externalizing itself from within—resolving itself into thought that engenders thought, and that, sustaining its embodiment in a manner commensurate with thought, abides as a lucid living presence. Spirit is artist.



VII.B. ART-RELIGION

43 Spirit has by its own doing raised the embodiment in which it is present to its consciousness into the form of consciousness itself. The master craftsman has abandoned his synthetic labors of intermixing the heterogeneous forms 'thought' and 'natural being'; and as this embodiment came to have the form of a self-conscious activity, he became a craftsman working upon spirit.

44 Were we to ask which actual spirit, in art-religion, is conscious of what it absolutely is by nature, clearly it would be ethos-based or pristine spirit. This spirit isn't just the generic substance of all constituent individuals [M459] but rather, existing as it does for consciousness in the actual world, is a substance embodied in the way that consciousness is—a substance to which individuation is integral, becoming known by individuals as their own essence and accomplishment. Hence for them this substance hardly consists in some monolithic divine light that only negatively and fleetingly accommodates the existence-for-self of a manner of self-consciousness that views that light as lord and master of its very reality. Nor does it consist either in the relentless

devastation wrought by hostile peoples, or in peoples subjected to a system of castes that, while seeming to be organized into a fully integrated whole, lacks the comprehensive freedom befitting individuals. Rather does this spirit consist in a free people whose ethos constitutes the substance of all, the actual reality and presence of which each and every individual knows to be what he wills and does.

45 But in an ethos-based spirit, religion consists in spirit's rising above its actual reality, withdrawing from its pristine truth into pure self-knowledge. Since the life of such a people is directly one with their substance and doesn't have within it the principle of pure individuality that's integral to self-conscious existence, their religion reaches its culmination only in departing from the very thing that sustains it. For the actual reality that ethical substance has is based in part on its staid immutability in face of the unrestricted dynamism of self-conscious existence, hence on self-consciousness having not as yet made the transition from static custom and steadfast trust to reliance upon itself—and in part on ethical self-consciousness's organization into a multiplicity of rights and duties, as well as into duly apportioned classes with distinctive functions acting concertedly toward the formation of an integral whole, hence on the individual's contentment with constraints being placed on his existence and his having not yet grasped the unbridled notion of his being a free self. But tranquil straightforward trust in ethical substance reverts to self-reliance and self-certitude; and the multiplication of rights, duties, and constraints on action proceeds in a dialectical dynamic in the ethical realm just like that met with in the multitudinous realm of things and their specifics—an ethical dynamic that stabilizes and comes to rest only in the simplex existence of spirit certain of itself.

46 –Ethical life's culmination in emancipated self-consciousness, as well as the fate of the ethical world, [M460] thus centers upon individuality that has come into its own: a manner of ethical spirit whose utter licentiousness dissolves from within all the hard-and-fast distinctions that sustain the spirit of the ethos and the apportionments into which it is organically articulated—a manner of spirit so completely self-assured now as to enjoy itself without inhibition, taking the greatest liberties in self-indulgence. The simplex self-certainty of such a spirit is ambiguous—as steadily sustained and steadfastly true as it is utterly fickle and deleterious to ethical life. Certainty of this sort turns into the latter because what ethical spirit amounts to in truth is still just a substantive essence and trust—one in which the self doesn't know itself as a free individual being, and which accordingly meets its downfall in wake of this internalization, this liberation of the self. With ethical trust having thus been broken and the substance of the people undermined, the very spirit that had mediated the above unstable extremes has now emerged as an extreme in its own right: a manner of self-consciousness which comprehends that it is itself what is of the essence. This is a spirit that's internally certain of itself, mourns the loss of its world and, sheerly from within its self, brings its essential nature to preeminence in the actual realm.

47 In an epoch such as this, art emerges in its absolute form. Heretofore art is merely an instinctual exertion immersed in everyday existence, working its way into and out from matter-of-fact being; such exertion doesn't have its substance in the free life of the ethos, and so also doesn't exhibit the free spiritual activity attributable to the self producing the work. Eventually spirit transcends art itself, doing so in order to achieve its preeminent expression—that is, so as not to be a mere substance born of the self but to exist as this particular self in what it presents as object—not just giving birth to itself conceptually but having its very conceiving for its embodiment, so that the conceiving and the artwork thus generated know each other to be one and the same.

48 As ethical substance thus finds itself taken out of its everyday existence back into its sheer self-consciousness, the latter forms the conceptual—that is, the actively engaged—aspect of this substance, whereby spirit brings itself forth as object. This actively engaged substance is sheer form, since in obedience and service to the ethos the individual has worked himself free of unreflective ways of life and rigidly defined roles of every sort, even as the very substance of the ethos has turned into an essence in flux. This form is the night in which substance was betrayed [M461] and made itself into subject—a night of pure self-certainty from which ethical spirit arises anew, embodied in a form emancipated both from nature and from such immediate existence as spirit has.

49 Pure conception's mode of existence, into which spirit has taken flight from its body, is that of a manner of individual whom spirit has chosen as the vessel of its anguish. Spirit is within him as his universality and his power, by which he is himself done violence—as this pathos, in devotion to which his self-consciousness loses freedom. Yet the positive power of universality ends up being overcome by the pure self—the negative power—of the individual. This pure efficacy, aware that it has an energy source it cannot lose, wrestles with this as-yet-unformed essence; in mastering that essence it has turned pathos into a resource and provided itself with a substantive content. And this unity emerges as a completed work: universal spirit individualized and set forth in representation.



VII.B.a. ABSTRACT ARTWORK

50 Primal artwork, being naïvely direct, is abstract and piecemeal. At that level it has need to rouse itself from this immediate and object-like modality toward self-consciousness—just as at another level self-consciousness, in a *cult*, endeavors on its own behalf to supersede the sectarian character that it (counter to its own spirit) initially gives itself, thereby producing a work of art that's animated from within.

51 The first mode of artistic spirit—in which the way that it's embodied and its active consciousness are furthest apart—takes the form of something directly present, basically in the manner of a thing. In this mode spirit's embodiment undergoes differentiation into some individual embodiment of the self as well as into a form of universality exhibiting a realm of being that's inorganically related to that embodiment: the self's environment and habitation. Advanced conceptually into an integral whole, this initial embodiment attains to its pure form as part and parcel of spirit. Such an embodiment then consists neither in the crystalline form met with in the understanding (serving as repository of the dead—that is, being illumined by a soul outside it) nor in an intermixing (as first inspired by plant life) of the forms [M462] 'nature' and 'thought' in which thought's activity is as yet merely imitative. Rather does conception strip away such roots, branches, and leaves as still adhere to those forms, refining them into figures in which the crystal's straight lines and planes are upraised into incommensurable relations, so that as the animateness of organicity is being incorporated into the understanding's abstract form, the incommensurability essential to animateness is preserved for the understanding.

52 But in being drawn forth from its animal integument, the god dwelling within the black stone is suffused with the light of consciousness. The human form sheds the animal features with which it was mixed. Animality is for a god but a casual guise extrinsic to the latter's true embodiment and as such no longer of import, being instead reduced in significance to something other than it—to a bare sign.

53 –Thereby the way in which a given god is embodied is also rid of such necessities as attend the natural conditions of animal existence, indicating that the inner stirrings of organic life have merged with the embodiment's surface form, inhering solely therein. But in essence this manner of deity is a union of such existence as is common throughout nature and a self-conscious spirit whose actual reality appears counter to natural existence. Moreover, embodied at first as a single individual, such a god is matter-of-factly present as a single natural element, just as its self-conscious reality consists in the spirit of a particular people. But in such a unity the former, the natural element, is reflected into spirit—nature transfigured by thought and united with self-conscious life. Thus the way in which the gods are embodied has its natural element present within it in sublated form, as but a dim recollection. –The desolation and chaos of elements run amok, the unethical realm of the Titans, has been vanquished and banished to the outer edge of an actual realm that has achieved self-clarity, to the obscure boundaries of a world that now identifies with, and finds repose in, spirit. These gods of old begotten by the Divine Light and by Darkness (first particularized in Heaven, Earth, Ocean, Sun, the blind typhonic earthly Fire, etc.) are themselves supplanted by embodiments only faintly reminiscent of such Titans—no longer [M463] beings of nature per se but the pellucid ethical spirits of self-conscious peoples.

54 This simplex embodying form has thus quelled within itself the turmoil born of endless individuation—that of the element of nature at large (which functions in accordance with necessity only as all-inclusive essence, but in its individuated presence and stirrings comports itself unpredictably), as well as that of a people (who, being dispersed into specialized apportionments of endeavor and individual atoms of self-consciousness, have an existence comprised of manifold intentions and actions)—and epitomized all this in a serene form of individuality. Opposite this serene individuality, the being of the gods, there accordingly stands an anything-but-serene moment, that of self-consciousness, which as a breeding ground of disquiet was for its part left no recourse save to exist sheerly by active endeavor.

55 –Although such substance as his artwork has was imparted to it wholly by the artist, in a work of this kind he has given no reality to himself as specific individual. Only by abnegating his particularity, disembodying himself, and rising to the abstractness of pure action could he have imparted perfection to his work. –In this first, directly present mode of creation there’s an as-yet-unresolved incongruity between the artwork itself and the artist’s self-conscious activity; hence such a work isn’t in and of itself really ensouled, but is an integral whole only in conjunction with the process of its coming into being. Common to all such artwork—that it is conceived in consciousness and wrought by human hands—is a moment in which conceiving exists as conception standing opposite the artwork. And whenever conceiving, whether that of artist or spectator, is so self-detached as to forget about being agent or spectator, and unreservedly declares that such a work has a soul of its own, in face of this one has to bear in mind that the conceptual nature of spirit can’t do without the moment in which conceiving is conscious of itself. But this self-conscious moment clashes with the work thus wrought in that such conceiving, in face of the above initial disjunction, is what assigns these aspects their abstractly opposing roles—that of doing versus being a thing—which haven’t as yet made their way back to the unity from which they derived.

56 The artist thus discovers that in his work he’s produced an entity that’s not at all like him. Indeed what he receives back from it is a conscious sense that an admiring crowd esteems it as being in the spirit of their nature. But such [M464] enthusiasm, reciprocating the artist’s self-consciousness with mere admiration, is tantamount to an admission that the crowd isn’t inspired in the same way as the artist. While receptive to the indiscriminate favor thus coming his way, he finds nothing in it of the pains he’s taken in cultivating himself to produce such creations, nor of the strenuousness of these endeavors. Others may go so far as to criticize or pay homage to his work, projecting their musings onto it however they see fit. When they, always the wiser, set themselves above it, he knows how far his creative act goes beyond what they could understand or say of it. And should they set themselves at its feet, perceiving in it a divine nature that captivates them, he realizes that he’s its master.

57 Artwork thus demands another element within which to be present—a god requires another way of emerging besides plummeting from the nocturnal depths of his creativity into the complete opposite, something external destined to remain a self-oblivious thing. This higher element is *speech*, a presence consisting in immediate self-conscious existence. No sooner is an individual self-conscious being matter-of-factly present in speech than he constitutes a kind of general contagion. The full-blown particularization of existence-for-self is at once a flux composed of many selves and the universally imparted unity of those selves—is soul existing as soul. Hence a god who has speech as his embodying element is in himself an inspired work of art, one that, as thus present, has right within it the pure activity that stood in contrast with it when it existed sheerly as a thing. In other words, in this objectification of its essential being, self-consciousness remains directly in its own presence.

58 –Abiding thus with itself in this its own being, such self-consciousness is a form of pure thinking, a thoughtful reverence the inwardness of which has, in the hymn, an outward presence as well. While the hymn preserves within it the individuality integral to self-conscious existence, this individuality is understood to be there as something common to all. The reverence kindled within all participants forms a psychic current that is aware of its existing, amidst the complexity of self-consciousness, as the action of all alike, and as a simplex mode of being. Spirit, as this communal self-consciousness of all who are present, embraces in a single unity its own pure inwardness as well as these individuals' way of being present to others and to themselves.

59 Such speech differs from another form of it spoken by [M465] the gods but not by self-conscious beings generally. An oracle, whether that of a god of art-religion or any of the preceding religions, is perforce a primitive form of divine utterance, it being implicit in the concept of such a god that it be an entity of nature as well as of spirit, hence having not only a natural but also a spiritual presence. Inasmuch as this moment is present only conceptually, and in religion isn't yet realized, such utterance strikes religious self-consciousness as being that of an alien self-consciousness. A self-conscious being who's still a stranger to his community isn't yet present in the way that the concept of such a being demands. The self consists in simplex self-relatedness, hence self-relatedness that's patently universal; yet the above manner of self-consciousness, detached from the self-consciousness of the community, is at this point one that's sheerly, singularly individual. –The content of this peculiar, singular mode of speech issues from the communal certainty in which this absolute spirit is being broadly established in its religion. Thus while the universal spirit here ascendant, having not as yet particularized its presence, makes statements simple yet general concerning the divine nature—the substantive content of which is in its simple truth sublime—to a self-consciousness more advanced in cultivation that content, by virtue of its vague generality, at the same time appears trivial.

60 The more cultivated self, attaining to an existence that's present to itself, is master over the sheer pathos of substance, over the stark objectivity of the dawning divine light, and knows the monolithic character of such truth as something inherently existent that, rather than having the form of a fortuitous presence conveyed in strange language, is *the sure and unwritten law of the gods, which lives forever, and about which no one knows whence it came*.¹ –While the universal truth that the divine light had disclosed has here receded into the inner or nether realm and is thus remote from the form of contingent appearance, in art-religion by contrast, since the way that a given deity is embodied has assumed the overall form of consciousness and hence individuality, the speech appropriate to a deity who is the spirit of a people's ethos is that of an oracle that is attuned to, and makes known what's beneficial to, the concerns of that people.

61 –Yet since these universal truths come to be known as 'inherently existent' [M466] verities, the thinking that discerns them claims them for itself, no longer deeming the manner of their articulation as alien but as its own. Just as the sage of antiquity searched within his own thinking for the good and the beautiful, leaving it to his *daimon* to attend to plainly contingent matters (such as whether it would be good for him to associate with so and so, or propitious for a friend to go on a given journey, and other such insignificant things),² so does consciousness at large come by knowledge of contingent matters from birds, trees, or volatile substances whose vapors deprive self-consciousness of its self-possession. For such happenstance occurs mindlessly and is extraneous to ethical concerns, and ethical consciousness accordingly lets such things be settled in a similarly mindless and extraneous way—say, by a throw of the dice.

62 –When an individual by his own lights ascertains and upon deliberation makes his choice as to what would be beneficial to him, this act of self-determination is based upon the specific nature of his own particular character. But the latter is itself contingent, and his knowledge of what he understands to be advantageous to him individually is thus rather like the knowledge one gains from oracles or in drawing lots—except that asking an oracle or drawing lots is expressive of an ethical indifference to contingent matters, whereas a self-determining individual treats such matters as inherently of interest, things essential for him to know and think about. But of course superior to either is to make deliberation itself the oracle of contingent action—while realizing that an act pondered, owing to its having an aspect linked to the particular and its being to some advantage, is itself contingent.

1. Hegel is here paraphrasing the lines from Sophocles' *Antigone* which he quoted in chapter V, paragraph 328.

2. Socrates.

63 The genuinely self-conscious presence that spirit attains in speech—as opposed to the utterances of a self-consciousness that’s exotic, adventitious, and by no means common to all—is that of the manner of artwork we previously beheld. The presence attained in speech contrasts with the thinglikeness of statuary. The latter has a static presence, whereas the presence attained in speech is ephemeral. What’s objectively present in statuary is of itself devoid of a self that’s directly its own, whereas in the presence attained in speech, what’s objectively there stays too bottled up inside the self, doesn’t get sufficiently embodied, and—like time—is no sooner present than not.

64 Comprised in the dynamic of both aspects—in which an embodiment of divinity is *astir* [M467] in the element of self-consciousness’s pure sensibility while at rest in the element of thinghood, and in which both sensibility and thinghood depart from their separate roles, bringing into existence a unity instantiative of the conceptual nature of both—is the *cult*. In a cult the self is afforded an awareness of the divine being’s having come down to it from on high, even as *yon* divinity, which until then exists only in the manner of an object and isn’t really actual, thereby attains the actuality appropriate to a self-conscious being.

65 The conceptual nature of the cult is in principle already present and incorporated within the melodious flow of its hymnic song. In this reverential act the self is by its own doing provided pure satisfaction right within itself. This self is a soul purified, in this purity existing literally in the only way that a divine essence does, and is at one with it. Due to this abstractedness such a soul isn’t an awareness that distinguishes its object from itself, and so is but the night of consciousness’s presence and a “place” readied for divinity’s incarnation. The abstract cult thus elevates the self so as to constitute a pure divine element such as this. Although the soul completes the purification consciously, this isn’t a self that has plumbed its depths, knowing itself to be evil, but one that just *is* what it is: a soul that purifies its exterior by washing, dresses in white, and inwardly completes a prescribed path of labors, punishments, and rewards—a regimen basically conducive to the disciplined relinquishing of particularity, readying the soul to dwell among and be received into the community of the blessed.

66 A cult such as this is at first only occult, its efficacy merely imagined not real, although it has to have some real effect since ‘action that doesn’t do anything’ is oxymoronic. A consciousness that’s true to its cult by that very fact attains to a pure form of self-consciousness, one in which divinity gives the impression of being an independent object. But via the efficacy of the cult this object turns back into the self; and to whatever extent the object gives indication in pure consciousness of being an entity abiding sheerly beyond actual reality, it descends via the cult’s mediation from the universal to the individual, thus establishing solidarity with the realm of the actual. [M468]

67 As the two interact, divinity wills that it be manifest to the self-conscious aspect (inasmuch as the latter consists in a manner of conscious being that exists in actual

reality) as some form of actually occurring natural being. While self-consciousness regards nature as belonging to it in the manner of property and possession, not as anything it regards as existing inherently in *itself*, on the other hand nature is inclusive of self-consciousness's own immediate actual being as well as such particulars as it deems insubstantial and ignores. –But for the cult's pure consciousness the natural realm outside the cult at the same time gives the opposite impression, that of indeed being an entity unto itself, one before which the self offers up what's insubstantial in it, just as conversely self-consciousness sacrifices—to itself—the insubstantial aspect of nature. By so involving both aspects the action of the cult is a spiritual dynamic—sublating the abstractness of 'divinity' (as characterized in reverential consciousness), turning it into an actual reality, and superseding what's actually taking place here (how specifically the active participant construes the object and itself), raising this into something common to all participants.

68 What the cult *per se* actually does accordingly begins with each member simply giving something away, without ostensible benefit to the one who possessed it, letting it spill out uselessly or go up in smoke. By doing this in the presence of the divine being envisioned in his pure consciousness, he forgoes all possession and right to ownership and enjoyment of it, renounces the personal nature of, as well as anything that might accrue to him from, action on his part, and reflects this action into the universal—divinity—rather than into himself.

69 –But therein, conversely, the entity that's existentially instantiated in this way meets its end as well. The sacrificial animal symbolizes a deity, and the fruits consumed are the living Ceres and Bacchus themselves. As the animal is sacrificed, the powers of the higher law (coursing with blood and actual life) perish, and as the fruit is consumed (which is bloodless yet has a secret and cunning power) those of the lower law perish.

70 –The sacrifice of this godlike substance, inasmuch as it consists in an act performed, belongs to the self-conscious side of the relation. For an action of this sort to be possible in reality, the deity must have in principle already offered itself up as sacrifice. And this it has done by becoming matter-of-factly present, turning itself into a particular animal and the fruit of the earth. This relinquishment already implicitly completed by that deity is demonstrated in matter-of-fact existence by the self performing the act, making this present to its consciousness and replacing the [M469] immediate reality of this deity with one of a higher sort, namely the deity's very self. For the unity resulting from the sublation of both sides in their singularity and separateness is a fate by no means merely negative, having as it does positive significance.

71 –An offering is given up altogether only when made to an abstract, netherworldly being, and hence only when the reflective act of returning possessions and existence-for-self into the realm of the universal is tantamount to their separation from the self

as such. But even then only a small portion of one's possessions is sacrificed, whereas in the other form of sacrifice only what's unusable is destroyed, most of the offering having instead been made into a meal—a feast wherein the sacrificial act is cheated out of its negative import. In the former offering the donor keeps most of what he has, while in the latter he retains the usable portion for his own enjoyment. Such indulgence is the negative power that sublates divinity and individuality both alike, even as it is the positive reality in which divinity's objective presence is transformed into a self-conscious presence, and the self is made aware of its oneness with the divine.

72 While a cult of this sort does, after all, accomplish something, the significance of what it does still lies mainly in reverencing—which doesn't involve anything being brought forth in an objective manner, just as the above manner of self-indulgence ends up robbing the cult of its objective presence. To compensate for this defect the cult accordingly takes the further step of first providing its devotion with an objectively sustained presence, in that it engages each participant in a practical effort (communal or individual) to produce a dwelling and decor such as would do honor to a god. In this way the sheer objectivity of statuary is superseded, in that by so dedicating his contributions and efforts the artisan favorably disposes a god to whom he regards his very self devoted; moreover such action doesn't just consist in the artist's solitary effort, the particular having here melded into an effort common to all.

73 –But that a god is being honored isn't all that's transpiring here; and the blessings of the god's favor don't flow upon the artisan only figuratively. Rather does this manner of artistic effort have a significance counter to the first, which consisted in abnegation and in honor done to something quite alien. The dwellings and halls of his god are for the use of man, and the treasures kept within them [M470] are his own should he ever need them. The glory that a god enjoys amidst such splendor is one that redounds upon this magnanimous and artistically endowed people. At his festivals the people adorn their homes as well as their attire, even as they embellish their ceremonial functions with elegant paraphernalia. In this way they receive from a grateful deity some return for their gifts as well as proof of his favor, having bound themselves to him by their labors—not in terms of hope and some eventual realization, but rather, as they bring their gifts and stand witness to his glory, by taking immediate delight in their own wealth and finery.



VII.B.b. LIVING ARTWORK

74 A people that approaches its god in a cultic art-religion is an ethos-based people that knows the nation and *its* workings to be its own will and achievement. Hence the spirit tensively engaging a self-conscious people isn't some divine light that, bereft of

self, doesn't accommodate the self-certainty of individuals, being instead only their generic essence and a despotic power within which they're lost from view. The cult formed by a religion of that sort, with a divinity so simple and amorphous, by and large gives back to its adherents only a sense of their being the people of their god, basically providing them mere subsistence and a uniform substantiality, not their actual everyday self, which is sooner held in contempt. For indeed they venerate their god as an abyssal profundity, not as spirit.

75 –Cultic art-religion, on the other hand, hasn't the abstract simplicity and hence the "depth" that such an entity has. A divinity that's directly one with the self is inherently spiritual and constitutes a "knowing truth" if not yet one fully known, that is, a truth in process of fathoming its own depth. Since here divinity is thus inclusive of the self, such consciousness welcomes this epiphany, and in the cult secures not only public sanction for its subsistence but also a conscious presence within that divinity itself. Conversely divinity, rather than having a reality devoid of self among a contemptible people whose substance is barely acknowledged, [M471] does have a self in a people whose own self is recognized for what it in substance is.

76 Thus from the cult there emerges a manner of self-consciousness that takes satisfaction in its essential nature, into which a god has entered as into his dwelling place. This locus is that of a nocturnal substance existing unto itself, abiding in its own pure individuality—yet no longer the tensive individuality of the artist unreconciled with the essential nature he's objectifying. Rather is this a night that gives a sense of satisfaction, having its pathos within it and, in want of nothing, has made its way back from a vision of objectivity as superseded. Such pathos sees within itself something of the ascendant divine nature, yet has now descended into itself, having its self-consciousness in what it has thus fathomed, and its actual presence and reality within itself.

77 –Here this divine nature has run the full course of its actualization. Reduced from a pure essence to an objectively existent natural force and its outward manifestations, such a being matter-of-factly exists in relation to something else, namely for the self that consumes it. The inarticulate essence of nature that's bereft of self reaches the point at which the fruits it brings forth, once readied for consumption, are offered to such life as is possessed of self. In its usefulness as food and drink the fruit of nature attains its highest perfection; for thus is it capable of a higher mode of existence, and brushes upon a spiritual presence. In the course of its metamorphosis this earth-spirit has grown into a quietly efficacious substance, the feminine principle of nurturing, and on the other hand into a kind of spirited ferment, the masculine principle, the self-driving force of self-conscious being.

78 In such enjoyment the ascendant divine light is thus shown for what it is: its mystery is this enjoyment itself. For the mystical consists neither in the concealing of a secret nor in ignorance, but rather in the self's knowing itself to be one with divinity,

which is thus manifest. All that's being revealed to the self is itself: in other words, what's manifest is just the self in its direct self-certainty. But with this, the cult has established a simplex mode of being: as a useful thing it isn't just something matter-of-factly present that's seen, felt, smelled, and tasted, but is also an object of desire; and by being actually enjoyed [M472] it becomes one with, and thereby completely and openly disclosed to, the self. What's said to be manifest to reason, to the heart, is in fact still secret, since it lacks the actual certainty of a direct presence—one that's both objectively present and enjoyed—a certainty that in such religion doesn't just consist in the self's direct nonreflective presence, but also in sheerly knowing the self.

79 What's been manifested to self-conscious spirit from within via the cult is thus a simplex essential nature, on the one hand progressing from nocturnal concealment into conscious being (serving as the substance silently nourishing consciousness), and on the other hand ending up lost again in the night of the nether realm, in the self (tarrying in the world above only in silent maternal yearning). But what supplies the raw driving force is the many-named ascendant divine light and the ecstatic vitality with which it, having likewise abjured abstract being, concerns itself first with the objective reality of the fruits of the earth, and then, surrendering itself to this manner of self-consciousness, attains the kind of reality appropriate to it—that of a roaming band of reveling females, nature's own unrestrained frenzy in self-conscious guise.

80 Yet all that's hereby disclosed to consciousness is the radical spirit of this simplex essence—mere immediate spirit, nature's spirit—not spirit as it is internally. What it accordingly lives out self-consciously is merely the mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus rather than that of the other, as it were higher gods, whose individuality involves self-consciousness as such as an essential moment. Thus spirit hasn't yet offered itself up as self-conscious spirit to self-conscious spirit itself: the mystery of bread and wine isn't yet the mystery of flesh and blood.

81 The frenzy unleashed by such a god has to be moderated in some manner of objectification; and artistic inspiration that hadn't made its way into consciousness has to produce a work that's every bit as fully formed as the statuary standing opposite the genius of the artist we saw previously—yet also one that isn't of itself lifeless but rather a living self. An artistic cult such as this forms a sort of festival that humankind [M473] celebrates in its own honor, without as yet ascribing to such a work the status of an entity that is absolute, since this entity is merely revealed to humankind without as yet actually being spirit—without assuming a form that's essentially human. This cult does nonetheless lay the groundwork for such a revelation, and proceeds to unfold the moments of it singly. Thus here one moment, the deity's living corporeality, is abstract, whereas previously the two moments had been conjoined in unthinking ecstasy.

82 –Accordingly, just as statuary had been fashioned to stand freely and wholly on its own, humankind puts itself in place of it as an embodiment trained and physically

developed so as to *move* with complete freedom. While each individual member of the cult knows at least how to play the part of a torch bearer, one rises from their midst who embodies the dynamism, the polished refinement and flowing energy of them all: an animated, living work of art who combines strength with beauty, and who for his vitality is awarded the garland once used to adorn statuary, being honored in the eyes of his people not as a stone god but as the highest corporeal manifestation of their very nature.

83 In both of these manifestations self-consciousness and a spirit-ensouled deity are unified, albeit without being in balance. In Bacchic enthusiasm the self is utterly beside itself, whereas in corporeal beauty spiritual being is all on the outside. The muzzy-headedness and erratic verbal stumbles of the former need to be integrated with the clear-headed presence of the latter, and the uninspired clarity of the latter within the inwardness of the former. The element in which the inwardness of the former is as perfectly externalized as the externality of the latter is internalized is once again speech—but not that of an oracle (entirely random and ad hoc in its content), nor the emotion-laden hymn in praise of but a particular god, nor the incontinent ravings of the Bacchae.

84 –Instead speech has here attained a content that's both clear and universal: *clear* in that the artist has worked his way out of his initial, wholly substance-bound enthusiasm into a mode of embodiment that in its every stirring is permeated by a self-conscious soul and is a presence attuned to its era—and *universal* in that, in this festival that honors [M474] humankind, the partiality of statuary accommodating only one national spirit, one specific characteristic of divinity, vanishes. While a resplendent warrior does honor to his particular people, his is a physically embodied individuality in which the comprehensiveness and seriousness of purpose, as well as the inner character of the spirit supportive of that people's particular way of life (their distinctive concerns, needs, and customs) are lost sight of. Externalized to the point of complete corporeality, this spirit has put aside the particular accents and resonances of nature that, as the actual spirit of a people, it had previously embraced. Hence the people constitutive of this spirit no longer have in it a sense of specialness, but on the contrary set all that aside in favor of what their existence as humans has in common.



VII.B.C. SPIRITUAL ARTWORK

85 Much as the varied spirits of peoples who come to think of a particular kind of animal as figuratively embodying their nature coalesce in one spirit, so do the noble spirits of separate peoples coalesce in a single pantheon whose element and dwelling is speech. A people's spirit that clearly sees itself as part of humanity at large in actual

reality has the form of a spirit that, along with other such spirits with whom it by nature comprises one nation, joins with them in a common undertaking toward forming an integrated people and a correspondingly integrated heaven. The universality that spirit thus matter-of-factly attains is nonetheless merely incipient, emerging as it does from an individual entity—an ethos—without having as yet surmounted the latter's immediacy, without having forged the populace into a unitary state. The ethos-based character of an actual national spirit rests partly on the unequivocal trust of individuals in the integral wholeness of their people, and partly on all, regardless of differences in status, assuming a direct role in the decisions and dealings of governance. In such a union, consisting at first not in a permanently imposed order but only in a joint undertaking, the freedom of each and all to participate is for the time being of secondary [M475] importance. This initial communality thus consists more in a convening of individual entities than in the dominance of some abstract idea that would deprive them of their self-conscious role in what the whole wills and does.

86 This assembly of national spirits forms a circle of exemplary figures whose present concern is nature at large as well as the entire ethical world, and who stand subordinate to one of their number more as their supreme commander than as sovereign. They see that they in common are the substantive components of what the self-conscious entity thus formed inherently is and does. While this assembled entity comprises the impetus and, at least initially, the focus of the exertions of these entities in common (even if at first seeming to combine their efforts only haphazardly), it's by virtue of divinity having [in them] reattained a self-conscious presence that the stage is already set for self-consciousness to be the focal point of these divine powers—initially obscuring the essential oneness of divine and human in the guise of an outwardly amicable relation of two worlds.

87 The universality befitting a content such as this of necessity also has the form of the consciousness in which that content emerges. Here consciousness is no longer engaging in cultic activity but rather in action that, having not yet advanced into anything conceptual, is instead merely representational, synthetically interlinking self-conscious and external existence. The representation's existent presence—speech—is speech in its initial form: the epic as such, having a universal import in that it articulates, if not the comprehensiveness of something thought through, at least the entirety of a world. The bard is, as this world's subject, the sole and actual source from which it is engendered and sustained. It isn't the benumbing power of nature that induces his pathos but rather *mnēmosýnē*: remembering with an ever-deepening inwardness, recollecting a realm of being that was once directly at hand. He's an organ that vanishes in the content it conveys; it isn't he himself that matters but his muse, his song of all in common. But what's actually in play here is a syllogism in which the universal extreme, the world of the gods, is linked to individuality, the world of the bard, via the intermediate realm of particularity. The intermediary is the people as exemplified in its heroes,

who like the bard are individual human beings, yet are only ideally represented and thus also [M476] universal, as is the autonomous extreme of universality: the gods.

88 In the *epic*, then, what's implicitly established in the cult, namely the interrelation of divine and human, is made actually explicit for consciousness. The content at issue is some deed on the part of a self-conscious being. Taking action disturbs the tranquility of ethical substance and enrages some divine being, whereby the simplicity of the latter is disrupted, opening up a complicated world of natural and ethical forces. Such a deed tramples across the resting ground—graves haunted by blood ties—calling forth departed spirits who, athirst for life, attain it in the activity of self-consciousness. The endeavor epitomizing the overall effort has two sides: the one, a self-interested aspect brought to fruition via an aggregate of actual nations and the individuals at the head of each, and the other, a universal aspect to be realized via the substantive powers that these nations and individuals have [in the gods and heroes]. But the interrelation of the two was preordained in the way in which universal and individual are synthetically combined, namely as set forth representationally. Any assessment of this world hinges on what it thus is as designed.

89 –The relation of these aspects is accordingly something of a muddle, having the unity of action illogically split up and the activity of the one side pointlessly shifted over to the other. The universal powers are embodied as individuals, thus having the principle of practical action integral to them, so that what they bring about appears to emanate as fully and freely from them as does anything undertaken by humans. Hence one and the same thing has been done by gods and men alike. How serious a role the powers of the gods play is laughably irrelevant, since they're in fact comprised in the strength of the individual engaged in action—while the toils and labors of humankind are exercises in futility, since it's the gods who control everything.

90 –Thus ephemeral mortals, who are as nothing, are nonetheless possessed of a self with such mettle as to captivate these universal beings, offending the gods and above all providing them with actual reality and an interest in what's done. Conversely, comprised in these otherwise ineffectually universal beings who feed on the talents of humans through whom alone they find something to do is the natural virtue and wherewithal for everything that takes place, [M477] as well as the substantive matter of ethics and the pathos inherent in action. Even when, individualized as free selves, they're first brought over into the realm of actual interactive reality, the elemental natures of the gods nonetheless constitute a manner of universal that stands aloof from such entanglements, remains unconstrained within its specified role, and, by the insuperable elasticity of its oneness, effaces the discrete identity and distinctive characteristics of the human agent, sustaining only itself while dissolving all that's individual in the flux of its divine nature.

91 Much as the gods lapse into this contradictory relation with the self-interested nature antithetic to them, their universality comes into conflict with their own specific character and the way in which it's related to others. Although they're eternal resplendent individuals at repose in their own ambience, affected neither by mortality nor by outside forces, they're also specific elemental beings: particular gods, who consequently exist in relation to others. Yet the gods' relationship to each other—tensive and hence conflictive—involves a comical forgetfulness of their eternal nature. Although what's specific to each is rooted in a divine mode of subsistence and within its own bounds sustains the independence of full-blown individuality, via this very specificity their characters also lose their sharp distinctiveness and become ambiguously interchangeable.

92 –One aim of the action of the gods, as when directed against some other god and hence against an invincible divine force, amounts to a sort of hit-or-miss, hollow, and hence diffusive blustering that turns the apparent earnestness of action into a risk-free, self-secure game played without consequence or success. –If, however, something negative of their divinity within the very nature of that divinity (their own specific determinacy) shows that their activity is merely inconsequential and has an outcome incongruous with purpose—and yet that their divinity in its autonomous secureness holds sway over things determinate—then the sheer force of this negativity flies in the face of their divinity, indeed amounting to a supreme power about which they can do nothing.

93 –Even though the powers of the gods are universal and positive as against the individual self of mortals, which scarcely holds out against their might, hovering over them all, over this whole representational world to which the entire substantive content of the ethos belongs, is the self thus common to them all, the [M478] nonconceptual abyss of necessity—sheer happening—to which they relate impersonally and ruefully since determinate natures scarcely identify with this manner of purity.

94 Such necessity nonetheless provides a conceptual unity of sorts—to which the contradictory substantiveness of this representation's individual moments is subordinated, bringing the inconsequential and arbitrary character of the action of the gods into some semblance of order and affording their frolicsome pursuits a seriousness and worth in their own right. The ethical content of this representational world plays its action out for itself in desultory fashion in the middle ground [between gods and humankind], converging upon the individuality of some hero who, for all his strength and splendor, feels his life shattered and gloomily expects an early death. For such individuality as sustains its actual reality from within has here been marginalized to the extreme and split up into moments that haven't yet been discerned and integrated. The individual who [as god or hero] is abstract and unreal embodies a necessity that has

no place among the common run any more than does the bard, who is a real-life individual yet stands aloof from life and exhausts his identity in his portrayal of it. Both of these extremes have to come closer to the [common human] content—the one (the necessity) having to be fleshed out with it, the other (the words of the bard) having to reflect participation in it—while the content itself, heretofore taken for granted, has to incorporate within it the sure certainty and fixed destiny of the negative.



95 This higher idiom, *tragedy*, brings the scattered moments of the world of essential being and the world of action closer together; divine substance diverges, as likewise does its dynamic, into various embodiments commensurate with the nature of what's here being conceived. With regard to form, by entering right into the content itself, speech ceases to be narrational, even as the content ceases to be representational. The hero is himself the one who's speaking, and the performance presents the audience (which is also spectator) with self-conscious human beings who not only know their rights and their aims, along with the power and will that affirms them, but also how to articulate these. The actors are artists who aren't merely, in the unconsciously natural and ingenuous vernacular accompanying everyday actions in real life, giving expression to the outer face of their characters' resolves [M479] and undertakings, but are externalizing an inner essence, demonstrating the rightness of their characters' actions, and calmly asserting with precise articulation a pathos within—as befits an individuality that's universal, free of the accidents of personal circumstance and idiosyncrasy. Finally, the existence of such characters comes alive in actual human beings who impersonate heroes and depict them using their own actual words rather than narrative. Just as the work of the human hand is essential to statuary, so is the actor essential to his mask, and not as some extraneous component from which one needs to abstract when regarding art—meaning that, to whatever extent there nonetheless is need to abstract from it, art hasn't yet captured the true, the genuine self.

96 The common ground upon which the movement of these conceptually generated figures proceeds consists in the mind-set of this primitive representational idiom and the resignedly self-disinterested content that unfolds within it. What the chorus of elders articulates is such wisdom as the common people at large have: in the powerlessness of the chorus the common people have their representative, because of themselves the common folk are but positive and passive materiel at the disposal of the imposing individual entity—the government—confronting them. For lack of negative potency, the common people, unable to subdue and keep rein on the rich and variegated abundance of divine life, deal with it piecemeal, extolling in their reverential hymns each individual moment thereof (now this one now that one) as an independent deity. Even where the common folk do sense how serious an impact conceptual-

izing has as it demolishes these representational figures in its course, and even where they do come to see how poorly their cherished gods fare when venturing onto ground where conceptualization holds sway, instead of actively intervening as a negative force in their own right they cling to a self-impoverishing notion of such power, ever mindful of “alien fate”—their only contribution being an idle wish for comfort and some feebly palliative words.

97 –In the *fear* they experience—in view of the higher powers serving as the directly intervening arms of the ethical substance, in face of their own struggles with one another, and in light of that ubiquitous “simple self,” necessity, [M480] which crushes the higher powers right along with the living mortals bound to them—and in their *compassion* for these mortals whom they know full well to be like themselves, all that’s left for them is the sheer terror of this dynamic. It is as benumbing as their feelings of commiseration are ineffectual, and ultimately affords such comfortless respite as is had in submission to necessity, whose effect is grasped neither as the unavoidable act of a given character nor as the kind of action intrinsic to a being who is absolute.

98 To the onlooking consciousness spirit makes its appearance not as though on a stage indifferent to what’s being performed and not in the checkered guise of its own multifacetedness, but in the simple process of splitting in two conceptually. Spirit’s substance shows itself to be torn apart thus into two potencies at extremes. These elementary universal entities are at the same time individual self-conscious beings: heroes who stake their conscious existence on one or the other of these powers, having their character defined in it, while in turn comprising that power’s efficacious and actual reality. This overall process of individuation continues, as we recall, right down to the immediate reality of real-life existence, and is presented to a crowd of onlookers who, in the chorus, have their dramatic counterpart, or rather a distinctive, self-expressive portrayal of themselves.

99 The content and dynamic of the spirit that’s here an object to itself, namely ethical substance’s nature and realization, has already been considered. In its religion this spirit comes to a conscious realization about itself, or rather manifests itself to its consciousness in a purer form and simpler mode of embodiment. Thus whereas ethical substance, in keeping with its own conception of its content, is divided into two powers characterized in terms of divine and human right (the law of the netherworld and that of the world above, the former the family and the latter the power of the nation, the one feminine in character, the other masculine), so now the previously diversiform circle of gods with their fluctuating roles narrows down to these two powers which, thus delineated, are made to approximate to genuine individuality. For the preceding dispersal of the [ethical] whole, namely into a plethora of abstract forces that appear to be its substance, is dissolutive of the [individual] subject, who simply comprehends them as the substantive moments of his self—thus [M481] reducing individuality to a

superficial form of those same deities. Conversely, any further differentiation of characteristics beyond those already named is to be reckoned as contingent and inherently extraneous aspects of personality.

100 But this manner of being is also divided in keeping with its form, the manner of knowing that's integral to it. When spirit engages in action, it does so as a conscious being vis-à-vis some recalcitrant object upon which it acts and which is accordingly characterized as the negative counterpart of the knowing agent. The agent thus finds himself in a tensive relation of knowing versus not-knowing. From his own character he derives his purpose, knowing this to be ethically of the essence; yet due to the specificity of his character he knows only that this one power is integral to ethical substance—the other being hidden from him. What's real here is one thing for consciousness and something else in itself. In this context both the law of the world above and that of the nether realm betoken a power that knows and reveals itself to consciousness, and one that conceals itself and lies in ambush.

101 –The former is the purveyor of light, the god of the oracle who, by virtue of his natural component having sprung from the all-illuminating sun, knows all and reveals all, namely Phoebus and his father Zeus. But the commands of this truth-speaking god, and his revelations concerning what's what, are on the contrary quite deceptive. For this manner of knowing is, by the very way in which it's conceived, no less a not-knowing, since consciousness engaging in action embodies this tension inherently. Both he who was able to unlock the riddle of the Sphinx³ and he who gave his trust in childlike manner⁴ are sent to their ruin by what a god reveals to them. The priestess through whom the illustrious god speaks⁵ is in no way different from the equivocating sisters of fate⁶ who by their promises lure the heedful into crimes,⁷ and who, by the equivocal character of what they've declared to be certain, deceive the one who relied on the overt meaning.

102 –And so a consciousness purer than this one who believes witches, and more circumspect and self-possessed than the one who trusts the priestess and the resplendent god, tarries over his revenge even when the murderous crime perpetrated against his father has been revealed by his father's own spirit, and, since this ghostly apparition [M482] could conceivably be the devil, contrives additional ways of securing proof.⁸

3. Oedipus.

4. Orestes.

5. Delphic Oracle.

6. The witches in *Macbeth*.

7. *Macbeth*.

8. *Hamlet*.

103 Hence this mistrust is well founded, since the consciousness that knows is beset by a conflict between its self-certainty and the essence objectively at hand. Ethical righteousness, which holds that in itself any actual state of affairs is as nothing vis-à-vis law that holds absolutely, learns that its knowledge is one sided, its law merely the law of its own character, and that it had grasped only one of substance's powers. To take action is itself to convert the "known" into its opposite, into matter-of-fact being, is to turn a claim based on character and cognizance into a counterclaim to which the former claim is connected by virtue of what it substantially is: Furies roused to hostility by the other character and power. This, the right apportioned to the nether realm, sits on the same throne as Zeus, enjoying respect equal to that accorded both the right that's openly manifest and the god who knows.

104 The world of the gods as sung by the chorus is limited by active individuality to three modes of being: one is the *substance of the ethos*, which consists as much in the *power of the hearth* and the spirit of familial piety as it does in the *public power of nation and government*. Since the distinction between family and nation is integrally one with this substance as such, rather than being portrayed as individualized in two distinct embodying forms, it's instead represented as having in reality two personae each with a distinct character.

105 –However, the dichotomy between knowing and not-knowing is common to both of these actual modes of self-consciousness, and only in the abstract, in the element of universality, is it split into two individual embodiments. For while the self, the hero, is matter-of-factly present only as an integrally whole conscious being and so essentially embodies the whole of the dichotomy pertinent to the form [of his knowledge], his substance is nonetheless specific in character, with his self incorporating only one side of this dichotomized experiential content.

106 –Thus in representational portrayals both aspects of conscious existence, which really have no separate individuality of their own, are embodied in their own special way: the one that of the god becoming manifest, the other that of the Furies, who keep themselves hidden. While both enjoy equal honor, the one embodying the divine substance—Zeus—is the necessity interconnecting them. This substance consists in a relation in which what's known is self-evident yet its truth simplistic [M483]—in a dichotomy that has reality-oriented consciousness based upon a still inner essence that undermines it, the clear assurance of such certainty being "corroborated" in oblivion.

107 Consciousness disclosed this conflict by taking action. Acting in keeping with the knowledge revealed, it experiences the treacherousness of such knowledge; and committing itself in keeping with the dichotomized content to one attribute of ethical substance, it violated the other and thereby vindicated the other's rightful claim against it. In following the god that knows, consciousness grapples instead with something

not revealed, and so pays the price for having placed its trust in a knowledge whose equivocality—which is its very nature—is evident to it now, as also is the warning that had to have been there all along.

108 –The ranting of the priestess, the inhuman visage of the witches, the voices of trees and birds, dreams and the like: these aren't the ways in which truth comes to light. Rather are they warning signs of deception, rashness, and how what one "knows" is fragmentary and hit-or-miss. Or to put the same another way, the power here antagonistic to, and violated by, consciousness is manifestly present in the form of expressly decreed law and established right—either as the law of the family or that of the nation—whereas consciousness has pursued its own special way of knowing and closed its eyes to the obvious.

109 –But the truth of the opposing powers, the result of this experiential content and consciousness, is that both are equally right—and hence, in the mutual antagonism engendered by the action they take, equally wrong. The oneness of these powers is demonstrated in the course of their action inasmuch as both are reciprocally undermined along with the self-conscious characters involved. Reconciling such a conflict entails either death, the Lethe of the netherworld, or, in the world above, the Lethe of absolution—albeit not from guilt, since this much consciousness, having committed the act, cannot deny, but rather from criminality—along with such expiatory peace of mind as goes with it. Both kinds of reconciliation consist in forgetting, in the disappearance of the actual reality and action of such powers as ethical substance has—the individual entities comprising it—along with the powers embodying abstract notions of good and evil. For none is by itself a divine being: the repose of the whole within itself, the staid unity of fate, the stasis (hence inertia and inanimateness) of family and government, [M484] the coequal stature (hence apathy-inducing unreality) of Apollo and the Furies, and the ultimate reversion of all the spirited hustle and bustle that these involve into the indivisible simplicity of Zeus.

110 This destiny completes the depopulation of a heaven comprised in a thoughtless mix of individuality and divinity such that the action of the latter appears illogical, arbitrary, and unworthy of itself. For individuality that's only superficially tacked onto an entity is *unessential* to that entity. The ouster of these insubstantial representational entities, as demanded by the philosophers of antiquity, is thus already underway in tragedy in that its articulation of the substance [of the ethos] is governed by conceptual thinking—with individuality then indispensable, and with the specifics of the individual's resolve inviolable in character. Hence a self-conscious being who's represented in tragedy is one who knows and acknowledges only one supreme power, recognizing Zeus as the power solely of the nation or else of the hearth—and, as opposed to the power of knowledge, merely as the father of the knowledge of particular matters in process of taking shape, and as the Zeus of the oath and the Furies, of the universal

element that abides concealed within. Moreover the meandering moments reduced to representation rather than concepts and successively endorsed by the chorus scarcely embody the pathos of a hero, but sooner demean him to the level of the passions, of arbitrary insubstantial escapades which, even though praised by the self-effacing chorus, can no more a heroic character make than they can bespeak and do honor to such being as a hero has.

111 But even the personae who exemplify divinity, as well as the [heroic] characters who substantiate nothing short of it, coalesce into the simplicity of the unconscious. This kind of necessity functions, in contrast with self-conscious existence, as the negative power animating all the figures who make their appearance, a power in which they not only don't recognize themselves but actually meet their end. The self makes its appearance only as variously cast in these characters, not as the intermediary of the dynamic. But actually self-consciousness—simple self-certainty—is what comprises the negative power of Zeus: the unity of substantive essence and abstract necessity, the spiritual unity into which all the above reverts. Because actual self-conscious existence [M485] is still distinct from both the substance and the fate being presented, it's the chorus—or rather audience—that the alien stirrings of divine life fill with fear or, in more familiar form, arouse to passive sympathy. On the other hand, to whatever extent consciousness does take part in the action and identify with the characters portrayed, this solidarity (since no true unity of self, fate, and substance is present yet) is of an external, “hypocritical” sort. The hero appearing before the audience dissociates into mask and actor, persona and actual self.



112 The self-consciousness of the heroes must now step forth from its mask and show that it knows itself to be the fate of the gods of the chorus as well as of the ultimate powers themselves, and that it's no longer separate from the chorus, the consciousness common to all.

113 *Comedy* accordingly has as its primary function to portray real self-conscious existence as the fate of the gods. These elementary entities, which exist as generic moments of that fate, are not self and are not real. While indeed decked out in the form of individuality, this is merely how they're represented in imagination, not something attributable to them in and of themselves. A real self has no abstract moment as its substance and experiential content. The self as subject is raised above any such moment, above any single property, and, having donned its mask, gives ironic utterance to any such generic moment aspiring to be something in its own right. Any pretension to being all in all divine is exposed in the self, which shows itself to be caught up in an actual reality and lets the mask drop just so that it can legitimately be something. Making its appearance here in its role as an actual reality, the self now plays out its part

with the mask it once donned in order to be its own person, but presently reemerges from this make-believe in its own nakedness and ordinariness, showing that it's in no wise different from an authentic self, be it player or spectator.

114 The wholesale resolution of divine being thus embodied in individuality turns more serious, and hence more petulant and bitter, the more that its content is of serious and ineluctable significance. Divinity's [M486] substance combines within itself significant aspects of both natural and ethical being.

115 –By using its natural habitat for its adornment, dwelling, and so on, and by feasting on what it sacrifices, actual self-consciousness shows that it's destined to see revealed the secret of its place in nature's self-sufficiency. In the mystery of bread and wine self-consciousness makes that self-sufficiency, along with what's meant by an 'inner essence,' integral to its own being—and in comedy is altogether conscious of the irony of what it above all means to be a self.

116 –Now insofar as its ethical nature plays a significant role, this consists partly in the people in both its aspects (the nation or *demos* proper and individual family units), but also partly in pure self-conscious knowing, in rational mindfulness of what all have in common. The *demos*, the common mass, which knows itself to be lord and ruler as well as possessed of considerable understanding and insight, bedazzles and dupes itself in its handling of the particulars of its reality, displaying a laughable contrast between its opinion of itself and what it is in its immediacy, between what it *has* to be and what it is by chance, between its commonality and its commonplaceness. When the principle of a people's individuality as distinctively embodied in actual reality asserts itself in detachment from the common weal, publicly assuming responsibility for and administering the body politic while privately doing it harm, this exposes all the more unequivocally the contrast between the common weal as theorized and as implemented in practice in a way that would have the purposes of unvarnished individuality totally free from and derisive of public order.⁹



117 Rational thought frees divine being from the arbitrary form in which it's embodied, and—as opposed to the conceptually impoverished wisdom of the chorus, which puts forth all sorts of ethical maxims and countenances a host of laws and fixed notions of duty and right—refines these into the simple ideas of the beautiful and the good. The thrust of this manner of abstraction is that of a consciousness mindful of the dialectical implications inherent in such maxims and laws, hence also that the un-

9. Aristophanes' *Knights*.

qualified validity they once seemingly had has vanished. As the casual role and superficial individuality which representational imagination lent to the [M487] divine beings evaporates, all that's left of them as regards their natural aspect is the nakedness in which they're directly present. They're clouds¹⁰—ephemeral vapors, like those representations themselves. Having become, in wake of their purported essentialness, simplistic notions of the beautiful and the good, they now admit of being filled with any content one pleases.

118 –The power of dialectical knowledge puts the fixed laws and maxims of ethical conduct at the mercy of youth who, carefree and pleasure seeking, are corrupted by such knowledge, while providing their careworn and anxiety-ridden elders, whose years are now short, with convenient weapons of deception. These pure thoughts—beauty, goodness—thus make for a comic spectacle: in being freed from conventional opinion, the substantive certainty and indisputable definitiveness that consciousness requires in order to hold fast to it, they become vacuous and thereby the mere plaything of opinion and caprice such as is met with in arbitrary individuality.

119 And with this a heretofore unconscious fate, consisting in empty acquiescence, oblivion, and severance from self-conscious existence, is instead united with it. The individual self, although constitutive of the negative force in and through which the gods vanish together with their defining moments as present in nature and delineated in thought, isn't itself an evanescent vacuity but sustains itself amidst all this nullity, abiding in its own presence and as the sole actual reality. In this self art-religion has reached its consummation and come full circle. And by virtue of individual consciousness having, in its self-certainty, shown itself to be a power that is absolute, this same power has shed the form of something represented, something altogether apart from consciousness and alien to it—as were statuary and the animated sculptures of splendid physiques, or the ethical content of the epic and the forces and personae of tragedy. Nor does this self's unity consist in such unreflective solidarity as is had in the cult and the mysteries; rather does the real self of the performer here coalesce with his own persona, just as the spectator is completely at home in the drama acted out before him and sees himself playing his own part therein. What this manner of self-consciousness witnesses is that anything putting on airs against it is sooner dissolved within, and at the disposal of, its way of thinking, living, and handling things [M488]—with all in common being thereby restored to a certainty of self that's aware of how utterly trivial and unimposing all alienness is, experiencing and permitting itself a sense of healthy contentment no longer met with anywhere outside such comedy.



10. Aristophanes' *Clouds*.

VII.C. MANIFEST RELIGION

120 Via the religion of art, spirit advanced from the form of substance into that of subject; for art produces its own embodiment, and in so doing infuses that embodiment with action—that is, with self-consciousness—which amidst [primal religion's] fearsome substance is but fleeting, and in [simple ethical] trust doesn't comprehend itself. This human incarnation of divine being is an outgrowth of statuary, which embodies only the external aspect of the self—an embodiment whose inner, active component is outside it. But in the cult these two aspects coalesced, the religion of art having culminated in their unification as it crossed over into the extreme formed by the self: a spirit fully self-certain that everything essential has been subsumed in the individuality integral to conscious existence. The proposition expressive of such folly runs: 'The self is a being that is absolute.' The divine being, which was once substance itself (with the self being a mere accident within it), has been reduced to a predicate, while spirit—in this self-consciousness for which there's nothing in the form of a divine being over against it—has lost its sense of there being such an entity.

121 The proposition that 'the self is a being that is absolute' obviously typifies an irreligious, actuality-oriented spirit; and we need to recall which manner of self asserts this—involving it in the dynamic of this proposition as well as that of the converse, which lowers the self to a predicate while raising substance to subject. –Not that in the converse assertion substance is implicitly (i.e., as only we would see) turned into subject, with substance so reinstated as to have spirit's consciousness led back to its beginning in natural religion; rather is the converse actually brought about [M489] for and by means of self-consciousness itself. In consciously giving itself over, self-consciousness is sustained in going out from itself thus, and remains substance's subject—although, in having externalized itself, it's also aware of *being* this substance. In other words since by thus making sacrifice of itself self-consciousness is actively bringing substance forth as subject, this subject remains self-consciousness's own self. So once the presence of both aspects is established in these propositions—in the first, where in substance the subject is simply lost from view, and in the second, where substance is but a predicate—with both aspects, regarded unequally, tensively present in each, the stage is set for both natures [substance and subject] to unite and interpenetrate, with both, regarded equally, as indispensable as they are mere moments. Spirit thus consists no less in consciousness of itself as objectively substantial than it does in a simplex self-consciousness abiding unto itself.

122 Art-religion is part and parcel of ethical spirit, which, as we saw earlier, founders in legal status, in the proposition that 'the self as such, the abstract person, is a being who is absolute.' In ethical life the self is immersed in the spirit of its people, in a fully realized community. Yet from this same substance there emerges a manner of simple individual who ends up thoughtlessly reduced to a 'person,' an abstract commonplace

of the sort typically met with in legal right. In this latter form of commonality such reality as ethos-based spirit has is lost; the insubstantial ghosts of individual nations are gathered into a single pantheon that, rather than being representational (its effete form accommodating each), is instead abstractly universal, consisting in pure thought that eviscerates ethical reality and imparts to the then spirit-bereft self, the solitary person, an existence in and for himself.

123 Yet this manner of self has thereby, by virtue of its vacuity, been alleviated of substantive content; a conscious being instantiative of such an entity is so solely “in its own mind,” its own existent presence consisting in the legal recognition given the person, an empty abstraction. All that it’s in possession of is a way of thinking about itself; in other words, existing as it does and as the object it knows itself to be, it isn’t actually real. All there is to it then is the stoic “self-sufficiency of thought,” which, in the course of its own skeptical mentations, finds its truth embodied in what was [M490] called the “unhappy self-consciousness.”

124 This latter form of self-consciousness knows how matters really stand regarding the status of the abstract person as well as what that status amounts to in the estimation of pure thought. It knows that having status of this sort is tantamount to losing all one’s worth; it itself is a conscious loss of self and relinquishment of self-knowledge. This Unhappy Consciousness is discernibly the counterpart and complement of comedy’s internally complete and happy consciousness. All divine being reverts into this latter consciousness, which has divested itself of any such substance. The Unhappy Consciousness, by contrast, exemplifies the tragic fate of mere would-be self-certainty, which would have itself exist in and for self. And since it is self-certainly aware of losing every trace of essentialness, not to mention any claim to self-knowledge—of losing substance as well as self—its anguish is such as finds expression in the hard words “God is dead.”

125 Thus in legal status the ethical world and its religion are immersed in a comic consciousness, while the Unhappy Consciousness realizes the sheer enormity of what’s being lost. It has lost the intrinsic worth of its immediate, as well as that of its mediated (i.e., thought-sustained) personhood. So also has trust in the eternal laws of the gods been lost, even as the oracles instructing what’s to be done in particular situations have grown mute. –The statues are now as corpses whose quickening soul has gone out of them, just as the hymns are now but words conveying something no longer believable. The altars of the gods are bare of spiritual food and drink, and consciousness no longer derives from its games and festivals a joyous sense of oneness with divine being. The works of the muse lack the might of a spirit whose estimation of its own identity had stemmed from its seeing both men and gods ground under. These have all become now what they are for us: delectable fruits plucked from the tree and presented to us by a kindly fate as though by the hands of a maiden. We aren’t bequeathed

the actual life they lived: neither the tree that bore them nor the earth and elements that provided their substance, neither the climate that gave them their distinctive flavor nor the changing seasons that governed the course of their growth. Thus [M491] while seeing fit to preserve these works of ancient art, fortune doesn't give us their world, the spring and summer of the ethical life in which they blossomed and ripened, but only the shrouded recollection of that world's reality.

126 –Hence in taking delight in them, rather than being engaged in the kind of divine worship through which our consciousness would have itself be its own complete and fulfilling truth, what we contribute is all external: we wipe away some of the rain splotches and dust from these fruits, and in place of the inner elements of the reality encompassing, engendering, and vitalizing that ethos, we merely construct, from archaic remnants of their outward existence (language, historical facts, etc.), an elaborate scaffold, doing this not so as to live the way that they lived, but merely to imagine the way in which they did. How the maiden proffers the gathered fruit involves more than what nature presents to us directly (a sprawling assortment of conditioning factors and elements: tree, air, light, etc.), integrating them in a higher way by the gleam of her self-conscious eye and the gesture with which she offers them; so also does the spirit of the good fortune which presented these artworks to us involve more than the ethical life and reality that such a people had. For this spirit consists in recollectively internalizing what in them was still an externalized spirit. This is the spirit of a tragic fate assembling all the individual gods and substantive attributes into one pantheon, into a spirit conscious of itself as spirit.

127 All the conditions for the emergence of this spirit are present, with the totality of these conditions culminating in the genesis—the conceiving—of such a spirit, the process integral to its emergence. The developmental cycle of art encompasses all the forms of externalization part and parcel of a substance that is absolute: such a substance exists in the form of individuality, as a thing, a matter-of-fact object of sense-consciousness; it exists in the form of pure language, as a processual embodiment whose presence doesn't extend beyond the purview of the self and is that of a sheerly evanescent object; it exists in direct union (via its enthusiasm) as well as in indirect union (via the action of the cult) with self-consciousness at large; it exists in the form of magnificent self-admiring physical specimens; and lastly it exists in a way of life raised into an imaginative representation and expanded into a [M492] world at last consisting as much in commonality as in pure certainty of self. These forms together with this world's other aspect, that of abstract personhood and legalism—including the devastating chaos that its emancipated constituents (stoicism's "personhood in thought" and the incessant restlessness of skeptical consciousness) create—are the figures anxiously gathering around the birthplace of a spirit now becoming self-conscious. At their center is the piercing anguish and longing of the unhappy self-consciousness, the communal birth pang of the emergent self-consciousness—a simplex form of pure conceiving that incorporates all these modes as moments of itself.

128 This conception contains both of the aspects presented above in converse propositions: the one whereby substance emerges from itself and becomes self-conscious, and the one whereby self-consciousness externalizes itself and turns into a form of thinghood, a commonplace self. With both aspects having met thus halfway, they've actually so much as converged. This substance's emergence, its becoming self-conscious, demonstrates its transition into its contrary, an unconscious transition that occurs of necessity—demonstrating that such substance is latent self-consciousness. Conversely, the externalization of self-consciousness shows that self-consciousness is a manner of being that is inherently all-inclusive—that for it, as sheer presence-to-self remaining self-possessed in its opposite, it's evident that substance is part and parcel of self-consciousness and therefore spirit. Hence it could be said of spirit that, in having left behind the form of sheer substance and entered into existence as embodied in self-consciousness, it has (borrowing terms relevant to natural generation) an “actual mother” but an “implicit father.” For its actual reality (its self-consciousness) and whatever lies latent within that reality as integral to its substance are both moments of spirit; by their mutual emergence and their turning into each other, they enable spirit to enter into existence as the unity of both.

129 Inasmuch as self-consciousness (even while taking its object to consist no less in being than in self, and realizing that [M493] all existence is in essence spiritual) nonetheless has but a one-sided grasp of its own emergence—with being at large, substance, to that extent having not on its part emerged from within itself and become self-conscious—it isn't yet evident to self-consciousness that something genuinely consisting in spirit has thus come into being. For then it's only from consciousness's point of view, not intrinsically, that all existence is in essence spiritual. In that way spirit is only “imagined” into existence—a manner of reverie that reads into nature and history, as well as into the world mythically portrayed in bygone religions, an inner significance other than what's directly apparent to consciousness, and, so far as these religions are concerned, a meaning other than that recognized by the very self-consciousness whose religions they were. But this added meaning is something merely loaned to them, clothing that does nothing to conceal the obvious or win credibility and respect, instead remaining [creations of] this mentality's own turbid night and private rapture.

130 Thus if the significance of this manner of objectivity isn't to consist in sheer imagining, it has to exist in and of itself—first by emerging conceptually from within consciousness and developing in accordance with a necessity of its own. That's how self-knowing spirit originated for us: through intuitive consciousness's own discernment—that is, an awareness of a matter-of-fact object necessitated by consciousness's own dynamic. Conceiving of this sort, which due to its immediacy also had the form of something directly evident to the consciousness doing the conceiving, has then secondly, in and of itself, the form of self-consciousness—precisely in keeping with something that such conception necessitates: that the being or immediacy of

some trifling object of sense-awareness emanates and becomes for consciousness [part of the] I. –Although that which exists immediately in and of itself (factually existent necessity) differs from what exists inherently in thought (noetic necessity), this isn't a difference outside the purview of such conception, since the simplex unity formed in conceiving is itself a mode of immediate being. Conception thus consists as much in a self-emanating or emergent necessity that's directly intuited as it does in a necessity that it knows and comprehends, while abiding with itself in it. –For spirit as it is immediately in itself [M494] to be incarnating itself as a form of self-conscious being means nothing if not that the actual world-spirit has arrived at such self-knowledge; only then does this knowledge enter into spirit's consciousness at large, and moreover as truth—how this comes about having by then been made evident.

131 Implicit in [the very idea of] absolute spirit having embodied itself as a form of self-consciousness, and in so doing also made this evident to its consciousness, is that it is now apparent to the world at large that as a matter of faith spirit exists as a self-conscious being, that is, an actual human being—that spirit is an object of immediate certainty, a divinity the believing consciousness sees, feels, and hears. Hence to the believer this isn't imaginary but real and actual. Rather than proceeding from an idea drawn from within and inwardly combining this idea of God with something matter-of-factly present, consciousness is here proceeding from an existing entity that's directly present and discerning God in it.

132 –One moment integral to the content of this conception—a form of immediate being—is then present in such a way that, everything essential having reverted to consciousness, religious spirit has turned into a simplex positive self, much as, in the Unhappy Consciousness, actuality-oriented spirit as such turned into a simplex self-conscious negativity. The self of this matter-of-factly present spirit thus takes the form of something entirely immediate, being put forth not as envisioned in thought or in representation, nor as creatively produced—as is respectively the case with the self immediately present in natural religion and in art-religion. Rather is this a deity that's directly intuited as a self, an actual, individual human being; and only thus is this deity a self-conscious being.

133 This human incarnation of the divine being—that it is in its essential nature directly embodied in self-consciousness—is the simplex content of absolute religion. Embodied thus, this being becomes known as spirit; that is, this is what it is conscious of concerning itself—that it is spirit. For spirit is knowledge of the self in process of self-emanation: an essence whose dynamic sustains its self-identity in the heterogeneity integral to it. Yet an entity such as this is a form of substance inasmuch as, even when reflecting into its accidents, it is reflecting into itself—doing so not as against something unessential and hence as into something extraneous toward which it is

[M495] indifferently disposed, but rather as abiding within itself therein, or in other words, inasmuch as this substance is subject, is self.

134 –In such religion the divine being is thus manifest. Its manifestation manifestly consists in being known for what it is. But this comes about precisely in becoming known as spirit, an entity that consists essentially in self-conscious being. When its object is alien or other than it, when religious consciousness doesn't know the object to be its own self, then something in that object is hidden from it. When this absolute entity existing as spirit is consciousness's object, there's no longer anything hidden; for then the object exists as *self* in its relation to consciousness, which is to say that consciousness is directly cognizant of or manifest to itself therein. Only within its own self-certainty is consciousness manifest to itself thus; therein its object is self, a self that's not alien but inseparably one with—directly all-inclusive of—consciousness itself. The self is purely conceptual: pure thought or presence-to-self that's directly, matter-of-factly existent and therewith present to others—and solely in being thus present to others is it brought full circle right back to itself, abiding with and hence being truly manifest to itself.

135 –The good, the righteous, the holy, the Creator of heaven and earth, and so on are all predicates of a subject—universal moments that abide within this point [of self-conscious light] and exist solely as consciousness withdraws into thought. When such predicates are the focus of knowing, their ground and essence—the subject itself—still isn't manifest, just as specific instances of a given universal are not the universal itself. But as *self*, the subject (and hence this pure universality as well) is manifest, since the self is precisely this internally reflected inner that's directly, matter-of-factly present and embodies a unique certainty: that of the very self to which this subject is present. To be manifest in this way—conceptually—is spirit's true embodiment; and this embodiment, its conceptual being, is its sole essence and substance. Spirit comes to be known as, and is directly manifest to, self-consciousness because it is self-conscious being itself: the divine nature is the same as the human, and this oneness of nature is what's being intuited.

136 Here, then, is how such consciousness—the way in which this being is present to itself, its mode of embodiment—is in fact identical with its [M496] self-consciousness. Indeed to be so embodied is to be a self-conscious being—is to exist as a matter-of-fact object even as this being, in its very immediacy, has such eminence as pure thinking has, a mode of being that is absolute. While an absolute entity such as this may, in existing as an actual self-conscious being, seem to have “descended” from its eternal simplicity, in fact it has only then attained to the highest form of this its essence. For only when the conceiving of such an entity has attained to simplex purity is it both an abstraction that is absolute—consisting in pure thought (and hence in

the pure individuality of a self)—and, due to its simplicity, something immediate, some manner of being. What's referred to as sense-consciousness is just such pure abstraction—thinking that has being, something immediate, present to it. Lowest is then also highest. The manifestation that has made its way to the surface is precisely thereby what's deepest. That the supreme being comes to be seen, heard, and so forth as a factually existent self-conscious being is this entity's conceptual consummation, by which it's as much something directly there as it is such a being.

137 This direct presence doesn't just consist in direct awareness [of what's thus present] but moreover in a religious consciousness. Immediacy such as this is inextricably indicative not just of a factually existing self-conscious being but of a purely no-etic form of being, an absolute essence. What we're aware of in our conceiving—that being is essence—is what religious consciousness is aware of. This oneness of being and essence—thinking that's directly constitutive of an existent presence—is evident in the religious consciousness's thought, its mediative knowing, as well as in its intuitive knowing; for this unity of being and thought consists in self-consciousness and is indeed present. In other words this unity conceived in thought at the same time embodies what just such a unity is.

138 –Here, then, God is manifest as he is; he's present as he is inherently; he exists as spirit. God is attainable solely in pure speculative knowing—existing only in, and indeed as, such knowing—because God is spirit; and this speculative knowing is the way of knowing that's integral to manifest religion.

139 –Speculative knowing knows God as thought, as pure essence, and knows thought as a form of being and presence, and knows this presence as its own negative modality—hence as self, a self that is at once this particular [M497] self and a universal self. That, precisely, is what manifest religion knows. –The hopes and expectations of the world that preceded had pressed forward solely to this revelation, to behold what this absolute mode of being is, and to find itself within it. The joy experienced in so beholding itself pervades self-consciousness and enthralls the whole world; for such being is spirit, the simplex dynamism of the above pellucid moments, a dynamic demonstrating that only in coming to be beheld as a directly present self-consciousness is such an entity known as spirit.



140 This conception of spirit, as knowing itself to be spirit, is itself immediate and still undeveloped. This entity [or pure essence, the divine being, God] is spirit—it has appeared, is manifest. But even while thus directly manifest, this immediate evidentness consists no less in pure mediation—thinking—and as such cannot but exhibit this within itself. Viewed more precisely, spirit instantiated in the immediacy of self-

consciousness exists as such and such individual self-conscious being as opposed to self-consciousness at large. A spirit of this sort is exclusive—a single individual who has as yet the unresolved form of a sensuous *other* for any given conscious being to whom he's present, and who thus doesn't yet know that this spirit is his own—meaning that this spirit present as an individual self isn't yet equally present as universal, as all-inclusively self. Differently put, this embodiment doesn't yet have the form integral to a concept, that is, of a universal self: a self that in its immediate reality is moreover sublated, consisting as it does in thinking, in universality, without losing its immediate reality in its universality. –The form of universality that comes closest to a universal self while still being itself immediate doesn't, however, really exist in the form of thought per se, of conceiving as such; rather does it consist in the all-inclusiveness of actual reality at large, the totality of all selves, with matter-of-fact existence elevated into a *representation* of what's actually there—as is commonly encountered, a specific example being a sublated sensuous This, which initially consists of a thing of perception and not yet a universal of the understanding.

141 The individual human being whom this absolute entity is revealed to be thus brings to fruition in himself as individual the dynamic of sensuous being. He is God immediately present—his being by that very fact passing over into having been. [M498] The consciousness for which he has this sensuous presence ceases to see and hear him. It did see and hear him. And only by virtue of its merely having seen and heard him does consciousness itself first become spiritual consciousness—or rather, even as he once rose up as a sensuous presence manifest to consciousness, so now has he arisen in spirit. For as such, all that seeing and hearing him avails is an immediate sensuous awareness that hasn't sublated the [temporal] heteronomy of objective existence and reintegrated it into pure thought—therein, instead of knowing oneself as spirit, one just knows this historically objective individual.

142 –Amidst the passing of the immediate presence of what's known as this being that is absolute [by virtue of its consisting in pure thought], this immediacy retains its negative moment: spirit remains the directly present self of this manner of reality, albeit in the form of a communal self-consciousness, that of a community abiding in its own substance, a substance that in this self-consciousness constitutes a communal subject—not as such and such single individual by himself but as conjoined with the consciousness of the community. And what the individual is for such a community is one in whom its communal spirit is fully integrated.

143 In the “long ago” and “far away,” however, immediacy of the above sort is mediated or universalized in merely imperfect form. Only superficially immersed in the element of thought, such a form is sustained only sensuously and isn't made one with the nature of thought itself. Thinking is here merely brought up to the level of representation, synthetically combining sensuous immediacy and the universality or thought of such immediacy.

144 While constitutive of a specific way in which spirit becomes aware of itself in its community, this representational form isn't as yet that of a conceptually developed self-consciousness, one with a conceptual grasp of what's thus represented. The mediation is still incomplete. There's thus something defective in such a combination of being and thought: spirit's essential nature is still unreconciled, split up into a present reality and a beyond. The *content* portrayed is genuine enough; but all its moments, couched thus in the element of representation, are characteristically nonconceptual, appearing instead as completely independent dimensions that interrelate in external fashion. In order that this genuine content also come to have for consciousness a *form* that's genuine, consciousness has to [M499] undergo further cultivation, raising its intuition of this absolute substance into a conceiving thereof, bringing itself as present to itself into accord with its self-consciousness—as has already taken place for us as well as implicitly [for spirit at large].

145 The way in which this content is present in spirit's consciousness warrants examination. Absolute spirit is here a substantive content: hence is spirit embodied as it is in its truth. But its truth—rather than consisting merely in the substance of a community (what some community amounts to in itself), or merely in its emerging from such insularity into the manner of objectivity that exists in representation—instead consists in becoming an actual self, reflecting into itself and existing as subject. This, then, is the process that absolute spirit brings to completion in its community; this is its very life. What a self-manifesting spirit such as this consists of in and for itself is thus hardly elicited by, as it were, unraveling spirit's rich life in the community and reducing it to its initial threads—perhaps to images of an inchoate community, or even to what some actual individual said way back then. While such a genealogy instinctually gropes toward something conceptual, it confuses the origin, the immediate presence that the initial appearance has, with simplistic conception. To so impoverish the life of spirit—to ignore how the present community represents its content and what it does in face of its own representation—doesn't give rise to anything conceptual but rather to something merely externalistic and lost in details, a historicized version of spirit's immediate appearance and the recollection, itself devoid of spirit, of an allegedly onetime and now bygone incarnation.

146 Spirit is the content of its consciousness at first in the form of a 'pure substance,' or in other words is the content of its 'pure consciousness.' This element—that of thinking—is the process of fathoming existence, plumbing the depths of individuality. Intermediating thinking and existence is a second element that synthetically combines them, a transmutative consciousness, imaginative representation as such. A third element, self-consciousness, is spirit's return from such imagining and otherness to itself. —Spirit is comprised in these three moments; and in representation its separate paths [of thought and existence] are resolved in some specific mode of imagining—such a specification [M500] being nothing other than a moment of spirit. The overall dy-

namic thus involves spirit's nature spanning each of its moments as though within a single element; and as each of these cycles reflects into itself in completing its circuit internally, it undergoes transition into the others. Representation is intermediate between pure thinking and self-consciousness as such; and while it is itself only one of the ways spirit comes to be specified, it spans all three elements (as is evident from its characteristic role as synthetic conjoiner) and is itself a mode of specification they all have in common.

147 The experiential content to be considered has itself already been partially met with in the representational musings of the Unhappy Consciousness and the believing consciousness—specified in the former as a content brought forth from and yearned for by consciousness, albeit one in which spirit can find neither satisfaction nor repose since it isn't yet inherently (or in its very substance) spirit's own. By contrast the content of the believing consciousness was regarded as a world the essential nature of which is devoid of self, a content in essence represented as though objectivistic, a manner of imagining that's altogether in flight from actual reality and hence lacks the sure-mindedness of self-consciousness, finding itself—be it in the form of intellectual vanity or of pure insight—quite out of touch with its content. The consciousness of a community, conversely, has its very substance as its experiential content, just as this content is the community's certainty of its own spirit.

148 Spirit, as first set forth representationally (as a form of substance in the element of pure thought), is then a simple, self-identical, eternal essence, one that, rather than having the abstract significance of a divinity, instead has the significance of absolute spirit. Yet spirit doesn't consist in "signifying" something, having some inner meaning, but in actually being something real. This simple eternal essence would thus be spirit in name only were it to remain representational and merely "expressive of" such an essence. But since a 'simple essence' is an abstraction, it is in fact something that in itself is negative of itself, indeed consisting in such negation as occurs in thinking, the negativity inherent in any essence [any spiritual entity]—in other words such an entity is absolutely at variance with itself, having 'its own pure' otherness emergent right within it. —What an entity of this sort is as essence is something sheerly implicit (or evident only to us); [M501] but since this purity [—the otherness emerging within it being intrinsically its own—] consists solely in its own abstractive process or negativity, a [spiritual] entity exists thus as present to itself—that is, is self, is conceptual. —Such an entity is thus [as present to itself] objective; and so when, as discussed above, the necessity integral to conception is grasped and articulated representationally as something that just "happened," this gets couched in terms of the eternal being having taken upon itself to "generate" something other than it. But in the manner of otherness at issue here the essence has as much as turned right back into itself, since this difference is a difference intrinsic to [the essence] itself—differing directly and solely from within itself, being then part and parcel of a unity that has returned into itself.

149 There are thus three distinct moments: [1] the *essence*, [2] a *presence-to-self* entailing the otherness integral to such a being as well as that to which it is present, and [3] a *presence-to-self in otherness*, that is, a knowing of self in what's other [within itself]. In its presence-to-self this being contemplates itself alone; even though self-emanating, it abides solely within itself. The presence-to-self that separates from the essential being is that being's knowledge of itself, a presence-to-self existing as the Word, which in being spoken is getting the speaker's word out and leaving him with no more to say the very instant he's being heard. And solely in making itself heard is the Word actually present. The distinct moments thus established are dissolved as soon as they're made, and made as soon as they're dissolved: what's true and actual here is precisely this dynamism cycling within.

150 This self-inhering progression expresses this absolute [inherently simplex] essence as spirit. When not comprehended as spirit, it's but an abstract vacuity, just as spirit, when not comprehended as consisting in this dynamic, is but an empty word. The moments comprising it, when grasped in their purity, are restlessly conceptual, existing solely in having their contrary inherent within them and finding repose only in the whole that they comprise.

151 –But the representational efforts of a religious community don't consist in conceptual thinking of the above sort, having instead a content that's devoid of conceptual necessity, and that, in place of conceptual form, imports the natural relationship of father and son into the realm of pure consciousness. Thus even when such a consciousness thinks, it does so figuratively; so while this being is indeed manifest to it, due to the synthetic nature of representation the moments integral to that being come apart rather than being interconnected by their own conceptual nature—with consciousness on the other hand [M502] drawing back from and relating only externally to its object. The object is then manifested to it by something alien. And in thinking of spirit in this way, consciousness doesn't recognize itself, doesn't recognize the nature of pure self-consciousness.

152 –Inasmuch as representational form and the above relationships derived from nature—especially those in which the moments of spirit's dynamic are construed as isolated imperturbable substances or subjects rather than as transitional moments—have to be left behind, this is to be viewed (as we recall from what was said about another of its aspects) as due to an urge to conceptualize, albeit one that, since it's merely instinctual, misunderstands itself, rejecting both form and content, and downgrading the latter to a mere historical depiction and heirloom handed down by tradition. Hereby all that's retained is something external to faith, something unfamiliar and long dead, while faith's inner vitality—since this would involve conception knowing itself to be such—is gone.

153 That which consists wholly in spirit, when represented in terms of a ‘pure essence,’ isn’t of itself an abstract pure essence but rather one that, by virtue of its being a mere moment within spirit, has devolved into a constituent element [of spirit]. Portraying spirit in terms of such an element thus has the same defect of form that any essence as such has. An essence, as something abstract, is negative of its own simplicity, and so is heterogeneous; likewise spirit, [portrayed as above, namely] as an elemental essence, has the form of a ‘simple oneness’—which just as essentially turns out to be heterogeneous.

154 –By the same token, the connection of an eternal essence such as this to its presence-to-self in no wise differs from the directly simplex interconnectedness of sheer thinking. Hence it isn’t otherness as such that’s established in this simplex beholding of itself in the other; such heterogeneity is like that encountered in pure thought, which directly within itself isn’t heterogeneous at all—here a “loving” recognition in which both [father and son] are by their very nature anything but antithetic. For spirit to be given expression in the element of pure thought basically involves its consisting not just in thought alone but in something more actual than that, since its conceptual nature entails otherness, that is, supersedes such conceiving as consists sheerly in thought. [M503]

155 The element of pure thought, because it is abstract, is itself the “other” of its own simplicity, and hence extends into the element of representation proper, the element within which the moments of pure conception come to have a substantive existence each in relation to the other even while existing as subjects that, rather than manifesting to a third party the reciprocal indifference characteristic of matter-of-fact being, reflect into themselves apart from and in contrast to each other.

156 Thus in relation to itself, spirit that’s [represented as] sheerly eternal or abstract turns out to be other than that, entering into the existential realm and directly into some manner of immediate presence. Thus does it “create” a world. And indeed ‘create’ is representation’s word for conception itself in its unrestricted dynamic, representation’s way of indicating that, because thought is abstractive, a simple essence put forth as *absolute*—as consisting in pure thought—is instead the negative complement (and hence the opposite) of itself, that is, is other. Or to put the same differently, since whatever is affirmed as essence is a simple immediacy—some sort of being, indeed being devoid of self—it’s also internally deficient, is passive, is relative to what’s other than it. –This being that’s relative to otherness also forms a world: spirit under the species of ‘relativity to otherness,’ in steadily sustaining the moments previously confined to pure thought, is thus dissolutive of their simple universality and diverges into the particularity that each of them has on its own.

157 But the world isn't just comprised of spirit dispersed into a multifarious and externally organized plenum; since spirit indispensably consists in the simplex *self*, this too has to be present in the world: actually existent spirit, the individual self that's possessed of consciousness, also *distinguishes itself* from itself as other—from itself as world.

158 –This individualistic self, set forth in its nascent immediacy, is as yet a spirit that's neither present to itself nor exists in the way that spirit does; thus while it might be called “innocent,” it could hardly be called “good.” For the individual self in fact to be a self and be spirit, it must also—just as an eternal being presents itself as a dynamism that's self-same amidst its heterogeneity—first become to itself something other.

159 –Since this spirit is characterized at first as immediately existent, as scattered throughout the miscellany of its conscious existence, [M504] its turning into something other than that consists in its knowledge involuting altogether into itself. Immediate everyday existence turns into thought, mere sense-oriented consciousness into thinking consciousness. And indeed because such thought issues from (i.e., is thus conditioned by) immediacy, it doesn't consist in pure knowing but in thought that harbors otherness integrally within it—hence the self-conflictive idea of “good and evil.”

160 –Humankind accordingly comes to be represented thus: once upon a time it “happened” (by no means of necessity) that humanity lost the form of inner harmony by picking off a piece of fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and was driven from the state of innocence, from nature's proffering her bounty free of human effort, and from paradise, the garden in which the animals live.

161 Since this involution of matter-of-fact consciousness is instantly destined to become anything but inwardly harmonious, evil appears as this involuted consciousness's nascent way of life. And because the ideas ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are utterly antithetic and this opposition is as yet unresolved, this consciousness is in essence simply evil. But beyond that, by virtue of there being such a conflict, also present here is a good consciousness dead set against evil, with good and evil relating interactively. –Insofar as immediate everyday existence makes the turn of venturing into thinking, and thereby more accurately determines that such an involution itself consists partly in thinking and hence partly in that moment wherein divinity turns into something other than itself, the genesis of evil can be relocated still further back, outside the matter-of-fact world altogether, indeed in a primal realm envisioned in thought. –Hence it could be said that, in thus involuting into himself, the first-born Son of Light had already fallen, but with another instantly created in his place. In any event, baldly representational, nonconceptual form of this sort—“Fallenness,” “Son”—reduces conceptual moments to representation, or conversely introduces representation into the realm of thought.

162 –Nor is anything accomplished by correlating the simple idea of the otherness integral to the eternal being with sundry other ways of incarnating it, and shifting the above involution onto them. Such a correlation nonetheless has to be countenanced since via this moment [M505]—that of otherness—a diversity is appropriately expressed, and not such diversity as mere multiplicity broadly entails, but rather as a specific kind of diversity whose one aspect (the son) consists in simply knowing itself as essence, but whose other aspect consists in this presence-to-self's own emanated presence, which lives solely to appreciate that essence. To this latter aspect one can then in turn attribute both the reappropriation of this emanated presence-to-self and the involution in which evil consists. Inasmuch as this otherness also splits in two, the [heretofore triune] moments of spirit, were we to enumerate them, could be characterized as “quadr-une” or (in that this complex splits yet again, namely into a part that remains good and a part that has become evil) as “quint-une.”

163 –But counting how many moments there are can be discounted as utterly useless here—not only because what's being differentiated is itself unitary (just as the idea of a difference is but a single idea) to the exact extent that it is this distinct entity (a second entity vis-à-vis the first), but also because the thought grasping this plurality as one entity has to have all that it generically involves sorted out and distinguished into more than just three or four variants. What's thus generically universal, when juxtaposed with the consummate definiteness of the abstract ‘unit’ (the principle of number), exhibits *indefiniteness* as it relates to number per se—so that one could refer to numbers only in general terms, that is, not to some specific number of variants. To think about numbers and counting at all here is thus totally superfluous, just as in other contexts distinctions based sheerly on magnitude and quantity neither are nor convey anything conceptual.

164 Good and evil came to light in thought as specifically distinct. Inasmuch as their opposition is as yet unresolved and they're portrayed as ideational entities each of which exists autonomously in its own right, humankind is an insubstantial self, and is the stage upon which they're brought together, actually exist, and battle it out. These universal powers nonetheless inhere in the self, it being their actual reality. Accordingly, this is the moment in which it comes to pass that, just as evil consists simply in the involution of spirit's natural presence, good emerges in the actual realm and makes its appearance as an existentially present form of self-consciousness. The divine being's transition into [M506] otherness, only broadly hinted at in thought's ruminations on spirit, here comes closer to realization for representational consciousness—a realization taken by the latter to consist in this being “humbling itself” by renouncing its abstractness and nonactuality. –As for the other side, evil's emergence, representational consciousness takes this to be an event extrinsic to the divine being; to grasp evil as intrinsic to the divine being (as, say, that being's “wrath”) would require the

most strenuous, indeed the supreme effort of which representation, wrestling with its own nature, is capable—an effort that remains fruitless since it is conceptually barren.

165 The alienation of the divine being is accordingly set forth in both of the ways it appears: Spirit's self and the simplex idea thereof are the two moments the unqualified unity of which comprises spirit itself; and this being's alienation consists in these moments dissociating, with one of them having a value unequal to that of the other. This inequality is then itself twofold, giving rise to two ways of interrelating that have the above moments in common. In the one, the divine being is deemed essential, with natural existence, along with the self, regarded as unessential and as something to be superseded; in the other, existence-for-self is deemed essential, while monolithic divinity is deemed unessential. The as-yet-vacuous mean between these ways of relating—the only thing both moments have in common—is that they each in the most general sense “exist.”

166 An opposition such as this is of course scarcely resolved via a struggle between two entities portrayed as separate and self-sufficient. It is inherent in their self-sufficiency that each, by the very way it is conceived, must resolve itself from within its own self. A struggle occurs only where both cease to be intermixtures of thought and autonomous existence and confront each other solely as ideas. For while as definitive concepts they essentially exist only in a relation of contrariety, as autonomous entities they each have an essence of their own outside this opposition, with the dynamic of each being then spontaneous and idiosyncratic. So even as the action of both is self-contained in that it's considered integral to them, it is initiated by whichever of the two is specified as existing in and of itself vis-à-vis the other.

167 –While this gets represented as an act of free will, the need [M507] for it to go outside itself is implicit in its very concept: an entity that's stipulated as existing in and of itself only by way of contrast has by that very fact no real staying power. Hence one who, rather than taking existence-for-self to be what matters, deems the divine being in its simplicity to be essential, is one who gives himself over, goes to his death, and thereby reconciles this being that is absolute with itself. For in this process the divine being manifests itself as spirit; its abstract essence is alienated from itself, having the kind of existence that nature has while also having the actual reality that a self has. This, the divine being's otherness, its being sensuously present, is reintegrated via a second process of becoming-other and established in sublated form: as universal. By way of this sensuous presence the divine being has come into its own. The immediate existence of the actual realm is no longer alien or external to divinity since this existence is sublated, is universal. To die thus is to rise up as spirit.



168 In its sublated form the immediate presence of self-conscious being is comprised in self-consciousness oriented to the universal. Conceiving of the sublated individual as a manner of being that is absolute thus gives direct indication that a community is in the making which, having until now been caught up in representation, is now making the turn back into itself as self. In doing this, spirit passes from its second defining element, representation, into the third, self-consciousness as such.

169 –Looking further into how this representational consciousness conducts itself, we note that it's asserted all along that the divine being assumes human nature. And with this, it's already as good as stated that the two aren't inherently separate—just as in the notion that the divine being emanates from itself all along, that its existential presence involutes and becomes evil, it's not explicitly stated but implied that this evil presence isn't inherently alien to the divine being. Were this presence truly other than it—had there really been a fall—then it would “be absolute” only nominally, whereas in truth this moment, this involutedness, is sooner a moment essential to the very self of spirit.

170 –That involutedness is itself conceptually integral to the divine being, which (as is evident to us) is actually real only thereby, appears to representational consciousness—to the very extent that the divine being does exist in conception—as an incomprehensible turn of events that has the inherent being of divinity assuming the form of indifferent matter-of-fact being. Yet the idea that [M508] these mutually repugnant-seeming moments, the ‘divine being’ and a ‘self existing for itself,’ are not all that far apart also occurs to representational consciousness, since it does have the content right—albeit as an afterthought: the divine being's abnegative emanation in becoming flesh. This as-yet-immediate and hence unspiritual manner of representation—with the divine being's human embodiment thought of at first only as particular and not yet universal—becomes spiritual for such consciousness via the process whereby the embodied divine being in turn sacrifices its direct existential presence and returns to what it is as divine being, which is spirit only when thus reflected into itself. In this we have a representation of the divine being's “reconciliation” with what generically is other than it, and with what specifically this other is thought to be, namely evil.

171 –If this reconciliation, so conceived, is expressed in such a way that it consists in evil's being “inherently” the same as good—or the divinity's being the same as nature in its entire expanse, whereas nature separated from the divine being would be a sheer nullity—then this would have to be deemed an unspiritual way of putting things, one bound to foster misunderstanding. If evil is the same as the good then evil isn't evil and the good isn't good, and both are instead sublated—with evil then basically consisting in involuted existence-for-self, and the good in being selflessly simple. If the two are expressed conceptually, their unity is at once apparent, since involuted

existence-for-self is that of a simplistic way of knowing, just as a selflessly simple existence is sheerly that of an involuted existence-for-self.

172 –Thus, as representation conceives them, however much it has to be said that good and evil are the same—that is, aren't really good and evil—it has to be just as strongly emphasized that they're not the same but utterly at variance, since simple existence-for-self and pure knowing are both in like manner purely negative or absolutely self-differing within themselves. Only both propositions together round out the whole; and in response to the assertions and assurances based upon the first, the other must be brought to bear with unflagging determination. Since both are equally right, both are equally wrong, and their wrongness consists in [M509] taking such abstract forms as 'same' and 'not same,' 'identicalness' and 'non-identicalness,' to be something true, firmly established, and actual, and in relying only on them. Truth is had neither in the one nor in the other but rather in their interaction, in which what's simply 'one and the same' is but an abstraction and hence involves absolute difference; yet this, as a difference that's intrinsic—differentiating itself from within—is then identical with itself.

173 –This also applies regarding the self-sameness of divine being and nature at large, human nature in particular: the former is nature insofar as divinity *isn't* just divinity, while nature *is* divine with respect to her essence. It is in spirit, though, that these two abstract aspects are affirmed as they are in truth, that is, as sublated, an affirmation that can't be expressed via judgment and its noetically impoverished copula 'is.' –Similarly, while nature, outside of its essence, is nothing, this nullity nonetheless exists—as a total abstraction, hence [in the form of] pure thought or involutedness. And involutedness conjoined with the moment in which it is dead set against spiritual unity is evil.

174 –The difficulty one encounters in these concepts stems from adhering simply to the 'is' while forgetting about *thinking*, in which the moments both are and are not, being nothing but the dynamic that is spirit. Spiritual unity, a unity in which differences exist only as moments, that is, as sublated, has become evident to representational consciousness in the course of the above reconciliation; and since such unity is comprehensively self-conscious, self-consciousness has here ceased to be representational: the dynamic has made its way back into self-consciousness.



175 With spirit thus established in its third element, a self-consciousness common to all, it consists in a community of spirit. The dynamism of the community, as that of a self-consciousness at variance with its representational self-portrayal, makes explicit what has implicitly come to pass. The God-man or man-God who went to his death

is implicitly the communal self-consciousness; that *this is what he is* has to become *evident to this* [communal] self-consciousness. Differently put, since self-consciousness comprises but one side of a contrast set forth in representation, namely that of evil, for which natural existence and individual existence-for-self are deemed to be all that matters—a side portrayed not yet as a mere moment but as standing self-sufficiently on its own—in order that this one side indeed be self-sufficient, it has to rise to the level of spirit existing in [M510] and present to itself, that is, has to exhibit the dynamic of spirit from within.

176 This self-conscious dynamic is spirit as it is naturally. The self has to pull back from this state of naturalness and come into its own, which is tantamount to saying it has to become “evil.” Yet implicitly this dynamic is evil already; its involuting consists thus in convincing itself that natural existence is evil. The world’s becoming and being “matter-of-factly” evil, as well as the divine being’s “matter-of-fact” reconciliation, all takes place within representational consciousness. Yet in keeping with its *form*, what’s thus represented takes place merely as a sublated moment in self-consciousness as such, since the self is negatively complementary [to natural spirit]—hence consists in knowing, an activity on the part of consciousness purely within itself.

177 –Inevitably this moment, this negative complement, shows up in the substantive content [of self-consciousness] as well: For since the divine being is in principle reconciled with itself already and constitutes a spiritual unity in which the representational components are sublated—are mere moments—it’s evident that each such component comes to have a significance quite the opposite of what it did before. The import of each is thus completed in the other, and only in this way is the content spiritual. Since each of these specifications consists equally in its contrary, this unity in otherness, the spiritual nature of each, is complete—whereas previously it was only from our perspective or implicitly that they, each in its opposite significance, were unified, and even the abstract forms ‘same’ and ‘not-same,’ ‘identity’ and ‘nonidentity,’ were sublated.

178 Thus while, in representational consciousness, natural self-consciousness’s way of internalizing was constitutive of “matter-of-fact” evil, in the element of self-consciousness to internalize is to know evil as something inherent in existence. Although coming by such knowledge is then tantamount to evil’s coming into being, all that’s really coming into being here is the idea of evil, something accordingly recognized as the first moment of reconciliation. For to withdraw into oneself from a natural mode of immediacy determined as being evil is to abandon this immediacy and to die to sin. Consciousness isn’t forsaking natural existence as such but only a mode of it that has moreover come to be thought of as evil. The dynamic of involution is thus [M511] mediated even in its immediacy: it presupposes itself or comprises its own foundation—the basis of the involution being that nature is already inherently

involute. On account of evil humankind has to involute, although to do so is itself evil. –This nascent dynamic is thus itself naïvely direct, simplistically conceived, since it's one and the same as the foundation it assumes. This progression, this 'becoming other,' therefore still needs to materialize in a form more appropriate to it.

179 So in addition to this straightforward approach, representational intermediation is needed. Implicit in the "knowledge" that nature is spirit's 'untrue presence,' and that the self is 'involute universality,' lies spirit's self-reconciliation. To an uncomprehending self-consciousness this *implicit* reconciliation takes the form of a *matter-of-fact* reconciliation set forth to it *representationally*. To such self-consciousness, comprehending doesn't consist in grasping this conception by which it's known that sublated naturalness is all-pervasive and thus reconciled with itself, but consists in seizing upon the above manner of representation—in which the divine being is reconciled with its existent presence via the matter-of-fact event of its having abnegated itself through its once-upon-a-time incarnation and death.

180 –This representational grasp of the matter now gives more exact expression to what had previously been referred to as a resurrection in spirit, the process whereby spirit's individuated self-conscious existence becomes something universal: a community. –The death of the God-man is, as death, an abstract negativity, the direct result of a process ending only in universality of a natural sort. In spiritual self-consciousness death loses its natural meaning, being turned into what it is when conceived of as above. Death is transfigured from what it means literally—the nonbeing of this particular individual—into the universality of a spirit dwelling within its community, where each day it dies and rises again.

181 Here, then, something belonging to the element of representation, the notion that absolute spirit is existentially embodied in a single—or rather particular—spirit representative of spirit's nature at large, is introduced into self-consciousness itself, a manner of knowledge that sustains itself in its very otherness. Thus unlike the particular spirit portrayed as having perished [M512] in actual reality, self-conscious being of this sort doesn't really die; rather does its particularity perish in its universality—in its knowing—which is a self-reconciliatory mode of being. The representational element comprising the direct predecessor of this knowledge is thus set forth in sublated form: it has returned into the self, into its conceptual being. What had been merely a matter-of-fact entity has turned out to be a subject. Here indeed the primal element—pure thought and the eternal spirit within it—no longer eludes representational consciousness or exists beyond the self: the reintegration of the whole involves all of its moments being contained within it. The mediator's death, so deeply felt by the self, sublates his objective aspect, his particular presence-to-himself; this particular presence-to-self has become the self-consciousness common to all.

182 –By the same stroke the ‘universal’ on its side has turned out to consist in self-consciousness, and the ‘pure’ (i.e., nonactual) spirit of mere thinking has turned into something actual. The mediator’s death doesn’t just involve the demise of his natural aspect (his particular presence-to-himself), nor that of the already dead husk removed from the vital essence, but also the demise of the divine being’s abstractness. For the mediator, insofar as his death hasn’t yet completed the reconciliation, is a one-sided being who regards as essential the simple reality of thought as opposed to actual reality; this latter extreme, the self, doesn’t yet have a worth equal to that of the divine being—only as spirit does the self have such worth.

183 –Hence the demise of the one who’s thus represented also entails the demise of the abstractness of a divine being that isn’t established as self. This is the anguish felt by the Unhappy Consciousness convinced that God himself has died. These hard words express the most intensely inward form of simple self-knowledge, the reversion of consciousness to the deepest night of the $I = I$, a darkness that no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside itself. Thus while this feeling does in fact constitute a loss of substance (along with whatever this substance faces consciousness with), it is also the pure *subjectivity* integral to this substance—the pure self-certainty that substance had lacked as mere object, as unmediated, as a sheer entity. Such knowledge is the spiritual animator whereby substance, its abstractness and inanimateness now by-gone, has become subject, [M513] hence become self-consciousness that’s actual and simplex and universal.

184 Thus is spirit self-knowing spirit. It knows from within that the object present to it really exists—that the way it represents the matter is altogether true in content, one that, as we’ve seen, is expressive of spirit itself. Moreover it isn’t just self-consciousness’s content, nor is it merely present to self-consciousness, but is its actual spirit as well; and it is this in traversing the three constituent elements of its nature, the dynamic coursing throughout it being what constitutes its very reality. The self-moving: that’s what spirit is, the subject of the dynamic as well as the dynamism itself—substance that has subject astir throughout it. The conceptual nature of spirit that had become evident to us by the time we entered into the sphere of religion—namely the movement that takes place within self-certain spirit as it forgives evil and therein abandons its simplicity and intransigence, a bestirring in which one outright antagonist recognizes that he’s the same as the other, with this realization bursting forth as the Yes! that bridges these extremes—is directly intuited by the religious consciousness to which the absolute being is manifest, and which proceeds to sublate the difference between its self and what it beholds. Even as such consciousness is subject, so also is it substance—and is thus itself spirit precisely because and insofar as it consists in this dynamic.

185 But such a community isn't made complete in the manner of self-consciousness it has here; its substantive content is at every turn present to it in representational form, and even the authentic spirituality it has in taking a step back from representation is still beset by a dualism, as was the [otherworldly] element of pure thought. And a community such as this isn't really aware of what it is. This is a spiritual self-consciousness that doesn't see itself as the object that it is, isn't open to consciousness of its own self, but, being conscious nonetheless, is left with representations of the sort seen above.

186 –At this last pivotal point we see self-consciousness turn inward upon itself and come to know what lies within; we see it leave behind its natural presence and achieve pure negativity. Yet its positive significance—that this negativity, [M514] the pure inwardness of such knowing, is equally a manner of being that's self-concordant (substance having herein attained self-consciousness to the full)—is alien to this devotional mentality. It grasps this aspect—that pure noetic internalization is inherently and entirely simplex, that is, substance—in representational terms, namely as the satisfying result of an outside intervention rather than something that is so by virtue of its conceptual nature. In other words this devotional consciousness doesn't realize that in the very depth of the pure self there is a potency by which the detached divine being is drawn down from its abstractness, even as this consciousness is being raised by the power of *its* pure devotion to the stature of a self.

187 –Action on the part of the self thus continues to have a negative significance counter to the self because substance emerges from its side of the relation as a mode of inhering that the self doesn't grasp and comprehend, let alone find reflected in its action as such. Since this unity of divine being and self nonetheless has implicitly come about, consciousness likewise has some notion that the two are reconciled, albeit as set forth in representation. While securing a measure of satisfaction in thus externally attaching to its pure negativity a positive significance, namely that of its unity with the divine being, such gratification is itself still beset with an obstacle: the beyond. Its own reconciliation accordingly enters upon its consciousness as something remote, something in the distant future, even as the reconciliation achieved by the other self [the God-man] appears as something in the distant past.

188 –Just as the individual human being possessed of divinity has an implicitly existent father and a merely actual mother, so does humankind at large, possessed of divinity—this community—have for its father its own action and knowledge, but for its mother an “eternal love” that it merely *feels* but doesn't directly behold as an actual object. While such a community's reconciliation accordingly takes place in its heart, its conscious existence is still divided, its actual reality still riven.

189 –Pressing upon the community's consciousness is something that's here implicit, namely that aspect of its experience having to do with sheer intermediateness: that any reconciliation lies in the beyond—while what it's faced with as its present reality is this

other, immediate and existential aspect, a world still awaiting its transfiguration. In principle the world is indeed reconciled with the divine being; and no doubt what's here implicit will be known by that being as [M515] no longer something it perceives as a self-estranged objective realm, but rather as one that is like unto it in its love.

190 –For self-consciousness, however, this immediate presence still isn't embodied in the way that spirit is. In its immediate consciousness the communal spirit is thus separate from its religious consciousness, which of course asserts that these shouldn't in principle be separate—although what is so “implicitly” is neither something that's been fully realized nor something that's as yet also totally present to itself. [M516]



VIII

ABSOLUTE KNOWING

1 The spirit of manifest religion still hasn't surmounted its consciousness as such—which is as much as to say that its actual self-consciousness isn't yet the object of its consciousness. Manifest religion's spirit as a whole and the self-differentiating moments integral to it fall within representational thinking and under the form of objectivity. The content of such representation is absolute spirit, and all that's still at issue centers on superseding this bare form; or rather, since this form is part and parcel of consciousness as such, the truth of it must have already turned up in the course of consciousness's own permutations.

2 –For consciousness to surmount its object isn't to be taken in the one-sided sense that its object showed itself to be turning back into the self but in the more definitive sense that the object as such has demonstrated its evanescence to the self, and moreover that it is self-consciousness's act of self-distantiation that sets forth such thinghood—this self-externalization having not just a negative but also a positive import, one evident not only to us (i.e., implicitly) but to self-consciousness itself. It's evident to self-consciousness that the object's negation, its self-sublation, thereby has positive significance: consciousness, having externalized itself thus—either by setting itself forth as an object, or by establishing that the object is identical with it in order to sustain the indivisible unity of its presence to itself—self-consciousness *knows* that object to be a nullity. By the same token another moment is involved here too: consciousness has to the same extent also sublated *itself* as thus externalized and objectified, and has reintegrated this within itself, thus abiding with itself amidst its own integral otherness. Such is the dynamic of consciousness in the totality of its moments.

3 –Consciousness must likewise orient itself to the object in accordance with the totality of the object’s specific modalities, and have comprehended it in accordance with each of them. The totality that they form makes the object in and of itself a spiritual entity—which is what the object truly becomes for consciousness when it grasps each of the object’s modalities as self, [M517] relating to them in the spiritual manner just indicated.

4 The object consists thus partly in some being that’s directly present, that is, some sort of thing (corresponding to immediate consciousness); partly in becoming other than itself or relativized, existing then in relation to what’s other than it as well as in relation to itself, that is, some manner of specificity (corresponding to perception); and partly in some essence, that is, a universal (corresponding to the understanding). Viewed as a whole the object is syllogistic, embracing the movement of the universal through specificity to individuality as well as the reverse—from individuality through specificity (sublated individuality) to the universal.

5 –To know the object as part of itself, consciousness has to know it in accordance with these three modalities. Nonetheless the manner of knowing that we’re talking about here doesn’t consist in sheer object-comprehension but rather in a form of knowing that should be set forth only as it progressively emerges, that is, moment by moment in keeping with that aspect of it which is integral to consciousness as such, and with the moments of conception proper or pure knowing set forth in the form of permutations of consciousness. Accordingly, in consciousness as such the object doesn’t yet appear as a spiritual entity such as we laid out above, and consciousness isn’t disposed to view it either in terms of such a totality per se, nor in that totality’s pure conceptual form. Instead consciousness regards the object in part as basically a permutation of consciousness, and in part as a number of such permutations that we gather together—one in which the totality consisting of the object’s moments and of consciousness’s way of relating to them can be presented only as resolved into the moments of that totality.

6 So all that’s needed for this aspect of object-apprehension, what it consists of in a given permutation of consciousness, is to recall consciousness’s previous permutations just as they came before us. Thus with respect to the object as directly present, some mode of being met with at random, we saw observational reason seeking and finding itself in this or that thing, aware that what it’s thus doing is as externalistic as the observation of the object is an ad hoc procedure. And at its culmination we saw observational reason voice its definitive assessment in the infinite judgment: *The being of the I is a thing*—indeed a sensuous immediate thing—although when the I is referred to as a ‘soul’ in addition to being represented as a thing, it’s portrayed [M518] as invisible, intangible, and so on, and so in fact not as a form of immediate being and not as what one means by a thing. Taken just as it sounds, this judgment is devoid of

spirit, is spiritlessness itself. But in light of its conceptual nature it's in fact consummately spiritual, and the inner aspect of it, which isn't yet evident in this judgment, is given expression in two other moments still to be considered.

7 *The thing is I.* In this infinite judgment the thing is in effect sublated. In itself it's nothing; its significance is relational, existing only via the I and by virtue of its connection to the I. This second moment emerged for consciousness in pure insight and enlightenment. Things are simply useful and are to be taken into account solely with an eye to their utility. –The cultivated self-consciousness that made its way through the world of self-estranged spirit has via its [internally self-abnegative, self-distantiative,] self-externalization engendered a manner of thing part and parcel of itself, in this way maintaining itself in the realm of things while realizing that each of them is non-autonomous, that essentially a thing is such that its very being is sheerly relative to something other than it. Or, to fully spell out this relation (which alone constitutes the nature of the object here), while deeming the thing to exist on its own in relation to itself and declaring sense-certainty to be a form of nonrelativistic truth, self-consciousness insists that this, the thing's relatedness to itself, is but a fleeting moment passing into its opposite, into a mode of being at the disposal of something else.

8 But even thus, knowledge of a thing still isn't complete; it has to be known not just for what it is in its immediacy and specificity, but also for what it is as essence, as inner, as self. This obtains in moral self-consciousness. A self such as this knows that its knowing is what's absolutely essential, that is, knows existence itself sheerly as pure willing, pure knowing—that *to be* is nothing but to will and to know, while anything else amounts to an unessential mode of being, not something that exists in and of itself but only the empty shell thereof. Insofar as moral consciousness, in the way it envisions the world, gives the existential realm some latitude, even in so doing it's reclaiming that realm. As conscience, ultimately, rather than continuing alternately to establish and disestablish existence and self, it knows that its existence [M519] as such consists in this sheer certainty of self. The objective element in which, by taking action, it exerts itself outwardly is nothing other than the pure knowledge the self has of itself.

9 These are the moments on the basis of which spirit is reconciled with the manner of consciousness that's distinctive to it. From each of their perspectives they exist in isolation, and it's solely the unity of their spiritual nature that provides the impetus that reconciles them. But the last of these moments is of necessity itself this very unity, and in fact, as is evident, consolidates them all within itself. A being who exists as spirit and is therein certain of himself has as the elemental constituent of his existence nothing save his knowledge of himself; and when he asserts that he's doing what he's doing out of dutiful conviction, his word is itself the warrant of his action.

10 –The action [of moral self-consciousness] initiates an intrinsic disruption in conceptual simplicity, and also opens the way back out of such disruption. The first development turns into the second because in the public element of recognition simple knowledge of duty is pitted against all the controversy and division that taking action per se involves, besetting it with a stubbornly resistant reality—although, as we’ve seen, in the act of forgiving, such obdurate resistance relents and goes beyond itself.

11 –Thus here actual reality as immediately present is of no significance to self-consciousness other than what’s within the purview of this pure knowing; so too the specific or relational presence that’s here face-to-face with itself consists partly in what the sheerly individual self knows and partly in what’s known to all in common. And with this what’s established is that the third moment—universality, that which is of the essence—matters to each of the two antagonists solely as knowing, and that they ultimately sublate the last vestiges of their futile antagonism and *are* what an I = I *knows*: that the *individual* self is immediately instantiative of a pure knowing, that is, a knowing that is common to all universally.

12 It’s thus evident that this reconciliation of conscious with self-conscious existence is brought about bilaterally, on one side in the religious spirit, on the other in consciousness itself as such. These differ in that in the one the reconciliation takes the form of a being as it is inherently in itself, while in the other taking the form of a being that’s present to [M520] itself. As we saw, consciousness and self-consciousness first emerge separately. In the sequence of permutations in which consciousness emerged for us, it was in part entering into the single moments of that sequence and in part moving toward their eventual integration well before religion fleshed out its object as an actual self-conscious being. The integration of these two sides—bringing to closure the series of spirit’s permutations in which it comes to know itself not just as it is in itself (in accordance with its absolute substantive content), and not just as it is present to itself (in accordance with its substantively contentless form, i.e., from the perspective of self-consciousness) but as it is in *and* present to itself—isn’t there as yet in evidence.

13 Yet such an integration has *in principle* already occurred—indeed in religion, in representation’s return to self-consciousness—albeit not in an appropriate form, since the religious side of the relation is that of a manner of inherency that’s resistant to the dynamic of self-consciousness. Their integration is thus the work of the other side, which by contrast involves a reflection into self and so includes not only itself but also its counterpart, and not just in principle or in a general way but as present to itself, that is, explicitly and distinctly. Both the religious content and the other side—self-conscious spirit insofar as the latter does constitute an “other” side—have been set forth and stand before us in their completeness; all that’s lacking for their integration

is conceptual being's simplex unity. This is already at hand in self-consciousness *per se*, although due to the way it emerged in the preceding, it, like all the other moments involved here, takes the form of a particular permutation of consciousness.

14 –This manner of conceiving is accordingly comprised in that phase of self-certain spirit's process of embodiment in which spirit is in conceptual stasis, and which we referred to as the "beautiful soul." This is spirit's knowledge of itself in its pure transparent unity: a form of self-consciousness that knows such pure knowing of pure inwardness to be what spirit is—not just a beholding of divinity but divinity's own beholding of itself. Intransigently resistant to realization, such conception is one-sidedly formed and ends up pining away ethereally—or else, as we've seen, makes the positive move of getting out of itself and moving on. Realized thus, the tendency of this self-consciousness *sans object* [M521] to keep to itself—with its powers of conception delimited rather than brought to fulfillment—is superseded: its self-consciousness attains the form of universality, and what remains for it to do is genuinely to conceive, conception having then succeeded in being realized. Self-consciousness such as this is what conceiving truly is, self-consciousness at one with its self-distantiation: a knowing of pure knowing—not as consisting in the abstract essence that duty is but as a manner of being comprised in this very knowing, this sheer self-consciousness that's also a genuine object since it's the self existentially present to itself.

15 Such conceiving attained fulfillment on the one hand in a practical, self-assured spirit and on the other in religion, in which it secured an unqualifiedly substantive content—in the form of something other than self, a content that's representationally present to consciousness. In the former embodiment the self is by contrast itself the form, since practical embodiment entails action on the part of a self-assured spirit, a self that's living out a life consisting in spirit through and through.

16 –The practical embodiment, as we see, consists in the simplex conceiving discussed above, which gives up its "eternal essence" and actually exists, that is, acts. In its conceptual purity simplex conceiving has the ability—because it does abstract or negate—to dis sever itself from itself or emerge from within itself. Accordingly it contains the element of its actual reality, its very being, within it—in pure knowing—since such knowing is a form of simplex immediacy consisting as much in its being and presence, namely as negative thinking, as it does in some sort of essence, some manner of positive thought itself. Ultimately, to exist in this way is to that very extent to reflect, existentially as well as with regard to duty, out of knowing and in upon oneself—which is what it is to be evil.

17 –Such an involution turns conception against itself; and with this there emerges a pure knowledge of what's essential that is disengaged and ineffectual. Yet the very fact that this knowledge first comes to light in this conceptual conflict makes it a par-

ticipant therein. Sheerly knowing of an essence is inherently a departure from simplistic thinking, since it consists in a dissevering—in the negativity integral to conception. So far as this dissevering becomes self-oriented, it is ‘evil’; so far as it exists in the manner of an inner principle, it is abidingly ‘good.’

18 –What at first takes place in principle is now also evident to consciousness—even doubly so, as both present to it [in its opposite] and as the way it relates to itself, that is, its own way of acting. What’s already in principle established [M522] now reverberates as something that consciousness knows and is consciously enacting. Each of the two abandons vis-à-vis the other the self-sufficing sure-mindedness with which it confronts that other. Such a relinquishment is tantamount to abandoning the conceptual one-sidedness that in principle initiated the encounter, although now the act of abandoning is consciousness’s own act, just as the way of conceiving that it forsakes is its own. What initially existed here in principle is in truth, due to its negativity, to the same extent mediated; the way that it exists in truth is thus now also the way that it’s affirmed—with each negative complement present to the other in its specific way while being inherently self-superseding.

19 –One of the two participants in this opposition is incongruously pent up within its individualistic existence at odds with their common universality; the other exists in the manner of an incongruously abstract universal as opposed to a self. The former dies to its self-orientedness, comes out of itself and confesses; the latter renounces the intransigence of its abstract universality, thus dying to its lifeless self and stagnant universality. In this way the former makes itself whole via the moment of universality whereby an essence has actual existence, and the latter does so via the universality entailed in being a self. Through this dynamic of active engagement, spirit—which is spirit only when it *exists*, raising its matter-of-fact presence into thought and hence into something completely tensive, and returning therefrom precisely in and through this dynamic—has emerged as the pure universality of a way of knowing that’s conscious of itself, as self-consciousness abiding in the simplex unity of knowing.

20 Thus what in religion was present as a substantive content, the form that the representation of something *other* has, is here the self’s own action. Conceiving it is what binds this content to the action of the self; for, as we see, conceiving it is tantamount to knowing that the action of the self within the self’s own ambit is all that’s essential and all that’s there—is to know that the subject [doing the conceiving] is the substance [of the conceiving], and that the substance of it is the self’s knowing what it is doing. Our only contribution here has been in part to assemble the individual moments [of conceiving], each of which exhibits via its own principle the life of spirit as a whole, and in part to adhere to the conceptual in the form integral to it—the content of which would have already emerged in each of these moments, each in the form of a permutation of consciousness. [M523]

21 The last of spirit's embodiments—spirit that endows its complete and true content with the form of self, and thereby realizes its conceptual nature even while continuing to abide within that conceptual nature—is absolute knowing: spirit that knows itself in the way that spirit is embodied, spirit that knows itself conceptually. Truth isn't completely the same as certainty just implicitly; it's even embodied in the way that self-certainty is: as existing in its own presence—which means that it is present to a knowing spirit in the form of that spirit's knowledge of itself.

22 –In religion, truth is a substantive content that isn't as yet identical with spirit's certainty. But it *is* thus identical once that content has become embodied as self. Thereby the self has itself become the element within which it is matter-of-factly present, that is, a form of objectivity that's present to consciousness, having itself become what it is in essence: a mode of conceiving. Spirit appearing to consciousness—or (equivalently) being brought forth here by consciousness in the element of conception—is *science*.

23 Thus by virtue of the way in which its nature, moments, and dynamic have come to light, such knowing is self-consciousness's pure presence-to-self. It is an I that is *this* particular I and no other I, and yet one that's immediately mediated or sublated, a universal I.

24 –This I has a content that it distinguishes from itself, consisting as it does in a form of pure negativity or self-dissociation: it is conscious being. A content such as this, in its very distinctness, is itself I, for it consists in the self-superseding dynamism, the same pure negativity, that the I itself is. In this content, as differentiated, the I reflects into itself—is a content comprehended simply by the fact that its otherness is at one with it itself. More exactly put, this content consists in nothing other than the dynamic spelled out above, since, embodying as it does the conceptual nature integral to spirit's objective existence, it itself is spirit traversing itself, and indeed doing so on its own behalf as spirit.



25 Concerning the existence of this manner of conception, science doesn't appear in time and reality before spirit has arrived at such an awareness of itself. Spirit that knows what it is doesn't exist at all until it has completed the task of overcoming its imperfect form, providing [M524] for its consciousness an embodiment of its essential nature and in this way achieving congruity between its self-conscious and its conscious existence. Once differentiated into its various moments in and relative to itself, spirit is a manner of knowing that is *present to* itself, having an 'overall grasp' that as such hasn't yet gotten at what substance is—in other words isn't yet, integrally in itself, a form of knowing that is absolute.

26 In actual reality noetic substance exists then prior to its form, its conceptual embodiment—substance being something that’s inherent but as yet undeveloped, a ground and conceptual principle in its as-yet-inactivated simplicity, and hence the inner being or self of a spirit that doesn’t really exist yet. What *is* there is as yet present in its undeveloped simplicity and immediacy—basically the kind of object that falls within the purview of representational consciousness. Discernment of that sort—as a spiritual awareness for which what’s inherent [in substance] exists only insofar as it is such being as is *present to* and *consists of self* (i.e., a way of conceiving)—for that very reason has at first but a meager object in contrast to which substance and *its* [eventual] consciousness are richer. The manifestation of substance in representational consciousness is actually a kind of concealment, since there substance consists of being that’s as yet bereft of [substance’s fully activated] self, and manifests mere self-certainty.

27 –What self-consciousness is in possession of initially is thus only the abstract moments of substance, although, due to their being the sheer dynamisms that they are, they impel themselves onward, and self-consciousness goes on enriching itself until it has wrested from the whole of substance what’s there to be had in such consciousness and has absorbed into itself the entire edifice of substance’s essential modalities; and since this negative orientation to objectivity is nonetheless positive—an affirmation—self-consciousness has generated these modalities from within its own resources and so reaffirmed them for consciousness. Hence in conceiving that knows itself as a form of conceptual being, these moments appear earlier than the fully fleshed-out whole, which comes into being in the course of their dynamic. In conscious existence, by contrast, the whole exists prior to the moments, albeit without being conceptually comprehended.

28 –Time is conceptual being itself, matter-of-factly presenting itself to consciousness as something vaguely intuited, on account of which spirit emerges perforce in the course of time, doing so as long as it doesn’t have a full grasp of its pure conceptual nature, hasn’t, in other words, annulled time. Time, the “external” self as intuited by the self rather than the pure self as grasped comprehendingly by the self, is but intuited [M525] conceptual being. In coming to grasp itself, conception sublates its temporal form, comprehends this intuition, and is then a comprehended and comprehending intuition. Time thus appears as the destiny and necessity of spirit that isn’t internally complete, as the compelling need to enrich self-consciousness’s share of conscious existence, to bestir the immediacy (the form in which substance is present in consciousness) of what in and of itself is, or conversely, to realize and manifest this inherent being that’s regarded as inner (as indeed it is at first)—to vindicate it for spirit’s certainty of self.

29 Accordingly it must be said that nothing is known that isn’t in experience, or as is also said, nothing is known that isn’t “felt” to be true, that isn’t present as an inwardly

revealed eternal verity, as a sacred object of belief, or however else it might be put. For experience consists precisely in this: that a content, here namely spirit, is in and of itself a form of substance and as such an object of consciousness. Yet this same substance—spirit—is in process of becoming what it has latently within it to be; and solely as an internally self-reflective process such as this is spirit inherently what spirit is in truth. It inheres in the dynamic that knowing is—transforming the implicit into the self-evident, substance into subject, the object of consciousness into the object of self-consciousness—into a sublated object: a concept. This is a dynamic that cycles back upon itself, presupposes its beginning, and only at the end arrives at that beginning.

30 –Thus insofar as spirit of necessity undergoes internal differentiation, the whole of it as intuited comes into contrast with its simple self-consciousness; and as the whole does this, it differentiates into its intuited purely *conceptual* presence—time—and into a *substantive* content, that which is implicitly inherent within it. As subject, substance is compelled, by what's initially an inner necessity, to manifest to itself what it is in itself: spirit. Only in the completed objective presentation does substance moreover have its reflection, its emergence as self. Hence until spirit is complete within itself, until it has fulfilled itself as world-spirit, it can't be fully consummated as self-conscious [M526] spirit. Thus although what spirit entails is given expression in the content of religion earlier than it is in science, only in the latter does spirit truly know itself.

31 The process of advancing the form of its self-knowledge is the work that spirit accomplishes as actual history. The religious community, inasmuch as it is but the initial instantiation of absolute spirit's substance, consists in a crude form of consciousness. The way of life of such consciousness is all the harsher and more barbaric the more depth its inner spirit has; and its torpid self accordingly has all the harder a struggle with its essence, with this—to it alien—content of its own consciousness. Not until consciousness has given up all hope of overcoming this foreignness in an externalistic, outlandish manner does it turn to itself, because it's in superseding such alien ways that it is brought back within self-consciousness. Not until then does it turn to its own world and presence, discover this as its own possession, and so take the first step toward coming down out of the "intellectual world," or rather animating the abstract element of that world with the actual self.

32 –Through observation, consciousness encounters existence in the form of thought and comprehends it; conversely, in its thinking it engages existence. Hence no sooner has consciousness abstractly affirmed the unequivocal oneness of thinking and being, the oneness of abstract essence and self—thus expressing the primal light in a purer form, namely as the unity of extension and being (extension here constituting a simple unity that more closely resembles pure thought than does light), and by so doing reviving in thought the substance of the Orient—than spirit recoils in horror from this abstract oneness, this substantiality that has no self, and in opposition to it affirms individuality.

33 –Yet only when spirit has self-distantiatively externalized this individuality in the form of culture, thus making it matter-of-factly present and insinuating it throughout the whole of existence—only when spirit has arrived at the idea of utility and in total freedom grasped this existence as its own will—only then does it bring to light the thought that lies in its innermost depths, openly affirming that what's of the essence is I = I. But this I = I is an internally self-reflecting dynamism; for inasmuch as such identity, due to its utter negativity, is in process of out-and-out variation, the self-identity of such an I stands in stark contrast with this sheer diversification—which, by virtue of its being at once pure and yet objectively evident to the self-knowing self, [M527] is to be explicated in terms of time. So whereas essence used to be explicated as a unity of thought and extension, now it would need to be grasped as a unity of thought and time, although left to itself variation—time restless and relentless—sooner coincides with itself internally. Whereas the former unity is comprised in the objective repose of extension, the latter unity consists in a form of pure *identity with self*: the I. –The I, in other words, isn't just self; rather is it the self's identity with itself.

34 –But identity such as this is in complete and immediate unity with itself: subject that is coequally substance. Substance present to itself alone would constitute a manner of intuiting devoid of any content, or the intuiting of a content that, in its specifics, would be wholly fortuitous and devoid of necessity. Substance would pass for something absolute solely insofar as it were to be thought of or intuited as an absolute oneness. And all content would, due to its diversity, have to fall outside substance in a manner of reflection that's extraneous to substance, since substance wouldn't then be subject, wouldn't be grasped as reflecting upon itself, or reflecting itself into itself—in other words wouldn't be grasped as spirit. Were mention made of a content nonetheless, the point of doing so would be merely to toss it into the abyss of the absolute, even as this content is on the other hand being snatched up in external fashion from sense perception. Knowing would then seem to be stumbling upon all sorts of things that are distinct from it and each other—without one's having so much as a clue as to how and why.

35 But spirit has shown us that it doesn't consist either in self-consciousness that just withdraws into its pure inwardness or that's sheerly submerged in substance at large, with its own distinctness nullified. Rather is spirit the self in process of distantiating itself from itself per se and immersing itself in the substance that's integral to it—having as subject entered into itself as it emerged from substance, making this substance into an object and a content even while sublating the distinctness of that objectivity and content. This first reflection out of immediacy is the subject's differentiation of itself from the substance integral to it, that is, conception in process of dividing itself from within: the involution and coming into being of the pure I. Because this differentiation consists in the pure act of I equating to I, such conceiving both necessitates and emerges as a matter-of-fact presence that has substance for [M528] its

essence and is sustained in relation to itself. But what sustains this presence in relation to itself is the conceiving that has thus been established in the determinate realm, fathoming its own internal dynamic within this simplex substance that exists as subject only when present in the form of this very negativity and dynamic.

36 –The I has no need to entrench itself in the form of self-consciousness in opposition to the form of substantiality and objectivity, as though it were in dread of ending up somehow shut outside itself. Rather is spirit's strength such that it stays self-same in the very process of distancing itself from itself; by virtue of its existing both in and present to itself, it puts both presence-to-self and existence-in-self in their place as mere moments. Nor is the I some third term that casts differentiae back into an abyssal absolute and declares that in it they're all the same. Knowing sooner consists in this seemingly passive role, merely taking note of how what has thus been differentiated is animated from within and returns to a unity of its own.



37 In knowing, then, spirit has concluded the process of embodying itself insofar as accomplishing this is burdened with consciousness's unsurmounted heterogeneity. Spirit has attained to the pure element of its existence, its conceptual presence. In keeping with the freedom integral to its being, spirit's content is the self distantiating itself [internally], something unequivocally unitary: self-knowledge. This purely self-distantiative dynamic necessitates the content it contemplates. As thus specified, any such heterogeneous content is relative rather than contained in itself, and being thus restlessly in flux, is self-sublative—that is, a form of negativity. Thus what's necessitated—this heterogeneity—is as much self as it is independently existent being; and in this form—as self, with existence directly present as thinking—the content is conceptual.

38 –Once spirit has thus arrived at this manner of conceiving, it unfolds an existential realm and dynamic in the ether within which it abides and exists as science. Here the moments of its dynamic no longer manifest themselves as specific permutations of consciousness but rather, since any variation that consciousness undergoes has been reintegrated with the self, as specific modes of conceiving in their organic, internally grounded dynamic. Whereas in a phenomenology of spirit each moment involves some manner of discrepancy between knowledge and truth together with the dynamic in which [M529] that discrepancy is superseded, science by contrast involves no such discrepancy and no such superseding, since in science each moment has the form that conception has, bringing the objective form of truth and that of the knowing self into direct unity. Each moment [of scientific experience], rather than appearing as a phenomenological dynamic—a shifting back and forth from consciousness or representation to self-consciousness—is embodied in pure form, freed from the apparentness

it has in consciousness: pure conceiving and its processual dynamic depend solely on that moment's own pure specificity. On the other hand, to each abstract moment of science there corresponds a generic permutation of manifest spirit. While existentially engaged spirit is no richer than science, in content it is no poorer. Distinguishing the pure concepts of science in this form, as permutations of consciousness, constitutes that aspect of science's reality in accordance with which the process of forming concepts (science's very essence) is set forth within her in its simplex intermediative capacity as thinking, takes notice of the moments of this mediation severally, and manifests itself in accordance with their inner tensiveness.

39 That it relinquish the form of 'pure conception' and effect conception's outward transition into conscious existence is an integral necessity for science. Self-knowing spirit, precisely by grasping its conceptual nature, constitutes an immediate self-identity that, amidst *its* diversity, consists in certainty of what's directly present: sense-consciousness, the beginning from which we started. Spirit's emancipating itself thus from the very form of its self constitutes the supereminent freedom and surety of its self-knowledge.

40 But even with this, science's externalization isn't yet complete; it expresses self-certainty's relation to an object that, precisely in being thus related, hasn't yet achieved its complete freedom. Knowing knows not only itself but also what's negatively complementary to it—that is, knows its limit. And to know its limit is tantamount to knowingly sacrificing itself. The sacrifice consists in an externalization in which spirit manifests, in the form of independent events at random, its coming to be spirit, intuiting its pure self as time existing outside it, and its being as space. [M530] This latter aspect of spirit's emergence, nature, is its living, immediate becoming. Nature, self-externalized spirit, is in its matter-of-fact presence nothing but the endless externalization of its ongoing existence and is the process that generates the subject.

41 The other aspect of spirit's emergence, history, is a knowing, self-mediative process of becoming: spirit externalized in time—an externalization that's by that very fact self-distantiative: a negating that's negative of itself. This process of becoming manifests a stately progression of spirits, a gallery of portraits each of which, endowed with the full wealth of spirit, moves so slowly just because the self has to penetrate and digest this, the entire wealth of its substance. Since spirit's consummation consists in full knowledge of what it is, of its own substance, such knowledge has it turning inward upon itself, leaving behind its present existence and giving this embodiment over to recollection.

42 –Although in thus turning inward spirit is immersed in the night of its own self-consciousness, its bygone existence is preserved therein, and this superseded presence—spirit's previous existence now reborn in knowledge—constitutes a new existential presence, a new world and embodiment of spirit. Here spirit must, just as

spontaneously as before, start out afresh with what it immediately is and grow to maturity, as though all that had gone before were lost to it, and as though it had learned nothing from the experience of earlier spirits. But inward recollection has preserved this experience—and is an internalized and indeed more advanced form of substance. So although this spirit begins its cultivation anew and seemingly from nothing but its own inner resources, it's actually starting at a more advanced stage.

43 –The realm of spirits thus fashioned in actual existence constitutes a succession in which one spirit has relieved the other and each has taken over from its predecessor the worldly realm. The aim of this succession is to disclose spirit's depth, which is conceptual through and through. Such a disclosure is accordingly sublimative of spirit's [initially unfathomed] depth, thus revealing spirit's own extendedness, the negativity of this inwardly abiding I, a negativity that consists in the I's self-distantiiveness—comprising its very substance. Moreover this disclosure reveals spirit's temporal nature, in that this same process of self-distancing is *internally* self-distantiative, existing in its extendedness as well as within its inner depth, the self.

44 –The goal, absolute [M531] knowledge, [or emancipated knowing,] spirit that knows itself as spirit, takes the path of recollecting these spirits as they are in themselves and as they complete the organization of their realm. Their preservation, viewed from the perspective of their spontaneous existence appearing in the form of contingency, is history, but, viewed from the perspective of their conceptual organization, is the science of knowledge in process of appearing. These together, that is, history comprehended, comprise the recollective internalization and the Calvary of absolute spirit, the reality, truth, and certainty of its throne, without which it would exist in lifeless isolation. Only

from the chalice of this realm of spirits
does there foam forth to Geist its infinity.¹



1. A free adaptation from the last stanza of Friedrich Schiller's poem "Friendship."

CONCEPTUAL AND TOPICAL INDEX

Note: In the following, the initial letter 'P' refers to the preface, 'In' to the introduction, and the numerals 'I . . . VIII' to chapters I through VIII. The Arabic numerals following these identifiers refer to the paragraph number(s) in the preface, introduction, or cited chapter.

the abiding concern. *See* concern

abnegation, self-externalization, internal self-distanciation, emanation [*die Entäußerung*]

'Abnegation' involves self-denial, giving up or relinquishing something (as, say, a right or privilege), and in chapter VI it plays a crucial role in the process of acculturation [*Bildung*]. Etymologically considered, it might be translated as "en-outering," involving a self-externalization in the sense of 'getting out of or beyond oneself as one is'—toward becoming a more complex and expansive self. Consider the Latin *educare*: 'to educate,' literally, 'to lead out or be led out,' namely out from the primitive, naïve, or as-yet-inchoate self toward a mature and informed self. When this process becomes internalized, it reaches its greatest potential for self-liberation, involving one's distancing oneself from oneself self-critically, enabling a greater degree of inner objectivity and realism (this being the foundation of what Hegel refers to as 'absolute knowing').

—as an already present purpose and means to cultivation, VI.87–93

—conception considered as directly intuited self-emanating necessity, VII.129–39

—as integrally essential to science/absolute knowing, VIII.2, 14, 33–44

absolute: 'the absolute,' what absolutely is, what's absolutely true [*das Absolute*]

This concept ranges from an 'abyssal entity in which all diversity reduces to sameness,' to pure insight's concept of 'pure thought present as an absolute, that is, as internally undifferentiated, indeterminate, and predicateless,' to *Geist* in its true, fully thought-through reality—liberated from natural and self-imposed thresholds of oblivion (< *L absolutus*, -a, -um, 'unfettered, emancipated'). When used in a general sense, this term

ranges from ‘pure, complete, or thorough’ (as in ‘absolute nonsense’), to ‘unrestricted’ or ‘total’ (as in ‘total freedom’), to simply ‘nonrelative’ or ‘nonrelativistic.’

In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* Hegel takes note of Spinoza’s active disapproval of the many opinions, errors, and thoughtless passions of humankind, and asserts that adopting the standpoint of Spinozism, freeing oneself of all such particulars, is essential to philosophizing. Hegel says that one’s soul must “bathe in this aether of the one substance, in which everything one has held as true comes to naught,” and that “this negation of all such particulars, to which each philosopher must come, emancipates spirit and is its absolute foundation [ist die Befreiung des Geistes und seine absolute Grundlage].”¹

—as “directly known, felt, or intuited,” P.8

—as conceived of in formalistic thinking, P.18

—as spirit, P.26–30

—represented as inaccessible to intellect, In.1–5

—as truth, as absolutely what is, and as absolute knowing, In.4, 28

—the “absolute” distinctiveness of things, which proves to be sheerly relative,

II.18–19

—a manner of inner truth and universal free of the opposition of the particular, III.21

—the understanding’s absolute conceptual principle: simplex infinity, III.52

—the I as absolute yet absolutely mediative in immediate self-consciousness, IV.36

—individual consciousness: a manner of being that is inherently absolute, V.1

—the category as a form of being that is absolute, V.304

—a concern that is absolute (i.e., with certainty concordant with truth), V.305

—absolute conceptualization making itself its own abstract, pure object, VI.225–26

—pure materiality as pure abstraction, an entity of sheer thought present in the manner of an absolute—internally undifferentiated and predicateless,

VI.227–33

—as absolute or total freedom—and the terror that ensues, VI.241–69

—absolute being: self-consciousness present to itself as a real substance, VI.269–71

—duty as absolute: self-consciousness bound by duty alone, VI.272–73

—conscience: a spirit certain of itself as a form of being and truth that is absolute, VI.330

—absolute (or emancipated) knowing, VIII.1–44

abstraction [*die Abstraktion*]

This word derives from the Latin *abstractum*, the participle of the infinitive *abstrahere*, meaning, in its most literal sense, ‘to pull or tear off, to drag or tear away, to take away by force,’ and figuratively ‘to free or release.’ The adjective form is *abstractus*, *-a*, *-um* meaning ‘separated or isolated from.’ –As used by Hegel, it generally means that something is as yet conceptualized incompletely, outside its broader experiential context and its fully thought-through, concretely integrated interrelatedness.

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 3:165.

- the abstractness of sense-certainty's initial knowledge of its truth, I.2–3
- as met with in the assertions of inchoate Idealism, V.14
- the laws of inorganic nature existing as things that function as abstractions, V.105
- actively solipsistic self-consciousness's abstract conception of 'being,' V.209–12
- the abstract character of shallow, inchoate forms of self-conscious spirit, V.259
- self-consciousness as able to abstract from any particular facet of itself, VI.128–36
- unrestricted conception making itself its abstract, purely conceptual object, VI.225
- pure matter as a pure abstraction, an entity of sheer thought, VI.226–33
- the abstractness of immediacy superseded by self-consciousness mediation, VI.263–67
- “pure” abstract duty versus duty that is concretely interrelated with otherness, VI.340–42
- and the “beautiful soul,” a self honed to the epitome of abstraction, VI.372–75

achievement/accomplishment [*das Werk*] (achieve < OFr *achever*, to finish, complete, e.g., a piece of work)

The German term *Werk* usually means a 'deed or act,' or a 'work' such as a book or work of art; and in the plural it can mean a 'factory' (e.g., an iron works), a 'mechanical device' (e.g., a clock works). But as this concept is used in chapter V, its central thrust has to do with a virtually solipsistic and certainly sociopathic process of self-realization via acts of individualistic accomplishment or “achievement”—and in English the usual meanings of 'work' just don't go far enough to convey the essential concept adequately.

- as the reality that a conscious being gives himself, V.278–84
- sociopathic reason's “true achievement”: wanting to do something and doing it, V.285
- and the abiding concern, V.285–91

action/actualization [*das Handeln, die Handlung, das Tun/die Verwirklichung*]

Hegel's interest here focuses on the individual and on existence-for-self, which he associates with Aristotle's concept *energeia*—the actualization of a real potential in actual reality.

- vis-à-vis formative activity (work that establishes form), IV.43–47
- existence-for-self as the principle of individuality, conscious being in action, V.110
- what one actually does versus what one means to do (intention), V.136
- as the true being of the individual, V.141–43
- to actually do something equated with existing consciously as an individual, V.239
- as its own immanent truth and reality, its purpose; to manifest individuality, V.259–60
- as self-containedly unitary in thought, seamlessly unitary in actual existence, V.261–63
- as self-conforming form versus the nonconformity of conceiving and reality, V.282–83
- and “true achievement” as constitutive of the abiding concern, V.285–91
- as splitting spirit into substance and consciousness of substance—while also disrupting both substance and consciousness, VI.10–11, 42–68

- in the form of a transgression whereby one, out of ignorance, incurs guilt, VI.45–58
- moral action as viewed in postulated harmonies between morality and reality, VI.276–97
- moral “pure” duty versus inaction, futile action, and moral half-measures, VI.306–16
- moral action as conscientious actualization versus the moralistic mentality’s ineffectual “pure” duty, VI.335–46
- in conscientiously and comprehensively attentive moral consciousness faced with the conceivably endless moral ramifications of actual reality, VI.345–50

alienation. *See* self-estrangement

analogy [*die Analogie*]

- as reducing necessity to probability, V.31–32

das Ansichsein/das Ansich/das Ansichseiende: the being or existence of anything in itself; the self-contained, inherent being or essence of any entity; and what anything is potentially, latently, implicitly, or in principle

See the discussion of this concept in the translators’ introduction, xxiv–xxvi.

- as spirit’s very substance, albeit as yet evident to spirit only in principle, P.29
- as essence or criterion of truth, In.16–19
- as related to self-related and other-related being, VI.233–39
- morality’s *actual* reality as essential “implicitly” [*an sich seiend*] versus essential “in principle” [*ansichseiende*], VI.304–5

das An-und-fürsichsein: an entity’s existence in and relative to itself; its existence in itself and present to itself; its existence considered as self-contained and/or self-oriented

See the discussion of this concept in the translators’ introduction, xxvi–xxvii.

- our investigation’s aim: to view the object as it is in and present to itself, In.19
- the individual in and relative to himself as viewed by physiognomic “science,” V.120–22
- individuality that deems itself to be self-containedly real and realistically self-oriented, V.259–62
- the category’s emergence as spirit, an entity existing in and present to itself, VI.1–2
- the end of the world of ethical substantiality as the I emerges in and for itself, VI.69–71
- and the incapacity of the narcissistic mentality to objectify itself as a “beautiful soul,” VI.374–75

anxiety [*die Angst*]. *See* fear

appearance [*die Erscheinung*]

- and its relation to falsity, P.49
- and its relation to truth—a “bacchanalian revel,” as it were, P.62–63
- as ultimately identical with truth, In.28

- vis-à-vis the supersensible realm, III.19–22
- the law of appearances versus the law of the inner; and the inverted world, III.43–50
- the sensuous realm as having such subsistence as appearance has, IV.6–7

argumentation [*das Rasonnieren*]

- in contrast to conceptualization, P.66, 80–82

becoming, the process of coming into being and developing or becoming other [*das Werden, das Anderswerden*]

- as a ‘turning-into-something-else,’ alteration, P.23–25
- the self abstracting itself from itself while reintegrating its self-identity, P.74
- becoming and time, the processes of internal self-distantiation and recollective internalization, VIII.41–44

being [*das Sein*]

- As Hegel uses this term, it ranges in meaning from (1) ‘matter-of-fact being,’ to (2) the amorphous concept ‘being per se,’ to (3) the minimalist notion ‘what simply is or exists,’ or (4) just ‘the way things are’ (i.e., the current situation or existent state of affairs). It’s also used in all sorts of combinations, for example, ‘organic being,’ ‘sensuous being,’ ‘abstract being,’ and so on; and in many contexts it appears virtually interchangeable with some senses of *Wesen* (but less as an ‘essence’ and more as an ‘entity’ or ‘mode of being’). In his *Science of Logic* Hegel asserts that “*das Sein ist Schein*.”²—that ‘being is what appears to be’ in both a positive and a negative light—one implication of which is that it then involves a conscious subject to whom it’s appearing just as it is, while on the other hand quite conceivably appearing only as it seems to be. –In his *Encyclopedia* Hegel noted further that ‘reality’ is a very ambiguous word; we can add, so is ‘being.’
- fully mediated being: a content directly present as I, as self, as conceptual, P.48
 - substance grasped conceptually as thinking (as subject), and thought (nous) grasped conceptually as substance, P.76–77
 - that whatever exists has its conceptual integrity *integral to its very being* is what logical necessity consists in, P.78
 - in its immediacy, as directly present to consciousness, I.1–3
 - the being of life’s diverse constituents as comprising nature’s infinite flux, IV.9
 - as initially thought of in actively solipsistic self-consciousness, V.204–8
 - as united with action in the “true achievement,” the abiding concern, V.285
 - conceived of in the manner of an absolute (consisting sheerly in thought), VI.225–29
 - pure being as sheerly abstract, that is, as thought—and thought as simplex, that is, as inclusive of self-consciousness’s negative complement: pure being, VI.230–35
 - absolute being: self-consciousness’s knowledge having become present to itself as a real substance, VI.270–72

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1975), 2:9.

category [*die Kategorie*]

- its meaning in former eras versus in modern philosophy, V.8
- as the simplex oneness of self-consciousness and being, V.8
- as retaining its identity amidst its integral diversity, V.9
- as individuality, the negative category, V.11–12
- as observation's culminating judgment, that the self is a thing, V.174–81
- as projected onto reality by actively solipsistic self-consciousness, V.207–10
- as met with in individuality that deems itself self-containedly real, V.259–62
- as one with the content and form of self-consciousness, V.303
- as a form of being that is absolute, V.304
- ultimately as an entity existing both in and present to itself, VI.1

causality. *See* force; purpose

certainty [*die Gewißheit*]

- as embodied in the category, V.5–12
- and the certainty of being all reality, V.259–62
- a concern that is absolute, having no discrepancy between certainty and truth, V.305
- as spirit (once reason's certainty of being all reality is raised to truth), VI.1
- See also* self; self-certainty

character. *See* ethical substantiality

conception, concepts, conceiving, conceptualization, and conceptual being [*der Begriff*]

Etymologically the German *Begriff* (concept) and related verb *begreifen* (to grasp, comprehend) are similar to the Latin *conceptus* (< *con* + *capere*: literally, 'to take or grasp together') in that they all suggest a physical act, but figuratively denote a mental act. Hegel uses *Begriff* over and over; but we translate it, depending on context, in all the above ways and add 'coherence' as well as 'cohesiveness,' referring to the logical interconnectedness integral to objective reality. –In Hegel's thought, logic isn't an abstract system applied externally to the actual world, nor is it something that just happens to be "present" in the actual; rather is it integral to the makeup and workings of things themselves—integral to the conceptual nature of being itself—which he clearly states in paragraph 78 of the preface (cf. his later assertion, "That which is rational is what's actually real, and that which is actually real is what's rational," and Spinoza's proposition, "The order and interconnectedness of ideas is the same as the order and interconnectedness of things"). –Moreover, whatever any being manages to do in actual reality—no matter how grand or trivial, beneficial or horrific—is a demonstration of its identity *in the context of* the logic at work in all actual reality. It is this actual universal logic that enables spirit/intelligence to know itself and its world, and to know other self-conscious beings like itself for who and what they are by what they do and have done. –Thus is conception, to borrow a phrase from Dante, Hegel's *vendetta di Dio*.

- scientific conceptualization versus intuition, P.8–9
- conceptual development and intelligibility, P.14–15
- conception as spirit in process of objectively generating itself, P.29
- familiar representations versus dynamic conception, P.39–47
- concepts as the substance of spirit's dynamic being, P.44
- fully mediated being: a content directly present as I, as self, as conceptual, P.48
- conception in relation to the substantive content of experience, P.74–78
- scientific conception versus argumentative and representational thinking, P.80–84
- in its initially unrealized state, In.9
- its corresponding (or not) to its object, In.19–20
- Stoicism's conception of its self, IV.50–51
- self-consciousness's initial concept of its object, V.2
- the conceptual nature of reason, V.27
- and the myriad specifics of observed nature, V.28–30
- and organic entities, V.38–47
- and inorganic entities, V.39–42
- nature's freedom from the sway of the conceptual, V.69
- the observable conceptual being of inorganic nature and organic nature, V.105
- conceiving found to exist only in self-conscious beings, V.105
- existence-for-self as the principle of individuality: conscious being in action, V.110
- self-consciousness as spirit's own conceptual being, V.200–203
- in individuality that deems itself to be all reality, V.264–67, 277–87
- as a form of negativity consisting in simplex knowing—knowing itself and its opposite (an opposite sublated within it), VI.178, 179
- faith's conceiving of a deity and relating to that being in thought and action, VI.192–206
- self-conscious negativity as conceptual—actively encroaching upon its opposite, VI.209–24
- absolute (unrestricted) conception making itself its own abstract object, VI.225–33
- consciousness's conceptual principle found in utility—something predicable of an object rather than a subject, VI.234–39
- moral self-consciousness as interrelated with otherness via its conceptualizing, VI.273
- 'creation' as religious representation's word for conception, VII.156
- and noetic substance, VIII.25–36
- matter-of-factly extant in the form of time, VIII.28
- and science, absolute knowing, VIII.14, 37–44

concern, business, undertaking, endeavor, enterprise; matter at hand, subject matter [*die Sache*], the abiding concern, what really matters, the essential endeavor [*die Sache selbst*]

See the discussion of both of these concepts in the translators' introduction, xix–xx.

- and philosophical/scientific conception, P.4
- the abiding concern and "true achievement," V.285–89
- the specific nature of a concern versus that of a thing, V.289

- the checkered experiential pursuit of one's abiding concern, V.290–303
- for an entity consisting in spirit, that is, for humans individually and at large, V.301–3
- ethical substance as a verity and concern that is absolute, V.305–6
- and the emergence of spirit's ethical reality, VI.1–7
- as embodied in the form of a public achievement via state power, VI.99

conscience [*das Gewissen*]

- as a manner of self comprised in a spirit which is certain that it directly embodies a form of absolute truth and being, VI.328–29
- contrasted with the self and sense of duty as variously encountered in the ethical world, the cultural world, and the moral world-view, VI.330–41
- as the communal/universal element of self-conscious beings vis-à-vis the abiding concern of individualistic self-consciousness, VI.342–43
- viewed with regard to the individual and public aspects of moral self-consciousness as it actively makes its self as such present to others, VI.344–69
- as envisioned by the mentality that would exist as a “beautiful soul,” VI.370–75
- considered in its actual reality, VI.376–96

consciousness [*das Bewußtsein*]/awareness, conscious being, conscious existence

- the integral moments of consciousness, P.47–48
- natural consciousness as knowledge only in concept, not in reality, In.9
- as immediately transcending its own confines, In.13–14
- as self-examining even with regard to its own standards of truth, In.20–22
- as present to itself in the first emergence of self-consciousness, III.58
- the mind's integral comprehensiveness as the essential nature of the conscious individual, V.113
- an entity consisting in spirit as conscious being at large and as a given self-conscious being, V.304
- pure consciousness, as embodied variously in pure insight and in faith, VI.148–57
- its conceptual principle found in utility, albeit as an object and predicate rather than as a subject, VI.235–41
- as having its certainty of self—what it knows—as its object, VI.270
- in religion, VII.7–12; VIII.1–8

content [*der Inhalt*], the substantive ‘other’ or objective aspect of conception, experience or thought

- fully mediated being: a content directly present as I, as self, as conceptual, P.48
- as entailing a logical dynamic integrally its own, P.71–73
- vis-à-vis the conceptual process itself, P.74–75
- as present in the opposition of self-relatedness and relativity to otherness, III.4–5
- as no different from form in force as conceived by the understanding, III.15
- and form in reductive psychology, V.107–8
- as contradictory in the moral world-view (along with its form), VI.328–29
- as present noncontradictorily in conscience, VI.330–32

contingency, coincidence; something utterly gratuitous [*die Zufälligkeit; etwas Zufälliges*]
 —and ethical substantiality, V.318–20
 —and moral action, VI.293

contradiction/contradictoriness [*der Widerspruch*]
 —and Skepticism, IV.58–62
 —and Idealism, V.14
 —and the moral world-view amidst its revisions and shifting stances, VI.273–327
 —of the moral world-view both in substantive content and in form (i.e., reality),
 VI.328–29
 —that the moralistic world-view is resolved only as superseded by conscience,
 VI.342–94

contrariety. *See* opposition

culture, cultivation, acculturation, education [*die Bildung*]
 —the strenuous process of working one's way beyond substance-bound life, P.6, 34–36
 —of the individual vis-à-vis spirit at large, P.38
 —ancient versus modern, P.43
 —philosophical cultivation versus the commonsense view of experience, P.93–98
 —as a world emerging from the self-estranged world of legal right, VI.78–85
 —abnegative externalization as the self's purpose and means of cultivation, VI.86–93
 —the simplex substance of spirit in process of cultivation, VI.94–136
 —pure culture: the all-pervasive inversion and estranging of reality and thought,
 VI.137–47
 —at its preeminent and ultimate level, VI.245–69

desire [*die Begierde*]
 —the immediate object of desire is something alive, IV.8
 —and self-certainty, IV.17–18
 —versus the independence of its object, IV.17–22
 —versus the dependent consciousness's enjoyment in work and formative activity,
 IV.38–46

dialectic [*die Dialektik*]
 —in speculative versus conventional nonspeculative thinking, P.89–90
 —immanently dialectical thinking—conception—versus externalistic thinking,
 P.91–92
 —in sense-certainty: the simple history of processive sensuous experience, I.21
 —and Skepticism's experience, IV.57–62

difference (diversity, disparity, variation, heterogeneity) [*der Unterschied, die Verschiedenheit*]
 —self-diversification in reflectively reintegrative identity, P.21
 —as nothing but relatedness to something else, III.8

discernment (intellect, knowing) [*das Erkennen, die Erkenntnis*]

—and the main concern of philosophy, In.1–2

duty [*die Pflicht*]

—the conflict of duties amidst the tragic collision of law with law and right with right,
VI.42–68

—as absolute, as all that binds self-consciousness: its sole purpose and object,
VI.270–73

—versus nature and the sensuous will, VI.273–303

—moral action in reality vis-à-vis futile action (or nonaction) and “pure duty,”
VI.304–27

—the truth of moralistic consciousness’s “pure duty,” VI.328–44

—as identical with the self, its knowledge, its conviction, its conscience, VI.345–69

dynamic, dynamism, process, progression, movement, commotion, stirrings [*die Bewegung*]

One might ask, say, on etymological grounds, why it is that we generally translate *Bewegung* as ‘dynamic’ rather than the simpler word ‘movement’ (or any of the other alternatives we’ve used). To begin with, while in Aristotle’s deployment of it *dynamis* does primarily mean ‘potential’ as in ‘real potential for being,’ in classical Greek it also means variously ‘strength, might, power, ability, faculty, value, worth, and force (both military and that of a word or argument).’ —Our reason for translating this prolifically used word in the *Phenomenology* as we do is that ‘movement’ simply lacks the force to convey what Hegel means. By now terms such as ‘aerodynamics’ and ‘hydrodynamics’ are reasonably familiar, and through modern media we’ve become accustomed to hear of one or another ‘political dynamic’ or of some ‘social dynamic.’ These are easily comprehensible and are common in modern English; we’re simply trying to avoid the rather abstract and stodgy—even soporific—effect of Hegel writing about ideational ‘movements.’ He’s examining conceptual dynamics, experiential dynamics, logical dynamics—and doing so not just intricately but forcefully.

—the negativity evident in the conceptual process of scientific specification, P.71

—spirit’s logical dynamic: as self-inhering, self-related, and related to otherness,
VI.233–45

—See also negation (as mover, the principle of motion)

enlightenment. See pure insight

error [*der Irrtum*]

—fear of error as fear of the truth, In.3

—as viewed in enlightenment’s struggle against superstition and unreason, VI.183–91

essence, essential nature or being; the modalities of essence [*das Wesen; die Wesenheit, -en*]

—as what in and of itself exists—the actual—that which consists in spirit, P.29

—of consciousness’s object versus how a given way of knowing conceives of it,
In.17–19

—sense-certainty’s experience of its essence, I.15

- the dialectic of sense-certainty as the simple history of sensuous process, I.21
- and the life-process, IV.9–15
- and the category, V.8
- life's essence as not constitutive of a genus, V.105
- the mind's comprehensiveness as the essence of the conscious individual, V.113
- the modalities of essence and actively solipsistic self-consciousness, V.209–14
- and the law of the heart, V.233
- what's of the essence to the way of the world versus “the good in principle,”
V.250–54
- substance become spirit: a self-conscious unity of self and essence, VI.78–82
- moral self-consciousness's conceiving as essentially mediative and negative,
VI.270–72

ethical substantiality/ethical substance [*die Sittlichkeit, die sittliche Substanz*]

- its concept grounded in mutually recognizing self-conscious beings, V.189–96
- the universal essence of a people as wrought by them individually, V.190
- individual self-consciousness inevitably at odds with its laws and mores, V.196–203
- as contrasted with morality, V.199
- as a concern consisting in self-consciousness's reality and action, V.305
- its laws or modalities: being, pure consciousness, and self, V.305–6
- ethical laws reduced to formalities without substantive content, V.306–17
- and contingency, V.318
- as reduced to tautological formality by probative reason, V.319–26
- that which is right in and of itself, V.327–31
- ethical substance versus actual ethical reality, VI.1–7
- as a substance at odds with what it is as an actual individuated reality, VI.10–16
- human law (of individuality) and divine law (of universality), VI.13–41
- as embodied in the family amidst the community/nation, VI.17–35
- and the abstractly universal, netherworldly, *elementary individuum*, VI.24
- as embodied in the nation/community/public at large, VI.33–37
- idealized as a state of orderly, if fluctuating, equilibrium, VI.38–41
- its internal contradictoriness and collapse into another mode of existence, VI.42–68
- and character in ethical-minded consciousness, VI.45
- transgression and guilt, VI.50–58
- its culmination in abstract legal personhood of the mass of individuals whose
existence is that of nonentities estranged from their reality, VI.69–77

experience (< L *experiri*, to try or test: [*ex-per-iri*] to go out from and through to) [*die Erfahrung*]

- consciousness's experience of spirit that has become its own object, P.47
- the dialectical progression in knowledge and consciousness's object, In.23–27
- sense-certainty's experience of its essence, I.15
- in fully experiencing appearances the understanding experiences itself, III.5–21
- and Skepticism, IV.55, 62
- and the Unhappy Consciousness, IV.66–67, 84–85
- and self-consciousness whose primary purpose is existence-for-self, V.202

explanation [*die Erklärung*]

- as conceived and undertaken by the understanding, III.39, 55–56

faith/belief [*der Glauben*]

- as a self-estranged flight from the actual world, VI.86
- a thought-constituted realm of religion in flight from actual reality, VI.148–51
- as contrasted to the other form of pure consciousness (that of pure insight), VI.151–57
- in and present to itself; vis-à-vis actuality; and in relation to pure insight, VI.158–63
- as seen in enlightenment's struggle against superstition, error, and unreason, VI.183–91
- its conceiving of a deity, and relating to that being in thought and in action, VI.192–206
- its estimation of the concept 'utility,' VI.209–10
- its desultory thinking as opposed to enlightenment's conceptual thinking, VI.211–24

falsity [*das Falsche*]

- and its place in the organic unity of philosophical science, P.3
- and its relation to truth, P.50–51, 62–63
- as seen in enlightenment's struggle against superstition, error, and unreason, VI.183–91

fear [*die Furcht*] of a self in mortal peril versus mere anxiety

- as experienced by self-consciousness in a life-and-death struggle, IV.42–46

force [*die Kraft*]

- the dialectical interplay of forces, III.5–28
- in its "expressed" and "repressed" modes, III.7
- as a universal to which difference (relatedness to something else) is integral, III.8
- force as conceived by the understanding and as it is in and relative to itself, III.15–20
- the play of forces as negatively significant, mediating something outside it, III.26
- the 'law' of force and 'universal attraction,' III.28–40

form [*die Form*]: the status or nature of a given content in *actual reality*

- Due to the potentially elusive conceptions that come to light in phenomenological ontology, a question recurrently arises concerning *what form of reality* we're in context dealing with (e.g., concerning faith's 'Supreme Being' and pure insight's 'internally undifferentiated and predicateless absolute,' etc.): Is this X an illusion or delusion, a dream, an error, a fantasy or pipe dream, a mere formality, a conceptual possibility or hypothesis, a tested theory, a matter-of-fact state of affairs, a plan, something that was meticulously thought out and/or created, or something that was deliberately *done*?
- form and essence, P.22

- the form and the content of the two modes of force seen to be the same, III.15
- and formative activity (work that establishes form), IV.43–47
- formative activity as universally formative, as unrestrictedly conceptual, IV.46
- the pure form of organic activity, existing self-relatedly for itself, V.50
- and content in reductive psychology, V.107–8
- action's form viewed as self-containedly unitary in thought, V.262
- action as self-conforming form versus the nonconformity of concept and reality, V.282
- of self-consciousness (existence for self and in relation to others), V.303
- moralistic self-consciousness's contradiction in form (i.e., its actual reality), VI.328–29

formalism [*der Formalismus*]

- formalism in general, P.17–18
- as incompatible with the conceptual dynamic essential to science, P.67–69
- and psychology's "laws of thought," V.106
- and ethical substantiality reduced to tautology by probative reason, V.318, 324–31
- individualistic consciousness attentive to some "abiding concern" as having only a formalistic grasp of spirit, VI.2

freedom [*die Freiheit*; also *frei lassen* or 'letting be']

- in servitude's incipient experience of it, IV.42–43
- as abstractly conceived in Stoicism, IV.50–56
- as abstractly realized in Skepticism, IV.55–59
- and the Unhappy Consciousness, IV.62, 90
- organicity's freedom as contrasted with inorganic being's determinacy, V.37–38
- the freedom or self-relatedness of a thing vis-à-vis what makes it be as it is, V.47
- nature's freedom from the sway of the conceptual, V.69
- as life, a form of conceptual being that in part exists freely, self-relatedly, V.82–84
- that of an organic genus versus such freedom as inorganic being has, V.95
- and determinism in psychology, V.115–17
- absolute—or total—freedom and its consummate achievement, VI.241–61
- as bringing the tension between the general and individual wills into balance, VI.269
- morality's substance, purpose, and sole content: knowledge of freedom, VI.270–72
- as conceived of by moral self-consciousness regarding itself and nature, VI.273–86
- spirit's self-emancipation from the form of self as its supereminent freedom, VIII.39–40

das Für-ein-anderes Sein: other-relatedness, relativity to what's other, other-orientedness

See the discussion of this concept in the translators' introduction, xxiii–xxiv.

- in connection to self-inhering being, self-relatedness, utility, and self, VI.234–44

das Fürsichsein: existence-for-self, presence-to-self, self-relatedness, self-orientedness

See the discussion of this concept in the translators' introduction, xx–xxii.

- substantive presence-to-self as subject, soul, self, P.20–22
- spirit's immediacy self-reflectively present to itself as an immediacy, P.31
- as such presence an object has for consciousness, In.16–17
- self-relatedness amidst relativity to what's other, II.17–23
- unconditioned universal and self-relatedness versus relativity to what's other, III.4
- and individual life-forms in the dynamic of living being, IV.11–14
- and self-conscious life-forms, IV.15–21
- incipient self-consciousness as a self-related being that's present to itself, IV.31–32
- and the dependent consciousness in servitude, IV.43–45
- a thing's self-relatedness as having nothing to do with what necessitates its being as it is, V.47
- the pure form of organic activity: its existing self-relatedly for itself, V.50
- as seen in life: conceptual being that in part exists freely, self-relatedly, V.82–84
- self-relatedness in organic being as contrasted with in inorganic being, V.96
- existence-for-self as the principle of individuality, conscious being in action, V.110
- the self-oriented individualism of the law of the heart, V.218–22
- and the category, an entity existing both in and present to itself, VI.1–7
- and its part in the language of flattery, in nobility, and in relation to wealth, VI.118–31
- as that which the spirit of wealth imparts to all: universal self-orientedness, VI.132–40
- as self-related to being that's other-related and being that inheres in itself, VI.234–44

genus [*die Gattung*]

- and self-conscious living being—the I, IV.15–17
- organicity's inner, indifferent to how it is embodied or actualized in reality, V.95
- its simplex specificity present in a form bereft of intelligence, V.99
- its action as restricted, sporadic, and abortive due to external forces, V.101
- life's essence not constitutive of a genus—unlike that of individual self-conscious beings, V.105

die Gestalt/die Gestaltung: embodiment, permutation, transformation; life-form; also configuration or shape

See the translators' introduction, xx.

- the successively emergent embodiments of consciousness, In.12, 25–26
- as referring to biological life-forms, IV.9–15
- and the emergence of religion in the course of the experiential permutations of consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, VII.1–21
- as exemplary figures (referring to the pantheon of heroes), VII.86

God [*der Gott, das Wesen*]

- faith's conceiving of a deity and relating to that being in thought and action, VI.192–206

guilt [*die Schuld*]

—and transgression, the violation of ethical law and right, VI.50–58

history [*die Geschichte*]

—the knowing, self-mediative process of becoming: spirit externalized in time, VIII.31, 41–44

the I [*das Ich*]

—fully mediated being: a content directly present as I, as self, as conceptual, P.48
 —and meaning, I.12
 —as a universal, I.13–14
 —as object of self-consciousness, IV.16–22
 —in immediate self-consciousness the simple I: an object that is absolute—and yet also absolutely mediative, IV.36
 —as object of the independent self-consciousness, IV.47
 —and the certainty that ‘I am I,’ V.3–6
 —as self-consciousness’s own reality amidst self-alienation and conflictedness, VI.129–47
 —as contemplated in the three infinite/conceptual judgments, VIII.6–24, 33–34
 —as the identity of the self with itself, VIII.31–36

idea [*die Idee*]

—as species, specific universality, P.76

Idealism [*der Idealismus*]

—as a form of thinking that is certain that it is an actual reality, V.2
 —as reason: consciousness’s certainty of being all reality, V.3
 —in its one-sided, spurious form, V.8
 —in its inchoate, self-contradictory form, V.14–16
 —as expressed in the abiding concern of “self-containedly real” individuality, V.292
 —present (theoretically and practically) along with skepticism in pure insight, VI.174

immediacy [*die Unmittelbarkeit*]

—spirit’s immediacy self-reflectively present to itself as an immediacy, P.31
 —as instantiated in the this (here, now, I), I.4–15
 —nonconceptually represented as unrelated to any other immediacy, I.16–21
 —for rational self-consciousness immediacy exists only in sublated form, V.186–87

the individual, individuality [*das Individuum, die Individualität; der Einzelne, die Einzelneheit*]

—as the negative category, V.11–12
 —a universal or all-inclusive individual (e.g., Earth), V.99–104
 —the conceptual being of a genus and the self-conscious individual, V.105
 —existence-for-self: the principle of individuality, conscious being in action, V.110
 —the mind’s comprehensiveness as the essence of conscious individuality, V.113
 —action as the individual’s true being, V.141–43

- active reason as first aware of itself as the individual's reason, V.188
- the radical individualism of the law of the heart, V.220–22, 235–36
- the sacrifice of individuality and the universal individualism of the world, V.235–43
- to actually do something equated with existing consciously as an individual, V.239
- as deeming itself self-containedly real, V.259–62
- the initial impetus of individuality that deems itself self-containedly real, V.263–76
- the abiding concern of individuality that deems itself self-containedly real, V.285–91
- and the universal, V.301–5
- as still thinking formalistically and at variance with ethical substance, VI.2
- as understood in the context of an ethical community, VI.13
- the human law of individuality publicly oriented to the community/nation; and divine law individualized in the family and the individual's unconscious, VI.13–41
- the Earth, seen by the ethos as an elementary imperishable individuality, VI.23
- the elementary *individuum*, VI.24
- and character in ethical-minded consciousness, VI.45
- as a virtual nonentity abstractly recognized as a person with legal status, VI.69–77
- the status and actual reality of the individual in the world of culture, VI.87–93

infinity [*die Unendlichkeit*]

- as conceptual principle of everything (being all and subsuming all), III.52
- as the simplex essence of life, III.52
- as incipiently emerging self-consciousness, III.55
- and the life-dynamic, IV.9–22
- as self-conscious unity in duality, IV.23
- in its spurious, sensuous form, V.14
- reason as pursuing its own infinity, V.17
- spirit's infinity, VIII.44

the inner; the inner being or essence, the inner realm beyond the senses [*das Innere*]

- as 'inner' truth not present to the senses and accessible only via intellect, III.19–23
- as an experiential void inherently beyond consciousness, III.23–24
- the 'law of the inner' versus the 'law of appearances' and the 'inverted world,' III.43–50
- appearance's own integral 'inner,' III.59–60
- organic/purposive being as internally processive like a concept, and as observed vis-à-vis inorganic being, V.37–53
- observing the organic 'inner' and 'outer' to find a 'law' interrelating them, V.54–79
- examining the inner processes of organicity vis-à-vis organicity's outer physical embodiment, V.80–104
- involution as decisive in religious spirit becoming self-conscious—such inwardness being conceptually integral to the divine being itself, VII.168–74
- See also organicity

intellect [*das Erkennen, die Erkenntnis*]

The above German words, which appear prominently in the first few paragraphs of Hegel's introduction, are virtual synonyms that (depending on context) can variously mean 'knowledge, perception, understanding, cognition, cognizance, cogitation, discernment, realization, recognition, insight, and even acknowledgment.' When thought of as an ability, as in the related *Erkenntnisvermögen*, it means the 'faculty of knowing' or 'intellect' (< Latin *inter* + *legere*, that which gathers together or interlinks). We are disinclined to think that by his choice of words here Hegel is delving into the arcane intricacies of philosophical terminology. He's speaking more naturally—and 'intellect' pretty much captures what is meant.

In broad overview, the central thrust of Hegel's introduction is akin to that of Spinoza's brief treatise *On the Emendation of the Intellect*. Both essays express need for a method³ by which one can get beyond ways of thinking deemed wanting, and progress to actual knowledge of the truth; and both address the problem of selecting a method adequate to the task. At the outset there seems to be no sure and settled standard by which to evaluate either the truth or the means to it. Indeed Spinoza asserts that initially all the mind has to work with is what nature provides; it starts out solely with its native strength (*vi sua nativa*). But he also asserts that the intellect is nonetheless able to go beyond its initial condition; and its ability to do so is much like what occurs in its making of material tools (*instrumenta*): one starts out with oneself and one's bare hands along with whatever one finds available, using these as primitive tools to make better tools, by turns making tools that do much more complicated work and require far less effort.

One might construe Hegel as disagreeing with this in his introduction, in that he specifically rejects the notion that our cognitive faculty is an instrument or tool (*Werkzeug*) somehow independent of us which we use to attain truth. –Yet Spinoza entertains no such idea; and Hegel is anything but in disagreement with him. The key word in Spinoza's argument is *habent*, which commonly means to 'have' or 'hold'—but can also mean 'make'—as it does in the context of making tools. It is this active functioning or active forming—this processive improving by re-creating—that embodies the progress of the thinking I. This is consistent with Spinoza's later discussion of the mind (*mens*) in the second part of his *Ethics* (Definition III), where he notes his preference for the word *conceptum* in discussing ideas, because this word emphasizes the *activity* of the mind, concepts being formed (*format*) by the mind because it is a thinking thing (*res cogitans*). So also for Hegel: it is precisely conceptualization, consciousness's formation of concepts (*Begriffe*)—initially crude, abstract, and defective, but progressively more subtle, rational, and comprehensive—that fleshes out the entire course of "natural consciousness pressing on toward true knowledge." –In.1–8

judgment [*das Urteil*]

—the convoluted judgmental notions of the good and the bad, state power and wealth, the compatible and the incompatible, the noble and the base, VI.96–147

3. From the Greek *meta*-, 'beyond' or 'across,' and *hodos*, a 'way' or 'road'; hence 'a way across or thither.'

- conscience and moral judgmentalism, VI.344–69, 376–96
- the I as contemplated in the three infinite/conceptual judgments, VIII.6–24, 33–36

knowing [*das Wissen*]

- versus representation and the familiar, P.39–44
- and its relation to truth, P.48
- as a way of life consisting in knowledge of self, P.63
- and truth as consciousness examines what it allegedly knows, In.15–28
- in relation to an object of sense and in relation to the I and meaning, I.5, 12
- what consciousness knows and what self-consciousness knows, IV.4–7
- knowing and not knowing; character and ethical-mindedness: law versus law, duty versus duty, VI.42–68
- moral consciousness's knowledge of freedom as its substance, purpose, and content, VI.269–72
- as self, conscience, conviction, duty, VI.340–69
- absolute knowing, VIII.1–44

language/speech [*die Sprache*]

- as expressing what's true in sense-certainty, namely the universal, I.9, 23–24
- as evaluated in the simplistic and/or fraudulent reasoning of physiognomy, V.123–43
- its significance and overall role in the public world of culture, VI.115–47
- the function of praise and flattery specifically, VI.116–25
- the special significance of sarcasm in epitomizing the entire cultural world, VI.137
- cultured speech as expressive of a self disruptive of all relationships, VI.138–47
- as self-consciousness made directly present as self-consciousness and as a particularized embodiment of self-consciousness at large, VI.361–69

law, laws [*das Gesetz, die Gesetze*]

This term refers to laws established by a legislative authority as well as to correlations of necessity that are conceptually/mathematically valid as well as demonstrative of the underlying logical dynamics integrally embodied in matter-of-fact physical phenomena (e.g., Newton's laws). The latter are conventionally referred to as 'laws'—yet only figuratively so, inasmuch as they are enacted by no legislative authority and are in fact impossible to break. –This term is also used in reference to the "laws" spuriously alleged in pseudosciences, which have no basis in truth (i.e., no demonstrable relations of necessity between the phenomena they purport to interrelate).

- the understanding grappling with 'universal variation,' 'universal attraction,' 'the law of *inner* reality,' 'the law of appearances,' and 'the law of force,' III.29–48
- the simplex nature of law as a form of infinity, III.51–60
- as sought in the instinctual observation of nature, V.29–36
- the basic idea of law, V.74–75
- of thinking, as conceived of in reductive psychology, V.106–9
- in psychology: the alleged laws of the mind's relating to actual reality, V.111–18

- as framed in physiognomic “science,” V.139–43
- the “law of the heart” espoused by out-of-control egotism, V.218–36
- as modalities of ethical substance, V.305–6
- ethical laws reduced to formalities absent substantive content, V.306–17
- ethical law as reduced to formalistic tautology by probative reason, V.318–31
- human law (of individuality publicly oriented to the community/nation) and divine law (individualized in the family and the individual’s unconscious), VI.13–68
- and transgression, VI.50–58
- and abstract legal right, VI.69–77
- of nature vis-à-vis moral self-consciousness, VI.273–303

life [*das Leben*]

- simplex infinity as the simplex essence of life, III.52
- and the object of immediate desire, IV.8
- its essence, sustaining element, and interrelating variants, IV.9–15
- as self-conscious, as genus, as I, IV.16–22
- and the life-and-death struggle, IV.33–36
- as a form of conceptual being that in part exists freely, self-relatedly, V.82–84
- life’s essence as not constitutive of a genus, V.105

mastery [*die Herrschaft*] and servitude [*die Knechtschaft*]

- mastery versus servitude, IV.37–41
- servitude versus mastery, IV.42–46

materiality, modes or forms of materiality [*die Materie, die Materien*]

In the *Phenomenology* Hegel isn’t surveying the subject matter of the physical sciences but focusing on spirit in itself and in its world. Instead of using the term ‘matter’ in its scientific sense when referring to the material world, he uses broader terms to make his point. He’s investigating what various conceptions of ‘physical otherness in relation to the thinking self’ actually mean.

- as the properties of things, II.8
- as “free of,” or unattached to, other forms of materiality, II.15
- examples of, in experimentation and as grasped conceptually, V.34–36
- pure materiality as a pure abstraction in pure insight’s conceiving vis-à-vis the pure abstract supreme being conceived by faith, VI.225–34

meaning: that which is meant, intended, conjectured or opined [*die Meinung*]

- as contrasted with what language expresses, I.9, 23–24
- the act of pointing out an immediacy that is meant or intended, I.19–20

measure: (1) [*das Maß*] measure, size; (fig.) moderation, proportion; (2) [*die Maße, -n*] right measure, just proportion, due apportionment, moderation; mode or manner (cf. mode < L *modus*, measure, standard, extent, size; way, manner, method, moderation, due or proper measure; sort, kind)

As will be further discussed in our commentary, the above German words express something similar to the Greek idea referred to as *kairós*—meaning ‘due measure, proper proportion, fitness, appropriateness; the right time, season, or occasion; the times or state of affairs; opportunity, advantage, profit.’ The above German words are not to be confused with *die Masse*, *-en*, which is used, for example, in VI.175–76 to refer to ‘the masses’ of the general public.

- ethical awareness as differentiating the essential moments of its substance and apportioning them into specific laws, V.305–6
- the ethos: a system of fittingly apportioned spiritual entities, powers, laws, VI.11
- total freedom’s cataclysmic dissolution of the system of separately sustained apportionments of self-consciousness’s world, VI.246–51

mediation [*die Vermittlung*]

- and self-identity, P.24–25
- fully mediated being: a content directly present as I, as self, as conceptual, P.48
- the distinction between instance and essence, immediacy and mediation, I.5
- the simplex or mediated universal as the object of perception, II.3–5
- the I in immediate self-consciousness as absolutely immediate yet also absolutely mediative, IV.36
- the Unhappy Consciousness’s indirect link to what it seeks—to supersede its nullity and become truly essential—via a mediating minister, IV.84–95
- self-consciousness mediating the tension between ethical substance and its individuated reality, VI.10–11
- language as intermediary, VI.115–47
- self-consciousness as thoroughly mediative, superseding abstract immediacy, VI.271
- moral self-consciousness as intermediating its action vis-à-vis nature and sensuality by means of postulated “harmonies” and “a mediator who sanctifies” duties and dutiful action, VI.273–328

medium [*das Medium*]

- entities/things viewed as simplex mediums (alsos) of specific properties, II.5–6
- versus things viewed as unitary entities (ones) exclusive of other entities, II.7

method [*die Methode*]

- as the logic or conceptually integrative structure of science’s whole dynamic, P.64
- as properly set forth in speculative philosophy (logic), P.79
- the self-examination of consciousness, In.15–27

morality, moral consciousness, moral self-consciousness [*die Moralität*]

- what the moral world-view presupposes regarding itself, duty, and nature, VI.273–74
- as postulating a harmony between itself and nature, VI.276–79
- as postulating a conformity between sensual will and morality, VI.280–83

- action as an endless task, VI.283–86
- the sanctification of specific duties, VI.287–93
- morality as a postulated ideality—incomplete in actual reality, VI.294–303
- moralistic misrepresentation, dissemblance, disingenuousness, and hypocrisy, VI.304–27
- as contradictory not only in content but in its form (i.e., its actual reality), VI.328–29
- as self-determining conscience; its conviction of duty as obligatory action, VI.330–50
- how conscience's self-certain spirit sustains logical cohesiveness in the face of scrutiny, and why any self taking moral action must publicly say its action is conscientious, VI.351–69
- as envisioned by the “morally inspired” self of a would-be “beautiful soul,” VI.370–75
- conscience's inherent questionableness as it is in actual reality versus judgmentalism, hypocrisy, and evil, VI.376–87
- the prospect of forgiveness and spirit's adequation, VI.388–96

nature [*die Natur*]

- observation of, V.22–104
- and organicity, V.37–104
- individuality's original determinative nature, V.264–76
- and the family as a natural relation versus ethical/spiritual relations, VI.17
- the sublation of the natural self in the process of cultivation, VI.89–93
- as conceived of by the moral world-view, VI.273–85

necessity [*die Notwendigkeit*]

- The German is suggestive of something processive, an ‘inevitable turning’ or a ‘need to change’—and also fate, destiny [*das Schicksal*].
- necessity's role in the evolution of philosophical science, P.3
 - the internal and external necessity that philosophy be scientific, P.7
 - the conceptual cohesiveness integral to the very being of whatever exists, P.78
 - as a relentless component of consciousness's self-examination, In.26–27
 - in perceptual apprehension, II.1
 - conceptual versus external necessity, III.36
 - the understanding's own necessity, III.39, 56
 - in organic being and its purposive activity, V.43–50
 - and what actively solipsistic self-consciousness inevitably experiences, V.211–17
 - self-consciousness that takes itself to be an agent of necessity for everyone, V.218–36
 - self-consciousness and abyssal Destiny swallowing up human and divine law, VI.42, 58, 69
 - as represented in art-religion, VII.93–97, 106–13
 - factually existent necessity and noetic necessity in religious conceiving, VII.129–30

negation/negativity [*die Negation, die Negativität*]

Negation involves some manner of conceptual or other noetic *activity*; used as an adjective, the word appears as 'negative,' as for instance in the description of the dialectical progression of sense-experience, in which each moment is *negated* and superseded by others. 'Negativity' on the other hand tends to be used when the focus is not on active negation per se, as for instance in the description of pure insight's 'predicateless absolute,' a purely negative and detached notion as distinguished from any positive/empirical fact. Occasionally Hegel also uses 'negativity' and 'negative' merely to characterize a conscious attitude or inclination toward something, or its view of some concept. In one context, in keeping with Hegel's tone, we even translate 'negative' freely, characterizing pure insight as "taking a dim view" of faith's Supreme Being.

- as emerging self-critical presence-to-self, P.22
- as integral to the active energy of thinking, P.42–43
- in consciousness's differentiation of I and the substance that is its object, P.48
- the void (i.e., negativity) envisioned by the ancients as the principle of motion, P.48
- and its relation to falsity and truth, P.49–51
- experienced as being an integral aspect of specific universals, I.8, 19–20
- in sensuous immediacy present as a specific universal (a property), II.4–5
- as present in both the oneness and the complexity of things (entities), II.5–8
- and self-consciousness's life-and-death struggle, IV.33–34
- the master's annihilative enjoyment versus the negative action of the slave, IV.37–39, 43–46
- as the principle of process in its conceptual relation to organicity, V.94–97
- reason having acted self-orientedly (i.e., negatively toward a reality it deemed negative of it) as superseded by "self-contained" reason, V.259–62
- enlightenment as a negativity encroaching upon its opposite, faith, VI.211–24
- as implicit in absolute/total freedom with its self-conforming general will, VI.259–61
- See also specificity

negative complement or counterpart (e.g., non-X vs. X), oppositeness [*das Negative; der Gegensatz*]

In contrast with oppositeness, Hegel also uses *Gegensatz* to indicate the dynamically tensive, dialectical relation of 'opposition.' See the latter in its own entry.

- conventional opinion as fixated on the oppositeness of true and false, P.3
- falsity viewed sheerly as the negative complement (opposite) of truth, P.49–51
- of self-consciousness, the world of sense-appearance seen as 'non-I,' IV.3–8
- all otherness initially viewed by self-consciousness simply as 'non-I,' IV.31
- in the transition from the experience of self-consciousness to that of reason, V.1
- consciousness viewing 'things' as forms of mere nonconscious being, V.11
- of self-consciousness, whose simplex essence is inclusive of sheer being, VI.228–34
- the moral world-view's concept of nature: morality's negative complement, VI.273, 282–90
- the self as negative complement of anything other than morality's essence, VI.339

- and the moralistic reverie of the beautiful soul, VI.375
- as an integral moment of absolute knowing, VIII.39–44

nous [*der Nus*]

- as knowledge of the specific substance of anything that matter-of-factly exists, P.76–78
- the conscious self deemed by reason to be a thing, V.179–85
- noetic substance, conception and ‘the I,’ VIII.25–36

number [*die Zahl*]

- examined as to the possibility of it being conceptually correlated with the organic essence of life and variations in physical embodiment, V.80–102

the object [*der Gegenstand*]

- the ambiguity of consciousness’s “object in itself,” In.21–22
- initially as essence and truth in sense-certainty, I.5–6
- experienced as intermediated with ‘the I,’ I.11–15
- of self-consciousness versus that of sense-certainty, perception, and understanding, IV.1–5
- self-consciousness’s dual object, IV.6–7
- the object of immediate desire: being that is alive, IV.8
- as consisting, for moral consciousness, in self-certainty, that is, what it knows, VI.269–72
- duty as the sole object and compelling purpose of moral self-consciousness, VI.272, 296–303

observation [*die Beobachtung*]

- generally, V.17–21; VIII.32
- of nature, V.22–104
- of organicity, V.37–104
- of self-consciousness vis-à-vis external reality, V.105–18
- of self-consciousness vis-à-vis its immediate reality, V.119–85

opposition—tensiveness, tensive relation—but also antitheses, contrariety [*der Gegensatz, die Entgegensetzung*]

- observation of the contrariety integral to nature, V.28–29
- self-estranged spirit driven in total freedom to the peak of its tensiveness, VI.269
- the shifting, contradictory stances of disingenuous moralistic thought, VI.304–27
- the inevitable tensiveness of individual versus public aspects of conscience, VI.376–96

organicity [*das Organische*]

- its self-relatedness or freedom versus inorganic being’s determinacy, V.37–42
- as self-related purposive necessity, V.43–50

- its purposive activity vis-à-vis self-consciousness, V.46
- the inner aspect of its functioning (sensibility, irritability, and reproduction), V.55–57
- its outer aspect (its physical embodiment, e.g., nervous system, viscera, etc.), V.58–59
- the attempt to establish a correlation of organicity's inner and outer aspects, V.60–79
- the attempt to correlate organicity's outer aspect with inorganic being, V.80–104
- and negativity, V.94
- the conceptual being exhibited by it versus that exhibited by inorganic being, V.105
- its process as only latently free versus the freedom of self-conscious purpose, V.174–75

otherness (that which is heterogeneous or other) [*das Anderssein*]

- comprehending the self in what is absolutely other than self, P.31
- self-consciousness's initial encounter with otherness, IV.23–29
- as initially thought of in actively solipsistic self-consciousness, V.207–10
- and the consciousness of the moral world-view, VI.273, 299–300

the ought, that which is *supposed* to exist or be done [*das Sollen*]

- and the nature of ethical laws as reduced to formalities that have no content, V.309–17
- in the form of a precept versus a an inherent existential (categorical) law, V.327

the outer, the outer being or external presence (which has an inner and outer of its own) [*das Äußere*]

- organicity's outer, V.58
- viewed abstractly in terms of physical structure, V.70–71
- its inner aspect seen as numerical, V.85

perception [*die Wahrnehmung*]

The German suggests that something is being 'taken as true,' although this 'take' on things may very well turn out *not* to be true.

- versus sense-certainty's apprehension of whatever appears, II.1
- the basic moments of perceptual experience, II.4–9
- the possibility of perceptual deception and perception's experience of it, II.9–12, 26–28
- the initial dialectic of such experience, II.10–16
- the dialectical emergence of the unconditioned universal, II.17–23
- perceptual "common-sense" understanding and its sophistry, II.24–28
- understanding functioning like perception in discerning the substantive content of laws, V.74–77

phenomenology (the logic of appearances and the process of appearing) [*die Phänomenologie*]

- as the developmental process of science, P.34, 45–48
- and science, absolute knowing, VIII.37–44

philosophy [*die Philosophie*]

- vis-à-vis mathematics, P.54–61
- concerned with essential specificity and the conceptual dynamic thereof, P.62
- as opposed to nonphilosophical thinking, P.93–96

physiognomy and phrenology [*Physiognomik und Schädellehre*]

- physiognomy's basic notion, observational procedure and results, V.126–39
- phrenology's basic notion, observational procedure and results, V.150–70

pleasure [*die Lust*]

- and actively solipsistic self-consciousness, V.206–11

precepts [*das Gebot, die Gebote*]

- as expressive of what ought to be ethically, V.311
- as absent effectual reality when not genuinely enacted as law, V.312–14
- as nonetheless expressive of ethical being in its immediacy, V.315

properties [*die Eigenschaft, -en*]

- of things (entities), II.4–8, 11–16

property (owned) [*das Eigentum*]

- and law, V.320–22, 330–31

psychology [*die Psychologie*]

- the 'laws of thinking' as conceived in reductive psychology, V.106–9
- psychology's alleged laws of the mind's relating to the actual world, V.111–18
- and determinism, V.115–17

pure insight [*die reine Einsicht*] and its dissemination in enlightenment [*die Aufklärung*]

- versus the other form of pure consciousness (namely that of faith), VI.148–58
- in and present to itself; in relation to the actual world; in relation to faith, VI.158–69
- as viewing faith to be antithetic to it, its reasoning, and its truth, VI.170–73
- and its dissemination in unsophisticated consciousness, VI.174–81
- its struggle against its antagonist's error and falsehood—as well as its own, VI.182–91
- and pure insight's negative view of faith's supreme being, VI.192–206
- and utility, VI.207–10

—and enlightenment's self-conscious—that is, conceptual—negativity versus faith, VI.211–24

purpose, aim, goal, end, objective (final causality) [*der Zweck, das Ziel, der Endzweck*]

- purpose and results in philosophical exposition, P.4–5
- as a negative self-relating, P.25
- purposiveness and organicity, V.43–50
- and self-consciousness, V.46
- its conceptual nature in relation to the inner functioning of organicity, V.57
- the aim of the individual regarding what's other than him, V.200–203
- the aim, drive, and “joy ride” of actively solipsistic self-consciousness, V.204–17
- radical individualism seriously pursuing its high purpose, V.220–23, 233
- and virtue-mindedness in conceiving its struggle with the way of the world, V.243–49
- as conceived of in individuality that deems itself self-containedly real, V.259–62
- ethical substance as an all-encompassing essence and purpose, VI.10
- as a thought-constituted substance in transition to actual reality, VI.89
- knowledge of freedom: the substantive content and purpose of morality, VI.269–72
- and the moral world-view, VI.272–74

quality [*die Qualität*]

- qualitative leap, P.13
- versus quantity, P.58–59
- as simplex specificity, P.74

quantity [*die Quantität*]

- versus quality, P.58–59
- as evident in relations involving no conceptual contrast, V.63–67
- in the form of number, V.85–93

reality, actuality, actual reality [*die Realität, die Wirklichkeit*]

- reason as consciousness's certainty of being all reality, V.3–13
- as running counter to and at odds with the law of the heart, V.220–33
- action that's sublated of reality versus action that is its own immanent truth and reality, V.260
- ethical substance versus ethical reality, VI.1–7
- faith as a self-estranged flight from actual reality, VI.86
- of the self-conscious individual in the realm of culture, VI.87–93
- moral consciousness's self-certainty (what it knows) as substance and reality, VI.269–72
- and the moral world-view, VI.273–305
- and disingenuous moralistic consciousness's concept of “pure duty,” VI.328–32

reason [*die Vernunft*]

- as consciousness's certainty of being all reality (the principle of Idealism), V.3–13
- as asserting that 'I am I' and also that 'there is otherness that's evident to me,' V.6–7
- as embodied in the abstract and general certainty of the category, V.8–12
- as laying claim to everything (all reality) being 'mine,' V.13–16
- in pursuit of its own infinity, V.17
- as observer: outwardly oriented yet internally incomplete, V.18–21
- as indefatigably searching, finding, and systematizing, V.22–27
- as functioning solely on instinct in its observational searching, V.27, 46
- as ineluctably experiencing that its systemizations conflict, V.28–29
- as seeking the "law" of universality in natural reality, V.30–36
- as finding itself to be a living thing, V.44–46
- as construing, in its observations, the conceptual nature of organicity (its purposiveness) to be something extrinsic to organic being as well as to reason's own organic being, V.47–48
- active reason first aware of itself as the individual's reason, V.188
- as truly realized among a free people, V.190–93
- the supersession of reason as sublative of any reality it deems negative of it, V.260
- as spirit, VI.1–7
- the way it is present and embodies itself as having nothing religious about it, VII.2

recognition [*die Anerkennung*]

- self-conscious beings recognize themselves in and through their being reciprocally self-recognizing, IV.23–39
- and ethical substantiality, V.189–93

reconciliation [*die Versöhnung*]

- and moral judgmentalism, VI.376–96
- in religious representation and conceptual judgment's integration [*Vereinigung*] of conscious and self-conscious experience, VIII.6–24

reflection [*die Reflexion*]

One form of reflection occurs in the fluid dynamic of self-identity, in which a self-conscious being progressively goes beyond itself as it is, while simultaneously turning back or reflecting (< *L reflectere*, to bend or turn back) into itself as the more developed self that it has become. –A second form involves a dual reflection, such as occurs in abstract thinking when it postulates some form of absolutely transcendent 'thing in itself'—a conception whereby self-consciousness is thought of as being thus experientially cut off from or reflected into itself outside of that 'in itself,' while the 'in itself' beyond its grasp recedes or reflects into *itself* outside the purview of self-conscious experience. –And a third form is the self-reflectivity of *Geist*: a plurality of self-conscious beings reflecting into self in and through others (i.e., interpersonally) as well as in and through otherness generally (i.e., via the science of nature and

reality)—hazarding the anything-but-trivial task of intercommunicating and interacting humanity (the subject of Hegel's whole book).

—reflecting, in otherness, into self, P.21

—simplex reflection, self-reflective being, P.31

—consciousness reflecting into itself as its object is reflecting into *itself*, III.2

—in the culminating dual reflection of cultivated/conflicted self-consciousness, VI.144

religion [*die Religion*]

—as it emerges in the world of self-estranged spirit, VI.148–52

—as an awareness of a manner of being that is absolute—albeit from the standpoint of consciousness and not as it is in and present to itself, VII.1–2

—reason's presence and manner of embodiment as having nothing religious about it, VII.2

—as seen in the ethical world as well as the world of faith, of enlightenment, and of morality, VII.3–8

—synopsis of the timeless experiential spheres of religion's paradisaic totality, VII.9–16

—as having—in its immediacy, in its artistic representations, and in its full manifestation an unsurmounted aspect that leaves spirit not fully present conceptually, VII.17–21

—in its natural, preselfconscious or merely incipiently self-conscious form, VII.22–26

—as selflessly immersed in a mystic vision of the light of a divine presence, VII.27–30

—in placid form versus its antipathetic, destructive/self-destructive form, VII.31–33

—as instinctually artistic in its representational activity, culminating in an outer internalized and an inner externalizing itself from within, VII.34–42

—as spirit self-consciously creative in the art of ethos-formation, VII.43–49

—as abstracting the self from the naïve directness of natural existence via participation in the ethos-oriented activity of a cultic community, VII.50–73

—in a community of individuals seen as living artworks in the first stages of fathoming their own depth, VII.74–84

—in speech—via the epic—as synthetically interlinking the universal world of the gods and the bard's world of particulars and individuality, VII.87–94

—and tragedy, VII.95–111

—and comedy, VII.112–19

—as effecting, via art, the transition from substance to subject—with the self seen as absolute, and self-consciousness conceiving of an incarnate divinity, VII.122–39

—as manifest in representational thinking that “signifies” a divine being—yet leaves spirit without a conceptual grasp that it itself is that being, VII.140–68

—involution: the decisive moment of spirit, securing the inwardness integral to the divine being, VII.169–74

—the self-conscious community of spirit and its representational dynamic, VII.175–90

—versus science/conceptual knowing, VIII.1–5, 20–24

representation [*die Vorstellung*]

As he uses this word, Hegel often hints at something being ‘set before one’ in its immediacy, or to something being subjectively ‘set forth’ or ‘projected’ onto reality without being fully and critically thought through.

- depictions of the familiar versus actual knowing, P.39–40
- analysis of, P.41
- by nature tied to accidental properties, P.84
- representational versus conceptual thinking, P.84–88
- the culminating truth of consciousness’s way of representing appearances, III.59–60
- as nonconceptual observation, V.181–85
- and the moral world-view, VI.295–303
- and misrepresentation or dissembling [*Verstellung*], VI.304–32
- and religion, VII.1–190
- versus science/conceptual knowing, VIII.1–5, 20–24

right [*das Recht*]

- in and of itself, V.331

science [*die Wissenschaft*]

The German suggests an active ‘making or achieving knowledge’; cf. Hegel’s phrase ‘the strenuous work of conceptualization.’

- and philosophy, P.7
- at its inception, P.16
- as spirit that knows itself to be spirit, P.30
- as opposed to natural consciousness, P.33
- and the organic integrity of the conceptual process, P.71
- and attentiveness to the object of inquiry, P.73
- as absolute knowing, VIII.21–44
- as noetic substance, conception, and ‘the I,’ VIII.25–36

self and self-certainty [*das Selbst, die Gewißheit seiner Selbst*]

- as process and as fully unfolded becoming, P.25
- fully mediated being: a content directly present as I, as self, as conceptual, P.48
- and self-identity, P.74–75
- self-certainty’s object versus that of sense-certainty, perception, and understanding, IV.1–2
- self-certainty and desire, IV.17–18
- self-certainty for the Unhappy Consciousness, IV.78
- reason finding itself as a living thing, V.44–46
- and reason become spirit, VI.1–2
- the I as a self pondering its fate as a cipher—an abstractly recognized person having the public status of a nonentity, VI.69–73, 77
- the sublation of the natural self in the process of cultivation, VI.87–93
- cultured speech as symptomatic of a self that’s disruptive of all relationships VI.145–47

- self and will that's universal (in that it encompasses itself and its object), VI.235–61
- as not losing its identity in the will common to all, VI.262–69
- self-certainty as consciousness's object in morality, VI.270–72
- as conceived of in the moral world-view: contradictory in content and form, VI.304–6, 328–29
- as conscience, comprised in spirit certain that it directly embodies a form of truth and being that is absolute, VI.330
- as conscience as distinguished from the self as variously comprised in the ethical world, the cultural world, and the moral world-view, VI.330–51
- noetic substance, conception, and 'the I,' VIII.25–36

self-consciousness, self-conscious being [*das Selbstbewußtsein*]

- simplex infinity as the emergent object of incipient self-consciousness, III.55
- as the resultant truth of the preceding permutations of consciousness, III.58–60
- its initial concept of its object, IV.2
- as one living, desiring self-conscious being amidst others, IV.16–22
- and spirit, IV.22, 66
- its struggle for recognition, IV.23–30, 39
- initially a self-identical, self-related being that is present to itself, IV.31
- and purposiveness, V.46
- the conceptual being of a genus is found only in self-conscious being, V.105
- as self-aware of its being spirit—with immediacy having now the form of something sublated, V.186–87
- as spirit's own conceptual being, V.200–203
- in the form of an actively solipsistic self—and its inevitable self-ensured fate, V.204–17
- as a self-oriented "heart" whose law of necessity applies to all, V.218–36
- as virtue-mindedness vis-à-vis the way of the world, V.237–58
- and the abiding concern of individuality that deems itself self-containedly real, V.285–91
- that has 'its own purpose, action, and actuality' as the content of its abiding concern, and has 'existence-for-self vis-à-vis others' as the form of that concern, V.303
- as concerned with the self-conscious reality and action of ethical substance, V.305–6
- as intermediating ethical substance in tension with its actual individuated reality, VI.10–11
- and its realizing through experience that the alleged all-encompassing worth of a self-conscious being is a reality estranged from him, VI.77
- substance become spirit in a self-conscious unity of self and essence, VI.80–82
- the establishment of its actual reality in the world of culture, VI.87–93
- as capable of abstracting from any particular facet of itself, VI.129–37
- as a form of conceptual negativity actively encroaching upon its opposite, VI.211–24
- its simplex nature inclusive of its negative complement: sheer being, VI.232–33
- for which, in morality, knowing is directly evident substance itself, VI.269–22

- and the moral world-view, VI.273–303
- in manifest religion, VII.169–90
- and conception as it truly is: self-consciousness at one with self-distantiation, VIII.14

self-estrangement [*die Entfremdung*]

- and the world of culture emerging from the self-alienated world of legal right, VI.78–85
- the sublation of the natural self via the process of cultivation, VI.86–93
- the estranged notions ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ and their objectification in reality, VI.96–114
- and the function of speech, VI.115–37
- the conflictedness of cultivated self-consciousness vis-à-vis power and wealth, VI.122–40
- as reducing the conflict of general and individual wills to transparency, VI.262–69

sense-certainty [*die sinnliche Gewißheit*]

- its initial abstract immediateness: the This, I.3
- the incongruity of the two thises (I and object) in their immediacy, I.4–5
- the examination of I and object in the here and now, I.6–15
- and sublation, I.19–21
- as the simple history of sensuous process, I.21
- and the Eleusinian mysteries, I.22

simplicity/simplexity [*die Einfachheit*] (sheer simplicity/integrally complex simplicity)

As we understand him, Hegel uses the same term in expressing both abstract simplicity and concrete ‘unity in diversity’ or simplexity: ‘simplicity amidst internal complexity’ as seen in progressively self-reflecting entities such as organisms. The self-identity of such entities is sustained through successive embodiments. For example, in the course of its development a human identity passes from one permutation to the next, and as it does so it not only supersedes the prior permutation but simultaneously reflects back into itself in altered form. In effect the prior embodiment is negated—yet also preserved as a necessary developmental stage integral to the still emerging self-identity.

- simplex specificity (quality), P.74
- the here, like the now, as a simplex multiplicity of instances within the universal, I.20–21
- any given ‘thing’ perceived as a simplex self-identical universal, II.4–8
- the flux of appearances amidst the nonphenomenal ‘inner’ conceived by the understanding seen as turning into a simplex form of variation, III.29
- life’s simplex universal flux and the simplex substance of the life process, IV.11–14
- the substance of organicity’s inner aspect as constitutive of the simplex soul—a form of pure purposive conceptual being, V.55–56
- the simplex substance of spirit in the process of cultivation, VI.95–97
- thought’s simplexity via its sameness with sheer being (its negative complement)—with each a demonstrating its sameness with the other, VI.225–40

Skepticism [*der Skeptizismus*]

- its function in phenomenology, In.9–14
- as realizing what Stoicism merely conceives in thought, IV.55–57
- as dissolutive of consciousness's very relation to objectivity, IV.58–61
- as self-contradictory, IV.61–62
- and self-contradictory Idealism, V.14
- and abstractly recognized personhood, VI.73
- as a subordinate form (along with idealism) of pure insight, VI.174

sophistry [*die Sophisterei*]

- in everyday perceptual understanding, II.24–28

specificity, determinacy, determinateness, determinativeness, definiteness [*die Bestimmtheit, die Bestimmung*]

In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* Hegel draws attention to what he refers to as a 'major proposition' set forth by Spinoza (in Letter 50), namely that "Alle Bestimmung ist eine Negation." –That is, 'Every specification is a negation.'⁴ This concept is couched in a concise syllogism in which 'specificity' serves as the middle term and 'negation' as the major term: "Quia ergo figura non aliud, quam determinatio, & determinatio negatio est; not poterit, ut dictum, aliud quid, quam negatio, esse." –That is, "Since a figure is thus nothing but a specification, and specification is negation, a figure, as we've said, cannot but be a negation."⁵

This discussion of 'figure' (or 'configuration') is in context laden with conceptual implications. Spinoza's letter is in reply to a conceptual question about figure in relation to God; and one might wonder if this has some connection to the idea of graven images alleged to depict God. But Spinoza's conception of the deity is that God is precisely Nature (i.e., 'the One Substance' together with its attributes 'mind' and 'extendedness' [the latter being the expanse of space and time]). –In this same letter Spinoza says, "It is manifest that the integral whole of matter [*integram materiam*], considered without limit, can have no figure, and that figure has a place only in finite and limited bodies." This is virtually equivalent to saying (consistent with his characterization of the One Substance as "an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways"), that the universe is and has always been (*sub species aeternitatis*) absolutely infinite spatiotemporally and hence *has no ultimate outer shape* because there is no outer periphery, no beyond, no outside position—or time—that one could enter from which to discern a shape. –We also note that the implication of the major proposition of Spinoza's syllogism is that 'Any and all specification/determination is a form of negation.'

4. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 3:164.

5. Benedict Spinoza, *Spinoza Opera* (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitäts Buchhandlung, 1972), 4:240.

- as definiteness, P.12
- as quality, P.74
- as species (specific universality), P.76–77
- in sense-certainty, I.8, 19–20
- in perception, II.4–8, 19–21
- and the pure category, V.9–12
- as exhibited in number, V.85
- and organicity's principle of process, V.97–99
- individuality in the form of an original determinative nature, V.264–76
- and duty in its relation to actual reality, VI.280–95

speculation (< L *speculari*, to look around, to contemplate or behold) –in Hegel, to see as whole [*die Spekulation*]

- as logic (speculative philosophy), P.48
- as properly setting forth the nature of scientific method, P.79
- versus conventional reasoning, P.89, 92

spirit (in some contexts mind, intercommunicating and interacting intelligence) [*der Geist*]

- at various stages of development, P.9, 34–36, 46–48
- its power, depth, and extent, P.12
- as what alone is actual, existing in and relative to, as well as present to, itself, P.29
- as science itself, self-reflectively knowing itself to be spirit, P.30–31
- abstract spirit, chapters I through V in their entirety
- and self-consciousness, IV.22, 66
- as mind, specifically as viewed in deterministic psychology, V.110–18
- as the object of rational self-consciousness, V.186–87
- self-consciousness as spirit's own conceptual being, V.200–203
- an entity consisting in spirit [e.g., a human being] and the abiding concern, V.301–3
- comprised of sheer conscious being and a given self-conscious being, V.304
- and its substantive role in the constitution of absolute ethical law, V.326–29
- concrete spirit, chapter VI in its entirety
- its initial emergence, VI.1–7
- in the world of ethical substantiality and ethical-minded consciousness, VI.8–77
- the simplex substance of spirit in the process of cultivation, VI.78–136
- as embodied in state power and wealth, VI.98–147
- as pure culture, all-pervasively inverting and estranging both reality and thought, VI.137–47
- as known variously by faith and by pure insight, VI.148–69
- absolute spirit, chapters VII and VIII in their entirety

Stoicism [*der Stoizismus*]

- as experiencing freedom in the act of thinking, IV.51
- as withdrawn from the tumult of existence, realizing only abstract freedom, IV.51–54

subject [*das Subject*]

- and substance, P.20–21, 29, 74
- as self-reflectively conscious versus a mere matter-of-fact predication, P.26–27, 82–87

sublation (nullifying or undermining; superseding while preserving in another form) [*die Aufhebung*]

- of propositional form, P.90
- in sense-certainty, I.19–21
- its dual significance in perceptual experience, II.4–6, 11, 21
- the understanding as sublating its own untruth, III.3
- in the understanding, III.10–11, 25, 54
- and the life-dynamic, IV.9–15
- and desire, IV.17–22
- and self-consciousness's encounter with self-consciousness, IV.24–29
- and formative activity, IV.44
- and the Unhappy Consciousness, IV.91–92
- immediacy existing in sublated form for rational self-consciousness, V.186–87
- the way in which virtuous-minded consciousness conceives of sublating individuality, V.239
- the sublation of reason that would sublate any reality it deems negative of it, V.260
- as seen in the cultivation of the natural self via abnegative self-estrangement, VI.295–99

substance (that which anything or anyone—consciously or not—has within its potential to be) [*die Substanz*]

The German *Substanz*, like the Latin *substantia*, suggests something that is 'at the bottom of' or that 'stands under' some actually occurring phenomenon, supporting or sustaining it.

- and subject, P.20–21, 29, 74
- as relevant to the definition of life, IV.9
- spirit as a form of substance, IV.22
- ethical substance, V.189–90, 305–6
- ethical substance as distinguished from actual ethical reality, VI.1–7
- as having become spirit in a self-conscious unity of self and essence, VI.80–82
- that of individual self-consciousness and of culture at large, VI.91–93
- the simplex substance of spirit in the process of cultivation, VI.95
- self-consciousness's realization that knowing is directly evident substance, VI.270–72
- noetic substance, conception, and 'the I,' VIII.25–36

the supersensuous/supersensible world [*die übersinnliche Welt*]

- and the understanding, III.21–25
- as distinguished from religion, VII.2

sylogism [*der Schluß*] (< Grk *sylogismos*, a reckoning or gathering [ideas] together)

- and the understanding, III.22
- and the Unhappy Consciousness, IV.89–95
- in art religion, VII.85–87

tautology [*die Tautologie*]

- as the formalistic operative principle of probative reason, V.318–31

things (entities)/thinghood [*das Ding, die Dingheit*]

- as an also, an entity consisting of various properties, II.6
- as a one, a unitary entity excluding other things, II.7
- as both a one and an also, II.8
- as relating both to mastery and to servitude, IV.37–46
- things as the object of formative activity, IV.44
- reason finding itself as a living thing, V.44–46
- as self-related and indifferent to what necessitates its being as it is, V.47
- thinghood as spirit's (and the individual's) presence-to-self, V.186–93, 203
- the altered thinghood of actively solipsistic self-consciousness, V.210
- as distinguished from the essential nature of a concern, V.289
- and the I as contemplated in the three infinite conceptual judgments, VIII.6–24

thought/thinking [*das Denken*]

- and understanding, P.41
- as itself a form of being, P.74–78
- and Stoicism, IV.51–54
- action as a purpose conceived in thought and seen as self-containedly unitary, V.262
- in the culminating dual-reflection of cultivated/conflicted self-consciousness, VI.144
- the emergent thought-constituted realm of religion in flight from reality, VI.148–52

time [*die Zeit*]

- as a form of conceptual existence, P.61, VIII.28

truth [*die Wahrheit*]

- a processively developing integral whole consisting in substance and subject, P.20–25
- versus appearances and falsity, P.49–51
- philosophical versus conventional, historical, and mathematical truth, P.52–61
- as a bacchanalian revel (translated à la James Joyce), P.62
- as absolute, In.4
- consciousness's criterion of truth, In.5–22
- comprised in the integral whole of I or object, I.15–21
- perception's truth versus sense-certainty's, II.1

- perception's "commonsensical truth," II.24–28
- understanding's initial obliviousness to its role in conceiving, III.3
- self-conscious certainty as corresponding to its truth, IV.1–3
- processively emerging as successive modes of certainty are superseded, V.6–7
- ethical substance as the truth of rational self-consciousness, V.198–99
- as contradictory to the law of the heart as seen by the latter's experience, V.229–36
- action as its own immanent truth and reality, V.260
- ethical substance as a verity with no discrepancy between certainty and truth, V.305–6
- reason as spirit, its certainty of being all reality having been raised to truth, VI.1–2
- the self-contradictory truth of the vain, cultured, judgmental self, VI.145–47
- the truth of enlightenment, VI.225–40

understanding [*der Verstand*]

- as the negative power integral to thinking, P.41–42
- as met with in the formalistic tabular understanding, P.72
- perceptual understanding, II.23–27
- the unconditioned universal (i.e., unconditioned by sensuous experience), III.1–5
- re force and its dialectical interplay, III.6–28
- force as conceived in the understanding versus force in and relative to itself, III.15–20
- re appearance versus the supersensible, III.19–28
- re the law of force and universal attraction, III.28–40
- in grasping necessity and explaining its conceptual grasp, III.34–56
- the law of appearances versus the law of the inner; and the supersensible world, III.43–50
- in fancifully conceiving of an "inverted world," III.45–50
- and infinity, III.50–58
- functioning as does perception when apprehending the content of its laws, V.74–77

the Unhappy Consciousness [*das Unglückliche Bewußtsein*]

- the divided consciousness's struggle to bet beyond its nonessentialness, IV.63–72
- as relating to its idealized incarnate beyond as a form of pure consciousness, IV.73–77
- as an individual being relating to its incarnate beyond via desire and work, IV.78–83
- as conscious of being present in its incarnate beyond, IV.84–95
- its self-deceptive "syllogism" in making use of an intermediary, IV.88–92
- as compared to the mentality that would exist as a morally "beautiful soul," VI.374–75

unity [*die Einheit*]

- in self-consciousness's diversity and multiplicity, IV.22
- action viewed as seamlessly unitary, actual matter-of-fact reality, V.259–62

the universal/universals/universality (that which is all-pervasive, all-comprehensive, or public—including ‘the public at large’) [*das Allgemeine, die Allgemeinheit*]

- as simplex being that exists via negation: a non-this, I.8
- as the truth of sense-certainty, I.9
- as perception’s generic principle, II.1–2
- in entities mediated by their properties, being at once simple and complex, II.3–8
- the unconditioned universal (i.e., unconditioned by sensuous experience), III.1–5
- force as a universal which—by virtue of its inherent relatedness to something other than it—has difference integral to its very being, III.8
- universal variability, III.28–31
- universal attraction, III.31–33
- as relevant to the life-dynamic, IV.11–17
- formative activity as universally formative, unrestrictedly conceptual, IV.46
- universal will, IV.92–95
- as instantiated in a nonconscious universal individual (i.e., the Earth), V.99–104
- and the law of the heart, V.218–36
- and virtue versus the individualistic way of the world, V.235–58
- as seen in something common to all, namely having gifts and capabilities, V.259
- as formalistic in probative reason versus the categorical actual will of all, V.318–29
- the abstract netherworldly universal—an ‘*elementary individuum*’—from which divine law derives its power, VI.24
- the divine law of universality and human law of individuality as the reality that spirit establishes in the cultural realm via alienation, VI.87–93
- self and will that is universal (in that it encompasses itself and its object), VI.241–61
- as seen in conscience’s public/universal aspect versus its individual aspect, VI.345–69

utility [*die Nützlichkeit*]

- as viewed by enlightened pure insight and by faith, VI.207–10
- as consciousness’s conceptual principle, albeit as the predicate of an object rather than of a subject, VI.235–41

virtue [*der Tugend*] and the way of the world [*der Weltlauf*]

- its sacrifice of individuality versus the universal individualism of the world, V.235–43
- as it conceives of its struggle against the way of the world, V.244–49
- what’s of the essence to its “good in principle” versus the way of the world, V.250–58

the whole, integral whole, totality [*das Ganze*]

- truth as integral whole, P.23
- sense-certainty’s truth as the integral whole of I and object together, I.15
- spirit as embodied in the ethical life of a whole people, VI.7

will [*der Wille*]

- self and will that is universal (in that it encompasses itself and its object), VI.241–49

- negation as implicit in absolute freedom and its self-conforming general will, VI.250–65
- the self retaining its identity in the will common to all—in pure knowing and willing, VI.266–69

work/labor [*die Arbeit*]

- and servitude's formative activity, IV.42–46
- and the Unhappy Consciousness, IV.78–83

the world/world-spirit [*die Welt, der Weltgeist*]

- and the cultural development of the individual person, P.35–38
- the insular world of spirit embodied in the ethical life of a whole people, VI.7
- the world of ethical substantiality and ethical-minded consciousness, VI.7–77
- the world of culture emerging from the self-estranged world of legal right, VI.78–85
- the reality of self-conscious existence in the world of culture versus that of legal right, VI.86–95
- total freedom placing itself on the throne of the world, VI.246–47



G. W. F. HEGEL (1770–1831) is one of the most significant thinkers in the history of philosophy. He is the author of several influential works, including *The Science of Logic*.

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